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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

CLASS ACTIONS

Men have changed their views as to the relative importance of the individual and of society; but the common law has not. Indeed, the
common law knows individuals only. . . . It tries questions of the
highest social import as mere private controversies between John Doe
and Richard Roe. And this compels a narrow and one-sided view ....
ROSCOE POUND,
Do WE NEED A PHILOSOPHY OF LAW?,
5 COLUm. L. REV. 339, 346 (1905)
The appropriateaction for this Court is to affirm the district court and
put an end to this Frankensteinmonster posing as a class action.
LUMBARD, C.J. (DISSENTING),
EISEN V. CARLISLE & JACQUELIN,

391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968)
The Hindoos give the world an elephant to support it, but they make
the elephant stand upon a tortoise. Invention, it must be humbly admitted, does not consist in creating out of void, but out of chaos; the
materials must, in the first place, be afforded: it can give form to dark,
shapeless substances, but cannot bring into being the substance itself.
In all matters of discovery and invention, even of those that appertain
to the imagination,we are continually reminded of the story of Columbus
and his egg. Invention consists in the capacity of seizing on the
capabilities of a subject, and in the power of moulding and fashioning
ideas suggested to it.
MARY SHELLEY,

FRANKENSTEIN 8 (1831)

When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get hint out is only the first step. The next is either
to kill him, or to tame hint and make him a useful animal.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES,
THE PATH OF THE LAW,

io HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1966, the Supreme Court promulgated an amended rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, replacing a rule that
had remained unchanged since 1938. The 1938 rule, which
was understood to reflect Professor Moore's famous distinctions
among "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class suits,' proved to
be a source of confusion almost from its date of promulgation,2
and by i966 courts were having great difficulty applying the
concepts of joint and several rights the rule relied upon to define
cases appropriate for class treatment.3 Commentators ignored
the terms of the rule and sought justification for conclusive adjudication of absentee claims through class suit in other, more
pragmatic considerations.4 Although no unified, well-accepted
theory of the purpose and function of the class suit had emerged
by 1966, there was a consensus that the historic criteria defining
the propriety of class suit had no contemporary meaning and
that therefore the class action device needed to be rethought.
By 1966, three answers could be found in the commentary
to the question: Why have class suits? First, class suit was
'See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the
Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 55', 570-76 (,937).
By 1946, for example, the Columbia Law Review had concluded:
The federal courts have, in general, uncritically accepted Professor
Moore's terminology and the analysis of representative actions in terms of
jural relationships and joinder, to their own confusion and the frustration
of the purpose of representative actions.
Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 CoLum. L. REV.
8x8, 822 (x946) (emphasis added). This conclusion was based in part on the case
of Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, io8 F.2d 5i (3d Cir. 1939), remanded, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), on
remand, 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd on remand, Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941). See Note, supra at 823 n.24.
In Deckert, the district court allowed the suit to go forward as a "class bill," 27 F.
Supp. at 769, without specifying what type of class suit it was. The court of
appeals subsequently labelled it "spurious," io8 F.2d at 55. On remand, the
district court concluded that the suit was "hybrid," 39 F. Supp. at 595, and the
court of appeals affirmed, opining that "[n~ames are not important," 123 F.2d at
983.
' See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966).
Original rule 23 provided in relevant part:
[One or more persons may bring suit on behalf of a class] when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(x) joint or common ...
;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting
the several rights and a common relief is sought.
Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a) (193&), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 94-95 (1966).
4See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law- Multiparty Litigation, 71 HARV.
L. REv. 874, 936-39 (I958); Note, supra note 2, at 833-36.
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seen to be useful, perhaps necessary, in situations where an action, regardless of its individual form, would itself either affect
the interests of nonparties or alternatively create a potential for
conflicting obligations for one of the parties.' The second answer,
rather than justifying class suit in terms of fairness to absentees
or to the class opponent, asserted that class suits provide convenient and economical forums for disposing of similar lawsuits.'
The third answer, which has developed into the theory of the
consumer class suit, was that class suits provide a device for
aggregating substantially similar claims, thereby prorating the
cost of litigation among numerous litigants and making suit feasible where it would not be otherwise.7
The draftsmen of the 1966 rule, while acknowledging these
three functions in framing rule 23 (b)'s categories of class
suits,' did not fully explore the consequences of such functions

I This

position is well-stated by Louisell and Hazard:
The felt necessity for a class action is greatest when the courts are called
upon to order or sanction the alteration of the status quo in circumstances
such that a large number of persons are in a position to call on a single
person to alter the status quo, or to complain if it is altered and the possibility exists that [the] actor might be called upon to act in inconsistent
ways.
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 719 (1962).
6 See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS oF EQUITY 149 (1950) ; Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUSTALO L. REV. 433, 43738 (ig6o). Convenience in disposing of multiple litigations has been a central
justification of the class suit, see Z. CHArEE, supra at 280; however, such convenience was traditionally understood not from the x966 perspective of the legal
system as a whole, but from the perspective of an individual litigant against
whom, or in whose favor, a multiplicity of actions would otherwise have been
brought, see id. at 201.
7 The classic statement of this theory is in Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. Rav. 684 (t94). See also Weinstein, supra note 6, at 435.
8 Rule 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if . . . :
(i) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as
a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. ...
Sections (b)(x)(A) and (b)(i)(B) were intended to describe the first, or
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in defining class action procedure subsequent to a determination

that an action could go forward as a class suit. Instead, the
rulemakers framed their treatment of class procedure primarily
in terms of two problems that had emerged in the post-I938
period: due process and res judicata. 9 The result of the rulemakers' efforts is a hodgepodge of pragmatic and occasionally
conflicting objectives." On the one hand, in some class suits
courts are specifically instructed - on the basis of such extrinsic

considerations 11-

to afford class members notice and an op-

portunity to exclude themselves from the suit. 2

On the other

hand, in those class suits where self-exclusion would not be practically possible, the rulemakers left all such subsequent procedural decisions to the discretion of trial courts.' 3 Beyond al-

lowing some class members to opt out, in no case does the rule
offer the courts any guidance as to how to protect absentee interests. 4
Although one might suppose that the superabundance of
necessity theory. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. ioo-oi (1966). Section
(b) (2) also seems to represent a situation where the litigation would necessarily
have an impact on absentees: it would in fact conclude their opportunity to seek
relief. How this situation differs from section (b)(i)(B) is not clear. Section
(b) (3) was apparently intended to encapsulate both the second and third theories,
although only a passing reference is made to the third theory in the Advisory
Committee Note. See 39 F.R.D. at 1o4. Justice Kaplan, the Committee's Reporter, has also indicated that rule 23(b) (3) was intended to implement the consumer suit. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: r966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure I, 8i HAv. L. REV. 356, 397-98
(1967); Kaplan, Prefatory Note, The Class Action-A Symposium, io B.C. IND.
& Com. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
9See Advisory Comm. Note,. 39 F.R.D. 105-07 (1966). See also pp. 1394-1401
infra (res judicata) ; pp. 1402-16 infra (due process).
"See pp. 1341-42 infra.
" These included the Advisory Committee's concern for due process, see
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. o7 (1966), and its determination to allow individuals to control their own litigation in the rule 23(b) (3) situation, see id. at
105.

'2 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
laSee id. 23 (c) (4), 23 (d).

To some extent, the findings that must be made to certify a suit as a class
action protect absentee interests, since these findings should ensure at least a threshold level of correspondence between the substantive claims and interests of the
class representative and others in the class. But see pp. 1474-75 infra. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a), which establishes criteria for certification, provides: (i) that the class be
"so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable"; (2) that there be
"questions of law or fact common to the class"; (3) that "the claims or defenses"
of class representatives be "typical of the claims or defenses of the class"; and (4)
that the class representative be able "fairly and adequately [to] protect the interests of the class." In addition, if the class action is settled, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e) requires that the judge approve the terms of the settlement.
14
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literature "5 on the class suit that has appeared in the decade
since amended rule 23 was promulgated would have begun to
create an operational blueprint for class suits under rule 23, in
fact the commentary has been strikingly narrow. One topic has
received by far the most scrutiny: the risks, rewards, and practical possibilities of implementing class actions aggregating
claims otherwise too small to be litigated. This literature has
itself been preoccupied with two issues: '0 whether individual
claims can be aggregated to meet jurisdictional amount in controversy requirements, 17 and whether rule 23, or due process,
requires that individual notice- which might make class suit
financially impossible 11 - be given to class members. 19 The Supreme Court has now given definitive answers to these questions
- respectively, no, 20 and yes (but only as a matter of rule interpretation).21 Regardless of the wisdom of the Court's answers,
it seems clear that further consideration of these questions by
federal courts is foreclosed. Commentators have also been concerned with the ultimate question about consumer class suits 15

An indication of the flourishing of this literature can be obtained from

entries in the Index to Legal Periodicals. In the volume covering September, 1964
to August, 1967, there are a total of only 8 articles on class actions listed under
the topics of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the oneyear period ending in August, 1975, however, there are 8o articles dealing with
class actions, now gathered under a separate heading.
16 A third topic, fluid recovery, has also received considerable discussion, see
pp. 1516-36 infra and articles cited therein.
1" Of the 8o entries in the Index to Legal Periodicals for the period ending
August, 1975, see note 15 supra, over 2o are concerned with the jurisdictional
amount requirement.
18 See generally Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REV. 426, 433-41 (1973).
1" Over I5 of the 8o entries in the Index to Legal Periodicals for the period
ending August, 1975, see note 15 supra, are concerned with due process or notice.
21 See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (each member
of a class must fulfill any relevant jurisdictional amount requirement).
"' See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) ; Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 397 n4 (1975), discussed, p. X402, note 64 infra.
22 A number of states have adopted class action legislation designed at least in
part to implement the concept of the consumer class suit by reducing the costs of
notice to the class. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 1781 (West 1973) (publication
notice allowed); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 901-09 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76) (random sample notice; notice cost shifting to class opponent); WIs. STAT. ANN. §

426.xro (West 1974) (state pays costs of notice). At the federal level, there has been
some interest in modifying the Federal Trade Commission Act to include a consumer class action device. See Proposed Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation-Il, 4 CLASS AcTIO RE-P. 342 (1975). Of course, the issue of whether due
process requires individual notice must be considered in determining the wisdom

and permissibility of amending rule

23

to eliminate the categorical requirement of

individual notice established by Eisen. See pp. 1402-16, 1627 infra.
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hypothesized as aggregating large numbers of very small claims 23
whether they constitute an "engine of destruction" 24 and "a
form of legalized blackmail" 25 or, instead, "one of the most socially useful remedies in history." 26 This debate has been openly
partisan,2" and has now seemingly reached an impasse, which
can only be broken through empirical verification of the assumptions underlying the competing positions.2 8 Although inconclusive,
this debate has had the undesirable effect of etching in the minds
of legal commentators a paradigm of class litigation that is in
fact misrepresentative of the bulk of federal class actions.2 9
By far the largest group of class actions on federal court
dockets are civil rights cases,3" in which plaintiffs typically seek
injunctive relief whether or not they seek damages. Many of
the statutes involved in this type of litigation provide for an
award of attorneys' fees; 31 as a result, the economic feasibility
of litigation does not depend entirely upon proration of costs
-

21

See, e.g., Handler, The Shift From Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in

Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLJm. L.
REV. I, 6 (971).
4

Simon, Class Actions - Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375

(973).
2 Handler, supra note 23, at 9.
"6Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell
Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAw. 1259, 1259 (1970).
", See Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class
Actions and the Substance-ProcedureDilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 843 (1974).
2a See pp. 1354-59 infra.
"9See p. 1356 infra.
" Recent statistics for the number of class suits filed and pending by nature
of suit are as follows:
CLASS ACTIONS COMMENCED BY NATURE OF SUIT
First-Half
FY i973

Total Suits
Total Statutory
Actions

Antitrust
Total Civil Rights
Civil Rights

Prisoner Petitions
Securities Laws

Other

FY! 1974

FY 1975

First-Half
FY 1976

2654

1oo.o%

2717

I00.O%

1221

100.0o%

I886

ioo.o%

2269

85.5%
5.9%

2336

io69

87.5%

1707

90.5%

114

86.o%
4.2%

95

58.0%

6.3%
62.8%

1268

5.0%
67.2%

50.8%
12.0%

xo61
207

6.6%

122

157
1.539
1248

291
235

338

1592

47.0%
11.o%

58.6%

77
767

1294
298

47.6%

621

8.9%

305

11.2%

12.7%

325

12.0%

x.o%

146
SI

144

x1.8%

222

56.2%

ie.o%
6.5

11.8%

CLASS ACTIONS PENDING ON DECEMBER 31, 1975
Total
5791
xoo.o%
Antitrust
Total Civil Rights

Civil Rights
Prisoner Petitions
Securities Laws

450
3459
285

6o8
n.a.

7.8%
59.7%
49.2%

1o.5%

SOURCES: Fiscal Year 1973 and 1974, ADMIISTRATIVE OFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, 1974 ANN. REP. 259-6o; Fiscal Year 1975 and i976, ADmINsTRATIVE OFFsICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1976 SEMI-ANNUAL REP. 23, 24, 26.

" Statutes authorizing attorneys' fees are collected in Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1975).
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over a number of individual claims. Moreover, many of the remaining actions, chiefly brought under the antitrust and securities laws,32 involve claims of injury, which, unlike some consumer
actions, are of the sort for which the statutes have been traditionally thought to provide remedies,33 and are also apparently of
a magnitude which, if not absolutely large, is large enough to
matter to the class members.3"
32 See note 30 supra.

3' See, e.g., cases cited at p. 1363, note 158 infra. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's decision in Zahn, see note 20 supra, is irrelevant in many federal question
cases where the jurisdictional statute imposes no amount requirement.
" There is little available data concerning the size of individual claims ag-

gregated in damage class actions. Opinions which mention the size of claims offer
support only for the proposition that damage class actions aggregate a mix of
claims, ranging from the very small to the very large. See, e.g., Windham v.
American Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 64x, 659 (D.S.C. x975) (claims ranging from
not "sufficient to warrant an independent anti-trust suit of this type" to over
$120,000); Republic Nat'l Bank v. Denton & Anderson Co., 68 F.R.D. 208 (W.D.
Tex. 1975) (claims of $i8,87o and $293,760 included among claims of class
members); Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, So (M.D. Pa.
i974) (claims of named plaintiffs range from $io to $34,000); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (claims of named plaintiffs range from
$16o to $14,76o). A study undertaken by the Georgetown Law Journal for the
Senate Commerce Committee suggests that only a small percentage of the claims
aggregated in damage class actions may be nonviable, see p. 1356 inlra: of
twenty class actions selected from across the nation in which recoveries were
awarded, in ten all funds designated for class recovery were distributed to the class;
in six additional cases less than five percent of the class recovery was left unclaimed.
See Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J.
1123, 1163 (1974). Data as to the importance class members attach to injunctive
relief appears to be nonexistent.
Although information as to the size of individual claims is lacking, data concerning the size of classes is relatively abundant. To the extent that the economic
attractiveness to attorneys of classes aggregating very small claims is a direct
function of class size, class size provides an indirect indication of the prevalence
of very small claims in class actions. The American College of Trial Lawyers
Report assumed that the average damage class action brought in the Southern
District of New York aggregated about 300,000 claims. See AMERICAN COLLEGE
or TRIAL LAWYERS, SPECIAL Comm. ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 (1972). Even if claims were very
small, attorneys might find classes of this size attractive. For example, if each class
member had a claim of only two dollars, the recovery fund would be $600,000,
and if an attorney's fee were fixed at a flat percentage of 15 percent, but see
pp. i6i-iS, the fee would amount to $9oooo. The Georgetown study, however, found classes to be much smaller in the District of Columbia. "Of the
5o cases for which figures on class size were available, . . . only 14 percent had
classes over ioo,ooo members and 25 percent had classes under Io,ooo members."
Note, supra at 1134. Moreover, even though skewed in favor of large class
actions, see id. at 1128 n.36, the Georgetown study's national survey revealed that
"over 75 percent" of the cases examined bad smaller classes than the average
size of 300,000 suggested by the American College of Trial Lawyers, see id. at
x158. A survey of class action decisions reported in Federal Rules Decisions in
3974 and 1975, also dealing only with damage actions, suggests that classes may

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS -

CLASS ACTIONS

1327

Almost all contemporary class actions are predicated on a
statute or the Constitution. 5 As Professor Chayes has developed
in his Article, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,3 6
lawsuits based on such public laws inevitably affect the rights
and interests of individuals not actually represented before the
court. This is so regardless of whether a suit is formally brought
as a class action, and regardless of whether injunctive or monetary relief is sought. Where one party is a government official,
for example, the interpretation given to a public law will have
a tendency to shape that official's conduct not only toward his
present opponent, but, through the force of bureaucratic standardization, toward others as well. 37 Even where an official is
not involved, the presence of a regulatory statute is itself evidence that the activity regulated is one in which numerous people engage who can be expected to conform their behavior to
interpretations of the regulation that may emerge in single-party
litigation.38 Because of the impact of a suit on others, the interests of nonparties who may be affected by the injunctive decree
frequently sought in public law litigation may in turn affect the
form or availability of such equitable relief, even if such a decree
is a simple prohibitory injunction. 39 Moreover, complex structural relief is often the only appropriate remedy in public law
cases. Such relief is fashioned in its details largely through bargaining and negotiation. ° Representation of the various interests that will be affected by the decree at the bargaining table
therefore becomes a crucial safeguard for absentee rights. 4
Analysis of the structure of the contemporary docket of the
federal courts thus suggests that class actions will characteristicalbe even smaller than the Georgetown study indicates. Of the 144 class action
decisions examined, 72 provided information as to class size. As the table below
indicates, 56 of the 72 suits, or 77 percent, involved classes of zo,ooo or less.

SIZE oF CLASS
(in thousands)
Over

Under
No. of
Suits

i

38

i- 5

5-10

10-25

25-100

12

6

6

5

100-1,000

1,000

3

For a class of io,ooo to generate attorneys' fees of $90,000, on the basis delineated above, the average class member's claim would have to be $6o. A $60 claim,
although small, is far less likely to be treated as nonviable by the claimant
than a $2 claim.
35 See note 30 supra.
3 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
37 See id. at 1294.
38
3

See id.

See id. at
'0 See id. at
1

1292-93.
1298-302.

" See id. at 1300-01.
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ly raise questions which the 1966 rulemakers left to the discretion
of trial courts and which subsequent commentators have largely
ignored. Even in damage actions, claims severable in form may
not be severable in practice; the right to opt out therefore may not
be meaningful. Even so, the size of the claims may be sufficiently
large that fairness requires that courts be careful to accomodate
the interests of all class members. This Note will attempt to
work out a general approach to class actions recognizing the
public law character of such suits and the consequent need for
taking absentee interests into account in class procedures. 42 It
42 This Note will deal expressly only with plaintiff-class actions in the federal

courts. This limitation of the subject matter does not, however, limit the generality of the conclusions reached. The problems created by the need to represent
absentee interests are, with the important exception of due process, see pp. 1403-o8
infra, the same whether a class is conceived of as a plaintiff or a defendant. Indeed, the multiplicity of interests typically present in a plaintiff class in, for example, a Title VII suit seeking complex structural relief makes any bifurcation of
the litigants into "plaintiffs" and "defendants" a somewhat meaningless exercise.
The restriction of the discussion to federal cases is similarly not a major limitation
since state class action law has, to a large extent, emulated federal practice under
either original or amended rule 23. See Homburger, State Class Actions and the
Federal Ride, 71 CoLuir. L. Rav. 609, 612 (1971). In states that do not have
either version of rule 23, or a facsimile thereof, the typical class action rule is that
of the Field Code, which usually is drawn in community of interest terms, see
Homburger, supra at 612-25, and is anachronistic, see pp. 1343-48 infra. In Field
Code states, therefore, federal precedents may often be persuasive. See Hombuiger,
supra at 625. The uses to which class actions are put in the states is less clear than in
the federal system. Many recent state class action statutes are drawn specifically
with regulatory, often consumer protection, purposes in mind. See, e.g., statutes cited
note 22 supra. To the extent that state class actions are used for regulatory purposes, they will present issues substantially similar to those treated here. It
does seem clear, however, that some states use the class action in somewhat idiosyncratic ways, see, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 71.015 (Vernon Supp. 1976) (land
condemnation), and these uses may present unusual problems. For a specific treatment of defendant-class actions, see, e.g., 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2770 (1972); Parsons & Starr, Environmental Litigation and Defendant Class Actions: The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 EcoLooY
L.Q. 88i, 884-902 (975) ; Note, Federal Rides oj Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant
Class Action with a Public Official as the Named Representative, 9 VALPARAISO U.L.
REV. 357 (1975). For survey and analysis of state class action law, see, e.g., Homburger, supra; Note, State Class Action Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 6o
IowA L. REv. 93 (1974); Comment, The Progressive Transformation of Class
Actions in California, I2 SAN DIEGO L. REV. x86 (1974).
This Note, moreover, will not attempt to be a primer on current federal class
action law. To a large extent, federal cases will be discussed as illustrative of
specific problems that class procedure must take into account. Issues closely related
to rule 23 will, however, be discussed in the following sections: Section IV, Part B,
due process and notice; Section IV, Part C, timing of certification and structure
of pretrial; Section IV, Part D, management of discovery and statutes of limitations; Section V, Part A, common question and typicality requirements (FED. R. Cxv.
P. 23(a)(2), (a)(3)); Section V, Part B, adequacy of representation requirement
(FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4)), subclassing (FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)), opt-outs (FED.
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is postulated that the interests (and interrelationships of inter-

ests) of absentees are relevant because courts in deciding cases
are under an obligation derived from substantive law to con-

sider and reconcile those interests.4 3 This obligation can be seen
most clearly in contemporary equitable doctrine," but it is also
implicit in efforts by courts to discover-

through devices such

as the appointment of masters and the recognition of amici "the impact of their decisions on those not before the court. On
the other hand, substantive law itself may restrict the procedural mechanisms available for recognizing absentee rights."

The central problem of class action procedure therefore becomes
the design of a mechanism for registering absentee interests which

will not distort the law that makes those interests relevant.
IL

THREE THEORIEs OF THE CLASS ACTION

The authors of the 1966 revision of the federal class action
rule eschewed "obscure and uncertain" abstractions.' Rule 23's
typology of proper class actions emphasizes the practical: the
criteria of propriety are drafted to take into account "[t]he
difficulties which would be likely to arise if resort were had to
separate actions by or against the individual members of the
R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2)), and class definition (FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (3)); Section V,
Part C, predomination of common questions (FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (3)); Section
VI, supervision of settlements (FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (e)).
" It is now commonplace that administrative agencies, in implementing their
statutory mandates, must give adequate consideration to all affected interests. See,
e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. RFv.
x667, i756-6o (975). Such explicit recognition of the need for courts to recognize
the interests of all affected has seldom been made, although some such conception
must underly the expansion of intervention privileges under FED. R. CIV. P. 24 to
encompass those who have a practical interest in a pending suit, see, e.g., Cascade
Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135 (1967); Advisory
Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. IO9 (1966) ("If an absentee would be substantially affected
in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general
rule, be entitled to intervene . . ."), and even those whose injury is limited to
the stare decisis effect of a decision, see Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379
F.2d 818, 826-29 (5th Cir. 1967). The purpose of allowing persons with such injuries to intervene is presumably to consider their claims to affect the status quo,
which compete with the similar claims of the original litigants. See id.; Stewart,
supra at 1750 (administrative law context). Of course, it is possible as a matter of statutory construction that the interests of some persons who are practically
affected will be legally irrelevant and therefore they could be neither class members
nor intervenors.
4"See Chayes, supra note 36, at 1292-93.
"See id. at 1300-01.
" See, e.g., pp. 1361-66 infra.
1

Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966).
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class"; 2 the fact that the party's action which prompted injunctive or declaratory relief was itself directed "to the class as
a whole"; 3 and the "economies of time, effort, and expense," as
well as the "uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated," which a class action would achieve.4 Perhaps because of
their pragmatism, however, the rulemakers, although purporting
to fix "the measures which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of [class] actions," I in fact did not. Almost invariably
rule 23 prescribes discretion as the solution to the problems
raised by the class action's use of representative procedures to
settle the rights of nonparties. 6
The various issues which class actions raise cannot be fully
analyzed unless the connections among the issues are explored.
Some overarching conceptual framework is a necessary prerequisite to an understanding of these connections. This section of the Note will sketch three general theories of the class suit.
Two theories assimilate class actions to ordinary litigation. In
these, a unity of interest among class members, whether objectively
manifest in a community of interest or subjectively evidenced by
the consent of class members to suit on their behalf, transforms
the class into an artificial individual, no different, at least in form,
from parties to a conventional lawsuit. Neither of the unity theories, however, is ultimately satisfactory. A third theory is therefore discussed, which focuses on the relationship of class action
procedures to substantive law, and which provides the analytical
framework for much of the rest of this Note.
The development of each of the three theories will proceed
by elaborating specific conceptions of the social justification for
the use of class suits and of the fairness of representative procedures from the standpoint of class members. The concepts of
justification and fairness are obviously not easily separated; indeed, under each of the theories discussed here, justification and
fairness will prove to be essentially two sides of the same coin. It is
nonetheless helpful to distinguish the two concepts at least provisionally, if only to make clearer the terms of their merger under
each theory. The development of the theories will also be
loosely historical. The first of the theories, the community of
interest theory, is most closely associated with class action law of
the nineteenth century. The second theory, the consent theory, is
suggested by provisions of the 1938 and 1966 Federal Rules. The
2 Id. at
3

ioo; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (x) ; p. 132 2, note 8 supra.

Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 1o2 (I966); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2);
p. 1322, note 8 supra.
4
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 102-03 (i966); see FED. R. CiV. P. 23(b)
(3) ; P. 1322, note 8 supra.
'Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 99 (1966).
'See pp. 1322-23 supra.
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third theory, the substantive theory, grows out of problems raised
by post-1966 class action practice. The association of particular
theories with particular periods of time is not meant to be rigorous. Indeed, one reason for discussion of the community of interest theory, for example, is that its influence continues to be
visible in the works of class action commentators ' even though
the theory itself is anachronistic in the contemporary context.
Moreover, the three theories are in a sense ideal types. They are
suggested by features of class action practice of certain eras, but
they are ultimately simplifications of that practice. For this
reason, although historically developed, the three theories are
chiefly of analytical significance. 8

A. Unity Theories of Class Suit:
Community of Interest and Consent
Traditionally, class action doctrine has started from the proposition that a class, in Langdell's words, "must, for all the purposes of the suit, constitute a unit." ' At least since the middle of
the nineteenth century, however, neither courts nor commentators
have succeeded in formulating a test of the unity of a class capable of winning general approval. Rival schools of thought can be
identified, adherents either of the view that all members of the
class must share "one right," '0 or of the theory that a sufficient
unity of interest may exist if all class members have "one and the
same case to establish." 11 This Part begins by sketching the
"one right" or community of interest theory in its early nineteenth century version and then the more modern consent theory
of justification and fairness, which is associated with the "one
case)) or common question definition of a class. The polar views
thus outlined, discussion turns first to the changes in styles of
'See, e.g., Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313,
315 (1973); Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requireinents in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1217, 1225-26
(1975); Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87
HARV. L. REv. 426, 434 (1973).

' Thus, for example, although the opt-out mechanism set up in the 1966 re23, see FED. R. CiV. P. 23(c) (2), is highly suggestive of the consent
theory of class suit, see pp. 1337-43" infra, the Advisory Committee Note indicates
that the rulemakers saw the common question class suits in which opting out was
permitted to be justified at least in part by the increased access to courts such suits
would make possible, see 39 F.R.D. at io4, a justification characteristic of the
substantive theory, see pp. 1359-66 infra. See also Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: z966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1),
81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397-98 (1967) ; note 39 infra.
' Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (VII): Creditors' Bills, 5
HARv. L. REV. xoi, 1o9 (i8gi).
'0 Id.at 128.

vision of rule

11

Id.
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legal reasoning which help to account for the decline of the community of interest theory, and second, to the limited capacity of
the consent theory to account for the uses to which class actions
have been put since 1966.
i. The Community of Interest Theory. - Calvert, in his
Partiesto Suits in Equity, first published in 1837,12 described the

English case law of his time as establishing a "community of interest" "aas the fundamental prerequisite for class suit. "[T]his
form of suit cannot be adopted," he wrote, unless all the persons,
on whose behalf the bill is filed, have "one common interest in all
the objects of the suit." '4 Early nineteenth century decisions
suggest that the underlying test of community of interest was one
of indivisibility of interest: whether individuals asserted to be
members of a class would, if they sued separately, each assert the
same interest in whatever property or other entitlement was at
issue. 5 Characteristically, conclusions as to the existence or non12

F.

CALVERT, PARTIES

TO SUITS

IN EQUITY

(1837).

Citations hereinafter,

however, are to the second edition. F. CALVERT, PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQUITY (2d
ed. 1847).
'3 Id. at 38. Professor Chafee, in his analysis of early nineteenth century class
action law, concluded that the chief problems class actions raised at that time had
to do with reconciling class suits and joinder requirements. See Z. CHAFEE, SOMvE
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 203-04, 210 (1950). Calvert's treatise, however, suggests that
the tension between joinder requirements and representative actions may not in
fact have been a matter of significant concern. Calvert devoted only two somewhat perfunctory pages to discussion of the requirement that classes be too numerous for joinder to be practicable, F. CALVERT, supra note 12, at 42-43, but took
nine pages to analyze the community of interest requirement, id. at 34-42. See also

note

21

infra.

14 F. CALVERT, supra note 12, at 42.
15 Two cases Calvert treated as central in his treatise are illustrative. Jones v.

Garcia del Rio, 37 Eng. Rep. 1113 (Ch. 1823), discussed in F. CALVERT, supra note
12, at 34-35, 4X-42, concerned a suit brought by three persons seeking recission on
behalf of all holders of shares of a loan which was alleged to have been fraudulently secured by ostensible agents of the Peruvian government. See 37 Eng. Rep.
at '113-14. The fraud was said to lie in the fact that, while the agents claimed to be
acting on behalf of the government of Peru, no government of Peru existed, at
least as a matter of English law, since Peru had not yet been recognized by the
English government as free of Spanish dominion. See id. Defendants, on a motion
to dissolve a temporary injunction blocking execution of the loan, argued that the
suit could not be brought as a class suit since the plaintiffs were not authorized
to sue by the other members of the class and since many if not most of the shareholders were content with the loan and were either ignorant of the suit or disapproved of it. Id. at 1114. Lord Eldon, agreeing that the suit could not go forward
as a class action, dissolved the injunction. Id. at 1115. He began by doubting the
possibility of a class suit "[w]here some parties are not dissatisfied, and are disposed to abide by the contract," since "[ihe cases where one party files a bill on
behalf of himself and others are cases where the others have a choice between
that and nothing ....
" Id. at 1114. His conclusion, however, ultimately rested
more on the theoretical possibility of class member dissent than on its existence
in fact. The plaintiffs could not "file one bill' because, "if they had any demand

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS- CLASS ACTIONS

1333

existence of communities of interest were framed in terms of the
distinction between joint and several rights. 16
Under the community of interest theory a class was a distinct
entity. Its existence derived not from the discretion of a court,
nor the option of class members, but from the nature of the right
held by putative class members." The fact that a suit took a class
at all," they "had each a demand at law, and each a several demand in equity
...."Id. at IIIS. See also Weale v. West-Middlesex Waterworks, 37 Eng. Rep.
412, 416-z7 (Ch. 1820).
Bromley v. Smith, 57 Eng. Rep. 482 (Ch. 1826), discussed in F. CALVERT,
supra at 37-38, like Jones v. Garcia del Rio, involved an attempt to bring a class
suit in the face of disagreement within the. class. Nine parishioners of a borough
brought an action on behalf of all other parishioners against borough officials who
had allegedly allocated funds inconsistently with their responsibilities under an
Enclosure Act. See 57 Eng. Rep. at 482. The defendants argued that the asserted
misappropriation had been ratified by a majority of the parishioners, and thus
that a suit challenging the appropriation could not be brought on behalf of the
parishioners. See id. at 482-83. The interests of the parishioners in the enclosed
land, however, were interests in common. Prior to enclosure, the rights had been
in common, see id. at 482, and the Enclosure Act, although altering the content
of those rights, evidently did not transform their nature. See also note i6 infra.
Sir John Leach, Vice-Chancellor, held that, given the common right, the class suit
was proper. "Where a matter is necessarily injurious to the common right, the
majority of the persons interested can neither excise the wrong, nor deprive all
other parties of their remedy by suit." 57 Eng. Rep. at 483. The right did not
run to the class members as an aggregate, but to the class as a whole, and thus the
views of class members, a majority or otherwise, were irrelevant.
"0Where the entitlement claimed was statutory, courts tended to focus less
on the nature of the entitlement and more on the fact of the indivisibly common
benefit which would result from the suit. See, e.g., Gray v. Chaplin, 57 Eng. Rep.
348, 350 (Ch. .825) ("In order to enable a Plaintiff to sue on behalf of himself
and all others who stand in the same relation with him to the subject of the suit,
it must appear that the relief sought by him is in its nature beneficial to all those
whom he undertakes to represent.") (emphasis added); Attorney-General v. Heelis,
57 Eng. Rep. 270, 274 (Ch. 1824).
The community of interest theory could not account for all early nineteenth
century suits taking a class form. In particular, creditor's bills, actions in which
one creditor asserted the rights of all creditors, even though the rights of the
creditors were distinct, did not fit the theory. Calvert at one point explained
creditor's bills as cases where a "[c]ourt assumes that a legatee or creditor praying
an account against an executor on behalf of himself and of all other legatees or
creditors seeks a relief beneficial to them all," F. CALVERT, supra note 12, at 36
(emphasis added), but ultimately concluded that these suits simply could not be
accounted for under the community of interest theory: "The simple explanation
seems to be, that there is an inconsistency in principle . . . " Id. at 54. Defendant
class suits were also troublesome for the community of interest theory. See note
21

infra.

11 In Leigh v. Thomas, 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch. 1751), for example, Sir John
Strange sustained a demurrer against a suit brought on behalf of 64 members of
a ship's crew on the ground that the suit should have been brought on behalf of
all go members of the crew. And in Baldwin v. Lawrence, 57 Eng. Rep. 251, 2545g (Ch. 1824), three members of a trading company were not permitted to sue
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form, rather than reflecting a choice requiring justification, followed from the structure of the legal relationships figuring in the
case. Similarly, once a community of interest was established,
the fairness of litigation to absentees was largely not a matter of
concern.' 8 Class litigation affected class interests, not individual
interests. With respect to class interests, class members were
"homogeneous"; 1'all stood "in the same situation." 20 The fact

that the common interest was asserted by one class member rather
than another was beside the point. 2'
The independent reality of the class under the community of
interest theory seems to link class suits with such feudal institutions as the joint tenancy, which also treated individuals "as
though they together constituted one person, a fictitious unity." 2
alone on the ground that the action could not be brought on behalf of fewer than
the whole
class.
"8 See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 13, at 203.
0

" Newton v. Earl of Egmont, 58 Eng. Rep. 286, 289 (Ch. 1832).

20 Small v. Attwood, 159 Eng. Rep. 1051, X072 (Ex. x832).
21 Calvert's discussion of class suits considered the problem

of fairness to

absentees only in the context of defendant class suits. See F. CALVERT, supra note
12, at 45-46. Despite contrary language in some cases, e.g., Bouverie v. Prentice,
28 Eng. Rep. X082, 1083 (Ch. X783), Calvert treated Mayor of York v. Pilkington,
26 Eng. Rep. i8o, i8i (Ch. 1737), as establishing that a defendant class need not
be united by a single community of interest. See F. CALVERT, supra. But see Z.
CHAFEE, supra note 13, at 165 & n.34 (Pilkington not a class suit). Calvert's
analysis of defendant classes nonetheless reflected community of interest thinking.
He argued that the interests of absentees would be adequately protected if, among
the class members present in court, there were holders of each of the several
rights shared by class members. See F. CALVERT, supra at 46. On this view, a
defendant class consisted of a complex of communities of interest, to be protected
through subclassing; if the rights of defendant class members were entirely distinct,
class suit could not go forward, see Dilly v. Doig, 30 Eng. Rep. 738 (Ch. 1794);
F. CALVERT, supra at 46-47. Calvert concluded that, as a rule of thumb, "[a] fair
test" of whether an individual could be sued as representative of a defendant class
was "[wihether, were he contending for the same right in the position of a plaintiff, he could file his bill on behalf of others as well as of himself." Id. at 47.
The interchangeability of class members, given a community of interest, not
only explains the apparent lack of concern for fairness to absentees in the early
nineteenth century cases, but also suggests why, contra Professor Chafee, joinder
was considered relatively unimportant, see note 13 supra. Given a community of
interest, the class, not the class member, became the legally relevant actor. Individual class members, therefore, had no interest in the litigation that would trigger
a joinder requirement.
22 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.I, at 3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Because
the interests of joint tenants were "one and the same," the "entire tenancy upon
the decease of any of them remains to the survivors, and at length to the last
survivor . . . ." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *183. A similar principle of
survivorship operated under the community of interest theory of class actions.
If an individual bringing suit on behalf of a class died, the action did not abate;
instead, another class member could step forward and continue the suit. See Boddy
v. Kent, 35 Eng. Rep. 707, 708 (Ch. i816); Leigh v. Thomas, 28 Eng. Rep. 201,
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Class actions in early nineteenth century England, however, were
not simply historical artifacts; the joint rights enforced in such
suits were commonly the rights of members of the unincorporated associations then ubiquitous in English society as a result
of the restrictions placed on the use of the corporate form by the
South Sea Bubble Act.23 The early nineteenth century class action, as it emerged in England, appears to be best viewed as a
transitional form - an attempt to extend a medieval legal concep(Ch. 1751); F. CALVERT, supra note 12, at 34. See also pp. 1464-66 infra
(mootness).
Class actions appear to have had their origins in feudal society, antedating courts
of equity. See Marcin, Searching for the Origin oj the Class Action, 23 CATH. U.L.
Rv. 515 (1974). In Cockbum v. Thompson, 33 Eng. Rep. IoO5 (Ch. i8og), Lord
Eldon referred to a number of cases having a distinctly medieval character in
responding to defendants' challenge to the legitimacy of class suits generally:
There are various other cases: a Bill by the lord of a manor against some of
the tenants, or, vice versa, by tenants on behalf of themselves and the others,
to establish some right; as a Bill with regard to suit to a mill . . . ; a Bill
against parishioners for tithes; or by some parishioners to establish a
Modus.
Id. at ioo8.
2
See generally Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HaRv. L. REv. 1369, 1370-7, (I956). Lord Eldon made clear the contemporary significance of the class suit in his opinion in Cockburn v. Thompson, 33
Eng. Rep. IoO5 (Ch. I8O9):
I shall give the Judgment with great consideration in this cause; which is
of high importance; going in effect, as it is argued for the Defendant, to
this; that with regard to all those Institutions, known to subsist in this great
metropolis in the nature of partnership, all Assurance Companies, for instance, if they have not a corporate character, no law can be administered in
any Court of Justice among the members of such Societies. Another extremely important effect, if this demurrer can be maintained, will be, that
with regard to a great number of charitable institutions, . . . no law or
equity can be administered among the members ....
Id. at xoo6. Calvert also treated class suits as a contemporary phenomenon, noting
that "[t]his part of the subject is immediately connected with Joint Stock Companies," F. CALvERT, supra note 12, at 30, and discussing at some length the connection between developments in class action doctrine and the abuses of associational forms which surfaced around 1825, see id. at 40-41 n.(x). In his discussion
of plaintiff classes, Calvert cited 13 cases decided prior to the nineteenth century,
and 34 cases decided between 1802 and 1843. See id. at 30-44. Of the 34, 14 were
suits by partnerships, joint stock companies, or other entrepreneurial associations.
Wallworth v. Holt, 41 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ch. 1841); Bainbridge v. Burton, 48 Eng.
Rep. X290 (Ch. x840); Preston v. Grand Collier Dock Co., 59 Eng. Rep. goo (Ch.
1840); Taylor v. Salmon, 41 Eng. Rep. 53 (Ch. 1838); Evans v. Stokes, 48 Eng.
Rep. 215 (Ch. 2836); Mare v. Malachy, 40 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ch. 1836); Small v.
Attwood, 159 Eng. Rep. io5i (Ex. 1832); Blain v. Agar, 57 Eng. Rep. 797 (Ch.
x828), 57 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch. 1826); Hichens v. Congreve, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.
1828); Van Sandau v. Moore, 38 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ch. 1826); Gray v. Chaplin, 57
Eng. Rep. 348 (Ch. X825); Baldwin v. Lawrence, 57 Eng. Rep. 251 (Ch. 1824);
Meux v. Maltby, 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (Ch. 1818); Adair v. New River Co., 32 Eng.
Rep. 1153 (Ch. 18o5). Five suits involved insurance associations. Long v. Yonge,
57 Eng. Rep. 827 (Ch. i83o); Ellison v. Bignold, 37 Eng. Rep. 720 (Ch. 1821);
Reeve v. Parkins, 37 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ch. 1820); Cockburn v. Thompson, 33 Eng.
Rep. oo5 (Ch. 18o9); Pearce v. Piper, 34 Eng. Rep. i (Ch. 18o9).
201
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tion in order
to give legal structure to contemporary social insti24
tutions.

In the United States, Story, unlike Calvert, attempted to
analyze class suits outside the framework of the community of
interest theory. His Commentaries on Equity Pleadings25 assert
at the outset of the discussion of class litigation that a representative action may be brought "where the parties are very numerous,
and although they have, or may have, separate and distinct interests .
,, 20 Near the close of the discussion, the Commentaries urge equity courts to give up "too strict an adherence to
forms and rules established under very different circumstances," 27
and to allow class suits on behalf of separate and distinct claims
not meeting the community of interest test "even to the extent of
binding unrepresented interests, after due notice to the parties to
appear and represent them . . 2 8 In the main body of his
analysis, however, Story was careful to point out that the practice
of courts at that time was indeed to require "a common interest,
or a common right, which the Bill seeks to establish and enforce,
or a general claim or privilege, which it seeks to establish, or to
narrow, or take away." 29 The prevailing view, he noted, was that
"all the parties stand, or are supposed to stand, in the same
situation ....
'0
Despite Story's contrary urgings, by the time of the Civil War,
class action law in the United States was shaped largely by the
community of interest theory. The Supreme Court's class action
decisions of that era all took as their doctrinal framework the
community of interest theory.3 Indeed, in Smith v. Sworm24 See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 13, at 211-13.
25 J. STORY, COmmENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS (3d ed. 1844).
26
Id. § 97, at x 9. Story held three types of class suits to be proper. In addition

to suits on behalf of numerous individuals with separate and distinct rights, appropriate class suits included, in his view, suits "where the question is one of a common
or general interest, and one or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole," as
well as suits "where the parties form a voluntary association for public or private
purposes, and those, who sue, or defend, may fairly be presumed to represent the
rights and interests of the whole . . . . " Id. at i18-19. See also West v. Randall,
29 Fed. Cas. 718, 722 (No. 27,424) (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (Story, J.) (dictum) (similar
categorization). The latter two categories of class suits, of course, were also proper
under the community of interest theory.
27 J. STORY, supra note 25, § i35a, at i7O.
28
1Id. § 135, at 267.
21 Id. § 12o, at 146.
30 1d. § 126, at 15X-52. From Story's account, the independent reality of the
class under the community of interest theory is clear: "But, if the Bill is filed by
the plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves only, and not on behalf of all the other persons in interest, the Bill would be unmaintainable, and be held bad on demurrer."
Id. at 152. See also note 17 supra.
"1See Ayres v. Carver, S8 U.S. (17 How.) 591, 594 (2855) (dictum); Smith v.
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stedt,3 2 the Court expressly rejected Story's suggestion that a class
suit could be brought on behalf of individuals with distinct and
several rights; 3 a proper class suit, Justice Nelson's opinion concluded, required "a common interest or a common right .

.

. ," "

Reported state court decisions also suggest the influence of the
community of interest theory.35 The close connection between
class suits and the law of unincorporated associations characteristic of the English case law carried over in the American litigation.
The two cases in which the Supreme Court held class suits to be
proper, Beatty v. Kurtz " and Smith v. Swormstedt3 7 both concerned litigation involving religious associations. Suits by or
against shareholders in economic. enterprises were prominent
among the state cases. 38
The Consent Theory. -A second theory of class suit
2.
exists which is in many ways the antithesis of the community of
interest theory. This theory takes as its starting point the indi288, 302-03 (x854); Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S.
Pet.) 566, 584 (1829). Justice Story authored the Supreme Court's opinion in
Beatty. There, representatives of an unincorporated Lutheran church sought to
quiet title to church property. The defendants challenged the authority of the
plaintiffs to sue on behalf of the church members. Justice Story found it unnecessary to inquire into the authority of the plaintiffs as a matter of church government
since the suit could properly be regarded as a class action:
...we think it one of those cases, in which certain persons, belonging to a
voluntary society, and having a common interest, may sue in behalf of themselves and others having the like interest, as part of the same society; for
purposes common to all, and beneficial to all.
Id.
32 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1854).
13 See id. at 302.
24 Id. justice Nelson's opinion for the Supreme Court found the requisite common interest in Smith, a suit by ministers of the southern branch of the Methodist
Church brought against ministers of the northern branch to recover a share of a
pension fund. In Ayres v. Carver, 58 U.S. (17 How.) g91 (I855), however, the
Court suggested in dictum that the requisite common interest might be lacking
where an individual brought suit against representatives of a class of landholders
to establish title to land. Justice Nelson's majority opinion observed "that it is
difficult to see any interest or estate in common among these several defendants,
that would authorize the rights of the absent parties to be represented in the litiga-

Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
(2

tion .

. . ."

Id. at 594. As a result, he indicated, "without anything in common,"

the class suit could not "have the effect to make a decree against one binding upon
the others, or even require them to join in the defense." Id.
3 See, e.g., Louisville & 0. Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Ballard, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 165, 171
(I859); New-London Bank v. Lee, ii Conn. 112, 120 (1835); Robinson v. Smith,
3 Paige 222, 230-31 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) ; Bouton v. Brooklyn, I5 Barb. 375, 392 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1853).
36 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566 (1829), discussed in note 31 supra.
3757 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1854), discussed in note 34 supra.
8
See, e.g., Louisville & 0. Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Ballard, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) i65
(x859) (shareholders defendant class); Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 222 (N.Y. Ch.
1832) (shareholders plaintiff class).
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viduality of class member interests. In contrast with the community of interest theory, the class member, not the class, is the

fundamental unit. The existence of a class is not a corollary of the
character of the substantive right at issue in a case, but a matter
of fact contingent upon the consent of class members.
The consent theory was not as much'an element of the con-

scious class action jurisprudence of its time as was the community
of interest theory. It received the imprimatur of neither the 1938
nor 1966 federal rulemakers." Nonetheless, a number of commentators have acknowledged that the consent of class members
may provide a source of legitimacy for the class suit.4 0 Moreover, the Supreme Court's holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueli n " - that individualized notice must be given class members in
class actions brought under federal rule 2 3 (b) (3)42 - seems most

defensible if it is assumed that to be proper such class actions
must be grounded in the consent of individual class members.4"
The best evidence of the "reality" of the consent theory is to be
found in the mechanics of the 1938 and 1966 federal class action
rules.

Rule 23, as originally adopted in 1938, made provision for
class suits similar to the traditional community of interest actions.
Under section (a) of the rule, class suits were authorized "when
the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the
class is . . .joint or common . . . ." 1 But the 1938 rule also
permitted class suits "where the character of the right . . . is

. . .several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought." 41 Thus,
" The 1938 rulemakers evidently took for granted the consent mechanism used
in "spurious" class suits; the focus of attention was upon use of the "spurious"
suit as a permissive joinder device. See p. 1339 infra. Although there is some
evidence that the I966 rulemakers saw the opt-out mechanism for (b) (3) classes
as a consent mechanism, see Kaplan, supra note 8, at 392, the chief focus of the
Advisory Committee Note was upon the economy and uniformity advantages of
the (b) (3) suit, see Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 102-03 (1966), with some
attention also given to the increased access to courts the (b) (3)suit would make
possible, see note 8 supra.
4
See, e.g., McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L.
R!v. 707, 716, 717 (1976) ; Comment, supra note 7, at 1236-37. See also Maraist &
Sharp, Federal Procedure'sTroubled Marriage: Due Process and the Class Action,
49 TEx. L. REv. x, 4, 19-20 (1970) (inference of consent to class suit from prior
voluntary actions).
41 417 U.S. 1t56 (1974).
4
2Id.at 177.
3

Notice, although an obvious prerequisite to consent, is required neither by
due process, see pp. 1402-16 infra, nor by the substantive theory of class suit,
see 4pp. 1439-48 infra.
'Fed. R. CiV. P. 23(a) (1938), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 95 (x966).
45

Id.
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while making use of the community of interest theory's distinction
between joint and several rights, the 1938 federal class action
rule allowed class suits even in the absence of a community of
interest.
Professor Moore, chief architect of the 1938 class action rule,
foresaw only a limited role for common question class suits. In
his view, these suits were "spurious" class actions.46 A judgment
rendered in a common question class action bound only parties
and privies, not absentees.4 7 The usefulness of the "spurious"
suit derived chiefly from the interaction of the relaxed permissive
joinder standard applied to judge the propriety of motions to
intervene made by class members 4" and the intricacies of the
law of federal jurisdiction. Intervening class members, Moore
argued, could be regarded as ancillary parties, and thus exempt
from diversity-of-citizenship and amount-in-controversy requirements.4 9 The "spurious" class suit, therefore, provided federal
courts with a ready mechanism for overcoming jurisdictional
hurdles to bringing all parties to complex litigation into court.5
Within three years of the adoption of the 1938 rule, however,
a second, more ambitious, use for the common question class suit
became apparent. In The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 1 Kalven and Rosenfield argued that the common question
class suit could be employed to deliver relief to masses of individuals injured by corporate wrongdoing but unable to assume the
costs of individual litigation.5 2 Following trials favorable to class
claims, they suggested, courts could order notice to be sent to
4 Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the

PreliminaryDraft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 574 (1937).
47
Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions - Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment,
32 ILL. L. RFv. 555, 561 (1938); see Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S.
38, 58 (I9O8).
4
Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 318 (I937). Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3) (1938), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 95 (1966), with Fed.
R. Civ. P. 20(a) (1938) (permissive joinder of parties), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 94
(1966).
4
Moore, supra note 46, at 575. At the time Moore was writing, the proposition that only the original parties to a class suit need meet the diversity requirement
was already well established. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356, 365-66 (X921). The Supreme Court has not subsequently questioned the
proposition. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (z969). Moore's theory that
intervening class members might be regarded as ancillary parties for purposes of
jurisdictional amount requirements, however, did not similarly derive from prior
case law and has subsequently been rejected by the Supreme Court, albeit in the
different context created by revised rule 23. See Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (973).
50 See Moore, supra note 46, at 575.
5 8 U. CH . L. REv. 684 (194I).
52 Id. at 684-86, 691.
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absent class members inviting them to intervene in advance of
entry of judgment, at the cost of only a pro rata share in the expense of the litigation, to obtain judgment on their own claims. 8
This technique of "one-way intervention," although in fact rarely
used by the courts,"4 came to be associated with the "spurious"
class suit. Until the revision of rule 23 in ;966, debate over the
propriety of common question class suits focused not so much on
the advantages of "spurious" suits for "cleaning up a litigious
situation" '5as on the fairness of one-way intervention as a means
of making common question class actions for damages practical."0
The one-way intervention technique transformed litigation
taking a traditional bi-polar form into class litigation by means
of a consent mechanism. Individuals became class members only
if they affirmatively chose to become class members by intervening to participate in the judgment.57 Because consent was not
invited until after trial, individuals could decide whether to become class members in a state of close to perfect information.
An individual need not estimate the likelihood of adequate representation in the class suit but only judge whether a trial result
was favorable enough to justify foregoing a separate suit.58 Postponing intervention, however, while it simplified the issue of
adequacy of representation for potential class members, increased
the burden of the litigative process for class opponents. Class opponents were liable to all individuals who chose to intervene as
class members in the event of a trial favorable to the class, but
all individuals, except for the class representative, could retain
their right to sue class opponents if trial were unfavorable to the
class.
Rule 23 was revised in 1966, in part in order to correct the
3

5 Id. at 692-94.

5

See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587-90 (ioth Cir.
cert. denied, 371 U.S. Soi (1963) ; State Wholesale Grocers v. Great A. & P.
Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510, 512-x4 (N.D. Ill. x959); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
ioo F. Supp. 461, 463 (D. Del. 1951). A number of courts, however, endorsed
one-way intervention in dictum. See, e.g., York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d
503, 529 (2d Cir. x944) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945);
Hormel v. United States, z7 F.R.D. 303, 305 (S.D.N.Y. x955) (dictum); Alabama
Ind. Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petrol. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386, 390 (N.D. Ala.
x939) (dictum); cf. Tolliver v. Cudahy Packing Co., 39 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D.
Tenn. 1941) (dictum) (FLSA suit).
5
Moore, supra note 46, at 575.
56
See, e.g., Z. CrAFEE, supra note 13, at 277-80; Developments in the Law1961),

Multiparty Litigation, 71 EHagv. L. REv. 874, 935-36 (1958).
5 See Comment, supra note 7, at 1236-37.
"8 In addition to estimating the' likelihood of a separate suit yielding more
favorable relief, an individual might also have to take into account the possibility
that a class judgment would be overturned on appeal.

'
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asymmetry produced by one-way intervention.5 9 The requirement of class member consent, however, persisted as the defining
characteristic of common question damage class actions. 60 The
revised rule provided that a judgment order in an action maintained as a common question class action should include all members of the class whether or not the judgment was favorable to
the class.6 Individuals were to be considered members of a
class if, after notice of their potential membership in the class,
they had not requested exclusion from the class within a designated period of time.6 2 Individuals who did not exclude themselves from a class could, if they wished, enter an appearance in
63
a suit through counsel.
The Advisory Committee Note on the 1966 revision of rule 23
suggests that the rulemakers also saw the common question class

action at least in part as a means of rationalizing party practice.

4

A single trial of an issue common to many claims would eliminate
the need for repeated marshallings of the same proof in multiple
trials, and would thus increase the overall efficiency of the trial
system. Moreover, especially if separate trials would have been
before separate juries, consolidation of issues through class suit
" See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 1o5-o6 (1966).
"o Common question suits for injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief may
be brought under section (b) (2) of the 1966 rule, and do not involve use of a
consent mechanism. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (2), (c) (3).
61

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).

12 Id. 23(c) (2), (c) (3). At least by the time the revised rule was adopted,
notice was thought to be best given early in the litigative process "if class members are to have a meaningful opportunity to request exclusion, appear in the
action, object to representation, etc.," Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations
Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 40-41 (1967).
03 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c) (2). At least on one view, the right to enter an appearance is not in form a full-fledged right to intervene; rather, entering an appearance triggers only the limited right to receive copies of papers and to be fully informed of the progress of the litigation. See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 392 n.137. In
practice, however, the distinction between an appearance and intervention is
limited, given the power of courts under rule 23(d) (3) to condition intervention,
see 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1799, at 257,
(1972), as well as the judiciary's discretionary power under section (d) (5) to
expand participation rights to intervenor status, see 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE f" 23.90[2], at 23-1622 to 23-1623 (I974).
64

Subdivision (b) (3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 102-03 (1966). See also notes 8 & 39 supra.
The Advisory Committee sounded a similar theme in justifying its revisions of
rule i9, dealing with compulsory joinder. See 39 F.R.D. at 89, 91. See also Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: r966 Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (11), 81 HARv. L. REv. 591, 597 (1968).
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would afford the significant advantage of preventing nonuniform
disposition of identical claims. These justifications are institutional: desiderata from the perspective of the judicial system as a
whole. But because common question class actions may not be
brought under rule 23 unless class members consent, such institutional interests are in practice subordinated to individual
interests." Whether a class suit is brought does not ultimately
turn on whether the suit will contribute to trial efficiency and uniformity; rather, the determinative test is whether, for individual
class members, the benefits class suit promises warrant the risk of
surrendering control of litigation. The chief attractions of the
class suit from the individual litigant's perspective are the opportunities aggregation of claims makes possible for shaving costs
and for increasing bargaining power. It may be that individual
and institutional interests coincide; wherever trial economy and
uniformity could be realized, savings from cost sharing and increases in bargaining power may be sufficiently substantial to
persuade individuals to consent to class suit. Such harmony,
however, is gratuitous insofar as the workings of the consent
mechanism are concerned. If class suit is conditioned upon the
consent of class members, the ultimate decisionmakers as to
whether class suit is justified become not the rulemakers or the
courts but individual class members.
Given a consent requirement, the fairness of class suit is
not an institutional concern. A representative suit is brought only
on behalf of individuals who have elected to waive the right to
bring their own suit. Nonconsenting individuals remain free to
litigate their own claim through separate suits if they opt out. 0
Such a waiver theory of fairness, like the justification for class
actions the consent requirement suggests, is radically individualistic. There is no attempt to fix general criteria as to when representation is sufficiently adequate. Rather, it is up to each potential
class member to decide whether his interests and the interests of
the class representative are in harmony.
The consent theory of class suit thus reverses the approach of
the community of interest theory. The class is not a distinct
entity, but an aggregate of individuals. The views of individual
class members, instead of being beside the point, are decisive.
The structure of litigation is determined not by the nature of the
cause of action, but by the breadth of the common transaction or
" While a court could screen out plainly uneconomical suits, see pp. i5o4-6 infra
(predomination), given the operation of a consent mechanism, the court would be
without power to insure that economical class suits do indeed go forward,
" Class members also possess at least a limited right of intervention. See note

63 supra.
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occurrence upon which suit is based, and the choices of the individuals injured.
3. The Inadequacy of the Community of Interest and Consent Theories.- The community of interest and consent theories
represent the two traditional responses to the problems of justification and fairness raised by class actions. Unfortunately,
neither theory is of use for analysis of developments in class action
law since the revision of rule 23 in 1966. The community of interest theory rests upon methodological assumptions foreign to
modern legal thought. The consent theory rests upon factual assumptions not in accord with the reality of contemporary class
litigation. Unlike the community of interest theory, the consent
theory fails to connect substance and procedure, and thus fails to
provide courts with a framework for structuring class litigation.
(a) The Community of Interest Theory. -The

1938 federal

class action rule, although it recognized class suits the community
of interest theory did not, held true to the traditional methodology by grounding its categories in the distinction between joint
and several rights.67 As is well-known, however, the rule's typology of class suits proved to be a failure. 68 Commentators mocked
it. 0 Courts fell into confusion attempting to apply it.7° This failure may be seen to reflect changes in the law, already underway
even before the i938 rule was adopted, which served to separate
the community of interest theory from its origins in practice, as
well as from usual modes of doctrinal thinking.
By 1938, the distinction between joint and several rights had
become an empty abstraction. Joint property was an anomaly.
The rules of construction courts employed in interpreting conveyances treated joint tenancies as exceptional and tenancies in common and other forms of severalty as the norm. 71 The ready availability of the corporate form 72 limited the need to conceive of
joint stock companies as classes in order to bring the activities of
such institutions within the purview of courts. Increased govern" See pp. 1338-39 supra.

s See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966).
"DSee, e.g., Z. CAFPEE, supra note 13, at 246, 257; Keeffe, Levy & Donovan,

Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CoRNELLI L.Q. 327, 334 (1948); Kalven & Rosenfield, supra
note 51, at 707 n.73.
70

See, e.g., cases cited in Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 68.

See also Z.

CHEAFEE, supra note 13, at 264-65.
71 See, e.g., Shapely v. Shapely, 324 Ill. 56o, 56o-6i, 155 N.E. 334, 335 (1927).
See generally 2 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 4 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ff 602 (P. Rohan ed. 1975).

72 See generally Louis K. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 5,7, 548-64 (1933)
H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

(Brandeis, J., dissenting);
19 (2d ed. 1970).
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ment regulation of mutual insurance associations, 73 and the increased willingness of courts and legislatures to accord entity
status to unincorporated associations7 4 further reduced the role
for class suits of the sort with which community of interest theorists were most familiar.
Moreover, by 1938, the community of interest theory was not
only disconnected from its social origins but out of phase with the
prevailing style of legal thought as well. A new, more pragmatic,
more empirical jurisprudence was emerging. 0 Matters previously
treated as appropriate for analytical inquiry were coming to be
seen as too value-laden or empirical for formal analysis. This
development was most visible in academic 71 thought and in con-

stitutional law."

But it was apparent as well in the law of pro-

cedure, reflected, for example, in the increasing use of the transaction or occurrence as the usual basis for rules governing joinder
of claims.78 The community of interest test, presupposing an
analytical categorization of rights rather than some more factual
inquiry, plainly was not a part of this new jurisprudence. Indeed,
in 1938 a good case could be made for the proposition that the
community of interest concept was long since dead, one of the
earliest casualties of the reorientation of legal thought.
73

See W. VANCE, HANDBOOK 0' THE LAW O INSURANCE 26-28, 36-Si (B.
Anderson ed. I95r).
74 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385-91
(1922); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (1938), reprinted in 3 A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE
ch. 17, at 2, 22 n.2 (2d ed. 1974). See generally Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the
Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1929).
71 On the philosophical origins and context of this jurisprudence, see M. WHITE,
SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AmERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORmAwrsm (2d ed. 1957).
1 See W. TwINIo, KARL LLWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 3-83 (1973).
7 The transformation in constitutional law is apparent, for example, from a
comparison, on the one hand, of Justice Peckham's indifference to statistical argument in Lochner v. New York, i98 U.S. 45, 59 (igo5), Justice Brewer's use of the
Brandeis brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (igo8), as evidence of traditional beliefs rather than of facts, see id. at 421, and Justice Pitney's refusal to defer
to legislative factfinding in Coppage v. Kansas, see 236 U.S. z, i6 (i9i5), as well
as his willingness to defend constitutional doctrine in terms of ideological ultimates, see, e.g., id. at x7, with, on the other hand, Justice Stone's largely factual
argument in dissent in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 363-72 (1928), Chief
Justice Hughes' emphasis on deference to legislative judgment in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937), and Justice Frankfurter's contention
in concurrence in American Fed. of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S.
538,7 8557 (1949), that value judgments are matters for legislatures and not courts.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims). See generally
Millar, Notabilia of American Civil Procedure 1887-z937, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1017,
1025 (i937). The transformation in civil procedure is also illustrated by the shift
in focus of procedure from the cause of action to the factual basis of a claim. See,
e.g., Simpson, A Possible Solution to the Pleading Problem, 53 HAV. L. REv. x69
(1939).
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At the outset, the attack on community of interest was pitched
not at the level of class action doctrine but of equitable jurisdic79
tion. Pomeroy, in his i88i Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence,
asserted that the community of interest requirement, as a test of
the jurisdiction of an equity court to consolidate actions at law
in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, found insufficient support in the case law.8" Equity jurisdiction was proper, he argued,

so long as consolidated claims were connected by a common question of fact or law.8 ' Pomeroy's reading of the cases was probably wrong.8 2 But his assertion proved a source of profound con" Citation hereinafter is to the reprint of the first edition incorporated by
Pomeroy's sons in their second edition. See i J. Pomamoy, A TRFATIsE ON EQuiTY
JURISPRUDENCE v-vi (C. Pomeroy & J. Pomeroy, Jr. eds. 1892).
'Old. § 269, at 367-70.
81
Id.
82 See Z. CEAFEE, supra note 13, at 173. For example, Pomeroy cited in support of his claim state court decisions allowing numbers of taxpayers, sometimes
suing as a class, to challenge levies against their property by municipalities, counties, and other subdivisions of state government. See J. POMEROY, supra note 79,
§ 26o, at 348 n.x. In at least six of the cases Pomeroy cited as suits brought by a
number of taxpayers, suit was actually initiated by a single individual acting alone.
See Terret v. Town of Sharon, 34 Conn. IO5, io8-og (1867); Webster v. Town of
Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131,

31-32 (x864) ; Scofield v. Eighth School Dist., 27 Conn.

499, 503 (9s8); Vieley v. Thompson, 44 Ill. 9, io (1867); Board of Comm'rs v.
Markle, 46 Ind. 96, io3-o5 (1874); Ten Eyck v. Mayor of Keokuk, 15 Iowa 486
(x864). Pomeroy argued that courts treated suits by individuals no differently
from suits by numbers of individuals, see J. POMEROY, supra at 349 n.i, but such
suits plainly offered no independent support for his proposition. Two other cases are
also obviously inapposite. See Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N.C. 244, 247 (1870) (suit
authorized by statute) ; Galloway v. Jenkins, 63 N.C. 147, 150 (i869) (defendant'
consents to class suit). Of the remainder of the cases Pomeroy cited, the overwhelming majority simply allowed suit by numbers of taxpayers without discussion of the standard determining the propriety of the multiplicity jurisdiction. See,
e.g., City of New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552 (2853); Drake v. Phillips, 40
Ill. 388 (1866) ; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474 (i85i). In the cases in which the
issue of the propriety of the multiplicity -jurisdiction was faced, most courts dealt
with the issue perfunctorily, finding equitable jurisdiction without framing the
issue in Pomeroy's terms as a choice between a community of interest and a
common question standard. See Vanover v. Davis, 27 Ga. 354, 358 (1859); Barr
v. Deniston, i9 N.H. 170, 18o (i848); Worth v. Commissioners, i Winst. Eq.
70, 72-73 (N.C. 1864); cf. Mayor of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 394"(i869)
(suit proper since municipal taxpayers constitute a class distinct from the general
public). Only in Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. I855), did a court
frame the issue as Pomeroy framed it; there, in a confused opinion, the court
allowed the suit by a class of taxpayers since, "although their individual interests
might be several and distinct," there was an "injury of the common right," id. at
86.
The cases Pomeroy cited do, however, establish that for many courts, in cases
of importance, the procedural validity of class suits and other suits brought on
behalf of numerous taxpayers was not a matter of question. Many of the cases
involved issues of considerable moment. At least thirteen were brought as
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fusion. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in Tribette v. Illinois
Central R.R., 3 challenged the accuracy of Pomeroy's citations,
rejected his conclusion, and reasserted the community of interest
requirement.8 4 Thereafter, however, the Mississippi Supreme
class suits. Nineteen concerned attempts to enjoin the levy of taxes in support
of bonds issued to finance purchases of railroad stock-high stakes litigation in
the nineteenth century given the magnitude of the liabilities municipalities and
county governments assumed in order to attract railroads into their environs, see,
e.g., Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 158 (1853) ("This is, beyond all
comparison, the most important cause that has ever been in this Court since the
formation of the government"). See generally C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION g8-ixx6 (1971). But Pomeroy's portrayal of the state of the law was
distorted. While many courts seem to have been prepared to tolerate taxpayer suits
sub silentio, where the validity of such suits was expressly drawn in question, courts
often resorted to community of interest analysis, and often held equitable jurisdiction to be inappropriate. The evolution of Iowa's law of taxpayer suits is illustrative.
Pomeroy cited nine Iowa taxpayer cases as support for his argument. Eight of the
cases allowed suits to go forward without comment as to their procedural validity.
The ninth, Zorger v. Township of Rapids, 36 Iowa I75 (0873), noted the existence
of an issue as to whether suits on behalf of classes of taxpayers were proper, but
did not address the issue since it was the "sole question in another case now pending," id. at i8o. Pomeroy did not cite the pending case referred to in Zorger. In
that case, Fleming v. Mershon, 36 Iowa 413 (1873), the Iowa Supreme Court held
a taxpayer class suit to be improper since "(tihe property of each tax payer is
held in severalty," id. at 418, noting that it could "find no case holding that one or
more tax payers may, for themselves and others chargeable with the same tax, enjoin the collection of the same . . . ," id. at 419.
More generally, the leading cases of the day appear to run directly contrary
to Pomeroy's argument. Justice Nelson, on circuit in Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 F. Cas.
1o79 (No. 3519) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1865), refused to hear a suit brought on behalf
of a number of taxpayers, on the ground that the requisite "community of interest
growing out of the nature and condition of the right in dispute" was lacking inasmuch as "the only matter in common among the plaintiffs, or between them and
the defendants, is an interest in the question involved," id. at io8o. Justice Cooley
of Michigan reached a similar conclusion:
. . .no other complainant has any joint interest with [any other complainant) in resisting this tax. The sum demanded of each is distinct and separate,
and it does not concern one of the complainants whether another pays or
not. All the joint interest the parties have is a joint interest in a question
of law...
Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 410-I (i875). Pomeroy was aware of cases
like Cutting and Youngblood, and argued that they rested on a misreading of the
law. See J. POMEROY, supra § 266, at 360-64 n.i. More accurately, it might be
said that these cases reflected the surface of the law of their time, but that underneath the surface a transformation had begun, a transformation, contra Pomeroy,
which had not been completed by i88i, and which did not come to the surface until
the publication of the Equity Jurisprudence itself.
83 70 Miss. 182, 12 SO. 32 (1892).
4 See id. at 186-93.
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Court overruled Tribette, 5 and then overruled its overruling. 8
The Alabama Supreme Court originally followed Tribette,17 but
switched its allegiance to Pomeroy in another leading case, Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins,88 only to switch back to Tribette by
the time Hopkins came up for rehearing. 9 The United States
Supreme Court, in Hale v. Allinson, ° attempted a compromise by
suggesting that equity jurisdiction should turn on the outcome of
a balancing test. 1 The Second Circuit, however, subsequently
distinguished Allinson and reasserted Tribette.02
The Pomeroy-Tribette controversy itself, of course, was ultimately mooted by the merger of law and equity. The doctrinal uncertainty the dispute revealed, however, was not confined to equity
jurisdiction. By 19o9, the existence or nonexistence of a community of interest had apparently ceased to be seen as the exclusive test of the propriety of class suit. Street's Federal Equity
Practice93 separated community of interest and common question class suits, through a distinction between "true" class suits,
concerning funds or property which could be brought within the
control of a court by joining only a few plaintiffs or defendants, 4
and "spurious" class suits, involving issues of personal liability
and "involuntary associations." 1 Class action commentary in the
193o's reflected advancing confusion in the case law. Blume
labeled the Field Code's equivalent of the community of interest
" The Mississippi Supreme Court purported to distinguish Tribette in Illinois
Central R.R. v. Garrison, 81 Miss. 257, 264-65, 32 So. 996, 997-98 (1902), but
subsequently acknowledged in Gulf & S.I.R.R. v. Barnes, 94 Miss. 484, 5o6, 48 So.
823, 827 (igog), that Garrison had in fact overruled Tribette.
80 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williamson, 1o Miss. I, 8-9, 57 So. 559, 560-6i
(i9io). The Williamson court treated the Garrison case as distinguishable from
Tribette, see id. at io; compare note 85 supra, and instead saw Whitlock v. Yazoo
& M.V.R.R., 91 Miss. 779, 45 So. 861 (i9o7), as the "apoheosis" of the "erroneous
doctrine of Prof. Pomeroy," Io Miss. at 14, 57 So. at 562. For a discussion of the
continuing impact of Tribette upon Mississippi class action law, see Comment,
Federal and State Class Actions: Developments and Opportunities, 46 Miss. L.J.
39, 55-67 (I975).
87
Turner v. City of Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 114, 33 So. 132, 141 (1902).
88 157 Ala. 175, 190, 47 So. 274, 278 (i9o8).
80 See Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 174 Ala. 465, 469, 475, 57 So. ii, 12, 14
(1911).
00 188 U.S. 56 (i9o3).
01 Id. at 77-78; see Fletcher, The Jurisdiction oj Equity Relating to Multiplicity
of Suits, 24 YALE L.J. 642, 645-46 (1915).
2

See Watson v. Huntington, 215 F. 472, 476-78 (2d Cir. X914).
T. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRAcTICE (i9o9).
0
aId. § 547, at 342.
5
" Id. § 548, at 342-43. Only "true" class suits, Street argued, had full binding
03 1

effect, id. § 552, at 345; "spurious" class suits bound only those class members who
were made parties in supplemental proceedings, id.
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test "more or less arbitrary and unworkable." " Wheaton found
the question of what constituted the common or general interest
required for class suit under the Code "[o] ne of the most baffling
problems of code pleading." 07 McLaughlin, in an article entitled
The Mystery of the Representative Suit, felt the need to start
from scratch in examining class suits, and to this end resorted to
dictionaries and linguistic analysisf 8 Significantly, all three commentators agreed that the proper test of the propriety of class
suits ought to be the common question standard. 9
The anachronism, even in 1938, of community of interest
analysis suggests that the community of interest theory is simply
not an available alternative to the consent theory in analyzing
contemporary class actions. This fact is of more than historical
interest. The consent theory is itself an inadequate guide to post1966 class actions, and its inadequacies, at least in part, are ones
which the community of interest theory does not share.
(b) The Consent Theory. - The consent theory, of course,
is more in keeping with the contemporary style of legal thought.
Class action practice, however, as it has developed since 1966,
suggests that the factual assumptions of the consent theory may
be today no less artificial than the processes of reasoning required
by the community of interest theory. Moreover, the consent theory's underlying premise - that responsibility for deciding the
propriety of class suit should rest with class members rather than
the court - of necessity prevents the theory from having anything to say about how courts should go about reconciling class
procedures with substantive law. In effect, the consent theory
leaves to class members not only the issues of justification and
fairness, but questions of statutory policy as well.
For the consent theory to be apposite, the claims of individual
class members must be severable; the individual class member, if
he refuses to participate in a class suit, must be able to preserve
his right of action. The structure of the 1966 rule plainly reflects this fact. Class members are afforded no right to opt out
in suits meeting the conditions of section (b) (i) of rule 23, encompassing circumstances where the interrelated situations of
class members would prevent the award of severable relief, or section (b)(2), covering cases where injunctive or declaratory re" Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 878, 903 (1932).
97 Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 CoRlNELL
L.Q. 399, 407 (1934).
9See McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 GEo. L.J. 878,
878,'882-83 (1938).
" See Blume, supra note 96, at 903; McLaughlin, supra note 98, at 89o, 893;

Wheaton, supra note 97, at 434.
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lief by its nature would inevitably run to the class as a whole.0 0
The limit severability sets on the usefulness of the consent theory
substantially reduces the theory's practical relevance. Truly
severable claims may be rare. Once the influence of precedent
upon litigation of common questions is recognized,' 0 ' the distinc-

tions rule

23

come tenuous.

draws between (b) (i) and (b) (3)class suits be02

It may be that individuals invited to consent to

class suit are ordinarily not free to decide solely on the basis of a
comparison of the expected recoveries from class and individual

litigation; because of the impact of the class suit upon any parallel litigation, individuals may be induced to join the class action
rather than proceed on their own. Whatever the number of cases
in which consent mechanisms may operate unhindered, it is clear
that, as a result of the severability constraint, the consent theory
has little relevance in a significant proportion of class suits. For
example, most civil rights class suits brought since 1966 have
been brought as (b) (2) actions.' 3 As of 1975, the largest single
group - 59.7 -of the class actions pending in federal courts
concerned civil rights violations.'0
For the consent theory to be apposite, the claims of individual
100

See FED. R. CiV. P. 23(b)(I), (b) (2), (c) (2).

101 See generally Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826-29 (5th

Cir. 1967). In Atlantis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the stare decisis effects of an adjudication upon a third party's claim
arising out of the transaction at issue in the litigation justified intervention as of
right by the third party under rule 24(a). The court, evidently seeking to limit the
application of its holding, repeatedly emphasized that the intervenor's interest in
the litigation derived from claims arising out of the same transaction as was at
issue in the litigation. See id. at 826, 829. The "same transaction" to which the
court referred, however, was in reality but a common question of law and fact"the right to build structures with or without permission of the Corps of Engineers,"
id. at 826- and thus, given the familial relationship of rules 23 and 24, see id. at
824, Atlantis' recognition of stare decisis as a barrier to severability appears fully
relevant to class action analysis.
102 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d
io83, io86 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Flanagan v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 44 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. April 5, 1976) (conceding overlap of (b) (I) (A)
and (b)(3) class suits inasmuch as different adjudications of common questions
create "different legal rules governing the same conduct" but refusing to read (b)
(I) (A) this broadly in order not to render (b) (3) wholly redundant); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 722 (N.D.
Ill. 1968) (impact of differing adjudications upon class opponent's planning basis
for categorization of suit under (b) (i) (A)). See also Benett, Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin: Supreme Court Calls for Revamping of Class Action Strategy, 1974
Wis. L. REv. 8ox, 818-23 (overlap of (b) (I) (B) and (b) (3) categories).
103 See, e.g., I W. CONNOLLY, A PRACTICAL Gui-E To EQuA EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY 511 (1975) ("most Title VII class action suits are brought under Rule
23(b) (2)").
104 See p. 1325, note 30 supra.
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class members must also be claims which the class members
would have litigated even were no class action mechanism available. If the claims which class actions aggregate are too small to
be individually litigated, the economy and uniformity justifications for class suit, attenuated in any event under the consent
theory, disappear entirely. More importantly, the emphasis the
consent theory gives to the interests of the individual class members becomes misplaced. Class member consent serves as an
adequate mechanism for establishing the appropriateness of class
suits only so long as the individuals whose consent is sought would
have sued the class opponent themselves but for the prosecution
of the class suit. In this situation, the class action threatens the
interests of potential class members, who risk loss of control over
the presentation of their claims, but not the interests of the class
opponent, who would have had to face all of the class members
at some point in any event, and who benefits from the reduced
litigation costs consolidation of the class claims makes possible.
Seeking consent from potential class members, rather than the
class opponent, is therefore appropriate. If potential class members would not have sued the class opponent individually, however, it is the class opponent, and not the potential class members,
whom the class suit disadvantages. The class action offers
potential class members the chance of an otherwise unrealizable
gain; the class opponent, however, must reckon with the prospect
of a total liability larger than would have been the case in the
absence of a class action. The consent of class members in this
situation is usually beside the point: the issue is the justification
for increasing the burden on the class opponent.
In fact, at least some of the claims aggregated in many of the
common question damage actions initiated since the revision of
rule 23 have been individually quite small. The individual suing
on behalf of six million Philadelphia area bread consumers in
Hackett v. General Host Corp.10 5 sought to recover only about
nine dollars. 10 6 Even if damages were trebled, the forty million
hotel guests on whose behalf an antitrust class action was brought
in In re Hotel Telephone Charges 107 would have recovered, on
the average, only about six dollars.0 8 Individual claims in these
amounts obviously could not be pursued in federal court without
recourse to class actions, or other devices, to spread the cost of
attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses.
Short of a rule excluding holders of claims of less than a certain amount from class actions, there appears to be little that
105 455

F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972).

0

"' See id. at 620.

107 5oo F.2d 86 (gth Cir. 1974).
8
10
See id. at 88.
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can be done to make class action practice fit with the assumptions
of the consent theory. The Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,0 0 holding that individualized notice must
be given to class members in (b) (3) actions, 10 can perhaps be
understood not only as a reflection of a consent theory analysis,"1
but also as an effort to insure the continued relevance of the consent theory. The cost of notice serves as a screen, denying access
to federal courts to the large damage class actions which are most
likely to have been brought on behalf of individuals asserting
claims too small to be litigated alone. The screen, however, is
imperfect. The cost of notice may limit the size of class suits, but
it is not clear that the limit that would be set is so low as to make
small claimant classes impractical."'
It is not just that the consent theory's assumptions fail to
square with contemporary practice; on its own terms the theory
is conceptually incomplete. The consent theory offers no view of
the relationship of class action procedure to substantive law. Class
suit, under the consent theory, is simply a mechanism of private
convenience, a useful device for individuals to realize litigative
economies and to increase bargaining power. The substantive
policies underlying the causes of action under which class suits are
brought are no more relevant than any other institutional values
to the decisions of individuals as to whether to consent to class
suit.
The problem of reconciling substance and procedure in class
actions first became apparent to courts as they attempted to move
beyond the confines of the community of interest theory. If class
suit were allowed only where "one right" was at issue, the procedure for trying a class action need differ in no remarkable way
from the procedure followed in any other lawsuit. Clearly, the
class suit concerned only one set of issues, which could be argued
by class representatives and the class opponent, and tried by a
court, in the usual manner. Where a substantive cause of action
treated rights as several rather than joint, however, courts found
consolidated procedures troublesome. Allowing each holder of
one of the aggregated claims to try his own case would be un109417

U.S. 156 (1974).

"1d.
at

177.

"I See p. 1338 & note 43 supra.
112 Attorney assumption of notice costs, see pp. 618-23 infra, or other devices,
may reduce the burden of giving notice. In any event, the Eisen class, numbering
about six million, see 417 U.S. at 166, was considerably larger than a "normal"
class, see p. 1326, note 34 supra; the notice costs for even such a giant class could be
reduced through subclassing, see 417 U.S. at X79-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part). See also id. at '79 n.i6; pp. 1498-I504 infra (manageability).
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deciding all claims on the basis of a trial of a

representative claim appeared to be inconsistent with the cause
of action's recognition of individual rights." 4 The bias against

consolidated or class treatment of tort claims, a continuing legacy
of the Pomeroy-Tribette controversy, originally reflected precisely these concerns."'

Given full scope, the consent theory in effect delegates to class
members the responsibility for deciding whether class procedures

are consistent with the policies underlying a given cause of action. If the only substantive policies class procedures might dis-

tort were policies having to do with protecting the rights of class
members, such a delegation

-

an extension of the consent theory's

waiver approach to fairness - could perhaps be justified. In
fact, however, class procedures are just as likely to interfere with
policies grounded in legislative concern for class opponents or
third parties. Where interests other than the interests of class

members are at stake, the consent theory's unlimited delegation
of responsibility to class members is plainly improper. It is perhaps for this reason that the consent theory is not, in practice,

given full rein. Rule

23

conditions authorization of common ques-

tion damage actions under section (b) (3) upon a judicial finding

that common questions "predominate," "I' and thus provides
courts with an opportunity to check the fit of class procedures

with substantive values. 1 7 Such judicial intervention, however,
...See, e.g., Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 174 Ala. 465, 479, 57 So. I1, 15
(Ig).
114 See, e.g., Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williamson,

zox Miss. 1,

14-15, 57

So. 559, 562 (IgIO).
"'The Advisory Committee Note on revised rule 23 opposed mass tort class
actions:

A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances
an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. io3 (I966). Courts refusing to hear mass tort
class actions under rule 23 have emphasized the individuality of class member
interests. See, e.g., Causey v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392,
399 (E.D. Va. 1975); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 570-71, 572
(E.D. Tex. 1974). A few courts, however, have found it possible to separate classwide issues from individual issues, and have allowed class litigation of the common questions. See Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 5581 560-6I
(S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 5o7 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Petition of Gabel, 35o F.
Supp. 624, 63o (C.D. Cal. 1972). See generally Comment, Mass Accident Class'
Actions, 6o CALm. L. REv. 1615 (1972); Case Note, 40 J. Am L. & CoM. 320 (1974).
"' FED. R. CiV. P. 23(b) (3).
11 See pp. i5o4-i6 infra (predomination).
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cannot be explained under the consent theory; to make room for
it, a new approach is needed.
B. A Substantive Theory of Class Actions
A third theory of the class suit is suggested by current practice. In outline form the theory can be stated as follows:
Class action procedures assist courts in giving full realization to substantive policies in two ways. First, to the extent
that they open courts to claims not ordinarily litigated, class
actions enable courts to enforce policies underlying causes of
action in circumstances where those policies might not otherwise be effectuated. Second, to the extent that they enable
courts to see the full implications of recognizing rights or remedies, class action procedures assist courts in judging precisely
what outcomes of litigation would best serve the policies underlying causes of action. Class action procedures are fair
because courts are more likely to see both the significance of
the claims of a plaintiff and the consequences of imposing
liability upon a defendant, and thus are more likely to arrive
at a substantively just conclusion. Through class action procedures, moreover, the interests of absentees, who may be
affected by the litigation regardless of its class nature, are
given representation in the litigative process, and thus are
more likely to be given their due.
This substantive theory of class actions has been developed in
response to issues of substantive and institutional distortion,
largely ignored by defenders of the class action mechanism, which
contemporary critics of class actions persistently raise. This Part
begins by outlining the attacks made upon the modern class action
and the chief responses to them. An analysis of the inappropriateness of the usual defenses of class actions, given the constrAints
of the Rules Enabling Act, 118 leads to a discussion of tho' assistance class actions give to the full realization of substantive
policies. This discussion develops an analytic framework in which
contemporary class actions and the Rules Enabling Act may be
accommodated and concludes with a theory of fairness that complements the full realization justification for class suits.
i. Class Actions and Their Critics: The Problem of Justifying Increased Access to Federal Courts. - One of the most significant functions contemporary class actions serve is to lower
barriers to access to federal courts. Class suit generalizes the
benefits an individual obtains from legal services by making them
118 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
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available to others similarly situated." 9 By allowing attorneys'
fees to be computed on the aggregate of benefits thus bestowed,
the class action can break the connection between access to courts
and financial wherewithal. In damage class actions, attorneys'
fees are paid not by the named plaintiffs, but by the class as a
whole, in the form of a pro rata deduction from the class recovery. 120 Since the fee is contingent upon victory, no class member
loses anything from class suit; since the fee is shared, no single
class member pays more than a small part of the costs of an
attorney. Class suits may not only reduce the cost of attorneys
for particular individuals, but may also increase the fees which
attorneys recover, thus creating an extra incentive for attorneys
to take class suits. In both damage actions and suits for injunctive relief brought under statutes providing for the award of fees,
the formal criteria for fee awards may take special account of
the class character of the suit; 121 in any event, the magnitude of
the benefit a class suit confers may prompt a judge to be particularly generous in fixing an attorney's fee. 22
Taking as their paradigm damage class actions grouping large
numbers of individually small claims, 23 critics have argued that
the contemporary class action has performed the access func" In addition to increasing access to the courts, the class action may also
make it more likely that a suit will be fully litigated. Because it is improper
for a class representative to settle a suit unless the settlement is fair to the whole
class, the representative is unlikely to be able to "sell out" the class, thereby
creating the classic strike suit situation. See generally pp. 1536-76 infra. Moreover, with respect to injunctive relief, the effect of the class judgment is to
give all members of the class standing to initiate contempt proceedings against
the class opponent, see, e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp.
846, 848-49 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 5ig F.2d 430 ( 9 th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976), and thus to limit the class opponent's ability,
after the conclusion of the litigation, to reach a settlement nullifying the injunction.
Finally, the class suit insulates the individual plaintiff from events that would
normally moot his particular claim. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 96
S. Ct. 1251 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (975); PP. 1464-66 & notes 53-63
infra.
20
1

1"1

See pp. 16o4-i8 infra.
Even if the fee is not fixed as a percentage of the class recovery, see p.

1612,

note 146 infra, reference to an hours-worked standard in fee calculation, see pp.
I6ii-ig infra, should cause attorneys' fees to be higher in class litigation than in
ordinary suits, given the greater efforts of class attorneys.
122 For indirect evidence that class suits may be better rewarded than ordinary
litigation, see Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5o3 F.2d X77, x88 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(vacating award of nominal attorneys' fees in Title VII case in which class suit
was not allowed and suggesting that in sex discrimination suits there is no real
distinction between class and non-class litigation).
112 See, e.g., Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations
in Antitrust Suits- The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLrm.
L. REv. i, 6 (i97i) ; Simon, Class Actions - Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction,
5s F.R.D. 375, 375 (,973).
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tion too well. The individual claims aggregated in class actions,
critics contend, are typically de minimis; the injuries such class
actions compensate would not be regarded by class members as
significant, and thus should not serve as a pretext for the expenditure of scarce judicial resources.12 4 Moreover, because class
opponents must confront the possibility of tremendous aggregate
judgments, the likelihood increases that class opponents will choose
to settle even apparently frivolous suits rather than risk poten-

tially catastrophic litigation. 2 5 Only the attorney, critics con-

clude, benefits from class action litigation. 2
Defenders of the contemporary class suit respond with two
arguments. It is by no means clear, they contend, that the claims
class actions aggregate are insignificant. 27 The costs of litigating
complicated questions of federal law may be quite high.' 2 Since
an individual's claim must exceed the cost of litigation to make
individual suit rational, individuals who have suffered inarguably
hurtful losses may be left without remedy if forced to act alone.
The second argument draws on economic theory. Class actions,
it is argued, enable holders of small claims to share the transaction costs of asserting a cause of action; because of the increased
access to courts which results, class opponents are forced to con124

See, e.g.,

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, SPECIAL COmm. ON RULE

23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
[hereinafter cited as AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS);
22-24 (1972)

Blechman, Class Actions- A Reappraisal in Light of Hawaii v. Standard Oil,
38 J. AIR L. & COM. 389, 398-99 (1972).
125 See, e.g., Katerincic & McClain, Federal Class Actions Under Rule 23:
How to Improve the Merits of Your Action Without Improving the Merits of
Your Claim, 33 U. PiTT. L. REV. 429, 432 (1972); Pollock, Class Actions Reconsidered: Theory and Practice Under Amended Rule 23, 28 Bus. LAW. 749
(x973); Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, io B.C. IND.
& Comt. L. REV. 515, 522 (1969).
120 See, e.g., Labowitz, Class Actions in the Federal System and in California:
Shattering the Impossible Dream, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 6oi, 606-07 (I974);
Schwartz, The Class Action: Its Incidence and the Eisen Cases, 29 Bus. LAW.,
March, 1974, at i56 (special issue).
127 See, e.g., Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 609, 641-42 (197); Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of
Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 305 (1973).
28See, e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412,
414 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (parties stipulate to $2o,ooo as appropriate attorney's fee

for individual Truth in Lending Act action); D. GOULD, STAFF REPORT ON TJlE
SMALL CLAIMS CoRTS i6 (National Institute for Consumer justice, August x5,
1972) (impractical for consumers to press defective product claims below the
$5,ooo to $io,ooo range); Pomerantz & Combe, Dialogue on Class Actions, 29
Bus. LAW. o9-io (1973) ($500 to $1,ooo claim costs more than that to prosecute).
See also Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST
L.J. 295, 298 (x966).

1356

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1318

front the full social cost of their activities.1' This forced "costinternalization" is said to promote economic efficiency. 3 0
The arguments of class action defenders are strikingly inconclusive. Analytically, it is possible to distinguish three types of
individual claims class actions aggregate: the nonviable, the individually nonrecoverable, and the individually recoverable. A
claim is nonviable if the expenses an individual would incur in
asserting a right to a share of a class judgment would be greater
than his expected share of the recovery. A claim is individually
nonrecoverable if it would not justify the expense to an individual
of independent litigation but would justify the lesser expenditure
required to obtain a share of a class judgment. A claim is individually recoverable if it warrants the costs of separate litigation; that is, if an action to recover the claim would be economically rational regardless of the availability of class action procedures. Critics of class actions tend to focus on the presence of
nonviable claims, and the absence of individually recoverable
claims.' 3 ' Defenders emphasize the opportunity for recovery class
action procedures afford holders of individually nonrecoverable
claims.' 32 Thus, on the question of whether the expenditure of
judicial resources in class suits is justified, the dispute is ultimately
both factual and normative. Its resolution requires, first, information so far unobtained as to the distribution of benefits from
and, second, a judgment as to whether such beneclass actions ...
fits as are conferred justify the expenditure of judicial resources
and the costs of holding the class opponent liable.
The cost-internalization case for class actions rests upon a
similarly complex series of judgments. First, it must be determined that placing costs on class opponents will in fact result
in a more efficient allocation of social resources than would be
produced by placing costs on holders of small claims. Since transactions costs between a class and a class opponent may be sub129

See, e.g., Moore, The PotentialFunction of the Modern Class Suit,

2 CLASS

ACTION REP. 47, 49-51 (i973); Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259, 126o (1g7o). See also
Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 940-45 (975).
130See, e.g., Note, The Cost-InternalizationCase for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L.
See also Newberg, Federal Consumer Class Action
REV. 383, 403-4 (1969).
Legislation: Making the System Work, 9 HAzv. 3. LEGis. 217, 218-21 (972).
11 See, e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE Or TRIAL. LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 22-25;
Blechman, supra note 124, at 398-99; Handler, supra note 123, at 9-1o; Simon,
supra note 223, at 378-79.
12 See, e.g., Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 663, 663
(1970); Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, io B.C.
IND. & Cou. L. REv. 502, 506-07 (1969). See also Rosenfield, An Empirical Test
of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL SrTUIEs x13, 113 (1976).
32 See p. 1326, note 34 supra.
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stantial, allowing costs to fall on holders of small claims may be
more efficient if the small claimants have access to a less expensive means of reducing social costs than do defendants.' Second,
even if large class actions increase allocational efficiency, distributional considerations must be taken into account. Class opponents required to shoulder huge judgments may not be able to
pass on all the costs; if losses rest with class members, however,
they will be spread among many people.' 35 Although requiring
class opponents to bear costs they cannot share is not necessarily
socially inefficient, the dislocation cost-bearing could cause class
opponents will be tolerable only if regarded as distributionally
proper 136 or as justified by increases in efficiency. Third, the
"chilling effect" upon class opponents of potentially crippling
losses must be considered. The combination of huge judgments
and high litigation costs may cause class opponents to protect
themselves by refraining not only from socially inefficient activity but also from activity which is in fact socially desirable.
The arguments of class action defenders are vulnerable to
attack not just because they rest upon unverified factual and normative assuinptions but because they assume that federal courts
engaged in procedural decisionmaking may independently look
to the same criteria Congress employs in legislating. The Rules
Enabling Act provides that rules of civil procedure "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right, . ."
Traditionally, federal courts and their rulemaking delegates have
attempted to keep within the confines of the Act by sharply distinguishing questions of substance and procedure: 138 typically,
procedural issues are resolved by reference to criteria which are
substantively neutral. 3 9 Thus, for example, the Rules Advisory
134 See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
x8

J. LAW

& EcoN. 1, i5-i6,

(I96O).
133 See generally G. CALABREsI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 39-40 (,970).
136 Cf. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1975)

(re-

fusing to issue injunction against polluting plant because of social cost to employees
who would be put out of work).
137 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).

3'See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).

See also Schlagen-

Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 113 (1964).
hauf1 v.
9
Professor Ely has defined a procedural rule as "one designed to make the
process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes."
Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 693, 724 (1974.) An emphasis on fairness and efficiency is characteristic of the justifications offered for the
1966 revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, amended
rule 12(g), concerning consolidation of defenses, was advocated as working
"against piecemeal consideration of a case," Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 78
(1966); amended rule 12(h), dealing with the waiver or preservation of certain
defenses, was justified as reinforcing the policy of "forbidding successive motions,"
id., as a means to avoiding delay in bringing certain defenses before the court,
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Committee justified the treatment which revised rule 23 accords
common question damage class actions in terms of the values of
economy and uniformity of treatment.' 4° Such neutral values
are not apposite in the context of contemporary class actions,
which do not so much consolidate claims courts would hear in any
event as bring into court claims that would otherwise go unheard.
It has been argued that the irrelevance of traditional rulemaking values suggests that contemporary class actions violate
the Rules Enabling Act.' 4' The Act, however, does not mandate
that federal courts ignore substantive considerations in making
procedural decisions, but rather requires only that, if courts are
to apply substantive criteria, they do so in a way that will not
distort the substantive choices Congress has independently
made.'42 It is clear, however, that resort to criteria like compensee id. at 79, and a surer way of putting a party "on fair notice of the effect of his
actions and omissions," id.
40 See id. at 102-03. See also note 39 supra.
141 See Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class
Actions and the Substance-ProcedureDilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842, 860 (1974).
This argument should be distinguished from a second contention of class action
critics, that judges must inevitably alter substantive law in order to make class
actions manageable, see, e.g., Simon, supra note 123, at 386, which is considered later
in this Part, see note 182 infra.
142 The interaction of substantive and procedural analysis which the Rules Enabling Act allows has been obscured by the attention given to the implications
of the Act in diversity cases, where under the Erie doctrine federal courts are required to take state substantive law essentially as they find it, and are thus unconstrained only in their consideration of procedural issues. Professor Ely, for
example, although arguing contra Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (94), that
the Enabling Act requires federal courts not only to determine if federal rules are
"procedural" but also to judge whether such rules "supplant" state substantive
policies, see Ely, supra note 139, at 722, treats the substantive inquiry, because it
arises in the diversity context, in a choice-of-law manner. The analysis involves
a search for conflicts between a federal rule and state law; if a conflict is found, it
is resolved not by inquiring whether either the federal rule or state law can be
adjusted to a point of accommodation, but by categorizing the state law as "procedural," in which event the federal rule prevails, or as "substantive," in which
case state law governs.
Such inflexibility is not necessary in the adjudication of federal questions, since
all federal law, substantive and procedural, is equally open to judicial shaping.
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), involving a question as to the relationship
of rule 23 and the jurisdictional amount requirement Congress has attached to its
grant of diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (297o), provides a paradigmatic
illustration. There, in deciding whether it was proper in (b) (3) suits to aggregate
claims in order to establish the requisite amount in controversy, Justice Black's
majority opinion, although holding that the issue was to be resolved under the
statute rather than under rule 23, see 394 U.S. at 336, recognized the legitimacy,
given the 2966 amendment of the rule, of an inquiry into whether the statute ought
to be reinterpreted, and, although holding that the statute's interpretation ought
not to be changed, see id. at 338-40, noted that the statutory policy would not in any
event seriously undermine the functioning of the rule, see id. at 342. More recently,
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sation and cost-internalization to defend class actions, without
regard to the policies of the causes of action that class actions enforce, is inconsistent with the Act. If contemporary class actions
are to be justified, it must be in a way more attentive to the interaction of judicial and legislative policymaking.
2. Class Actions as a Means to Full Realization of Substantive
Policies: Increased Access to Courts.- The surest way to guar-

antee the consistency of class action procedures and substantive
policies is to ground the justification for the procedures in the
policies themselves. On this view, the increased access to courts
that class actions make possible is justified because it allows the
policies underlying the claims enforced in a class suit to be given
effect in situations in which this would not otherwise be the case.
If class actions are to be substantively justified in this
way, the key question becomes whether the policies underlying a
cause of action are indeed furthered by class suit. In answering
this question, ordinary techniques of statutory interpretation may
be of little help. Some statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act 4 3 and the revised Truth in Lending Act, 4' incorporate
provisions regulating the use of class actions. However, Congress
usually will not have considered the place of class actions in its
statutory scheme. As a result, statutory language and legislative
history will not be directly relevant. Judicial analysis must conin American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), the Supreme Court

expressly acknowledged the dialectic of substantive and procedural reasoning in
Rules Enabling Act analysis in federal question cases. In American Pipe, the Court
held that the commencement of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for all
individuals who would have been members of the class but for the failure of the
class to meet the numerosity requirement of rule 23 (a) (i). Id. at 552-53; see
PP. 1448-54 infra. A contrary ruling, the unanimous Court reasoned, would

disserve the policies underlying federal class action procedure, see id. at 553-54;
moreover, tolling of the statute of limitations in this context would not be inconsistent with the values furthered by a time bar, see id. at 554-55. Class opponents
argued that the Rules Enabling Act prohibited courts from adopting procedural
rules that would extend a congressionally-enacted, "substantive" statute of limitations. See id. at 556. Justice Stewart's opinion, however, concluded that under the
Rules Enabling Act the supposed substantive character of the adjusted statute of
limitations was not by itself dispositive: "The proper test is not whether a time
limitation is 'substantive' or 'procedural,' but whether tolling the limitation in a
given context is consonant with the legislative scheme." Id. at 557-58. Since the
tolling rule for class actions which American Pipe adopted was consistent with
statute of limitations policies, the Rules Enabling Act was not violated. See also
Brennan v. Machinists Local 5o, 503 F.2d 8oo (9th Cir. 1974).

243 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (i97o). See generally Foster, Jurisdiction, Rights,
and Remedies for Group Wrongs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special
Federal Questions, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 295.
144 i5 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. IV, I974).
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cern itself chiefly with the policies which may be seen to underlie
a given cause of action.'4 5
More specifically, substantive analysis of the appropriateness
of class actions requires a precise understanding of the policies
shaping the relationship of a cause of action and the statutory
directive it enforces. One set of policies may be called remedial
and concerns the purposes a cause of action serves: for example,
compensation, disgorgement of unjust enrichment, or deterrence
of violations in the first place. Were remedial policies the only
ones to be considered, class suits, given their effect of increasing
access to courts, and thus statutory enforcement, would appear
to be almost invariably consistent with substantive policies.
There may, however, be a second set of policies expressed in the
elements of a cause of action. These policies, which may be called
structural, encompass values such as precision or ease of selfapplication and reflect the impact the elements of a cause of
action have upon the operational meaning of a statutory directive.
The substantive propriety of class suit turns on the compatibility of class procedures with both the remedial and the structural policies of a cause of action. For example, it has been
argued that courts, seeking to further the perceived remedial
purposes of a statute, have redefined elements of liability to
remove '"uncommon'' questions that would limit the usefulness of
the class action device.' 46 The compatibility of such a generalization of the circumstances of liability with underlying policies
is a matter that can be determined only on a case-by-case basis.
It is certainly possible, however, that generalization would conflict with a statute's commitment to precision or individual accountability.' 47 Judgments as to the appropriateness of class suit
...In judging the propriety of class actions, courts ought to adopt essentially
the same approach that the Supreme Court has relied upon in deciding whether to
imply private rights of action under federal regulatory statutes. Although the
Court has at times relied upon statutory language and legislative intent as an
initial basis for refusing to imply a cause of action, see, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 4X4 U.S. 453, 456-61
(1974), in general the Court has treated statutes not as themselves determinative
of the implication question but as the sources of the policies which implication of
a private cause of action may be found either to frustrate, see, e.g., SIPC v. Barhour, 42X U.S. 412, 421-23 (I975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, supra at 461-64, or further, see, e.g., Allen v. State Bd.
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
431-33 (1964). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (refusal to imply
private right of action adding nothing to furtherance of statutory purpose). See
generally Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some
Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1422-37 (z975).
" 6 See generally Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rile rob-5, 38
U. CHm. L. REv. 337 (97I).
147 See pp. i5o4-i6 infra. Similarly, use of classwide mechanisms for the distribu-
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may require not only recognition of both remedial and structural
policies but awareness of the effects of the policies' interaction.
For example, a complex mode of proof may make a liability determination quite exact, but to the extent that proof is complex,
the unpredictability of the outcome of the suit may increase.
Given the large liability class suits may threaten, such uncertainty
could give rise to a dynamic encouraging class opponents to settle
class suits or simply to forebear from all conduct even arguably
prohibited. The ultimate effect, therefore, may be to exaggerate
a remedial policy of deterrence to the point that a statute's
effective scope is extended beyond its literal reach - in other
words- overdeterrence.
Possibly because courts have accepted the class suit under
rule 23 as a device that merely creates a more efficient forum for
litigation without affecting the substantive law applied in a suit,
case law considering the effect of the class device on substantive
policies is limited. Because of this, and because this Note is not
concerned with specific substantive applications, further analysis
of the interaction between remedial and structural policy and the
class suit will be limited to illustration. The clearest examples of
situations in which courts have apparently sensed a need to
reconcile statutory policy and the class suit involve statutory
penalty cases brought under the original Truth in Lending Act and
the antitrust laws.
Particularly acute problems of distortion are likely to arise
where class actions are brought to enforce causes of action imposing a penalty for statutory violations. One reason for including a
penalty provision in the elements of a cause of action is to achieve
artificially the deterrent effect of a more uniform enforcement of
a statutory directive. Class actions also serve to increase the
uniformity of a statute's application, by transforming a suit
brought by a single individual into a suit brought on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals. The increased deterrent
effect class actions create may intensify the already heightened
deterrent effect of a penalty provision,
to a point perhaps counter148
productive to statutory policies.

Class actions under the original Truth in Lending Act provide
an obvious example. Until recently modified, 49 the Truth in
tion of relief may not harmonize with a statutory policy of remedying only individually established injuries. See pp. 1525-27 infra.
48 In this regard, it is interesting that § goi (b) of the recently enacted New
York class action law, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & Run s §§ 9Oi-o9 (McKinney Supp.
,975-76), denies class treatment to actions seeking to recover a statutory penalty or
a minimum measure of damages unless such a class suit is expressly authorized by

statute.
14'See

15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).

See generally Comment, The
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Lending Act made no provision for class actions but did guarantee
individuals suing under the Act a minimum recovery of $ioo as
well as attorneys' fees. 50 Class suits aggregating the $ioo claims
of credit card holders threatened mass credit companies with
enormous liabilities for even technical violations.'' In the leading case of Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.," 2 however, Judge Frankel in effect closed off the Truth in Lending Act
to class actions.'' Even though Judge Frankel attempted to limit
the scope of his decision to the facts of Ratner, 54 at the center
of his argument was a conclusion which moved beyond those facts
to encompass Truth in Lending class actions generally: class actions were "essentially inconsistent" with the remedy provided
by Congress since they would carry the effect of that remedy
"to an absurd and stultifying extreme ....

;) 15

Court decisions concerning the propriety of class actions under
the antitrust laws afford a more complex illustration of the interaction of class actions and the remedial and structural policies
underlying statutory causes of action. Section 4 of the Clayton
Act provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"
1974 Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, 53 N.C.L. REv. 1259 (1975).

See

also note 155 infra.

10 See Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, § 130.
'1E.g., Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972)

(potential damages of $i billion); see Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in
Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410, 1411 & n.12 (1974).
152 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
"' Although there may have been a backlash developing at about the time
Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act, see, e.g., Haynes v. Logan Furniture
Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1974); Note, Recent Developments
in Truth in Lending Class Actions and Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1o1, 110 n.53 (1974), most courts hearing Truth in Lending Act cases appear to
have treated Judge Frankel's Ratner opinion as decisive on the question of the
propriety of class suits. E.g., Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 56 F.R.D.
548, 549 (N.D. II. 1972); see Fisher, From Ratner to Qui Tam: Truth-in-Lending
Class Action Developments, 24 HAsTnmcs L.J. 813, 833-34 & n.121 (i973); Note,
supra note 151, at 1412.
""See 54 F.R.D. at 413. He noted that the defendant in Ratner had already
ceased, albeit inadvertently, the conduct in violation of the act, id. at 414, and
concurred in the defendant's observation that the sought-for $13 million class
recovery would be a particularly "horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment"
given "at most a technical and debatable violation of the Truth in Lending Act,"
id. at 416.
'" 2 Id. at 414. The 1974 amendments to the Truth in Lending Act expressly
recognized the possibility of class actions under the Act, see 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. IV, 1974), but declared that the $ioo minimum recovery
provision, see id. § (2) (A), did not apply in class suits, see id. § (2)(B), and limited
the amount of the recovery in class suits to "the lesser of $xoo,ooo or i per centum
of the net worth of the creditor," id.
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may recover treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. 5 ' Like
the Truth in Lending Act, the Clayton Act thus establishes a
penalty. 5 7 Courts, however, have not banned antitrust class
actions altogether. Rather, they have tied the propriety of class
suit to the particular cause of action under which suit is brought.
The polar cases are set by class suits charging price fixing, which
are almost always allowed to go forward,"" and class suits claiming monopolization, which are generally disallowed.' 59 The courts
themselves have usually distinguished between price-fixing and
monopolization suits by focusing on the propriety of classwide
modes of proof in the two contexts. 0° The treble damages provi15 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).

""TSee Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,

222

F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 350 U.S. 825 ('955) (L. Hand, J.) ("The remedy provided is not solely
civil; two thirds of the recovery is not remedial and inevitably presupposes a
punitive purpose"). For a more detailed discussion of the policies underlying the
treble damages provision, see pp. 1533-35 infra.
" See, e.g., Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. io9 (S.D.N.Y. I975); Weit v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 6o F.R.D. 5 (N.D. Ill. 973); Wainwright
v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 432 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Philadelphia v. American Oil
Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44
F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968). But see, e.g., City & County of Denver v. American
Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
"0 See, e.g., San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435
(W.D. Tex. 1975); Gneiting v. Taggares, 62 F.R.D. 405 (D. Idaho 1973); Shaw v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 6o F.R.D. 566 (D.N.H. 1973); it re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution
Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, on
grounds not here relevant, 481 F.2d 122 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045
(1973). But see City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 6o F.R.D. 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 5o1 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
160 Although price-fixing class actions have been generally allowed, such suits
have not been received favorably by the courts where the class alleged a conspiracy on the part of a large number of defendants. Methods of proving conspiracy which do not require individualized investigations of such defendants'
acts have been held to be insufficient as a matter of antitrust law; given the need
for separate showings as to each defendant, class suit becomes improper. See, e.g.,
Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 230-33 (9 th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 963 (975); In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 5oo F.2d 86, 89 (9th Cir.
1974); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 429-31 (W.D. Mo. '973).
In the monopolization cases, courts have seen the chief issue to be that of impactthe Clayton Act's requirement that individuals seeking to recover treble damages
show that they were injured in their "business or property" by violation of the antitrust laws, see 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Proof of price-fixing is itself proof of injury,
see San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435, 439 (W.D.
Tex. 1975) ; once price-fixing is established, a plaintiff need only show the amount of
damages in order to recover, see Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45,
67 (D.N.J. 1971). By contrast, proof of monopolization is not itself proof that
class members were injured; as a result, individual showings of injury by each
class member cannot be dispensed with, and class suit becomes improper. See,
e.g., Yanai v. Frito Lay, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 349, 351-52 (N.D. Ohio X973); Shaw v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 6o F.R.D. 566, 569 (D.N.H. 1973). For more detailed discussion
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sion has not been treated as relevant to the issue of the relative
propriety of price-fixing and monopolization class suits, and no
attempt has been made to suggest that the concern for overdeterrence is of a different intensity in the two contexts.
Significantly, however, the differences courts see in price-fixing and monopolization cases do indeed track important differences in the likelihood and consequences of overdeterrence - differences attributable to structural features of the two causes of
action. The possibility that individuals will be overdeterred by
the prospect of price-fixing class actions is limited given that the
elements of a price-fixing violation are few, and that the acts
constituting the violation are initiated by the individual charged. 1 '
Threatened with a price-fixing class action, an individual may
with relative ease determine the likelihood of the suit's success,
and thus reduce the risk of settling a frivolous claim.Uz In conof the limits the existence of individual issues places on the availability of class
suit, see pp. 15o4-i6 infra.
161 Price-fixing in violation of § z of the Sherman Act, i5 U.S.C. § 1 (.970),
is established by proof of the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy
for the purpose of fixing prices which in fact did have an effect on price structure.
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 15o, 219-20 (194o). The
first two elements of liability, concerning the existence and purpose of concerted
action, obviously turn on the meaning to be attributed to the defendants' own
acts. The third element, having to do with the effect of the defendants' conduct,
on its face appears to concern factual questions as to which defendants are likely
to have no better information than anyone else. The Socony-Vacuum decision,
however, substantially diminished the significance of the effect requirement by
treating effect as relevant only where defendants' conduct did not involve overt
price-fixing, see id. at 219; once price-fixing is established, its impact on the
market is irrelevant: "Even though the members of the price-fixing group were
in no position to control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or
stabilized prices they would be directly interfering with the free play of market
forces." Id. at 222; see id. at 224 & n.59. See generally Rahl, Price Competition
and the Price Fixing Rude--Preface and Perspective, Symposium on "Price
Competition and Antitrust Policy," 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 137 (1962).
161 Defendants are not in the position of having to rely only upon protracted
and expensive trial procedures to screen out frivolous claims. In antitrust actions,
as in other suits, summary judgment is available to short-circuit litigation of
clearly nonmeritorious suits. Although it has traditionally been thought that
"summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation,"
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (x962), in recent
years courts, while repeating the maxim, have not hesitated to make use of
summary judgment to dispose of nonmeritorious antitrust actions, see, e.g., Solomon
v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 393-94 ( 5 th Cir. 1976); Clark v.
United Bank of Denver Nat'l Ass'n, 480 F.2d 235, 240 (roth Cir.), cert. denied, 414
US. 1004 (X973), including price-fixing actions, see Scranton Constr. Co. v. Litton
Indus. Leasing Corp., 494 F.2d 778, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S.
1r05 (1975). See also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 168, at 92 (2d ed. X974).
The argument that price-fixing class actions are unlikely to overdeter potential
defendants because potential defendants are in a good position to judge the validity
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trast, the elements of the monopolization offense are greater in
number and less clearly derive from acts within an individual's
control. Proof may be retrospective, and liability can turn as much
on an assessment of a situation as on identification of particular
acts. 1 13 Uncertainty, therefore, is greater and thus the likelihood
increases that an individual wary of monopolization class suits will
overreact by avoiding conduct not in fact violative of the antitrust
laws and by settling class actions in fact frivolous. The costs of
overdeterrence may also be greater in the monopolization context.
An individual concerned by the prospect of price-fixing class actions would avoid any possibility of appearing to depart from
market pricing, a course of conduct not necessarily socially undesirable. An individual fearful of monopolization class actions,
however, might refrain from expansionary practices which are in

fact socially beneficial.
The full implications of the substantive mode of analysis necessary to square class actions increasing access to federal courts
with the Rules Enabling Act should not go unrecognized. Substantive analysis narrows the frame of reference for debate as to the
propriety of class actions: the issue no longer is the merits of the
class suit in general, but the acceptability of class actions with
respect to a given cause of action. As a result, questions of class
action procedure must be seen as more a matter for individualized
adjudication than rulemaking. This is not to say that a class acof price-fixing claims is, of course, strongest as applied to paradigmatic pricefixing suits-where the plaintiffs claim a limited number of defendants entered
into an agreement directly fixing prices, see also Rahl, supra note i61, at 143. In
situations where the alleged conspiracy involves a trade association and its membership, and thus only ambiguous joint action, see, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker
& Co., 5o8 F.2d 226 (gth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), noted in
Comment, 1975 UrAH L. lEv. 292, where the alleged price-fixing is only an indirect
effect of other, superficially innocuous action, see, e.g., United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 250 (1940), or where, despite the per se character of the
price-fixing violation, see Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211, 213 (1951), defendants may find in plaintiffs' conduct a basis for escaping
liability, see, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S.
481, 494 (1968) (dictum), defendants may not be in a position to judge the significance of their actions, and as a result the combined impact of class-wide liability
and treble damages may be of more concern.
163 The central element of monopolization offenses-the possession of monopoly power by the relevant actor or actors -presupposes
some definition of
the market which defendants are said to control. Identification of the relevant
market may require complex analysis of the cross-elasticity of the demand for
various products, see, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 395 (1956), or of the constraints geography places on both buyers and
sellers, compare United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US. 563, 575-76 (1966),
with id. at 589 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Such analysis does not concern itself
only with defendants' conduct, but with market structure generally, and thus
defendants may not be particularly well situated for purposes of judging liability.
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tion rule is unnecessary if the justification for class suit is
grounded in substantive law. A rule would still serve the critical
function of providing a point of departure. In effect, a rule could
be used by courts as a picture of a "normal" class action, a depiction of the process of class litigation which courts could treat
as a benchmark in shaping particular class suits to fit individual
causes of action.'
If class suits are to be justified substantively,
however, a class action rule cannot be applied mechanically. The
trial judge, and not the rulemaker, must bear chief responsibility
for the design of class action procedures."'
3. Class Actions as a Means to Full Realization of Substantive Policies: Heuristic Functions.- Class actions do not simply
increase the opportunities for federal courts to enforce statutory
directives but also assist the courts in determining precisely what
the implications of those directives are. A class action calls to
the attention of a court the interests of individuals other than the
immediate parties which, in common with the interests of one or
the other of the named parties, will be affected by decision of the
issue before the court. The existence of these absentee interests,
whether they reinforce or diverge from the interests of a named
party, may be a relevant factor in the court's decision on the
merits of a case or award of a remedy. A judge attentive to the
considerations underlying statutory directives might consider
absentee interests in any event; the class action, however, functions as a heuristic device, reminding the judge that resolution of
the dispute between the parties may affect, and correspondingly
be affected by, the interests of individuals not before the court.' 0
(a) The Heuristic Function and Necessity: Class Actions and
Limited Funds. - The heuristic function of class actions is most
apparent in cases where relief awarded to the immediate parties
would obviously affect the interests of absentees or would be obviously affected by the actions of absentees. For example, where
a number of individuals claim rights to a share of a fund too small
to satisfy in full every individual's claim, courts readily allow a
class action to be brought to allocate the fund among the competi164 This

is essentially the approach

taken in California.

See Comment,

California: A Flexible Scheme, Class Action Symposium, 68 Nw. U.L. Rav. iooo,
1024 (i974).
65 Because of its largely discretionary structure, rule 23 may in practice
effect a significant delegation of power to trial judges. See Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 39 (i967).

"IsThe notion of the heuristic function of the class suit is developed in several
opinions of Chief Judge Clark, who made use of the idea as an explanation of the
purpose served by the "spurious" class suit under the 1938 version of rule 23.
See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. X957); All American
Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1954). See also 3B J. MOORE, supra
note 63, f[23.10 Ei, at 23-26o9 to 23-26io.
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tors.1 6 7 A series of suits by individual competitors might result

in a situation where each competitor possessed the right to claim
in full against the fund, putting the holder of the fund in the
quandary of having to decide which of a number of equally binding
judgments to obey. Moreover, since the fund is limited, each
competitor would be affected by the outcome of every other competitor's lawsuit. To whatever extent recovery rights are awarded
one competitor, the difficulties other competitors would face in
recovering would be increased.
It has been suggested that in this situation class suit is somehow a matter of necessity.:" 8 The class action, however, is not in
fact the only solution to the limited fund problem. As a matter
of substantive policy, a "first come, first served" rule might be
deemed superior. Even if substantive policy is better served by
pro rata distribution, class actions are not strictly necessary.
If the court hearing the claim of the first competitor took
cognizance of the entire situation and applied allocative criteria
appropriate for the entire situation to determine the extent of
each claimant's share of the fund, application of the principle of
stare decisis in cases brought by the other competitors could lead
to a situation free of difficulty. 16 9 It is not clear, therefore, in
what sense class suit here may be said to be "necessary." The
justification for use of the class action form in this setting is in
fact more modest. By setting out before the court hearing the
first competitor's claim the relationship among the claimaints,
the class action calls to the attention of the court its responsibility
in deciding the claim to work out a satisfactory solution to the
situation.' 70
7

See, e.g., Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 63 F.R.D. 34,

35-37 (D.S.D. 1974); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Assoc., Inc., 48 F.R.D.
333, 337 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 414 F.2d 311 (ist Cir. I969).
108 See p. 1322, note 5 supra.
9 See generally Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class

Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. RaV. 433, 446-48 (ig6o). Stare decisis, of course, is relevant
only where litigation turns on questions of law or mixed questions of law or fact.
Presumably, the question of the measure of relief -the
central question in the
limited fund situation - falls into one or the other of these categories.
170 The argument for a heuristic rather than a necessity interpretation of
the limited fund class action is not merely that class suit is not strictly necessary
in the limited fund situation. It may very well be that the res judicata effect a class
suit may afford, but see pp. 1395-400 infra, would provide greater certainty
than stare decisis, and on this basis ought to be preferred. The focus of
the necessity concept, however, obscures the fact that, at least as to relief, class members are in a state of mutual opposition: each benefits from the other's loss. The
fact of mutual antagonism was clear to community of interest theorists, see note-16
supra; indeed, the point of Langdell's article on creditor's bills was to show that a
class action solution to the limited fund problem could be satisfactorily derived from
equitable principles without resort to class action doctrine, see Langdell, supra note
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(b) The Relevance of the Heuristic Function to Issues of
Both Relief and Liability.- The limited fund class action calls
the attention of a court to the context in which individual relief
is sought, and thus increases the likelihood that the individual
relief the court awards will be meaningful. The heuristic value
of the class suit in other contexts may derive from the clarity
with Which the class action reveals that, even where a right is
individual, the appropriate remedy may not be. For example, a
single individual has standing to challenge racially discriminatory
practices burdening a group of which the individual is a member.'
Relief from racial discrimination, however, may require
court orders restructuring the way the discriminator deals with
the group as a whole." 2 Influenced by traditional doctrines limiting the scope of relief to the scope of the right,7 3 a court hearing
only the claim of a single individual may be reluctant to award
such far-reaching relief. 74 The class action, by aggregating the
claims of discrimination victims, reestablishes the symmetry of
right and remedy. 75 It assists the court in seeing not only the
differences in situation of individual class members which may
affect the details of structural relief, but also the generality of
the challenged discriminatory practice that makes structural
relief appropriate in the first place. 76
Class characteristics may also be relevant to adjudication of
the merits of a claim. Class actions, therefore, can serve a heur9. From this perspective, the limited fund suit is analogous to school desegregation

suits, which under rule 23 would fall into the separate (b) (2) category, see Advisory
Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 102 (1966), but which may give rise to similar conflicts
problems at the relief stage, see, e.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 7M7, 718 (5th
Cir. 1975).
I" See, e.g., Robinson v. Dallas, 514 F.2d X271, 1272-74 (5th Cir. 1975);
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. I968); Potts v. Flax, 313
F.2d 284, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1963).
172See, e.g., Rogers v. International Paper Co., Sio F.2d 1340, 1356-57 (8th
Cir.), vacated on grounds not here relevant, 96 S. Ct. ig (i975) ; Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 243-63 (5th Cir. 1974).
17 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738, 744 (I974).
174E.g., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1972). See
also Otis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968); Comment,
FederalEmployment Discrimination:Scope of Inquiry and the Class Action Under
Title VII, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1288, 1294-95 (1975).
175 Indirect evidence of the usefulness of the class suit in connecting righf and
remedy is provided by appealability doctrine: a federal district court's refusal
to allow a suit for injunctive relief to proceed as a class action is open to interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § X292 (a) (i) (,970) as an order "modifying"
or "refusing" requested injunctive relief. See, e.g., Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
goi F.2d 1177, 1x79 (gth Cir. 1974); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1364-65
(ist Cir. 1972).
178 In some circumstances, the effect of the "case or controversy" requirement
of article III may be to make a class suit a more appropriate forum than an individual suit for seeking certain forms of injunctive relief.
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istic function even where the relief afforded could be framed to
affect only the situation of an individual claimant. The usefulness
of the class action form in this context does not depend upon
whether a court ultimately decides to allow a class suit to go
forward. For example, a court asked to hear a class suit brought
under rule Iob-5 177 on behalf of open market investors claiming
injury because of material misrepresentations by the class opponent would have to decide, before it could allow the suit to go
forward, whether a showing of material misrepresentation was
sufficient to make out a claim under rule Iob-5, or whether the cause
of action rather required each injured investor to show actual
reliance upon an alleged misrepresentation. 7 8 In deciding this
substantive issue, the court might find relevant the characteristics of the class bringing suit. The size of the class, the loss
claimed by individual class members, and the impact of liability
upon the class opponent, would give the court a basis for gauging
the extent to which adoption of a materiality requirement would,
on the one hand, further a policy of compensating the victims
of securities "I fraud or, on the other hand, increase the deterrent effect of rule Iob-5 to the point that the operation of the
securities market would be undesirably constrained.8
Thus,
even if the court concluded that the substantive policies shaping
the rule iob-5 cause of action dictated a requirement of actual
reliance, and therefore that a class of investors who could show
only a material misrepresentation could not bring suit,'8 ' the
class action form would have served a heuristic function.8
177
178

7 C.F.R. § 240.Iob-5 (,975).
See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack,

524

F.2d 89i, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975), petition

for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. March 5, 1976) (No.
v. Kramarsky, 6i F.R.D. 674, 68i (S.D.N.Y.

1974).

75-1258);

Werfel

See generally p. I5o7 &

note 264 infra.
179 See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
rob-5, 88 H~Av. L. REv. 584, 593-94 (i975).
0 Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-43 (1975)
(upholding purchaser-seller restriction on standing to sue under rule iob-5 as a
safeguard against the in terrorem effect of frivolous suits). But see The Supreme
Court, x974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 47, 271-73 (975).
181 In fact, a showing of reliance probably would not be required in this
context. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 9o5-o8 ( 9 th Cir. 1975), petition for
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. March 5, 1976) (No. 75-1258); Note, supra
note I79, at 592.
182 The class suit may thus be seen as a way of calling to the attention of judges
the full consequences of their substantive lawmaking which might otherwise be
obscured by a case-by-case common law approach. However, if the heuristic function is to be served, and subliminal shifts in substantive law, see Comment, supra
note 146, at 341, 345, possibly inconsistent with the Rules Enabling Act, see Note,
supra note 174, at 597 n.65, avoided, class action procedures requiring a judge to
consider the conformity of class suit with cause of action policies, see pp. 15o4-i6
infra, must in fact be carried out.
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A number of courts have refused to treat challenges to the
constitutionality of government action as class suits. 8 3 In foregoing class action analysis, however, courts hearing constitutional challenges may give up an opportunity to familiarize
themselves with the facts of a case which may be relevant to its
outcome.'8 Some courts have reasoned that there is no need
for a class action challenge to the constitutionality of a government practice since, if the practice were held unconstitutional
with respect to one potential class member, government officials
would not in any event continue the practice in dealing with
other potential class members. 5' Other courts have concluded
that apparent differences in the situation of potential class members cause case-by-case adjudication of constitutional claims
to be preferred to class litigation. 180 The two positions are inconsistent: If government officials will treat all potential class
members identically in any event, case-by-case adjudication is a
sham; if differences in the situation of class members justify a
case-by-case approach, government officials may not treat all
class members identically after all. If class actions were not
rejected out of hand in the context of constitutional challenges,
but rather their propriety judged in light of the facts of a particular case, courts would be required to determine which of the
two positions was the more accurate reflection of the situation
in the given case. The merits of a constitutional claim may
ultimately turn in part upon the outcome of such a determina"'3 See, e.g., United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812
(5th Cir. 1974) ; Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (ioth Cir. i973) ;
Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572-73 (8th Cir.), vacated as
moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 640' (2d Cir. 1971). See
also MANUAL FOR COmPLEX LITIGATION § 1.401 (1973).
1 84
By so doing, courts also deprive litigants of the protection against mootness
the class device affords. See note iig supra; pp. 1464-66 inlra. Refusal to
treat a suit challenging the constitutionality of government action as a class suit
further deprives litigants of the power which widespread access to the contempt
sanction gives, see note rig supra, to insure that government does not restrict its
compliance with a judgment of unconstitutionality to cover only its dealings with
the immediate litigants. See generally United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods,
432 F.2d 2072, X075-76 (7th Cir. 2970) (decision of lower federal court does not
bind state courts except as to case at hand). The possibility of only selective
respect for a judgment of unconstitutionality is by no means hypothetical. See,
e.g., Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 547-48 (8th Cir. 1975).
185 See, e.g., United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 8i2
(Sth Cir. 1974); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.sd 122, X226-27 (ioth Cir.
1973); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 199, I2OO n.I (E.D. Va.
1975), aff'd mem., 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976). See also Hoehle v. Likins, 405 F. Supp.
1167, ii75 (D. Minn. 1975) (statutory action).
"'See, e.g., Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572-73 (8th
Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972) ; Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 640 (2d
Cir. 1971); Stewart v. Wohlgemuth, 355 F. Supp. 1212, 1213 (W.D. Pa. 2972).
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tion. The requirements of procedural due process, for example,
are set by a balance of factors including, inter alia, the functional
appropriateness of particular procedures for resolution of the
dispute in question.1 8 7

If government action indeed does not

raise issues likely to differ from case to case, procedures useful
for the fair decision of sharply individualized claims may not be
constitutionally required. 3
4. Full Realization and Fairness.- Not only the justification
for class suits, but the fairness of such procedures as well, may
be seen to derive from the contributions class actions make to
full- realization of substantive policy. It is fair to adjudicate
the rights of absentees through a representative process because
use of that process increases the likelihood that the absentees
will receive what society has decided is their due. It is not that,
in the absence of class actions, the rights of the individuals who
would have been class members do not exist or are not affected
by others' conduct. If conduct occurs which legislation has
stipulated ought not to occur, at least in the absence of settlement, the rights of individuals affected by the conduct are
nullified de facto if no suit is brought. If suit is brought, although not formally on behalf of members of a class, the rights
of the individuals who would have been class members are again
affected. The relief awarded may alter the situations of absentees
as well as the parties to the litigation; at the least, the litigation
will create a precedent which may guide the conduct of the
defendant in a lawsuit with the absentees, or influence the outcome
of any litigation the absentees subsequently might bring. 18 9 Class
suits, by increasing access to courts and by positioning judges to
see better the significance of claims before the courts, increase the
likelihood that the rights of individuals which would be affected in
any event are accorded the weight to which they are entitled by
statute or constitution.
The obligation which this substantive theory of fairness
imposes upon judges trying class suits is, not surprisingly, an
obligation to ensure that class suits do not infringe the rights
of class members. Procedural adjustments may be called for to
ensure that the situations and interests of absentees will be able
187 Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits
on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 IARv. L. RaV. igIo, 1514, 1516-17 (1975);
see, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402-o6 (1971).
188 See also Stewart v. Wohlgemuth, 355 F. Supp. 1212,

1213 (W.D. Pa. 1972)
(emphasizing "myriad of differing circumstances" in refusing to allow class treatment of suit challenging alleged conclusive presumption).
'" See p. 1349 &notes XOI-02 supra.
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to be identified, so that the court will be able to take absentee
rights into account in determining the outcome of litigation."' 0
It is also possible, however, that the rights of absentees will
themselves be procedural. While the substantive theory of the
fairness of the class suit is instrumental, in that it takes as the
measure of fairness the degree to which class procedures are a
means to protecting the rights of class members, the rights that
the substantive theory commits courts to protect may not be.
The rights recognized by a given cause of action may include
rights of participation or of individual treatment valued for their
own sake.'
If absentee interests are to be given their due, class
procedures may have to be designed to safeguard such procedural
rights. Should no class procedure protecting procedural rights
be practical, a court, to be fair to absentees, will have to determine
whether the totality of the rights a cause of action recognizes,
both substantive and procedural, is better served by terminating
the lawsuit or by going forward in derogation of some of the
L2
rights.
Two general and related implications of the substantive
theory of fairness should be apparent. The judge rather than the
litigants is the focus of attention. 3 The relative homogeneity
of a class is immaterial to the fairness of class suit, at least insofar
as differences within the class can be accommodated by the judge
in deciding the case. 1 4 More specific consequences of the substantive theory of fairness, as well as of the full realization
justification for class suit from which the theory of fairness
derives, are worked out in the next four sections of the Note.
The first of these sections considers several general approaches
to procedural design useful in analyzing class action issues. The
three remaining sections are more concrete, considering the
appropriate form for pretrial procedures in class actions, the
fundamental requirements for class suits, and the proper procedures for accommodating settlement negotiations within class
litigation.
o90
See pp. 1474-79 infra.
...The right of litigants to control their own lawsuits may also be seen as a
more general value pervading the entire legal system and requiring judges to
delegate to litigants at least some responsibility for shaping even class suit. See
McCoid, supra note 40, at 714; Weinstein, supra note 168, at 438; PP. 1387-90 infra.
192 See pp. 15o4-i6 infra (predomination).
111 A judge, therefore, ought to be able to transform a suit into a class action
on his own motion. E.g., Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 4o6 F. Supp. 1195, Ix98 (M.D.
Ga. 194
1975); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LiTIGATION § 1.40, at 17 (1973).
See pp. 1471-88 infra.
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III. DIVISION OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONTROL IN
CLASS ACTIONS FURTHERING PUBLIC REGULATORY POLICY
Implicit in the substantive theory I of the class suit is a notion
that society's interests are served when public regulatory policy
is enforced by private lawsuits. And, indeed, the image of the
class suit as a manifestation of a private attorney general theory
of litigation is corroborated by the overwhelmingly public law
basis of the substantive claims litigated in federal class actions.2
The substantive theory of class actions is paradoxical, for
at the same time it consigns vindication of public interests to
private parties, it recognizes that the public interest must be protected against the machinations of those very same parties. 3 Within the substantive model, this tension is resolved through judicial
control: The court is entrusted with protecting the class from its
own champions. 4 So long as the lawsuit is fully litigated, there is
at least in theory little danger of private control subverting the
public interest. But in practice, few class actions are fully litigated. Most class actions for damages are either dismissed before
trial or settled,5 and injunctive decrees may be negotiated, even
' See pp. 1353-72 supra.
2 See p. 1325, note 30 supra.
3See pp. 1371-72 supra.
4
See pp. 1402-x6 infra.
'See Morris v. Burchard, 5i F.R.D. 530, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("It is remarkable that cases which have gone through the crucible of a complete trial are not
readily to be found, although Rule 23, as amended, has been in existence for about
four years."); AmERiCAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, SPECIAL COmm. ON RULE 23

OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15i6 (1972) (since x966, no antitrust or securities class action has proceeded
through trial to actual determination of damages); Furth & Burns, The Anatomy
of a Seventy Million Dollar Sherman Act Settlement-A Law Professor's TapeTalk with Plaintiff's Trial Counsel, 23 DEPAuL L. REV. 865, 88o (1974) (practitioner observes that virtually all antitrust class actions are settled) ; Handler, The
Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits - The TwentyThird Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLum. L. REV. I, 8 (1971). But see North
Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, No. 74-2154
(4 th Cir., Jan. 12, 1976) (antitrust class suit brought by State of North Carolina, as
part of Pfizer litigation, dismissed after trial on merits) ; Patrick & Cherner, Rule
23 and the Class Action for Damages: A Reply to the Report of the American
College of Trial Lawyers, 28 Bus. LAW. 1097, i-8 (1973) (list of tried damage
class actions). A statistical study of class actions brought within the District
Court for the District of Columbia found that in 63% of the cases the certification issue was never reached and that 55% of the cases were won by the defendant
on a preliminary motion, usually a motion for failure to state a claim for which
relief could be granted. Of the 21 cases producing any relief, whether equitable or
legal, xx were settled, 6 were won on summary judgment motions, and 4 were
won by plaintiffs after a full trial. Note, The Rule 23(b) (3) Class Action: An
Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1135-38 (1974).
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if liability is adjudicated. 6 This raises two related questions: How
much judicial intervention is necessary to ensure fairness? How
much private control is consistent with the purposes of the substantive model?
Such questions did not trouble traditional legal thought, which
implicitly assumed that the parties would, on the basis of their
business judgment and predictions about the likely outcome of
trial, reach settlements that implemented underlying policy or at
least did not so distort that policy as to require judicial supervision.' Federal class action procedure has taken a less sanguine
view of settlement, and today requires judicial approval of dismissals or compromises of class and derivative suits, and suits involving unincorporated associations.' Implicit in such judicial review is the assumption that the judge will exercise some sort of
control- presumably in what he defines as the interest of absentees or of the public generally - over the private arrangements
of the named litigants.'
How precisely the judge is to impose the "correct" degree of
social control is not clear and seems to turn on a great many
factors. The rulemakers' decision to allow settlement is an indication that the parties' interests are to count for something."0 The
substantive law under which a suit is brought may also indicate
a preference for solutions negotiated among the parties." Frequently, substantive law will dictate no more than a general form
for relief,' 2 and party input and cooperation may be necessary to
assure a remedy that fulfills the purposes of substantive law, not
in the least because cooperation of the parties will be essential
to the implementation of the decree.' On the other hand, judicial
6See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Pueblic Law Litigation, 89

HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1298-1302 (976).
'Of course, settlements of lawsuits, like other contracts, could be overturned
if force, fraud, or duress tainted the agreement. See generally 6A CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1292 (2d ed. 1962). See also Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Howbert,
57 F.2d 769, 771 (ioth Cir. 1932) (mistake).
'See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), 23.1, 23.2.
' See generally pp. I536-4o, 1565-76 infra.

10 Settlement is a well-recognized means for disposing of litigation, encouraged in many types of federal cases. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 53
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972); MANUAL FOR COmPLEX LITIGATION,
pt. I, § 1.21 (,973). See also Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their
Responsibility, 53 F. R. D. 129 (971). Negotiation is also an important element
in many recent federal statutes. See note i6 infra.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 2o0oe-5(a) (i97o). See generally United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 846-49 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3429 (U.S. Jan. I5, 1976) (No. 75-oo).
12 See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1292-96.
13 The judge's need to enlist the continuing support of the parties -and
particularly the defendants who are often the only group in a position to implement
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control over settlement or decree negotiation may be necessary
to assure a remedy that fulfills the purposes of substantive law.14
In exercising such control prior to a determination of liability,
however, a judge must be careful to avoid prejudging the merits
of the dispute.-5 And in any case, the judge must avoid the appearance of partiality in order not to undermine the legitimacy of
the class action procedure. Some degree of private control, therefore, may be required by considerations of fairness as well as by
substantive policy.
A framework for analyzing possible modes of judicial interaction with private ordering can be developed by considering four
ideal types of dispute resolution mechanisms identified by legal
anthropology and sociology: (i) regulation of private ordering;
(2)
mediation; (3) privately controlled adjudication; and (4)
publicly controlled adjudication. In the first two, public control
is minimal. The ultimate disposition of the dispute is shaped by
the values and interests of the disputants, although the outcome
will depend on their bargaining power, which will reflect at least in
part the credibility of the plaintiffs' substantive claims. In the
latter two, the dispute will be resolved in accord with social norms,
although in privately controlled litigation there is always the opportunity to remit the dispute to negotiation or mediation at any
time the disputants so choose. These four modes are not, however,
mutually exclusive: A dispute may be regulated on several levels
simultaneously or successively.
A. Regulation of PrivateOrdering
The oldest form of dispute resolution - one that predates
society - is self-help, letting the parties fight it out. Its chief
the decree of the court, see, e.g., Draft Report of the Masters 31, Morgan v. Kerrigan, Civ. No. 72-pxi-G (D. Mass. March 2x, 1975) -is
evidenced by the conciliatory tone taken toward defendants by judges even after a determination of
constitutional violation. See COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1317-18 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), aff'd sub. nom. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. X975), rev'd, 96 S.
Ct. 598 (,976); Louisville Courier-Journal, July 23, 1975, at A8, cols. 2-3 (remarks of Judge Gordon). See also Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598, 6og (U976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (decree "was one that the Police Department concededly
could live with").
"4See pp. 1523-76 infra.
15 In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. i56 (1974), the Supreme Court
disapproved the practice of the lower court in holding a minihearing in which the
likelihood of the plaintiff's success was determined and the cost of notice apportioned accordingly between the plaintiff and defendant. Among other reasons
given by the court for disapproving this practice was the fear that such a preliminary hearing could prejudice the later trial of the case. Id. at 178. A similar
problem could be raised by any attempt to determine how a settled case might
have come out on the merits since it is always possible that a settlement will fail
and trial will, indeed, ensue.
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advantage is that it promotes pluralist decisionmaking.'0 The state
does not dictate a solution; rather the parties work out a settlement on the basis of their interests, shared expectations, 7 and relative bargaining power. But there are two disadvantages. First,
the solution that results may be irreconcilable with collective
notions of justice.18 Second, conflict between the parties can result in violent social disruption. All societies must therefore regulate self-help to some extent. Certain weapons will be restricted
or banned to prevent violence.' 9 But other non-violent weapons
" Pluralist decisionmaking is often chosen as a mode of implementing regulatory statutes. For example, Title VII charges the EEOC to attempt to conciliate a civil rights dispute before allowing it to go to court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe
-5(a) (1970). See also 29 U.S.C. § 6z6(d) (1970) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act; Secretary of Labor to "seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion"). Similarly,
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, I5
U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (Supp. IV, 1974), mandates an attempt to reach a negotiated solution in warranty disputes, see id. § 231o, as did early drafts of the consumer class action bill, which would have required class plaintiffs to allow the
defendant an opportunity to settle with class members, see Dole, The Settlement
of Class Actions for Damages, 7, Cor m. L. REV. 971, 1004-05 (971).
See also
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1024
(i955) (arguing that courts should avoid becoming entangled in labor disputes
because adjudication was inappropriate for maintaining a regime of industrial selfgovernment).
1" Professor Eisenberg has pointed out that principles, rules, precedents, and
reasoned elaboration can play a part in the negotiated resolution of disputes. See
Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HaRv. L. REV. 637 (I976). This suggests that claims of right based on
social norms, such as regulatory statutes or the Constitution, could play a role
in private ordering even if there was no practical access to a court to obtain a
judicial sanction.
18 See Stern, Alternative Dispute Settlement Procedures, 1968 Wis. L.
REV.
1100, 1101.
19 The absolute proscription of private violence is a fairly recent development.
In more primitive times, society was content to regulate violence rather than eliminate it altogether. See P. FITZGERALD, SALarOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 90 & n.(e)
(12th ed. 1966). See also Barton, Procedure Among the Ifugao, in LAW AND WARFARE 179-80 (P. Bohannan ed. 1967) (two week truce imposed on disputants in
Philippine tribe, after which the "parties may fight out the dispute to suit themselves") [hereinafter cited as BoHAN AN]; Pollock, The Transformation of
Equity, in EssAYs 3N THE LAW 185 (1922) (lex talionis belongs "to a much later
and more rational stage of ancient law, for it presupposes a long course of bargaining and settlement of feuds . . . "). At an intermediate level, society may ritualize
violence, substituting less bloody forms. Dueling may succeed murder, boxing or
wrestling may supplant dueling. See x F. PoLmocK & F. MAITLAND, THE HisiORY
OF ENGLISHc LAW 39-40, 50-5I (2d ed. 1898) (extrajudicial fighting); Barton, supra,
at 168 (wrestling to settle land boundaries).
Judges and commentators have also recognized that the court may, in some
types of cases, be essentially a theater in which the parties may have a ritualized
fight. See Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under
the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REv. 81, 107 (I975); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's
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will remain available to disputants and may be used without societal authorization as sanctions to coerce settlement.
One mode of societal regulation of private ordering is the
structuring of bargaining relationships between groups of potential
disputants. Nonviolent negotiation may, for example, be both
possible and socially acceptable when the parties are to some degree mutually dependent.2 ° Because either party may threaten
future non-cooperation, or even withdrawal, each has non-violent
bargaining power with which to prevent gross injustice. 2 Private
bargaining is ineffective, however, if one side is too disorganized
or weak 22 to protect itself, or if one party has no incentive, or
need, to bargain with the other. To promote private ordering in
these circumstances, society may provide a mechanism through
which the aggrieved may organize themselves into bargaining
units, and disputants may be required to negotiate in good faith,
thereby creating a structure for peaceful resolution of conflict.3
Society may also, and routinely does, redefine relationships
directly through the enactment of regulatory statutes. To some
extent, individuals will conform their behavior to regulatory norms
even in the absence of an effective sanction. For society to ensure
compliance, however, publicly or privately initiated adjudication
is generally required. But, because regulatory statutes may reflect different interests than those shared by either the regulated
party or its opponent, or because regulatory statutes may allow a
range of outcomes more or less desirable to the parties, both
parties may prefer a negotiated to an adjudicated solution.2 4
Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1283-84 (1952) ("A political
libel suit is the modern substitute for ordeal by battle . . . . [T]he judge is not the
commander but merely the umpire."); cf. Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New
Deal, 47 HARv. L. REv. 913, 931-37 (1934) (criticizing the idea that the judge should
be a neutral umpire on the ground that "rugged individualism" view of law, in
which that idea made some sense, is not apposite in regulatory contexts).
2
See Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 305,
313-14 (1971).
2 See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 55, reprinted in SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL
ORDER I6I, 171-72 (R. Schwartz & J. Skolnick eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZ & SKOLNICK].
22 This may frequently be the case in class suits initiated by groups, such as
prisoners or inmates of mental institutions, thought to be in a subordinate role to
the defendant. But even here, some possibility of bargaining exists. See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 672-80.
2
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(d), 204, 29 U.S.C. §§ i58(d),
174 (0970).
24 For example, in the Norwalk, Connecticut school integration case, the parties
agreed to a desegregation plan in which only minority students were bused. Other
class members objected that the equal protection clause required two-way busing,
but they were ultimately unsuccessful. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of
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Rather than using enforcement mechanisms to obtain a judicial
resolution of the dispute, therefore, an aggrieved party may use
the threat of going to court as a weapon to force its adversary to
the bargaining table. To the extent the parties are willing to trade
statutory entitlements for benefits for which they have no legal
claim,2 5 conformity with social norms can also be diluted. The
difference in outcome between negotiated and adjudicated outcomes may, in some cases, subvert regulatory policy. On the other
hand, it may be perceived as a benefit, giving needed flexibility to
a regulatory regime.
Enforcement of statutory norms through class actions simultaneously creates the potential for fuller realization of substantive policy through adjudication and the preconditions for effective bargaining among the named parties. When an aggrieved
group holds individually recoverable claims, some private ordering
may be possible in the absence of class suits. If, however, aggrieved individuals are disorganized and hold individually nonrecoverable claims, the class action creates the structure essential
for negotiation. By extending access to the legal system to persons
holding individually nonrecoverable claims, the class suit mechanism makes possible a threat of litigation that the class opponent
cannot simply ignore. Indeed, a class action may be a much more
credible weapon than a threatened invocation of either legislative
or administrative 2 action - once a claim is filed, both the court
and the defendant must respond. But, for the reasons mentioned
Educ., 298 F. Supp. 203 (D. Conn. i968) (denial of temporary restraining order),
298 F. Supp. 208 (denial of application by Black and Puerto Rican parents and
students to intervene as defendants), 298 F. Supp. 210 (i969) (certification), 298
F. Supp. 213 (1969) (merits), aff'd, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 197o). See also Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. X973), affd, 522 F.2d 7,7 (5th Cir.
,975) (rejecting constitutional challenge to negotiated school decree that did not
require extensive busing); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517
F.2d 826, 853-56 (5th Cir. I976) (construing terms of consent degree narrowly
to avoid its being against public policy), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3429
(U.S. Jan. 15, 2976) (No. 75-1005).
2 For example, in Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 455 (1972), dissident union
members sued union officials for restitution of funds improperly spent. In approving a settlement- opposed by five of the six named plaintiffs because it did not
require the defendants to admit guilt-the court noted that the primary concem of the plaintiffs in bringing suit had not been restitution, but ousting the
defendants from their union offices by discrediting them. Such an ouster went
beyond the permissible relief that could be granted by the court under the statute upon which suit was brought, and the court therefore approved the settlement which had no provision for an admission of guilt. See id. at 499.
26 Some administrative procedures may put equivalent pressure on defendants.
However, in many procedures the administrative agency will retain discretion to
determine whether the defendant must answer a complaint. See, e.g., National
Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § i6o (1970); Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
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above, both the class representative and the class opponent may
find it desirable to negotiate, rather than adjudicate, their dispute. As a practical matter, however, it seems likely that a class
opponent's incentive to negotiate, or at least the terms of a settlement that a class opponent is willing to accept, will depend on the
extent to which the settlement can, as a practical or legal matter,
terminate the possibility of future adjudication." Here, again,
the class suit, which allows absentee class members to be bound
without their consent,2 or which at least puts inertia on the side
of settlement by requiring absentees to opt out,2 9 provides a mechanism to facilitate a negotiated outcome.
The cost of class actions provides the chief incentive to settle
for both the class and the class opponent. For the plaintiff class,
trial is complex and expensive, and class attorneys have much to
lose. For the defendant, the risks of suffering a huge judgment, or of being burdened with court-imposed structural relief,
may be unacceptable.3 ° Settlement pressures, however, may not
always be equal. At the outset of litigation, the plaintiff class
can rely upon the defendant's interest in avoiding both the
full consequences of an adverse judgment and the rapidly mounting expenses of litigation to provide an incentive for quick agreement. 3' After a time, though, the defendant's deeper pocket may
enable it to win a favorable settlement through a war of attrition,
by simply outlasting the plaintiffs.3 2
Class action procedures also provide the parties means of
pressuring their opponents. The power to move a court to rule on
27 No case has been found where a settlement was reached prior to judicial

definition of the class or where the class definition was not itself the subject of
negotiation. In the former case, the class will be legally bound if the settlement is
approved by the court; in the latter, the defendant apparently attempts to set
class size to preclude any practical possibility of future litigation, see pp. I555-56
infra. See also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 700 (7th Cir. 1975) (certification needed to promote certainty in settlement negotiations).
28 See pp. 1394-1402 infra (res judicata).
21 Where the class definition is negotiated, notice of the class suit, notice of the
settlement, and an opportunity to opt out may all be combined into one communication from the court. In this situation, absentees have a clear opportunity
to assess the adequacy of the settlement and may, indeed, reject it. The defendant is nonetheless given some assurance that the settlement will have practical binding effect since (z) inertia will be on the side of accepting the settlement; and (2)

the defendant may be able to condition his assent to the settlement on a substantial
proportion of absentees accepting it. See generally pp. 1555-6o infra.
20 See Simon, Class Actions - Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D.
375, 389 (1972).
31 See Handler, supra note 5, at 9.
32 Cf. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 9oo-oi (2d Cir. 1972) (lengthy derivative
suit may not be worth plaintiff's attorney's time); Reiter v. Universal Marion
Corp., 299 F.2d 449, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (lawyer may compromise derivative

suit for inadequate amount).
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the issue of class certification, 3 for example, provides a class opponent with an important bargaining weapon. Standards of certification such as predomination and adequacy of representation are
often indeterminate, 34 and representatives of a class may be unwilling to take the risk of an adverse ruling. Even a favorable
ruling on certification may have unfavorable consequences for a
class since procedural obligations triggered by certification, such
as the responsibility to give notice,3 may significantly increase
the costs of litigation. On the other hand, class action notice gives
plaintiffs a means of creating adverse publicity about defendants. Indeed, the very function of notice is to bring the class
suit to the attention of absentees who may well be the customers,
creditors, or potential shareholders of the defendant company. A
defendant may well fear that such publicity will interfere with its
day-to-day operations. In Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,3" for example, the defendant, fearing that notice of a pending class action
would prejudice it with its customers, asked the court to dispense
with notice and convert the action into a test case.3 7 If the plaintiff won, absentees could benefit; if the plaintiff lost, absentees
would not be bound. For Carte Blanche, ridding itself of adverse
publicity was worth more than obtaining mutuality of estoppel.
Discovery can also be a bargaining weapon.3 8 Because class
actions tend to be big cases, covering a complex factual pattern,
many more documents and exhibits may be relevant than in a
simple lawsuit.39 Thus relevance may provide little check on the
scope of discovery. The class may demand more information than
"aSee pp. 1416-39 infra.
4 See pp. 1471-1516 infra.

3

31 See pp.

1402-16 infra.
36496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (I974), noted, 88 HARv.

L. REV. 825 (1975); see Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 8o1, 8o6
(W.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 526 F.2d xo83 (3d Cir. 1975); Weightwatchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weightwatchers Int'l, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 647, 649
(E.D.N.Y. 197I) (interim order) (publicity about trial that evidenced commercial
nature of franchises said to be very damaging to company image among "highly
sensitive obese population").
37 496 F.2d at 757-58.
' 8 Abusive discovery apparently goes on despite the safeguards of FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(c). See, e.g., Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrowing Path to
Rectitude?, 50 IND. L.J. 472, 474 ('975) (discovery by unions against management

in National Labor Relations Act § 301 suits). See generally Comment, Tactical
Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALiE LJ. 117 (1949).
See also 4 J.MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f1 26.02(3] (2d ed. 1975) (abuses occur, but
for 39
the most part can be controlled by discovery rules).
See, e.g., Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir.
X973) ("voluminous employment records"); Cornaglia v. Ricciardi, 63 F.R.D. 416,
421 (E.D. Pa. x974);
1217 (M.D. Pa. i973)

Hoffman v. Charnita, Inc., 17 FED. RuLEs SERV. 2D 1215,
("As both suits have been certified as class actions, the extent
of discovery has of necessity been broadened.").
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could possibly be sifted at trial in an effort to interrupt corporate
activity,40 probe for embarrassing secrets, or impose costs.41 On
the other hand, the class opponent may use discovery to harass
absentees, hoping thereby to cause enough opt-outs to make the
case financially infeasible. If discovery of the class is restricted 42
to prevent such abuses,43 however, the class opponent will be unable to discourage extensive discovery by making counter-demands.
The defendants' bar calls the system of private bargaining
made possible by class action procedure "blackmail." " This epithet assumes that even meritless strike suits have access to the full
range of weapons. But the difference between bargained and
adjudicated outcomes may not be so great. Class attorneys, who
will receive a fee only if they benefit the class, 45 have economic

incentive to screen out meritless cass.46 Cases are further screened
at certification and on summary judgment motions." Also, an innocent defendant could demand a manageable trial on the common
issue of liability.
Since the ultimate justification for class actions is the contribution they make to full realization of substantive policies underlying causes of action, the social acceptability of settlements that
result from bargaining in the context of threatened class litigation
turns at least in part upon the degree to which the strength of the
parties' respective legal positions determines the outcome of the
negotiations. One means of fostering the congruence of negotiated
settlements and substantive policy is through careful design of
class action procedures. While such procedures have the primary
function of providing a structure for adjudication of class claims,
they can be bargaining weapons, and thus their desirability must
be evaluated from both the litigating and negotiating perspective.
Due regard for the dynamics of bargaining imposes both constraints and obligations on class action procedure. No procedure
should make class litigation so onerous that a party has no alternative but to accede to an opponent's demand. So long as all parties
retain a credible threat of withdrawing from negotiations and
seeking an official resolution of a dispute, however, the parties'
40 See

Yaffe v. Powers 454 F.2d 1362 (ist Cir. 1972); American Finance Systems, Inc. v. Pickrel, x8 FED. RuLa SmV. 2D 314, 3x6 (D. Md. 1974); Comment,
Making the Class Determination in Rule 23(b) (3) Class Actions, 42 FoRDIHA L.
REV. 791, 804 (X974).
41 See
42 See

p.1441 infra.
pp. i44o-41, 1446-47 infra.

41 See pp. i44o-4i, 1445-46 infra.
41 See Handler, supra note 5, at 9.

41 See

40 See
17

p. i615 infra.

Note, supra note 5, at 1154.

See pp. 418-27 infra.
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expectations about the outcome of adjudication will limit the affect
of adventitious elements on the negotiated resolution - if one
party perceives a demand of the other as more onerous than the
expected outcome of adjudication, that party will proceed, or at
least threaten to proceed, to adjudication rather than accept a
burdensome settlement. From the bargaining standpoint, therefore, notice requirements that impose a prohibitive cost upon
plaintiffs, or which lack the flexibility to enable a judge to protect
a defendant from debilitating publicity, are suspect. Similarly,
discovery rules that leave no leeway for regulation of plaintiff
attempts to use class litigation as a private freedom of information act or of defendant attempts to harass and intimidate class
members through repeated demands for information may be
counterproductive if they undermine the ability of a party to make
credible threats of going to adjudication.
Affirmatively, proper class action procedures must include
mechanisms by which litigants may obtain official determinations
of their substantive claims. In many class suits, trial itself will
provide the necessary means. But because trial may sometimes
be too drawn-out or expensive to be a practically available alternative, other devices, such as summary judgment procedures or
substantive settlement review hearings, may be necessary.
If bargaining in the context of a pending class suit is to be regulated to reduce adventitious elements of bargaining power, the
trial judge must assume chief responsibility and must not be
bound by inflexible procedures regulating the timing or form of
procedural orders. Assumption of this responsibility does not,
however, create a particularly activist role for the court. Even
in the context of class suits, negotiation is a useful means of dispute resolution, desirable for its own sake, and indeed often recognized as desirable by the statutes under which class suits are
brought. Use of class action procedures as bargaining weaponry
is therefore ordinarily not objectionable since substantive policy
will usually be furthered by any of a range of settlement outcomes.
It is only when procedural weaponry becomes so powerful that it
makes possible settlements outside the substantively satisfactory
range that there is a need for regulation.
The role of the trial judge in ensuring the credibility of the
parties' respective threats to adjudicate is not, however, the only
role for the trial judge in monitoring private negotiations. While
it is important that adventitious elements be reduced in negotiations, this alone does not ensure that absentees' interests will be
adequately represented in any negotiated resolution of the class
suit. To a large extent, protection of absentees requires adjustment of the party structure of the negotiations or review at settle-
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ment hearings. Both of these possibilities will be discussed at
length later in this Note. 48 A third possibility for ensuring that
settlements are fair to absentees is to cast the trial judge in the
role of the mediator. Whether this is feasible and appropriate in
the class action setting will now be considered.
B. Mediation
Mediation is conventionally defined as the intervention of a
third party to settle disputes without the use of coercive force.4"
It differs from adjudication in that the mediator seeks to further
the interests of the parties as they individually perceive them,
while the adjudicator stipulates an outcome not necessarily related to the desires of the parties. The paradigmatic act of mediation is the articulation of a compromise mutually acceptable to
the disputants. A mediator, however, may also foster agreement
in less active ways. The mere presence of a third party is likely
to inhibit negotiation in bad faith, since the disputants will generally not want to appear unreasonable.5 ° In addition, the outsider may be able to facilitate agreement by clarifying issues.
Through requests to the parties to state areas of agreement
and disagreement, through his own statement of the issues, and
through direction of discussion toward the most fruitful areas, an
outsider may be able to break deadlocks and secure a compromise
agreement."Ordinarily the value of mediation is seen to lie simply in the
fact that it facilitates agreement. The advantages of mediation
are, therefore, the advantages of negotiation. For example, the
parties are free to talk out the full range of their grievances unfettered by legal categories or rules of admissibility and relevance.5 2
At the end of the mediation, there will be a compromise to which
each has contributed. There will be no unilateral ascription of
blame; all will be partially vindicated and none condemned. 3
The common experience of participation in the act of settlement
may enhance feelings of solidarity and create a working unit to
resolve future disputes." At least theoretically, however, media"s See pp. 1479-82 inra (subclassing) ; pp. 1536-76 infra (settlement).
4"See Fuller, supra note 20, at 308, 311-13; Felsteiner, Influence of Social
Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 63, 69 (1974).
" See Fuller, supra note 20, at 307-09.
"' See id. at 318.
12 In villages in India, for example, dispute resolution negotiations resemble

group therapy sessions. Related disputes are brought up and grievances aired.
There is a general talking-out of group problems. See Cohn, Some Notes on Law
and Change in North India, in BoirArNa, supra note 19, at 148.
53 Id. at 156; Felsteiner, supra note 49, at 70-71.
" See McCray v. Beatty, 64 F.R.D. 107, 109 (D.NJ. 1974); Eisenberg, supra
note 17, at 646-49.
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tion differs from negotiation in that the mediator has the power to
introduce a degree of outside direction into the negotiating process.
There may be a number of compromises of a given dispute which,
once articulated by a mediator, the parties would find equally
acceptable. There may also be a number of solutions that society
as a whole would find equally satisfactory. If the two sets of
acceptable agreements overlap, a mediator, by articulating a
compromise agreement falling within the overlap, may be able
to reconcile the interests of the disputants in a way which is consistent with social objectives.
It is unclear, however, whether such theoretical control could
be realized in the class action context. The social interests the
mediator would be attempting to accommodate with the interests
of the disputants should be those identified with the interests of absentee class members.55 The disputing parties may, therefore,
regard the mediator as the representative of a distinct interest
group and treat the mediator's proposals not as neutral suggestions, but as the ploys of a fellow bargainer." Thus, explicit use of
mediation as a means of social control may nullify mediation's potential for facilitating negotiated settlement.
To capture most fully the cooperative values of mediation,
settlements must be reached before blame is ascribed.," In the
pretrial stage of the class action, however, mediation undertaken
by the judge hearing the case raises a number of ethical difficulties.
Mediation, to be perceived as fair by the parties, requires the
judge to be aware of the merits of the case.5 If this awareness is
achieved through extra-record conferences with the parties particularly ex parte conferences - subsequent adjudicatory factfinding by the judge may be open to the criticism that it reflects
more than a considered evaluation of the record." In addition, if
" If the judge does not mediate with an awareness of absentee interests, then
he has no choice but to review the settlement as if no mediation had ever occurred
and may be required, as a matter of adjudication, to reject a settlement suggested
in mediation.
" See Fuller, supra note 20, at 312-13.
" See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 658-60; Felsteiner, supra note 49, at 70-7,.
58 See Fox, supra note io,at 142-43.
" See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3A(4) (1974)

(a judge should "neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications
concerning a pending or impending proceeding"); CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES, Canon 3(A)(4), in 69 F.R.D. 273, 275 (x976) (same); cf. Fox,
supra note io, at X43 (limiting his encouragement of an active role in settlement

to jury trial cases where "any factual discussions in settlement conferences could
jeopardize neither the judge's responsibility at trial nor the integrity of final
factual determinations."). See also United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U.S.
274, 289 (1924) (order void because parties not apprised of the evidence upon
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the judge makes a concerted effort to make a fair evaluation of
the parties' cases, that evaluation may color his subsequent rulings
in the case should it go to trial.6 0 Equally important, if the case
is settled on terms different from those suggested by the judge,
or if absentees should attack the fairness of the settlement suggested by the judge, the judge will be required in effect to rule
on the adequacy of his own order. Such a posture for the trial
judge seems to contravene both the spirit of the federal statute
prohibiting a judge from sitting on an appeal from an order he has
previously entered, 6 and case law prohibiting administrative
officials from sitting on cases in which they have prejudged the
outcome."' Such prejudgment is an especially acute problem in
the context of settlement approval because, unlike an issue that
is ultimately decided as a matter of law, there is no readily available external referent to which a judge can turn to determine the
adequacy of a settlement and to minimize the force of his own
prejudgment. 63
There appears to be no fully satisfactory solution to the
problems of prejudgment and bias raised by judicial mediation.
These problems may be reduced if a judge does not attempt mediation until after he has heard all the relevant evidence and enunciated the law in an adjudicatory proceeding, or if, in mediating, the
which order was based even though information came from parties' annual
reports). To be sure, it is possible to overstate the effect of extra-record information. To some extent, judges passing on evidentiary issues are routinely exposed to such evidence; however, they are not asked, as they are in mediation,
to determine the weight of such evidence in evidentiary hearings.
o See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. i56, 178 (1974).
61 28 U.S.C. § 47 (197o) ("No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from
the decision of a case or issues tried by him."); see CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES, Canon 3(C)(I)(e), in 69 F.R.D. 273, 278 (1976) (a judge should
disqualify himself when "he has . . . expressed an opinion concerning the merits
of the particular case in controversy.").
62 Cinderella Career & Finishing School, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 589-92
(D.C. Cir. 1970); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 767 (6th Cir.
1966); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 76o (D.C. Cir. x964), vacated on other
grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468-69
(2d Cir. x959). See also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the
Federal Courts, 86 HARv. L. REV. 736, 758 (1973) (urging that rule announced in
administrative law cases be applied to federal judges); Note, Disqualification of
Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 1435, 1448-52 (1966)
(same).
63 Prejudgment of issues of law is generally thought to present fewer problems than prejudgment of issues of fact, or of the case as a whole. See Note,
Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1435,
1449 (1966). The standard to be applied when judging the adequacy of a settlement
is a balancing test, resting on factual information about the case, the course of
negotiation, and absentee interests, and legal issues concerning the substantiality
of the plaintiff's case. In short, the judge's role is not that of a law applier, but
a characterizer of fact. See pp. 1569-76 infra.
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judge limits himself to suggesting general compromises or to clarifying issues. The judge might also confine himself to making
structural adjustments in an ongoing bargaining process." But,
since a judge's rulings of law may not cover every issue which
could be mediated and which the judge would have to adjudicate
should negotiation and mediation fail, the prudent judge should
refrain from making overly specific suggestions, even after an adjudication of liability. Moreover, if active mediation by a judge
occurs only after formal rulings of law and findings of fact have
been made, at least some of the value of mediation may be lost.
Ascription of blame may undermine the consensual base of mediation. Even if formal recognition of the disputants as antagonists
does not make mediation entirely impossible, it may still reduce
the likelihood of future cooperation after the settlement is put
into effect.
Many of the problems raised by mediation in the context of
class actions might be avoided if a judge appointed someone else
to act as mediator. This would eliminate the problems of prejudgment and bias. Restrictions on the timing of mediation and
on the activism of the mediator would be unnecessary. This
course is not without expense, however, since such a mediator
must be paid. It is unclear what authority the judge would have
to tax the costs of mediation against either the plaintiff class
or the defendant; 05 mediation could be financed only if the
parties consent to it. In any event, it is unclear what authority
the judge has to insist on mediation if either party objects to it,
or, indeed, what value mediation would have if it is not consensual. If the parties agree to mediate, there seems little reason
for the judge to appoint the mediator as an officer of the court,
since, if the mediator attempts to perform any part of the judge's
role as protector of absentee interests, he, like the judge, may
well lose the impartiality needed to mediate. If the mediator
plays no role in protecting absentees, however, his presence should
have no effect on procedural decisions designed to ensure that
absentees are adequately represented. In reviewing a mediated
settlement, a judge would have to apply the same standards he
would use to review any negotiated settlement. 0
The problems of prejudgment and bias, and of undermining
the force of mediation through advocacy of absentee interests,
suggest that a judge ought not to regard his role in the class
action process as primarily one of mediation. This is not to say
that judges should not sometimes resort to mediation in resolving
" See pp. 1i58-65 inlra.
"5 See pp. 1563-64 infra.
" See pp. x569-76 infra.
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class actions. For example, a judge, faced with drafting a complex
structural injunction that affects several distinct interests may
naturally turn to a process of negotiation and mediation among
the affected parties." Such a course will be particularly appropriate where, as under Title VII, "8 the statute upon which liability
is based evinces a policy in favor of conciliation. The choice of
negotiation and mediation over some alternative form of decree formulation - for example, reliance on a court-appointed master will also minimize the intrusiveness of the decree on the interests
of the parties. This is desirable since it will generally be to the
advantage of both parties and the court to have willing acquiescence in an agreement, rather than grudging compliance with
a decree that a party perceives as unfair.6 9 Moreover, the settlement of a complex structural case requires a continuing remedy
which will itself be so complex that it cannot be easily monitored
or rigorously enforced. 70 If the settlement is to be effective, the
judge must reconcile the parties to restore a working relationship
between them so that they can administer the decree cooperatively. Otherwise disputes will arise over alleged violations which
it would be wasteful and institutionally inappropriate for a judge
to decide. 7'
C. Privately Controlled Adjudication and
Publicly ControlledAdjudication
In private ordering and mediation, society does not impose
a solution upon the parties. In privately controlled adjudication,
however, society will impose a solution at the instigation of any
party who can afford to litigate. Indeed, society may subsidize
litigation - through provision of attorneys' fees 7' - to create
67

See generally Chayes, supranote 6, at xo58-62.

08 See notes 11, i6 supra.

"0See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 672-80.
10 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
I972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63
F.R.D. i (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 517 F.2d 826 (sth Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W 3429 (U.S. Jan 15, 1976) (No. 75-ioo5).
71 See Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case Study in Judicial Flexi-

bility, 6o CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1974); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation
of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1373-76
(1975).
72 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5(k) (1970) (fees in employment discrimination cases) ; i5 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (treble damages and attorneys' fees in antitrust
cases). See generally Note, Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors,
88 HAav. L. REV. x8i5 (I975); Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1875 (975); The Supreme Court, x974 Term, 89 HARv.

L. REV. 47,

170

(975).
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the opportunity to enunciate general principles and exercise social
control. To the extent society is successful in encouraging adjudication, the distortion of regulatory statutes caused by private
bargaining is eliminated.
In publicly controlled adjudication, society will impose a
solution whether or not the parties want it. Public control may be
exercised in any of four areas: investigation; initiation; litigation; or settlement. Official investigation and initiation of a lawsuit represents the greatest degree of public intervention in private disputes. There is no room for private bargaining; the victim
has no power to forgive the offense."3 Paradoxically, official control of initiation may also be used to delay private access to the
courts in order to promote negotiated solutions between the government and a private party. 4
Public control of litigation can take two forms. First, an
official may prosecute the action, either in the interest of an individual or of society as a whole. Second, the judge may, to various
degrees, control the conduct of the lawsuit, overriding litigational
choices made by the parties. In the traditional theory of adjudication, private control of the issues presented for adjudication
and of facts elicited in proof was conceptualized as absolute."6
But even in the simple binary lawsuit, there is a good deal of
judicial control.7 6 This control is exercised for three purposes:
(i) to promote efficiency- e.g., compulsory counterclaims, 7
mandatory joinder of claims arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence,7 8 consolidation " and multidistrict litigation; 0 (2)
to protect the integrity of the factfinding process - e.g., the best
evidence rule,81 hearsay rules,82 the character evidence rules; 83
11 This may not be true in practice. Victims, by refusing to testify, may be
able to forgive an offense.

"

See, e.g.,

42

U.S.C. § 363o (z97o)

(fair housing); 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5

(z97o) (employment discrimination); 29 U.S.C. § x6o (970) (NLRB enforcement powers); 29 U.S.C. § 662 (97o) (Secretary of Labor's Occupational Safety
and Health Act enforcement powers).
S5See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 6, at 1283; Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy
of Law, 5 CoLum. L. REv. 399, 344-49 (i9o5).
"6 This control may be used to encourage private negotiation. See FED. R.
Civ. P. x6; MANUA rOR COmPlEX LITIGATIoN, pt. I, § 1.21 (1973).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (a).
3
8
" See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP JUDGMMNTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. x X973).
7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
8028 U.S.C. § 1407 (970).
81
E.g., FED. R. EviD. 1002.
82

3

E.g., id. 802.
E.g., id. 404.
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(3) to protect absentees - e.g., necessary party rules,8 4 intervention rules,85 rules limiting discovery against non-parties.8 "
In the class action, because of manageability problems, the
potential for abuse, and the need to protect absentees, judicial
control is both more explicit and more pervasive. The tools of
this control are such devices as explicit manageability determination,8 7 appointment of masters, experts, or implementation committees, 8 sub-classing, 9 determination of adequacy of representation,9" and oversight of communications with absentees. 9
In the simple binary lawsuit, there is no public control of settlement; the parties may, at any time, negotiate rather than
adjudicate their dispute. Public control over settlement may be
exercised for two purposes: first, to reduce distortion in regulatory policy; second, to protect absentees. Judicial scrutiny of
settlements in class actions exemplifies both concerns. Absentees
may desire strict application of regulatory policy, while the
class representative may prefer negotiation. The defendant may
create a conflict of interest by offering a generous settlement to
the named plaintiff but not to the class. 2 In such cases the class
advocate may favor the interests of the named plaintiff over those
of the class. In recognition of this conflict, the court must make
some arrangement for providing the absentees with representation.9
Strict enforcement achieved through adjudication is not, however, an unalloyed good. Regulatory statutes frequently evince a
desire for flexibility and harmony where not inconsistent with
broad statutory directives.9 4 Moreover, public control of adjudication may itself distort substantive policy. Agencies charged with
enforcing the law may be captured by the groups they are supposed to regulate, and shield them from strict enforcement of the
law. 5 Judicial control raises serious problems of bias, for the
84 E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. ig.
"'0 E.g., id. 24.
" E.g., id. 33 (interrogatories limited to parties); id. 35 (physical or mental
examination limited to parties).
87 Id. 23(b) (3) (D). See also pp. 1498-1504 infra.
88 See Chayes, supra note 6, at io6o-6i; pp. 1561-65 infra.
11 See pp. X479-82 infra.
00 See pp. 1471-1504, 1537-38 infra.
91 See pp. i597-x6o4 infra.
12 See pp. 1540, 1547 infra.
11 See pp. I54O-46 infra.
94 See note 16 supra.
°5See R. FELLMETH, TnE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION 1-39 (1970);
Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly
Man, 82 YALE L.J. 87X, 876 (1973); Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, x68i-88 (i975).
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court may be called upon to judge the propriety of its own action."
Moreover, even an appearance of partiality may undermine the
legitimacy of a court's decisionY7 For these reasons, procedural
draftsmen should not assume that regulatory policy is best served
by increased public control.
D. The Interactionof the Four Modes: Two Illustrations
The seminal paradigms of the substantive theory of class actions - damage suits for individually non-recoverable claims and
suits seeking complex structural injunctions - may be characterized by the mixture of the four modes of dispute resolution appropriate to each.
The concern of the court in the damages case is primarily
with strict enforcement of the law. There is usually no ongoing
complex interrelationship between the parties to protect."s While
damages may be difficult to calculate and distribute,"0 there will
be no need for continuing enforcement. Once the funds are disbursed, the case is closed. The interest in justice for absentees
requires the court to play an active role; settlement negotiations
should not be a private bargaining mechanism. The judge should
monitor negotiations to enable him to assess the fairness of a proposed settlement and to ensure that the credibility of each party's
threat to withdraw from negotiation and seek adjudication is maintained. Finally, he can appoint a guardian for absentee interests,
a sort of public prosecutor, to protect the unrepresented.'
Class actions seeking complex structural relief differ from
damage suits in two respects. First, in fashioning a decree, a judge
must create a code for future conduct. It would be impossible for
him to amass enough experience and expertise during a trial to
formulate all the necessary details of the decree. Once liability
is established, the court will naturally turn to the parties for
assistance in working out the -fine points of the injunction.'
It
96 See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.

976 (1972); cf. Gibson v Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (due process denied
when adjudicative tribunal has pecuniary interest in outcome of litigation).
"'See AmwcAN BAR Ass'N, CODE OP JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2 (1974);
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 2, in 69 F.R.D.
273, 274 (1976).
98
But see Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l,
Inc., 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972) (franchise case); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota
Motor Co., 17 FED. RULES SRV. 2D 132 (S.D.N.Y. I973) (same).
99
See pp. 1516-36 infra.
00
See pp. 1561-65 infra.
1o0 See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1298-1302; cf. Miller, Problems in Administering
Relief in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 5ox, 5o9 (197)
(distribution of awards); Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of
Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 303 (,973).
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is impossible, therefore, for relief in such cases to be framed

totally through adjudication. The judge's role is inevitably that
of mediator or overseer. Second, the parties are often joined by
ongoing complex relationships. The preferred resolution of the
conflict ought to reconcile the parties, especially because, without
good faith compliance, attempts to enforce a complex decree may
fail.
This interest in harmony suggests that a mediated or negotiated resolution will have advantages over adjudication. There
may be many sources of conflict among the interrelated parties.
A court searching for a single right answer deducible from legal
principles may attempt to confine its inquiry to the narrowest
controversy. 0 2 A better solution might result from allowing the
parties to talk out the full range of their differences.
Furthermore, there may be an advantage to having the parties
experience the negotiation process itself. The cooperative nature
of negotiation may forge a structure for good faith bargaining in
the future.10 3 Class members' sense of participation may also add
to the legitimacy of the resolution. To facilitate the potential for
harmony that may be created by negotiation, negotiators should
be genuinely representative, chosen by a process that absentees
consider legitimate. This process should foster intraclass dialogue and facilitate input from those affected by the decree.
Nevertheless, because complex injunction cases are often
brought to vindicate fundamental rights, the court must supervise the resolution process to ensure justice. In a sense, the case
should proceed on two levels: adjudication and negotiation. The
danger with such a hybrid process, though, is that the result may
seem neither just nor consensual.10 4 The court, therefore, must
oversee the bargaining process to ensure its legitimacy. Controlling both trial and negotiation, the court can use the one as an
instrument for justice, the other as an instrument for harmony
and reconciliation.
IV.

STRUCTURING PRETRIAL:

PROBLEMS OF INFORMATION

AND DUE PROCESS

The elaboration of special pretrial procedures for class actions by court rules is a recent phenomenon. In traditional equity
102 See generally Fuller, On The Nature and Limits of Adjudication: Collective Bargaining, in SCHWARTZ & SKOLNICK, supra note 21, at 587.
103 Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 669-72 (in rulemaking negotiation, terms

already agreed serve as precedents for further elaboration of terms of agreement;
initial agreement implies duty of fair dealing in working out additional terms).
4
" See generally Tinning, Conciliation of Labor Disputes and Civil Rights
Disputes, i9 LAB. LJ. 563 (1968).
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practice, objections to class treatment were raised in the same
manner as other party questions -by motion directed to the
pleadings or at the hearing on the merits.' Original rule 23, while
developing elaborate jural categories intended to determine cases
suitable for class treatment, prescribed no pretrial procedures for
developing the facts or law that might be required to decide suitability in a particular case and made no express provision for a
hearing at which the issue of suitability could be raised.2 Set
against this background, the novelty of the pretrial provisions of
amended rule 23 is apparent. Judges must determine the propriety of class suit "[a]s soon as practicable" I and before any
adjudication of the merits.4 In some cases, the rule requires a
judge certifying a class suit to order that notice be sent to class
members, advising them of the suit, their right to participate, and
the fact that, if they do not exclude themselves from the suit within a set time, they will be included in the class judgment regardless
of the outcome of the suit.5 In all cases, the rule gives a judge
discretionary power to order notice, as well as authority to structure the litigation through subclassing or other means in order to
assure the fairness of the class action process. 6
Because so many of its provisions are discretionary, rule 23,
despite the attention it gives to pretrial procedure, is less a blueprint than, in Judge Frankel's words, an invitation "to piece out a
' In Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.)

288 (1853), for example, the

lack of a proper class was raised on a motion for want of proper parties. Id. at
141. In the 1912 Equity Rules, printed at 226 U.S. 629, such a motion could be
made by answer, in which case rule 43 required a hearing to be held within 14
days. In Smith, however, which predated the 19X2 rules, the motion appears to
have been heard after all facts on the merits were developed. See 57 U.S. at 141.
The Equity Rules of 1912 also seem to have contemplated such a procedure
since rule 44 makes specific provision for "tardy objections" raised "at the
hearing of a cause." 226 U.S. at 661.
' Except for provisions requiring judicial supervision of settlements in representative suits, Fed. R. CiV. P. 23(c) (x938), printed at 39 F.R.D. 94-95, the original
Federal Rules contained no special provisions for dealing with class suits or protecting absentees. Concern for absentees seems to have been translated into procedural rules only in the early i95o's. See Advisory Comm. Note to Proposed (but
Unadopted) Amendment to Rule 23, in 3B J. MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE i 23.02[5]
(2d ed. i974). Even so, an amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938), which would
have established a pretrial procedure similar to that in current rule 23, failed of
adoption in 1955. See id. 1111
23.01[4]-[6]. See also Advisory Comm. Note, 39
F.R.D. 99 (1966) ("original rule [23] did not squarely address itself to the question of the measures that might be taken during the course of the action to assure
procedural fairness. ....
").
3
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (I).
' See note 159 infra.
a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(C) (2).
'Id. 23 (d).
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huge body of procedural common law." I The development of a
common law, however, presumes that courts know the principles
or policies to be served by procedures designed to determine, at
an early stage of the lawsuit, the suitability of an action for class
treatment. Three such general concerns are reflected in the choice
of pretrial procedures adopted in 1966: res judicata, notice, and
class definition. First, and perhaps most importantly, the draftsmen sought to achieve the broadest possible res judicata binding
effect in actions decided against the class.8 The express certification findings were to insulate the class suit so far as possible from
successful collateral attack; I the order was to be entered as soon
as practicable in order to avoid any nonmutuality of estoppel.' 0
Second, as a corollary of this res judicata policy, the draftsmen
framed notice provisions meeting assumed due process requirements." In addition, some form of official notice to absentees
was required in common question actions to implement the
absentee's right to opt out of the lawsuit.' 2 Finally, the draftsmen
thought it necessary for the court to "define" the action.3 Precisely what this definition was to achieve - and why it had to precede decision on the merits - is uncertain, although some familiarity with the interests and circumstances of the absentees is
necessary if the judge is to discharge his function of overseeing
settlements ' 4 and ensuring adequacy of representation.' 5
This Section of the Note will take up in turn each of the
draftsmen's reasons for defining the pretrial procedure of rule 23
as they did. The first Part of this Section will argue that mutual
estoppel is neither an obviously valuable, nor practically possible
objective for class suits. Only a limited res judicata policy, having
few implications for pretrial procedure, is required by the substantive theory of class suits. The second Part considers the constitutional ramifications of giving binding effect to class actions and
concludes that notice is required, if at all, not by procedural due
process but by principles of equal protection and delegation to the
extent to which notice may reasonably be thought to improve
adequacy of representation. The third Part develops a pretrial
procedure that seeks to facilitate class definition, as well as meaningful participation by class members, through a series of steps
7 Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rvle 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 39
(x967).
'See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 99, 1o5-o6 (i966).

'Id. at io6.
10

Id.

11 Id. at

io6-o7.

12 Id. at io5.
' 3 Id. at 104.
'4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) ; pp. 1537-38, 1565-76 infra (settlement).
"See pp. 1402-16 infra.
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analogous to those by which merits issues are developed for trial,
and addresses a series of additional problems created by discovery
and statutes of limitations.
A. Res Judicata
One of the central purposes of the draftsmen of the 1966 re1
vision of rule 23 was the elimination of one-way intervention,
the practice of holding open a "spurious" class action judgment
favorable to the class in order to allow absentees to intervene to
enforce their claims against a losing opponent, free of the risk of
being bound by an adverse result." This decision to seek to extend the binding effect, of an adverse decree to absentee class
members, especially in common question suits brought under rule
2 3 (b) (3), seems to explain virtually the complete structure of the
pretrial procedure of rule 23. A hearing on the suitability of a
case for class treatment had to be held before any hearing on the
merits, otherwise there was a danger that a judgment would not
be extended to bind a losing class.' s An early and complete hearing in common question cases was also needed to allow absentees
receiving notice an opportunity to appear and argue the merits.
Such provision for early notice, apparently intended to imple" See, e.g., American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974).
See pp. 1339-40 supra.
IS Certification, in the opinion of the Advisory Committee, would make a
'7

collateral attack less likely to succeed. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D.
io6 (1966). For this reason, the risk of de facto one-way intervention would
increase if a decision on the merits were entered prior to any certification decision.
Surprisingly, the few cases which have considered the binding effect of the
class action judgment have refused to bind absentees even though the trial courts
had certified the suits. For a discussion of the cases, see Note, Collateral Attack
on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REv. 589 (x974).
In the one case that bound an absentee, In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (974), the court rested
its decision not on the trial court's findings of adequate representation, but on
the fact that the estopped party had had actual notice of the precise terms of
the settlement it sought to avoid and had been negligent in failing to seize the
opportunity to intervene or opt out. Id. at 843-44. The effect of the amendments to rule 23, in fact, seems to have been to make courts reviewing class action
judgments on collateral attack more sensitive to adequacy of representation than
in the past and more willing to deny res judicata effect because of trial conduct
subsequent to certification. Compare, e.g., Gonzalez v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th
Cir. 1973) (holding that failure to appeal decision adverse to the class may
constitute failure of representation), and In re Four Seasons Securities Laws
Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 667, 680-83 (W.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 502
F.2d 834 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974) (suggesting that failure
of typicality destroyed adequacy of representation), with Supreme Tribe of BenHur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (adequacy standard but no actual analysis),
and Krick v. Klockenbrink, 144 Ind. App. 5S, 6o-6x, 242 N.E. 2d 848, 851 (1969)
(adequacy assumed from apparent identity of interests).
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ment a perceived due process requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard, 9 is itself not independent of the res judicata
effect the draftsmen sought to create. If class suits had no binding effect in the event the class lost, there would be no need to
structure the class suit to ensure due process for absentees; absentees would retain the right to sue individually if they were not
satisfied with the outcome of the class suit and would, therefore,
have neither their property nor liberty endangered by that suit.
Similarly, the draftsmen's choice to allow individuals in common
question suits to opt out of the class action would not be needed
if the class judgment were not binding -absentees who wished
to control their own litigation could do so after the class suit was
decided by bringing another suit.
The reasons the rulemakers opposed one-way intervention are
not clear. The Advisory Committee Note, although emphatic in
its insistence that "one-way intervention is excluded" under rule
23 (c) (3),o is otherwise silent, except for a reference to disagreement as to the propriety of prior practice. 2 ' Justice Kaplan's
treatment of the matter is similarly cryptic. He took "the essential task" of the rulemakers to be "to redefine the conditions for
maintaining the fully effective action," 22 but his summary of the
reasons for rejecting one-way intervention included only mention of the views of some critics that the procedure "was distasteful" as "lacking 'mutuality,'" and "a perverse anomaly" inasmuch as "there could be a class action that did not run fully
for or against the class." 2
Defense of the 1966 rule in terms of the principle of mutuality
- that it is unfair to bind one party to an adverse judgment if
the other party would not also have been bound in the event of
defeat- would, of course, be anachronistic. Justice Traynor's
1942 opinion in Bernhard v. Bank of America National
Trust & Savings Ass'n 24 established the doctrinal framework
which would lead to the demise of the mutuality doctrine, and in
1975 the Restatement (Second) of Judgments abandoned mutu19

See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. io7 (i966).

2

oId. at io6.
21 Id. at ioS.
66
2 Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: x9 Amendments oj the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure I, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967).
23 Id. at 385-86.
24 i9 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). The demise of the mutuality doctrine
has been tentatively recognized by the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (i97i), and commentators have concluded that the trend in the federal courts is away from strict
application of the doctrine, see, e.g., iB J. MooP., supra note 2, 0.4X2(i), at 74
(2d ed. 1973); Note, Class Action Judgments and Mutuality of Estoppel, 43 Gao.
WAsH. L. Rav. 814, 8M8-i9 (1975).
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ality altogether, consigning the doctrine to the status of a minority
rule.25 In place of mutuality, the Restatement focuses on the issue
of whether the person sought to be estopped has had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the merits of his claim.2 0 In general,
the class suit would provide the class opponent such a full and
fair opportunity to litigate against the claims of both the named
plaintiff and the absentees. The class opponent is apprised of the
factors traditionally thought critical to giving a judgment binding effect: the nature of substantive claims of others invoking the
judgment, the existence of a large number of persons who wish to
sue; and the size of potential liability.27 In having a detailed
warning of claims that may be pressed against him, the class opponent is in a better position than other defendants who may be
bound by losing a single, individual litigation. The effect of oneway intervention, when compared with the effect which may be
given to single-party litigation under the Restatement's rules does
not seem especially unfair to the class opponent.
A more modern argument for binding class members to losing
litigation might focus on the values of economy and repose. If
res judicata effect were not given to class judgments, the resources of the judicial system would be wasted on the relitigation
of once-decided claims and class opponents would be denied protection from vexatious and harassing multiple lawsuits. The force
of this argument is undercut, however, by the structure of rule
members in (b) (3) actions are given an opportunity
23 -class
to exclude themselves from a class suit, and thus the protection
which a class judgment affords against relitigation is incomplete.
Even were no opt-out right recognized, however, the content of
res judicata law itself would significantly diminish the extent to
which recognition -of the binding effect of class action judgments
would in fact further the values of economy and repose. The
case for claim or issue preclusion is most strong, if a judgment
settles the effect on future relations of an isolated, past action
governed by relatively well-settled law.28 In such a case, the effect
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JuDGw:ENTS § 88

(Tent. Draft No.

2 1975).

See

also Reporters' Note, id. at 98-99.
26 Id. at 99.
21 See The Evergreens v. Nunan, r4 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGmENTS §§ 68.1(e) (ii), (iii) (Tent. Draft No. 1 T973); id.
§ 88, Comments a, b (Tent. Draft No. 2 1975); cf. American Pipe & Const. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974) (not unfair to subject defendant to otherwise
time-barred claims of absentees when complaint discloses nature of substantive
claims and number and generic identity of potential plaintiffs) ; Haas v. Pittsburgh
Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083, 1097 (3d Cir. I975) (same).
28 See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948) ; Groner & Sternstein,
Res Judicatain FederalAdministrative Law, 39 IOWA L. REv. 300, 303 (1954).
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of an erroneous outcome will generally be confined to the parties,2 9
and, given the need to economize on the use of judicial resources,
it is not unfair to cast the effect of an erroneous judgment on the
parties who have, after all, controlled the litigation." On the other
hand, the scope of preclusion has always been limited in suits,
which include the great majority of class actions, 3 having the
attributes of what Professor Chayes has called "public law" liti-

gation.32 Such suits are characterized by a number of factors
which require subordination of the efficiency policies that justify
preclusion by judgment to the need for a currently accurate legal
result. Most importantly, public law litigation concerns itself
with regulation, not isolated instances of largely private interactions. By its nature, regulated activity is activity undertaken by
many people who are substantially similarly situated. In addi-

tion, regulatory statutes deal with behavior which, if not illegal,
may commonly be repeated over time.

Finally, the factual in-

quiry in the public law lawsuit is generally not about what happened on a specific past occasion, but what the legal interpretation of an agreed set of events should be.3 4 Given this set of factors, propagation of an erroneous judgment through res judicata
can lead to persons similarly situated being treated differently
"'See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV.2 1281, 1287-88 (x976) ; Groner & Sternstein, supra note 28, at 303.
oSee Chayes, supra note 29, at 1287-88.
21 The public law character of federal class suits is apparent from the statutory
and constitutional basis of jurisdiction in most such suits. See p. 1325, note 30
supra. The situation in the states is less clear. Missouri, for example, uses
class suits for land condemnation. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Coleman, 490
S.W.2d 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). On the other hand, California, New York, and
Wisconsin have enacted new class action legislation intended to assist consumer
class litigation. See CAL. Crv. CODE ANx. § 1781 (West I973); N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
LAW & RuiEs §§ 9oi-o9 (McKinney Supp. 1976); WIs. STAT. ANN § 426.1IO (West
1974).
22 See generally Chayes, supra note 29. Professor Chayes notes a development
reflecting similar accuracy concerns in the handling of factfinding in public law
litigation. Increasingly, judges, recognizing the public nature of the lawsuit and
the number of persons potentially affected by a decree, are no longer willing
to allow the litigants to be the sole source of information to the court, but are
shaping the trial, turning to court-appointed experts where necessary to develop
accurate information. Id. at 1297-98, 13oo-oI.
'3 For example, were high school diploma requirements for entry level jobs
not generally suspect under Title VII, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), employers would in all likelihood have continued to use them.
In this sort of situation, were res judicata applied to block the application of a
change of law, employers in all senses similarly situated would face different legal
obligations based on the fortuity of when they were sued unless res judicata were
relaxed to allow a change of law to affect all equally.
34See

Chayes, supranote

29,

at X296-97.
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and can frustrate the ability of the courts uniformly to implement
statutory policy as that policy changes over time. 5
The tensions thus established between judicial economy, on
the one hand, and equality of treatment and proper implementation of statutory policy on the other has long been resolved in
favor of the latter policies in the fields of administrative law "
and taxation. 37 In the words of the Supreme Court, collateral
estoppel must be limited to 31
lawsuits over matters . . . which have remained substantially

static, factually and legally. It is not meant to create vested
rights in decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous with
time, thereby causing inequities ....
The Second Restatement has generalized this concern, largely on
the basis of cases dealing with regulation, stating that a rule of
law should not be binding "when other litigants are free to urge
that the rule should be rejected." " It thus seems unlikely that,
given the regulatory purpose, the large element of fact characterization, and the public law subject matter of class suits, res judicata can provide any greater degree of binding effect against a
losing class than stare decisis in40the majority of cases brought as
class suits in the federal courts.
" See, e.g., Christian v. Jemison, 303 F.2d 52, 55 (sth Cir. 1962) ("It would
be senseless absurdity to sanction in Baton Rouge segregated seating under a law
patently unconstitutional while everywhere else in the country segregated seating
is prohibited."); YMCA v. Sestric, 362 Mo. 551, 567, 242 S.W.2d 497, 507-08
(i95r) (en banc); Groner & Sternstein, supra note 28, at 3o6 ("In order more
fully to achieve the Congressional purpose, the private party is denied continued
benefits
from a former decision, now appreciated as erroneous.").
"9 See 2 K. DAVIS, ADmiNiSTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 18.03 (i958); Groner &
Sternstein, supra note 28.
" For example, Dean Griswold almost forty years ago suggested that res
judicata was appropriately applied in tax cases only where the fact situation was
truly static, and not where continuing behavior on the part of the taxpayer raised
similar questions of tax treatment in each tax year. Griswold, Res Jtdicata in
Moreover, he argued that a
Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE LJ. 1320, 1357 (937).
supervening change in the law, which showed the first interpretation of the tax
code to be erroneous, should not be propagated despite unchanged circumstances.
See id.
a Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
SRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDomENTs, Reporter's Notes § 68.1(b) (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1973).
40Neither the Restatement nor the case law differentiates between damage
actions and actions for prospective relief, although most of the case law deals with
relitigation which would result in an order having only prospective consequences,
See, e.g. Christian v. Jemison, 303 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. z962); Louis Stores, Inc. v.
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal. 2d 749, 371 P.2d 758, 22 Cal.
Rptr. i4 (x968); Floyd County Bd. of Educ. v. Layne, 474 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. Ct,
App. 1972). Whether relitigation of an action leading to an award of damages

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS-

CLASS ACTIONS

1399

The decline of mutuality doctrine and the exception to estoppel for judgments heavily based on legal issues suggests that the
central concern of the 1966 rulemakers for ensuring res judicata
effects was misplaced. To be sure, if representation has been adequate and the legal climate static, little is gained by relitigation.
But in such conditions res judicata may not be needed to quiet
relitigation. If the legal climate is static, stare decisis will work
as a bar,41 and class attorneys, who are ordinarily compensated
only if they win,4 2 will be unlikely to bring suit to retest an adverse judgment.
Whatever marginal advantage binding class members to losing
actions would achieve seems to be .more than outweigned by the
costs of treating the achievement of res judicata effects as an
important determinant of class action procedure. If class members are to be bound regardless of the outcome of litigation, the
propriety of class suit must, at least on the theory of the 1966
rulemakers, s be adjudicated prior to adjudication of the merits
in order to insulate the class judgment from collateral attack.
Adjudication of the merits may come rather quickly after a lawsuit is initiated, on a motion for summary judgment or dismissal
for failure to state a claim. Judges are therefore put under pressure to decide on the propriety of class suit as soon as possible.
The dangers of this pressure are two-fold: 44 first, judges may
decide questions of class procedure before they in fact have
enough information properly to do so; second, judges, although
not strictly prevented by an early determination from reopening
class issues, may be inclined to treat them as settled, and thus
neglect their obligation to insure adequacy of representation. A
focus on res judicata also raises the risk that a court hearing a
class suit will attempt to protect its judgment by deciding class
action issues in a way which would provide collateral attack
courts with "bright line" evidence of adequate representation,
covering a period which would have been covered in a prior damage suit is
appropriate does not seem answerable as a matter of abstract res judicata policy.
Instead, the answer must be determined as a matter of the remedial policy of
the statute supporting the litigation. Thus, for example, if the statute evinced a
policy of eliminating unjust enrichment or of compensation, retroactive effect
might be appropriate. A contrary result might, however, be called for if damages
were primarily intended as a mechanism for modifying future behavior.
"' See Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 1967)
(holding stare decisis to be a sufficient ground for intervention of right because
similarity of issues would, as a practical matter, foreclose any other outcome in

a subsequent suit by intervenor); Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some
Problems
in Class Actions, 9 BursAwso L. Rav. 433, 446-48 (i96o).
42
See p. 1615 infra.
, See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. io6 (1966).
44 For further discussion of these problems, see pp. 1416-27 infra.
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such as individualized notice, even if such decisions were not in
fact necessary.
Although res judicata ought not be a central influence in
the design of class procedures, this conclusion should not obscure the fact that there are cases in which res judicata may usefully be employed to force the consolidation of the claims of many
persons into a class suit. The absence of interested parties raises
particular problems in two kinds of situation: the suit for complex structural relief; and the consumer class suit. In each of
these, no problem is raised if the class loses - encouragement of
participation is important only if the class wins; and for this
reason, it makes little difference whether a class is "certified"
before or after the decision on the merits.
In the complex structural injunction case, a new suit will
complicate implementation of the decree and may lead to confusion ultimately sapping the vitality of the relief given in the
first suit.45 The decree will inevitably be shaped through negoti-

ation 46 and, for negotiations to be successful, the parties must
have a fairly certain idea of the constraints within which they are
working.47 For negotiations to be worthwhile, there must be some
assurance that the negotiated solution will not be constantly
subject to relitigation and modification. In addition, the parties
may have established ongoing forms of dispute negotiation such as biracial 48 or employer-union-employee committees 4that are designed to process additional grievances in an orderly
manner, making it more likely that the decree can be implemented
in a satisfactory manner by the parties themselves. To allow a
collateral attack in these circumstances would upset expectations
" See N.Y. Times, Oct. X2, I975, at 29, col. X (decision to allow private Title
VII suits to go on after government consent decree means "settlement is never
going to become effective"). A similar policy is reflected in the National Labor
Relations Board's contract bar rule which, in the interest of stable labor relations,
requires that the negotiating structure represented by a consummated collective
bargaining agreement bar representation elections for a three year period. See
General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
48
See Chayes, supra note 29, at 1298-3ox.
"At the heart of bargaining is making trade-offs. If a bargainer can never
be sure that he can get the benefit of a particular compromise, he is unlikely to
make it. Although this may not be a problem as to the finer points of the
decree, the central concessions that may make a decree work may often be most
uncertain. For example, a number of school decrees have been attacked for
providing inadequate busing or for adopting desegregation plans that do not
achieve sufficiently low minority populations in all schools. See, e.g., Calhoun v.
Cook, 522 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1975); Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479
F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1973).
4
8

E.g., id. at 764.
"9See Steel Indus. Consent Decrees, printed in BNA FArR E PL. PRAic.

MANUAL 431:125-52

(1974).
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that have been formed and which ought to be fostered since negotiation, by generating precedents or at least tacit commitments
to further good faith dealing, assists in assuring compliance with
the decree. °
Where a decree is still open, therefore, res judicata ought to
be available in a limited form. First, parties should be required to
intervene in the ongoing suit." Even intervention should be
denied, however, unless the absentees can show that they have
not been adequately represented. 2 This modified form of preclusion will have the effect of involving the absentees in the
negotiating milieu, but with minimal affect on expectation and
agreements that have already been created. 3 Finally, since there
is always access to the court if negotiations reach an impasse,
their legal
intervention will allow former absentees to protect
54
rights where representation was in fact inadequate.
In consumer class suits where individual claims are small, but
relief must be delivered to large numbers of individuals at defendant's or class' expense,55 the cost of creating a mechanism for
relief delivery may be so great that fairness to the defendant, or to
the class, requires that administrative expenses be paid only once.
For example, in the Antibiotic Drug Antitrust Litigation,56 delivery
of relief to consumers required widespread advertising, media
events, persuasion of consumer publications and labor newsletters
to run stories, and the employment of a staff of 15 to 25 part and
"oSee pp. 1383, 1391 supra.
1t Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765 & n.2 (5th Cir.
i973); accord, NEA v. Board of School Comm'rs, 483 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1973);
cf. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 866-68, petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3429 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1976) (No. 75-1005) (upholding
consent decree provisions by which EEOC agreed to suggest that other pending
or subsequent litigation be brought into consent mechanism established by
decrees).
52
ines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1973). If
representation is adequate, there seems little need to add new parties to the
negotiation since their presence may needlessly upset or delay agreements already
reached.
5
3 In Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765 n.2 (5th Cir.
1973), the Fifth Circuit suggested that the most appropriate form of intervention
would be to allow the intervenors to participate in the implementation committee
since this would "ensure that different points of view would be presented."
14 See id.
55 Expenses involved with delivering relief may be taxed against the class'
recovery, or, where a statute so provides, may be taxed to the defendant. The
pending Consumer Class Action bill would tax the costs of distributing relief to
the defendant, see H.R. 2078, 9 4 th Cong., ist Sess. § 14 (1975), the New York
class action statute would allow, but not require, the defendant to bear the costs,
see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
511West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 34 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. i97o), aff'd,
440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 87, (z971).
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full-time clerks for a period of a year to process claims." The
cost of these efforts amounted to over $230,000. Since the cost of
delivering relief will probably not vary much with the total
amount of damages to be delivered, fairness seems to require that
all claims be brought in one suit and that suit be binding so long as
representation has been adequate.
B. Notice and Due Process in Plaintiff-Class Actions
Whether absentee class members, either individually or
selectively, must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard
in a class suit if that suit is to comport with due process is a question much debated. In this debate, the touchstones have been the
cases of Hansberry v. Lee "I and Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.59 The former is generally thought to stand for
the proposition that due process requires only "adequate representation" on the part of the class representative; " while the
latter suggests that some form of notice to absentees is required
to foreclose absentees even if they are represented by a guardian
ad litem.0 Complicating this debate is the recent case of Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,6 2 which, while inconclusive on the constitutional question,6 3 required individual notice in class suits brought
under rule 2 3 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4
" Shapiro, Processing the Consumer's Claim, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 257, 263-65
(1972).

58311 U.S. 32 (1940). Hansberry, a black, acquired property allegedly bound
by a racially restrictive covenant. In an earlier suit in which the covenant was
upheld, the parties (who did not include Hansberry) had falsely stipulated that
the covenant was signed by the requisite number of property owners to satisfy
a condition precedent of its validity. The Supreme Court held that Hansberry
was not bound by the prior suit on the ground that neither litigant in the suit
had adequately represented Hansberry's interest. See Z. CHArEE, SOmE PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 232-37 (1950) ; pp. 1472-74 infra.
59339 U.S. 306 (ig5o) ; see p. 1413 infra.
60311 U.S. at 42-43; see, e.g., Comment, The Importance of Being

Adequate:

Due Process Requdrements in Class Actions Under Federal Ride 23, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1217, 1224-31 (x975); Note, supra note I8, at 593-6oi; Note, Managing the
Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426, 434 (1973).
6 See 339 U.S. at 3i8-i9.
62 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
63 See id. at 176-77; Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 SUP.
CT. REV. 97, Iog-uI.

64417 U.S. at 177. In a more recent case, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975),
the Supreme Court appeared to limit Eisen to a holding about rule 23(b)(3).
See id. at 397 n4. The implication of Sosna is, therefore, that notice is not required as a matter of due process. Sosna, moreover, appears to overrule cases
holding that notice is a constitutional requirement in suits brought under rule
23(b)(i) or (b)(2), such as Hoston v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D.
650, 657-58 (E.D. La. 1975); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465,
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In addition, there is the black letter learning that adjudications,
to be "binding," must provide for adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 5
To date, the debate has proved inconclusive. One court, relying on a theory of estoppel,"6 has held that actual notice and an
opportunity to be heard are sufficient to foreclose a subsequent suit
by a class member even if representation has not been adequate. 7
Other courts and commentators have suggested that adequacy of
representation without notice is enough." The Federal Rules,
after Eisen, display a schizophrenic approach - notice is required at apparently any cost to protect the $io claim of an
absentee in common question class suits, but individual notice is
not required to adjudicate absentees' constitutional rights."9 The
inconclusiveness of this debate seems to stem largely from the
narrowness of the universe of cases and doctrines thought relevant
to the issues. What will be attempted here, therefore, is to present an argument from a nontraditional perspective that suggests
that any notice obligation in plaintiff-class suits is ancillary to a
requirement of adequate representation derived from considerations of equal protection and delegation.
It is first necessary to distinguish two meanings of the term
"binding effect." In most notice and hearing cases, a person is
bound in the sense that he will have to suffer a coercive order
entered against him in a court. 70 The exercise of such coercion,
466 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1352-54 (E.D. La.
1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1i6 (5th Cir. 1971). See Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d
1167, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir 1976) ; Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1975).
"2E.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (,877).
" The law is well-settled that due process rights can he waived. See, e.g.,
D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 407 U.S. 174, i85 (1972). However, whether
the notice required by rule 23 is sufficient to allow a waiver theory of due process is by no means certain. In cases in which litigation costs make any active
response to notice practically impossible, there is little evidence of the sort of
voluntary, knowing, or intelligent waiver that the Supreme Court has generally
required if due process is to be found waived, see, e.g., 407 U.S. at 186-87. See
also Comment, supra note 6o, at 1235-37.
67 See In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834, 843 (Ioth
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (974).
"8See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5o8 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. Ioll (1975); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 980
n.io (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Northern Natural
Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. i968), aff'd in part, 44i
F.2d 704 (loth Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 95, (97i) ; Note, supra note i8, at 605.
6 Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 4X7 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1974), with
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 n.4 (I975), and Advisory Comm. Note, 39
F.R.D. 69, io6 (1966) (subdivision (d)(2) "invokes the court's discretion").
7
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) (due process litigation
has "typically involved rights of defendants . . . ."); cf. id. at 382 ("We do
not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is ...
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which constitutes a deprivation of liberty or property, would
usually trigger a due process obligation. This would be the case,
for example, where a judgment is entered against a defendant class,
although there are cases allowing a defendant class to be bound
in a coercive sense without actual notice and an opportunity to be
heard." The second meaning of "binding effect" is its res judicata
sense -here used to mean denying a person access to a court to
relitigate a claim previously tried in a class suit in which that person was a member of the plaintiff class. It is binding effect in this
res judicata sense that has been the focus of recent debate.7 2 An
unrealized right of action - what is lost when res judicata is
applied to bar an absentee's claim- has never been thought itself to be property in the constitutional sense. 73 Thus, the
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause . . . ."). Almost all major notice and
hearing cases involving judicial processes concern the right of someone in the
position of a defendant or of one being coerced by an ex parte court order. E.g.,
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 6oi (1975); Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 6o (i974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (X972);
Lynch v. Household Finance Co., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (94);

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (877). Although commentators have noted that
the plaintiff-defendant distinction is not one that can be consistently maintained
for purposes of constitutional analysis, see, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court
and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights- Part 1, 1973
DuxE L.J. I153, 1177-97, it does seem true that persons in a plaintiff posture

have never been thought to have a presumptive right to notice and opportunity
to be heard. See note 73 infra.
" E.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 361 (1921) (no
procedure instituted to notify Indiana claimants being enjoined by this suit);
Smith
v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (x853) (no mention of any notice).
72
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (x974); Dam, supra
-

note 63.

". An individual's claim of a constitutional right to notice and an opportunity
to be heard is an effective defense to an attempt to raise a class judgment as a
bar to the individual's prosecution of his own suit only if attribution of binding
effect to the class judgment would deprive the individual of liberty or property.
See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (975). The only right the
individual loses if a class judgment is given binding effect is the right to bring
the action himself, and the remedy afforded by the class action can provide constitutionally sufficient alternative protection of the individual's underlying substantive claim. See Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 5x6, 532 (9o7)
(representation by corporation in defendant class action sufficient protection of
shareholder's rights). It has been argued that the right to bring an action ought
itself to be regarded as a property right. See Comment, The Heirs of Boddie:
Court Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HAav. Civ. R.-Civ. Lin.
L. R v. 57z, 587 (1973). Traditionally, however, the Supreme Court has not
regarded the extinction of a cause of action as itself sufficient to trigger a constitutional claim. The only rights the Court has treated as infringed by repeal
of a statutory cause of action have been the underlying substantive rights; indeed, only where the underlying substantive rights have been held to "vest" has
the Court engaged in constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Coombes v. Getz, 285
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traditional prerequisite for the notice requirement is lacking in
the class action context. The constitutional question raised by
binding effect in the res judicata sense, therefore, is not whether
notice is required, but when, or if, access to a court may be foreclosed to an individual.
The power to deny access to a court by denying a cause of
action to all potential litigants indiscriminately is largely unchecked. Even in the heyday of the contracts clause, no one ever
supposed that statutes of limitations, which undoubtedly cut off
access to a trial on the merits of a plaintiff's claim, raised constitutional questions. 4 With the subordination of retroactivity doctrine to the rationality analysis of modern substantive due proU.S. 434, 442 (1932); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.
673, 678-79 (1930); Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 157-58 (1913). See
also Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450, 457-58 (1864). See generally Pritchard v. Norton, io6 U.S. 124, 132 (1882).
Even were the deprivation of an unrealized cause of action held to provide
a basis for claiming due process rights, a right to notice and an opportunity to
be heard would not immediately follow. Class actions fix rights in the aggregate,
not individually. The matters in issue in class suits primarily have to do with acts
of a defendant affecting class members in common, and not acts of the defendant
affecting individual class members, or acts by individual class members themselves.
In Professor Davis' terminology, see i K. DAvis, supra note 36, § 7.02, class actions
determine legislative facts, not adjudicative facts. See Chayes, supra note 29, at
1297 (arguing that public law litigation is not about factfinding in the usual sense,
but about fact characterization and prediction, the stuff of legislation). Under BiMetallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915),
therefore, there may be no constitutional obligation to afford a hearing to individuals
whose rights are determined by class action proceedings. Cf. FPC v. Texaco, Inc.,
377 U.S. 33 (1964) (individual hearing not required under APA as to matters determined in prior rulemaking procedure). Only if a class action judgment were substantively unconstitutional, or representation of absentee interests inadequate, see
p. X410 infra, would an individual class member retain an individual cause of action.
"'In Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), for example, all
seven Justices assumed that, at least as prospectively applied, statutes of limitations were proper under the contracts clause, the relevant constitutional provision, and undertook to show that the insolvency law at issue in the case could
(or could not) be distinguished from a statute of limitations. See id. at 261-63
(Washington, J.); id. at 287 (Johnson, J.); id. at 301 (Thompson, J.); id. at
326-27 (Trimble, J.); id. at 348-49 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). See also McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 311, 327-28 (1839) (state does not violate
the full faith and credit clause by looking to its own statute of limitations in determining whether to enforce another state's judgment). 'Chief Justice Marshall
suggested in dictum in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 121 (1819),
that the retroactive application of a statute of limitations in a case involving a
contract entered into prior to the enactment of the statute would be unconstitutional. See id. at 207. It is not clear, however, that this dictum survives Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934). See generally Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 259--61 (2d Cir. I948).
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cess7 5 legislative discretion to terminate rights of action is
generally assumed. In the Portal-to-Portal Cases, 70 for example,
Congress was held to have the power to cut off windfall claims
which had arisen under the Fair Labor Standards Act" even
though some were actually in litigation.7"
Where access to courts is limited to some but not all holders
of a cause of action, however, the constitutionality of the government action is less clear. Differential distribution of access to
courts, like differential distribution of any other government
service, raises questions of equal protection. 9 The Supreme Court
has held, for example, that while no individual need be afforded
a right to appeal from a trial judgment, if a right to appeal is
granted, unjustified discriminations in the grant of the right are
unconstitutional." Selective denials of access to trial courts have
been similarly analyzed. For example, in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.,8 the Court upheld New York's security
for costs requirement in shareholder derivative suits. While recognizing that the statute might discriminate against small claimants 8 2 - completely foreclosing access to the courts to potentially
meritorious claims 83
the Court found sufficient justification for
the requirement in the legislative judgment that a security for
cost provision was needed to stop strike suits.8 4 More recently, in
three cases, Boddie v. Connecticut,8 5 United States v. Kras,80 and
Ortwein v. Schwab,"7 the Court dealt with the issue of whether
filing fees that excluded low income plaintiffs from court were
constitutionally prohibited. Because the filing fees were struck
down in Boddie 88 but upheld in Kras 80 and Ortwein, 0 the ultiSee Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (0934),
See generally P. BATOR, P. MIsHxIN, D. SHAPRo & H. WECHSLER, HART

"

8
AND

WECHSLER'S THE

FEDERAL

COURTS AND

THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM

322-24

(2d

ed. 1973).
7 29 U.S.C. § 2o6(d) (970).
78 E.g., Thomas v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 174 F.2d 71I (3d Cir. 1949).
7' See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41I U.S. 1 (1973)
(education); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare payments);

Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. x97), afl'd on rehearing,
461 F.2d 1171 (5 th Cir. 1972) (mem.) (municipal services).
80 See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (972);
U.S. 12

(I956).

81 337 U.S. 541 (0949).
82

Id. at 551-52.

83 Id. at 552.
4
1d.
I
at 550-53.

85401 U.S. 371 (97i).
so409 U.S. 434 (i973).
87 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
8
See 40X U.S. at 374.
8 See 409 U.S. at 450.
0
oSee 410 U.S. at 658-60.

Griffin v. Illinois, 353
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mate significance of the cases is not clearY At minimum, however, they stand for the following: a person in the position of a
plaintiff has a less well established entitlement to be heard than one
who stands in the position of a defendant or in the position of one
coerced by extrajudicial action,92 but the rights of plaintiffs are of
sufficient magnitude that selective denials of access require at least
some governmental justification. 3
Plaintiff class actions also raise the selective access question.
Access to court is foreclosed to an individual who was previously

an absentee class member although courts are generally open to
individuals with the type of claim asserted by the former class

member. Analysis of the constitutionality of this discrimination
is made difficult by the fact that no consensus has emerged as to

the standard of review to be applied in judging selective denials
of access. It is clear that, where a plaintiff seeks to vindicate a
fundamental right, selective denial of access requires a substan-

tial justification.94 Some have argued that a plaintiff's right of
access to courts is itself fundamental, and that regardless of the

character of the claim a plaintiff wishes to assert in court, selective denial of the right of access must always be supported by a

compelling reason.

5

The Supreme Court has not gone this far,

however. In Cohen, Kras, and Ortwein, where the rights plain-

tiffs sought to vindicate were not constitutionally fundamental,
the Court's review of selective denials of access was couched in
91 See generally Michelman, supra note 70.
02 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 79 n.26 (1973)

(distinguishing Cohen

as a plaintiffs' rights case); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-77 (197).
O"The Supreme Court has used both due process and equal protection analysis
in analyzing the access issue. Compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 372,
374-77 (197i) (due process), and United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443-46
(1973) (same), with Boddie v. Connecticut, supra at 383-86 (Douglas, J., concurring) (equal protection); id. at 386-89 (Brennan, J., concurring) (same);
United States v. Kras, supra at 446-49 (same); id. at 457-58 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 66o (1973) (per curiam)
(same). A comparison of the due process and equal protection analysis in the
majority opinion in Kras shows that due process analysis is the same as equal
protection analysis inasmuch as each attempts to differentiate fundamental rights,
to be accorded more protection, from other rights that can be foreclosed on a
rational basis standard. See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (treating due process analysis in the same way, relying on equal protection precedents), noted in The Supreme Court, x974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 47, 77-85
(i975). One exception to this overlap may be the analysis suggested by Justice
Harlan in Boddie: that if the state requires an individual to undertake some
transaction in court, then due process requires an absolute right of access. See
401 U.S. at 376-77.
94 See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443-49 (1973).
11 See Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right
to Protect One's Rights-Part I1, 1974 DuKE L.J. 527.
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terms of the rationality standard associated with minimal equal
protection scrutiny."
Because the Supreme Court has apparently adopted a twotier standard for determining the constitutionality of restrictions
on access to courts, 97 the binding effect of a class judgment will
depend both on the substantive right asserted by the person
seeking to avoid the binding effect of the class suit and on the
reasons supporting the extension of binding effect to the absentee.
Where the substantive right asserted is not fundamental, a desire
to shield the defendant from relitigation - a purpose very similar
to that asserted to support the security for costs requirement in
Cohen 's - would appear to satisfy at least the rational relationship requirement set out in Cohen, Kras, and Ortwein, even
though the practice under rule 23 of permitting opt-outs suggests
that finality is not a particularly compelling purpose inasmuch as
the absence of relitigation will turn on the uncontrolled choices of
class members.0 9 Since, however, the one-way intervention that
would result were binding effect denied does not seem particularly
unfair when compared to modern res judicata notions, 0 it seems
doubtful that prevention of relitigation would rise to the level of
a compelling interest. 10
In some circumstances, the ascription of binding effect to class
actions would appear to meet even a demanding standard of justification. The award of class-wide structural injunctive relief, to
be fair, must be done in a single proceeding, where all interests
practically affected can be taken into account. In this type of
case, recognition of a binding effect serves both to goad affected
individuals to come forward and to create the repose necessary
if implementation of a complex structural decree is not to be made
meaningless by repeated alteration of its terms. 0 2 Although not
" See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549-50, 552-53
(1949); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656, 66o (,973) (per curiam).

" There may also be a middle tier of scrutiny. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 74-79 (1971) (invalidating double-bond requirement on appeal from
tenant's action against landlord).
11 See 337 U.S. at 548.
99
See p. 1396 supra.

See id.
The fact that it may not be possible to bind class members to a losing
lawsuit in which constitutional claims are asserted provides one more reason why
res judicata concerns ought not to be a central determinant of class action procedure. See generally pp. 1396-99 supra.
102 Attempted relitigation of claims resolved in favor of a class is by no means
merely a hypothetical possibility. In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus.,
Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a consent decree negotiated by representatives of EEOC,
the Justice Department, and the Department of Labor, on one side, and repre100
101

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS -

CLASS ACTIONS

1409

often thought to raise similarly complex issues, class actions for
damages may require elaborate and expensive mechanisms for
delivering relief, operating over a protracted period of time. Where
the cost of delivering relief is a substantial proportion of the value
of the relief to be delivered, fairness may also require that relitigation be avoided. 103 In each of the above cases, the justification
for extending binding effect to absentees is that such binding
effect is necessary to effectuate class relief. Justifications of this

sort, framed in terms of the necessities of effectuating governmental functions designed to secure personal rights, are of a form

which the Supreme Court has found persuasive in circumstances
where ordinarily only the most compelling justifications would
be tolerated.104
sentatives of the steel industry and unions, on the other. The decree sought to
correct Title VII violations in the steel industry through structural reform of
industry hiring and advancement practices and through provision of a fund to
cover back pay awards. See id. at 834-36. Steel industry employees, who were
not parties to the consent decree, were not bound by the decree so long as they
did not accept back pay under the decree. See id. at 837-38. Since -approval
of the decree, a number of class actions, pending at the time the decree was negotiated, and brought by employees seeking both structural and back pay relief,
have resumed. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d
1043 (5th Cir. 1975); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 69 F.R.D. 382
(W.D. Pa. 1975). At least one observer has suggested that the failure of the
steel industry consent decree to put an end to litigation may mean "that the industry wide settlement is never going to become effective." N.Y. Times, Oct. i2,
1975, at 29, col. i. See also pp. i4oo--oi supra.

103 See pp. 1401-02 supra.
304

The Supreme Court has indicated that restrictions on access to govern-

ment services which are justifiable as corollaries to provision of the services in
the first place will survive constitutional scrutiny in contexts where the Court
ordinarily requires a compelling justification. Thus, in Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (I973), the Supreme Court
upheld a refusal by the FCC to require a federally licensed broadcaster to carry
editorial advertising, although content-based discrimination of the sort the FCC
tolerated is ordinarily forbidden under the first amendment, see, e.g., Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the
FCC's Fairness Doctrine, see 412 U.S. at 130-32, itself a form of content regulation, as a means of realizing first amendment values in the broadcasting context,
and held that, absent government intervention seemingly inconsistent with first
amendment norms, see id. at 126-27,
opening broadcast media to editorial advertising might distort the broadcast "marketplace of ideas," see id. at I23-24, and
therefore need not be constitutionally required.
Similarly, in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Court upheld Iowa's
requirement that an individual reside in the state for one year before seeking a
divorce under its law, although the Court had previously struck down durational
residency requirements in other contexts as unconstitutional penalties on the exercise of the fundamental right to travel, see Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (,974) (free nonemergency medical care for indigents);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (i969) (welfare benefits). Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
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The access cases are a strong indication that one cannot, as did
the Supreme Court in Mullane and Eisen, move from precedents
dealing with coercive binding effects to a conclusion about the
constitutional requirements for res judicata 0 without explaining why the former is applicable to the latter situation. Instead,
the access cases suggest that curtailment of access to the courts
presents a fairly standard problem of equal protection analysis.
Under this analysis, access can be cut off if such curtailment of a
legal remedy furthers sufficiently important governmental interests, even though the courts are generally open to redress the
grievance complained of.
Unlike the selective limitations of access which the Supreme
Court considered in Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein, however, the foreclosure of access effected by class suits results from a judicial
rather than a legislative decision. This difference does not diminish the relevance of the access cases since a court hearing a class
action is acting pursuant to legislative grants of power embodied
in, for example, the statute governing the court's jurisdiction and
the Rules Enabling Act.' But the fact of delegation is significant
because it creates the constitutional requirement of adequacy of
representation in class suits. A delegate cannot be free to act
arbitrarily. He is constitutionally mandated to further the purpose
for which authority has been delegated to him.'
The purpose of
the pertinent delegations in the class action context is the adequate
determination of a point of law or issue of common fact, or the
implementation of a decree that adequately considers the interests
of all affected. If a prior class suit is to foreclose an individual who
would otherwise have access to courts, therefore, the class suit
must have been adjudicated through a process ensuring that the
interests of absentees would in fact be given their due in the litigaSosna, in canvassing the state's justifications for its residency requirement, emphasized the state's interest "in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce
decrees to collateral attack," 419 U.S. at 407, and the usefulness of a bright-line
test like the durational residency requirement in furthering that interest, see id.
at 407-08 & n.21. But see id. at 426-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ; The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 94 n.48 (1975). Justice Rehnquist also
noted Iowa's interest "in avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in which
another State has a paramount interest," 419 U.S. at 407, and the interests of
possibly absent spouses and children in the divorce proceedings, see id. at 406-07,
concerns which suggest a second justification for the durational residency requirement framed in terms of the usefulness of a jurisdictional limit as a means of
allocating divorces to the states in the best position to reach substantively correct determinations, see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra at 94-95.
10 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1974); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (195o).
106 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
107 See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 44 U.S.L.W. 4737, 4744-45 (U.S. June
1, 1976).
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tion. This requirement, of course, is the requirement of adequate
representation
which Chief Justice Stone set out in Hansberry v.
8
0

Lee.1

Although the requirement of adequate representation is often
associated with a duty the class representative must discharge, it
is in fact not a duty of a single individual, but a requirement that
must be met by the process of class adjudication taken as a whole.
Even under rule 23, which makes the adequacy of the class representative an express requirement of class suit,"0 responsibility for
ensuring adequacy is mainly that of the judge who can cause the
class to be divided into subclasses, issue orders to protect absentees, or send notice inviting intervention to improve representation."' As will be developed more fully in the discussion in
Section V below,"' the responsibility for ensuring adequacy devolves in the first instance on the trial judge since he is the only
person in a position independently to scrutinize the "fit" between
the interests of the class representative and the class. Nonetheless,
fulfillment of the requirement of adequate representation also has
important implications for the conduct of class counsel, who are,
after all, generally entrusted with initiating the procedural steps
through which representation problems are identified and cured.
These elements of the professional responsibility of2 class counsel
will be fully developed in Section VII of this Note."
The conclusion that the adequacy of representation requirement derives from the delegation doctrine is reinforced by consideration of the origins of the duty of fair representation developed in labor law.1 3 The power of an exclusive bargaining repre108 See pp. 1472-74 infra.
10 FED. R. CiV. P. 23 (a) (4).
"' Id. 23(c)(4), 23(d).

...See pp. 1454-1536 infra.
112 See pp. I577-1623 infra.
"1 The analogy to labor law drawn here is not intended to suggest that the
duty of the union representative in negotiating and enforcing collective bargaining agreements should be defined by the same standard as the duty of adequate representation in class suits. The situations are quite different, most importantly in that it may be possible to disaggregate a class, or redefine a class,
to enhance the uniformity of interest in the represented group. See pp. 1479-82
infra (subclassing). Such redefinition will usually not be possible in the labor
field where appropriate bargaining units are defined without regard to employee
interests on specific job-related issues. Consequently, if collective agreements are
to be made at all, the union must have a wide scope to compromise conflicting
points of view. The heuristic functions of the class suit, on the other hand, require that such conflicting interests, rather than being compromised outside of
the courtroom by class counsel, be brought to the judge's attention, and perhaps
be represented by an advocate, see pp. 1479-82 ifra.
The conclusion of the foregoing analysis -that
a union representative may
be an inadequate class representative in circumstances in which he would meet

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1412

[Vol. 89:x88

sentative to compromise individual rights or interests is strikingly
analogous to the power of a judge, through adjudication of a class
suit, to foreclose the access rights of absentees. In the seminal
case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,1 4 the Supreme
Court, construing the grant of exclusive representative status in
the Railway Labor Act "5 to avoid constitutional infirmity,
said:

"3

[T]he exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others
involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the
power in their interest and behalf .

. .

. [T]he statutory rep-

resentative [has] at least as exacting a duty to protect equally
the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution
imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates.
This does not mean that the statutory representative . . .
is barred from making contracts which may have unfavorable
effects on some of the members of the craft represented. Variations . . . based on differences relevant to the authorized
purposes of the contract . . . are within the scope of . . . representation ....

The duty of fair representation developed in Steele has subsequently been carried over to define the duty of the union when
settling the contractual claims of its members. Thus, in Vaca v.
Sipes,117 the Court held that union members could be denied
access to court to contest contract claims under a collective bargaining agreement unless they could show that the union had
violated its duty of fair representation."1 Moreover, Vaca explicitly reconciles the congressional purpose to have labor disputes informally settled with the employee's right to seek redress
in court by requiring union representation to be adequate."n
his obligations under the duty of fair representation -is
supported by the one
case that has specifically discussed the relationship of the two doctrines. In Air
Line Stewards Local 55o v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir.
,973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974), the Seventh Circuit held that the union,
all of whose current members had interests potentially antagonistic to former
union members included in the class, did not adequately represent the latter
group in reaching a settlement in which the interests of the former members
were subordinated to those of the present members. See id. at 640-42.
114323 U.S. 192 (1944).
115 45 U.S.C. § ii
(,97o).
116323 U.S. at 202-03; see
117 386 U.S. 17, (1967).
" Id. at i86.
11

id. at

198-204.

Id. at 182-83 ("[Tlhe duty of fair representation has stood as a bulwark
to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional
forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law") ; accord, Hines v. Anchor

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS -

CLASS ACTIONS

1413

And the recent case of Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 12 °
holds that an employer cannot bind an employee to the results
of an arbitration in which the union inadequately represented the
employee. 2'
The foregoing excursus into the access cases and labor law
thus seems to confirm Hansberry's pronouncement that adequacy
of representation is the central concern of constitutional analysis
of binding effect in the res judicata sense. The relationship of
adequacy of representation to a possible notice requirement in
class actions may be illuminated by reconsidering Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 2 1 from the theoretical per-

spective of the access cases. Mullane was not technically a class
suit, but involved a New York procedure by which a trustee of
a common trust fund could petition the courts for acceptance
of an accounting. 2 3 Upon acceptance, the trustee was freed from
any subsequent liability for improper management of the common fund. 4 As part of the procedure, guardians ad litem for
income and corpus beneficiaries were appointed and perfunctory
publication notice was accorded the absentee beneficiaries. 5
The Supreme Court held that due process required better notice
and specifically that the trustee had to notify individually by
mail all those beneficiaries with whom it was in regular correspondence. 6
On its face, Mullane seems squarely inconsistent with the access cases since it appears to accord full due process rights to
a procedure the result of which was merely the termination of
access to redress inchoate claims against the trustee for breach
of fiduciary duty. But the force of this inconsistency is undercut by two considerations. First, the complaining parties were
in the position of defendants and the case therefore "looked like"
the coercive defendant cases which provided the totality of the
precedential support for the opinion.'
Second, as the Court
specifically noted, the fees of the guardians ad litem would be
charged against the trust, thus depriving the beneficiaries of
Motor Freight, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1048, 1059-6o (i976) ("[W]e cannot believe that
Congress intended to foreclose the employee from his [LMRA] § 3oi remedy
otherwise available . . . if the contractual processes have been seriously flawed
by the union's breach of its duty to represent employees honestly and in good
faith and without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct").
120 96 S. Ct. 1048 (1976).
121

Id. at io6o.

122 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

See id. at 309.
See id. at 309, 311.
125 See id. at 310.
2
1 1 See id. at 3 I5-19.
127 See id. at 310.
12

124
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tangible property as well as claims against the trustee.'28 For
this reason, there was a true coercive element in the suit.'29
There is, however, even a more fundamental objection to the
procedure used in Mullane. To understand this objection, it is
necessary to construct two models of how a judge might act to
ensure adequate representation of absentee interests. The first private control- model places independent value on an individual's mastery of his own claim - so much so that a class member has a presumptive right to intervene or opt out even though
either action may be dysfunctional from the standpoint of efficiency. The value attached to private control reflects the traditional assumption of the adversary process: each individual is
the best judge of his own interests, even on matters such as the
litigation strategy to be employed in the suit. 30 This approach
is skeptical of the ability of any third party, including a judge,
to identify and evaluate absentee interests. The numerosity of
the parties makes it impossible to join all who are interested,
but the aim of the judge and the procedural system is to get
actual intervention of a sufficient number of class members to
ensure a reasonable likelihood that each absentee's interest is
represented before the court by someone sharing the same interest, and at the same time to afford an opportunity to escape the
suit to any absentee who doubts the likelihood of anyone else
being able to protect his interests."' Early and extensive notice
is obviously a requirement of such a scheme, not only to allow
absentees the opportunity to act, but also to take advantage of
the traditional notion that a person with notice who does not
intervene can fairly be estopped from complaining of the result
132
of litigation.
In the second - judicial control - model no special significance is given to private control. Instead, representation of class
interests is adequate if those interests are brought to the attention
of the court,"'3 but each distinct interest need not be represented
28
1

Id. at 313.

Use of trust funds to pay attorneys' fees is distinguishable from use of
a class recovery as a common fund to pay litigation expenses since the beneficiaries'
rights in trust, in contrast to class members' interests in a fund, pre-existed the
litigation.
130 Cf. Chayes, supra note 29, at 1282-88 (traditional view of lawsuit).
131 These objectives may be inconsistent to the extent that affording class
12'

members an opportunity to opt out has the effect of removing from the lawsuit
the individuals who would have otherwise been most likely to intervene. See
PP. 1483-84, 1487-89 infra.
32 See Chayes, supra note 29, at 1287-88.
133 See, e.g., Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir.
1973). Much of the commentary on class actions stresses the special role of the
judge. See Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions,
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by an advocate. Indeed, intervention is suspect since intervenors
will represent only that segment of the class able to obtain an
attorney. A portion of the class will lack practical access to the
court and, as to these class members, there is no reason to assume either adequate representation or voluntary waiver of their
interests in the suit. Instead of intervention, devices such as subclassing, 1 34 the appointment of amici or special representatives, 135
or surveys of the class 136 must take the place of multiplicity and
the adversary system in informing the judge of the range of interests with which he must deal in reaching judgment. Because
access to the legal system can best be provided to the group as
a whole, an individual's claim to control the advocacy of his
cause must be subordinated when necessary to allow group rights
to be vindicated. Although our traditions dictate minimizing
such subordination, the judicial control paradigm recognizes that
giving full sway to private control can be self-defeating since individual litigation may not in fact be possible and yet insistence on
individual rights could make class suit financially or practically
infeasible. Notice may or may not play a part in apprising the
court of the multiplicity of interests held by absentees; in any
event, since notice is designed chiefly to generate information,
and not necessarily to spur intervention, 37 notice need not be
extensive.
The fundamental flaw in the procedure at issue in Mullane
is that if it fits neither model and thus failed to ensure adequate
representation. As far as can be ascertained from the opinion, the
Supreme Court doubted whether there was any practical supervision of the adequacy of the court-appointed representatives
either by the court or by absentees.3 Moreover, the Court seemed
to assume that this was a case in which actual intervention was
contemplated by the statutory procedure, since the Court ascribed
no role to the trial judge in overseeing adequacy of representation
9 BUFFALO L. REv. 433, 460 (196o); Note, supra note i8, at 603; Comment, Adequate Representation,Notice and the New Class Action Ride: Effectuating Remedies
Provided by the Securities Laws, 1i6 U. PA. L. RaV. 889, 905 (1968). Professor
Crafee likened the class action to the receivership of an insolvent corporation- the
judge must oversee the interests of the numerous absentees involved. Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 58, at 289.
134 See pp. 1479-82 infra.
135 See Chayes, supra note 29, at 1299-1301; pp. i561-65 infra.
'31 See pp. 1441-44 infra.
107 Of course, if an absentee should
138 See 339 U.S. at 316-17. See

F.2d

239,

intervene, that is all to the good.
also Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5o8

256 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

note X33, at 912-13.

421

U.S. io1 (1975); Comment, supra
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or even the reasonableness of the fees paid the guardians.130 In
this view, Mullane stands for the rather limited proposition that,
if multiplicity of intervention - the private control approach is to be relied upon to achieve adequate representation, then notice must be reasonably likely to come to the attention of those
who might intervene - potentially everybody in the class. 140
C. Definition of the Action: The
Structure of PretrialProcedure
"In order to give clear definition to the action," 141 rule
23(c) (i) mandates that "[a] s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall
determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." Why such
definition by order is needed, especially near the outset of litigation, remains one of the most puzzling questions about rule 23.
The rule itself would seem to require definition, even in the limited
sense of being able to state the generic identities of class members,
at only three times: (i) after entry of a judgment, to be able to
state who is bound by the action; 142 (2) before a hearing confirming a dismissal or settlement, to be able to give notice; "I and
(3) under rule 23 (b) (3), before a hearing on the merits, in order
to enhance binding effect, implement opt-out rights, and give such
notice as may be required by due process. 14 4 Only on the third
occasion is early definiton of the class arguably necessary. Although even here, since the ultimate judgment will not run to
those to whom notice is not directed,"0 some more convenient
definition of the class, such as that in the complaint, would seem
to serve the function of giving notice to absentees of their participation rights.4 0 Moreover, even if it is conceded that protection
1..

See 339 U.S. at 313 (guardians "may conduct a fruitless or uncompensa-

tory contest").
140 Although

the notice Mullane requires may be extensive, its constitutional
standard of "reasonable" notice, see id. at 314, should not be confused with the
more rigorous rule of individual notice which the Supreme Court found required
by rule 23 in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. i56, 175 (1974). See Dam,
supra note 63, at io6-og; Note, Managing the Large Class Action, supra note 6o,
at 435-41.
141 Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. io4 (1966).
142
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (3).
4

' See id. 23 (e).

144 See

id. 23(c)(2), discussed, pp. 1392-95 supra.
. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) ("The judgment ... shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was
directed . . .").
146 Sending notice prior to the development of more than fragmentary information about the class would, to some extent, handicap the effort of the trial
judge to secure participation by absentees. Because such notice would disclose very
45
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of absentees requires some information about class members, it
would seem that such information could be gathered through discovery devices that are readily available in the Federal Rules, and
that certification vel non adds nothing to the information before
the court, although a certification hearing may provide a convenient forum for argument about the meaning of information that
has been collected.' 4 7 Indeed, a spate of recent appellate decisions
commenting negatively on trials in which certification was delayed (or ignored altogether) until after a decision on the merits
seems to confirm that federal courts have found early definition
in the rule's sense unnecessary
to successful adjudication of at
1 48
least some class suits.
This Part of the Note will consider whether certification ought
in fact to be considered a procedure of little practical significance
which, at least in the absence of rule

23(c) (I),

can be safely

ignored. The present structure of the pretrial procedure that has
been built around rule 23 will first be described and then critically
analyzed to determine whether this procedure does in fact serve a
useful defining function. Second, because the conclusion is reached
that present procedure focuses on incorrect goals, an alternative
procedure derived from the substantive theory of the class suit is
presented. The pretrial procedure which is developed is directed
primarily toward generating information about the class in much
the same way pretrial procedure in individual suits develops information about the merits of a dispute. Problems of informationlittle about the action, absentees might not be able to judge what course the action
ought to take to be consistent with their interests without engaging in expensive
and time-consuming factfinding of their own. Reluctant to undertake such an
investigation, and equally reluctant to take perhaps unnecessary and certainly
costly steps to intervene in the class action, absentees might conclude that the best
response to incomplete notice is to opt out. Under current early certification
practice, however, notice based on the pleadings may offer little less information
than notice based on information elicited at the certification hearing. See pp. 242224 infra. Offsetting any disadvantage created with respect to intervention might
be the salutary effect of limiting any tendency on the part of class representatives to overstate the size of the class to get settlement leverage: since the plaintiff
must pay the costs of individual notice in rule 23(b)(3) suits, see Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974), his cost of suit would increase

in tandem with any settlement leverage.
' Thus a hearing on class information for the purposes of clarifying what is
known about the class could usefully serve a function parallel to that of the rule
i6 conference, which is intended to focus the trial on issues that remain unresolved.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 16; pp. 1427-38 infra.
148
See cases discussed at note 159 infra. See also Rodriguez v. East Texas
Motor Freight, 5o5 F.2d 40, 51 (5th Cir. 1974) (no formal certification until after
decision on the merits, class suit allowed), cert. granted, 44 US.L.W. 3670 (U.S.
May 25, 1976) (No. 75-718); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 446-47
(5th Cir. 1973) (same).
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gathering from class members are, therefore, next considered. A
final section analyzes constraints statutes of limitations may place
on the timing of a determination of the suitability of an action for
class treatment.
i. A Critique of Practice Under Rule 23. -

One of the most

difficult tasks in analyzing the pretrial structure of rule 23 is that
the rule itself mandates very little and, as a consequence, courts
have taken divergent views both on the timing of certification
relative to various motions going to the merits and on the scope of
the investigation that is needed to justify certification. On the
timing question, the law seems to be in a state of flux. In Dolgow
v. Anderson,' one of the first cases to address this question,
Judge Weinstein held that a class suit could not be certified unless the class representatives were able to show a "substantial possibility" of prevailing on the merits.' 50 Such a preliminary inquiry
was required, he thought, to avoid unfair pressure on the defendant to settle.' 5' Although the Dolgow procedure has been urged
by those worried about the abusiveness of class suits,"5 2 it has received mixed reviews 153 and the Supreme Court's decision in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,5 4 which held that a preliminary
149 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd and remanded for entry of findings

of fact and conclusions of law, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
15043 F.R.D. at 5oi.
151 See id. at 501-02. Judge Weinstein implied that notice, especially carrying

the imprimatur of a federal court, could depress the class opponent's stock prices,
thereby apparently giving the class undue bargaining leverage by disrupting the
opponent's ordinary business relationships. See also pp. 1437-38 infra.
12 See, e.g., AmERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, SPECIAL Coam. ON RULE
23 oF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

25-28 (1972). Other procedures intended to reduce the bargaining leverage of
class representatives have also been adopted. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (i974) (use of non-class
test case procedure to avoid harmful publicity that would arise from notice),
discussed, pp. 1437-38 infra.
1s Compare, e.g., Hoffman v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 86, 91 (M.D. Pa. 1973)
(hearing on the merits); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 52o, 513 (W.D.
Pa. 1971) (showing that claim was not frivolous required), rev'd, 496 F.2d 747

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (974);

Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51

F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. i97o) (following Dolgow), with e.g., Miller v.
Mackey International, 452 F.2d 424, 427, 429 n.5 (5th Cir. X974) (rejecting Dol-

gow); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 39x F.2d 5g5, 563 (2d Cir. 2968) (dismissal
of class allegations appropriate only upon clear showing that case not suitable for
class treatment); Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 64 F.R.D. 346, 349 (S.D. Tex.
1974); Professional Adjusting Sys., Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 64
F.R.D. 35, 38 (S.D.N.Y. I974); B & B Investment Club v. Kleinert's Inc., 62
F.R.D. 140, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Lamb v United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25,
35-36 (S.D. Iowa 1972). See generally 3B J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 19-22 (Supp.
1975).
15a447 U.S. 156 (1974).
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hearing on the merits for the purpose of apportioning the cost of
notice was improper under rule 23, 5' appears to rule out Dolgow
hearings as well. 15
Eisen did not, however, dispose of the issue of whether traditional preliminary motions directed to the merits, such as summary judgment motions, could precede certification. 1 7 This issue
has received a great deal of attention in the last year and the law
now seems relatively clear. Focusing on the need to avoid procedures having the effect of one-way intervention, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits have held that certification of rule 2 3 (b) (3) class suits,
with its attendant notice,' must be made prior to the determination of summary judgment motions, whether the disposition of
the motion is for or against the class. 5 ' In suits brought under
1 5

'
Id. at 178-79.
110The Supreme

Court cited approvingly Judge Wisdom's opinion in Miller

v. Mackey International, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the Fifth Circuit,
construing rule 23, had held a Dolgow hearing improper:
In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether
the plaintiff [has] stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits,
but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.
417 U.S. at I78, quoti1g 452 F.2d at 427. The Court also noted that preliminary
hearings, "not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures applicable to
civil trials," 417 U.S. at 178, could result in substantial prejudice to the class
opponent. See also pp. 1383-87 supra.
17 The Supreme Court relied upon two factors in disapproving the preliminary
hearing in Eisen: lack of authorization by, and apparent incompatibility with, rule
23, and the possibility of prejudice to the class opponent due to a lack of normal
procedural safeguards. See note i56 supra. See also Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v.
Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 564 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (questioning
whether preliminary hearing violated seventh amendment jury trial right).
Neither of these problems is raised by hearings on rule 12 or 56 motions prior
to certification. Such motions are obviously both contemplated and specifically
authorized by the Federal Rules, and are clearly not thought to be prejudicial to
any party. But see Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1975),
discussed, note 159 infra.
'See

FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2).

...This line of analysis begins with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sprogis
v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.

991 (ig7i), in which the court of appeals held that § 7o6(g) of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2oooe-5(g) (i97O), authorized a trial court to extend a judgment in
favor of a single plaintiff to the class of similarly situated airline stewardesses.
Judge, now Justice, Stevens dissented, arguing that a procedure in which an action
was given class status after a judgment was "strikingly unfair" because such a
judgment was not mutually binding. In 1975, the Seventh Circuit had occasion
to reconsider its Sprogis holding in Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349
(7th Cir. 1975). In Peritz, the trial court had severed the liability issue in a Truth
in Lending Act suit from other issues and tried it to a jury before ruling on
certification. After a special verdict was entered for the plaintiff, the trial court
certified the class and the defendant appealed. Id. at 350-5I. Chief Judge
Swygert, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's discussion of one-way interven-
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rule 23 (b) (i) or (b) (2), these same courts have allowed certification to be made contemporaneously with a determination of the
merits,' 6 ° although even here such late certification contravenes
the command of rule

23(c)

()

161 and may be impermissible if

the defendant is prejudiced by the delay.' Thus, the emphasis of
pretrial procedural design seems to have shifted its focus from
protection of the defendant from the in terrorem effect of the class
suit to the protection of the defendant from the supposed unfair1 3
ness of one-way intervention.

tion in American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 545-49 (1974), and
also on the plain meaning of rule 23(c)(I), see 523 F.2d at 353, ruled that such a
procedure was improper and that the certification order had to be vacated. See
id. at 353-55. In the course of this opinion, the holding in Sprogis was characterized as a "specialized rule" for Title VII cases. See id. at 353 n.3. See also
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 5I (5th Cir. 1974) (extending
judgment in discrimination suit to whole class as alleged even though no formal
certification entered), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. May 25, 1976) (No.
75-718); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 446-47 (5th Cir. i973)
(same).
In the following case of Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied sub noma. Jimenez v. Mathews, 44 U.S.L.W. 3754 (U.S. June 29, 1976)
(No. 75-1114), Judge Stevens, this time writing for the majority, discussed the
whole problem of the timing of certification and motions leading to a disposition
on the merits. In suits brought under rule 23(b)(3), he wrote, the requirements
for notice and opt-out set out in rule 23(c)(2) and the need to avoid one-way
intervention require that certification precede summary judgment. See id. at 698. In
suits brought under rule 23(b)(i) or (b)(2), however, the absence of an opt-out
right and, apparently, lack of concern over one-way intervention, make it permissible to enter an order on the merits and on certification at the same time. See
id. Nonetheless, delay in certification contravenes the express language of rule
23(c) (i), id. at 699, and delayed certification may be improper if prejudice
to the class opponent would thereby result, id. But cf. American Pipe & Const. Co.
v. Utah, supra, at 554-55 (not unfair to class opponent to allow alleged class
members to intervene after denial of certification because of adequate notice of
nature of class claims). Jimenez involved a case in which summary judgment
was won by the class on appeal in the Supreme Court, see 523 F.2d at 693, but the
Seventh Circuit has made clear in a subsequent case, Roberts v. American Airlines,
Inc., 526 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1975), that the no-certification-after-a-heating-on-themerits rule is equally applicable to cases won by the class opponent. See id. at 763.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d xx67,
1182-83 (D.C. Cir. 1976), has concurred with the Jimenez court in all particulars.
160 See note 159 supra.
' See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 899 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. Jimenez v. Mathews, 44 U.S.L.W. 3754 (U.S. June 29, 1976) (No. 751114); accord, Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1183 (D.C. Cir. x976)
(semble).
. 62 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 699 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. Jimenez v. Mathews, 44 U.S.L.W. 3754 (U.S. June 29, I976); accord,
Laionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
L63Whether a vacating of the certification order after a hearing on the merits
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The rationale of these recent cases, if carried to its logical
extreme, would require certification to precede even motions made
under rule 12(b) (6); ' even though such a motion could not
of the motion leads only to continued
bind a defendant -denial
trial, not judgment - the class representative would get the
benefit in settlement negotiations of alleging a class without any
attendant res judicata detriment."" There is reason to think that
such an extension will not occur, however; or if it does, that it will
have little practical impact. The Senate Commerce Committee
class action study,' for example, reports that 55 percent of the

class action cases studied were disposed of in favor of the defendant on preliminary motions . 6 7 Plaintiffs' attorneys who were

interviewed in the study further reported that they thought it
essential to present a strong case on the merits in order to get

certification, regardless of whether a certification order was actually entered before formal consideration of the merits.'"

So

without vacating the decision on the merits as well is effective in removing one-way
intervention is doubtful. Where a summary judgment is decided in favor of the
plaintiffs, the court in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nor. Jimenez v. Mathews, 44 U.S.L.W. 3754 (U.S. June 29, 1976) (No.
75-1114), realized that, under modem theories of res judicata, see pp. 1395-99
supra, it was very unlikely that a class opponent would be able to relitigate the
summary judgment isue against any subsequent opponent, whether or not that
opponent was a member of the class as alleged. See id. at 70,; accord, Elliott v.
Weinberger, No. 74-1611, at 15 (9th Cir., Oct. 1, 1975) (noting that the overturning
of certification because of alleged defects in notice would be fruitless since the class
had won and legal services attorneys would doubtless be able to bring individual
suits invoking the stare decisis and res judicata effects of the summary judgment
even if the notice was defective), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nora.
Mathews v. Elliott, 44 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. May 25, 1976) (No. 75-1234). See also
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 758-62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
855 (1974). As a result of stare decisis and res judicata, one-way intervention cannot be avoided unless the decision on the merits, rather than the certification order,
is vacated. Such an outcome would, however, seem unfair to the named parties.
..4 FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (6) provides for motions against the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
16 Cf. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328
(E.D. Pa. 1967) (arguing that it was impermissible for class representative to "enhance his own bargaining power by . . . alleging that he is acting for a class of
litigants" unless class can in fact be bound).
166 Published as Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study,
62 GEO. L.J. 1123 (1974).
at 1136. See also id. at 1144 (sample cases tend to show concurrent
07d.
consideration of certification and merits issues).
"Bid. at 1144.
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long as the "penalty" for disposing of merits motions before certification is not a reversal of the ruling on the motion, but merely a
vacating of certification, 1"9 defendants may well continue their
attempts to defeat the class suit on the merits before turning to
the class allegations, 7 ' especially since the actual benefit to be
expected from res judicata is not substantially greater than that
afforded by stare decisis in any event.' Yet, despite what may
be a gap between theory and practice, it does seem clear that there
is growing pressure at the appellate level to make "as soon as
practicable" 172 mean "very quickly," a pressure that is reinforced by local rules of court '"' that require a party to move for
certification within 30 to go days after filing of the complaint on
17
pain of having the complaint stripped of its class allegations. 1
The earlier in the course of an action a court enters a certification order, however, the less likely is it that definition in the sense
of digging below the pleadings will be possible. Instead, courts
will have to decide issues raised at the certification hearing on the
basis of the pleadings 175 or on a limited amount of discovered
"' See Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp.,
170

523 F.2d 349, 355 (7th Cir. I975).

See id. (plaintiff attorneys thought that a decision on the merits against a

class would effectively preclude further suit regardless of timing of certification).
See also pp. 1395-99 supra.
Moreover, a number of cases indicate that the defendant may "waive" early
certification and elect to proceed directly to the merits. See Roberts v. American
Airlines, Inc., 526 F.2d 757, 762-63 (7th Cir. x975); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,
496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (i974); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 8oi, 805-06 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aIJ'd in part, remanded in part, on grounds not here relevant, 526 F.2d Io83 (3d Cir. 2975).
171 See generally pp. 1394-1402 supra.
172 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(I).

17See, e.g., E.D. PA. R. 45(c); S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. xIA(c)-(d).

See generally

MANUAL FOR COmPLEX LITIGATION, pt. 2, §§ 0.23, 1.40 (West 1973)

(suggested

local rules).
17 See Walker v. Columbia University, 62 F.R.D. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (untimely motion cause for dismissal of class allegations). But see Gilinsky v Columbia University, 63 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (untimely motion overlooked).
Even if no motion is made, the court has an independent duty to decide
whether to certify the class. See, e.g., Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d
1236, 1243 (6th Cir. 1974); 3B J. MOORE, supra note 2, f 23.50.
172 In a number of cases, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D.
351, 354 (E.D. Pa. 1974); G & B Invest. Club v. Kleinert's Inc., 62 F.R.D. 240,
145-46 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 337
(D.R.I. 1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,
457 (E.D. Pa. 2968), some or all of the requirements of rule 23(a) were decided on
the basis of the complaint or the apparently unverified statements of counsel at
oral argument. It seems clear that a decision on the basis of the pleadings is
proper. See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973); 7A C.
VRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 178s, at 131 (2972).
Moreover, a number of cases seem to sanction a decision on the pleadings by, in
effect, requiring the defendant to show why the action cannot be maintained as a
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information . 6 The procedural posture of the certification hearing has sometimes caused courts to decide certification issues on
the basis of presumptions 177 historically with a bias in favor of
class treatment. 78 Such a cursory definition of the action need
not be final, of course. Rule 23(c) (i) itself provides that certification orders are provisional and "may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits." 17 Reconsideraton of a certification order, however, is discretionary; rule 23 does not itself
structure pretrial procedure in a way which would occasion reconsideration. In fact, by mandating that all of the inquiries
required by rules 23 (a) and 23 (b) be undertaken at once, 8 0 the
rule could encourage courts to see the certification hearing as a
cataclysmic, all-or-nothing event. In any case, certification on
the basis of a record that does not get beyond the pleadings
scarcely seems to provide a defining function; and even if further
definition of the action in fact takes place throughout the course
class suit. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp, supra. Indeed, such an
approach seems mandated by some appellate opinions, which seem to require the
trial judge to state why an action cannot be maintained as a class action and, if
there is not such a statement based on a record, reverse the trial court. See Price v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 5oi F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. i974); Wilcox v. Commerce
Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 345 (zoth Cir. I973).
176 This evidentiary hearing approach has been sanctioned, and the form of
the hearing oulined, in Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 712-14 (5th Cir. 1973).
See also Professional Adjust. Sys., Inc. v. General Adjust. Bureau, Inc., 64 F.R.D.
35, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying Cass standard); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 175, § 1785, at 131.
177 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. x968);
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (oth Cir. 1968) (citing Eisen), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (I969); accord, Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d io9o, io98 (5th Cir. i975);
Green v. Wolf Corp., 4o6 F.2d 291, 295-98 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969). See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 175, § 1785, at 134
(advocating such presumptions). The effect of such presumptions is to place the
burden on the defendant to disprove the maintainability of the class action. See
Newberg, Burdens of Proof for Class Issues, 3 CLAss ACTION REP. io3 (1974).
178 See cases cited note 177 supra; 3B J. MOORE, supra note 2, ff 23.45 (Supp.
1975).
170 Although a number of commentators have expressed some doubt that the
rule 23(c) (I) order could be conditional as a practical matter, see Frankel, supra
note 7, at 42, class status has been revoked in Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
466 F.2d 1374, 1377 (ioth Cir. 1972); Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343,
346 (E.D. Pa. i973); Abercrombie v. Lur's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 388, 394 (S.D.
Fla. 1972).
1 0 Rule 23(c)(i) does not expressly require that all of the issues surrounding
certification need be made at once, but most courts have in fact treated the rule
as if it mandated a single hearing on all the issues raised under rules 23(a) and
23(b). See, e.g., Professional Adjust. Sys., Inc. v. General Adjust. Bureau, Inc., 64
F.R.D. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D.
351, 354-59 (E.D. Pa. I974).

1424

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1318

of the action, rule 23(c) is immaterial to the development of

that definition.
The foregoing description may in fact caricature the present
order of battle in class actions; "I'nonetheless, it does seem clear
that policy pressures are driving the certification hearing toward
the beginning of the suit, especially in suits brought under rule
2 3 (b) (3). The primary effect of this movement is to limit the
potential of the certification hearing as a device for assessing
information about the class and for determining what else it might
be useful to know about the class before adjudicating its rights.
There are, however, two other adverse consequences of this movement. First, early certification on the basis of presumptions creates the potential for unfairness to the defendant. Second, an
improper class determination at the outset can make control of
settlement difficult.
The point of the preliminary hearing on the merits instituted
in Dolgow v. Anderson 182 was to ensure the court that an action
had some merit before notice, with its attendant adverse publicity,
was sent to class members.' 8 3 Once such notice was sent, Judge
Weinstein feared that the class opponent would be put under
severe pressure to settle the action because the opponent's stock
prices would fall, apparently interfering with the opponent's ongoing, but terminable, business relationships. 8 4 As rule 2 3 (b) (3)
procedure is currently being structured -to stress avoidance of
one-way intervention - there is, at least in theory, no way for the
class opponent to escape settlement pressure arising from such
adverse publicity. 5 The certification hearing ought to be early
in the action, certification may ensue unless the class allegations
are grossly deficient,8 0 and, especially after the Supreme Court's
For example, no case has been found that states that rule 23(c) does not
allow a wave of discovery and an evidentiary hearing on class issues. Indeed, even
181

Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976), which holds that
certification hearings should generally be held early in the action, see note x59
supra, recognizes that factual development may be necessary to make a proper
ruling. See 533 F.2d at 1183 n.40. Nonetheless, a reading of trial court cases leaves
the distinct impression that most certification issues are decided on little more than
the pleadings and, perhaps, oral argument. This conclusion, however, is weakened
by the fact that many opinions certifying class suits are ambiguous as to the
factual basis for certification and to the legal issues the court thought the case
raised. See also Note, supra note i66, at 1143 (opinions on certification often unclear, generally did not state facts or reasons for opinion).
18243 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd and remanded for entry of findings
of fact
and conclusions of law, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. i97o).
8
. See 43 F.R.D. at 501-02.
184

2

See id.
Cf. Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp.,

523

P. 1425 infra.
"" 8 See cases cited at notes 175, 177 supra.

F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1975), discussed,
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decision in Eisen,18' notice must be sent to all persons individually
identifiable." 8 Faced with this problem, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in the leading case of Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp.,'89 found in the threat of adverse publicity
sufficient reason for abandoning class suit altogether -at least
with the consent of the class opponent 190 - and substituting instead a test case procedure whereby the named plaintiff's claim
is first litigated. If the class opponent wins that case, it is left
with only stare decisis protection against the class; on the other
hand, if the class opponent loses, persons found to be in the class
as originally alleged would be allowed to take advantage of the
judgment. 9 '
Whether the procedure adopted in Katz, which was decided
before the Supreme Court's opinion in Eisen, survives that decision is uncertain.'9 2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp.,'9' has already disapproved, as creating a potential for one-way intervention, a procedure similar to that used in Katz, whereby the trial
18.

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,

417 U.S. 156 (1974).

'"s See id. at 175-77.
18g

496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974), noted, 88 HARV. L.

REV. 825 ('975). See also Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 8o
Pa. 1974), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 526 F.2d 1o83 (3d Cir. 1975).

(W.D.

In Katz, plaintiffs brought suit under the Truth in Lending Act alleging that
certain fees charged by Carte Blanche were in fact finance charges within the
meaning of the Act and had to be, but were not, disclosed. See Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 51o, 512 (W.D. Pa. 1971). The harm that Carte Blanche

feared from notice was that its account debtors, the class members, might withhold
payment on their accounts as part of a set-off. Additionally Carte Blanche feared
that it would have to assert counterclaims in the forum of the class suit, which
might cause business relations with its customers to be hindered. See 496 F.2d at
757-58, 760, 762; 88 HARV. L. REV. at 831.
190 See 496 F.2d at 762. It is not clear why the consent of the defendant is
needed. Unless the test case, if won by the plaintiff class, is followed by certification of the class, collection of fees from those benefited by the judgment may be
difficult because subsequent litigation using the judgment won in the test case
could occur in many courts and there will be no fund easily available to charge
with costs. This eventuality might make a test case -financially infeasible, a result
clearly unfair to the plaintiff. This problem could perhaps be overcome if the
defendant would also agree to pay attorneys' fees. Nonetheless, it must be questioned whether litigants have the power to modify the mandates of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by consent.
191 See 496 F.2d at 758-62.
192

See 88 HARv. L. REV. at 828-29.

F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1975), discussed, note 159 supra. It is interesting to
note that the Peritz procedure, like that in Katz, did not prejudice the defendant's
case in the way that the Eisen preliminary merits hearing did, see note i56 supra,
suggesting that Eisen is being interpreted as a case about one-way intervention.
If this is the case, then it is difficult to distinguish a partial trial as in Peritz from
a full trial before certification as in Katz.
193 523
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court severed a liability issue and tried it to the jury prior to
certification. 94 On the other hand, the Katz procedure does not
necessarily require that absentees seeking to use a judgment
against the class opponent do so in a class suit. 9" To the extent
that subsequent class suit is avoided, the Katz procedure could,
perhaps, be justified as an execution of the mandate in rule 2 3 (b)
(3) to consider, and presumably implement if superior, procedures
alternative to the class suit.'
Whatever the outcome of this
debate, it is clear that the Katz procedure, which at least as a
formal matter ignores the claims of absentees, is not capable of
implementing any defining function as envisioned in rule
23

(c)(W).

A more pervasive problem with early certification based
largely on the pleadings is that such certification can be counterproductive to effective control of settlement. Once an order
defining the class is entered, the parties will be relieved of any
obligation to present further argument on an appropriate class
definition, and the dynamics of the post-settlement situation make
it unlikely that either party will spontaneously challenge an order
already entered. Neither party will want to upset the settlement
and the judge will, therefore, be deprived of adversarial presentation of class issues. Moreover, the judge may be hesistant on his
own motion to upset or delay a settlement once reached especially if gathering information about the class will itself be a
complicated process. 97 As a result, a class definition once tentative becomes final without reevaluation.
If it were reasonably likely that the class definition as alleged
would be correct, the failure to have adversary presentation would
present few problems. The trial judge could accept the class definition presented by the plaintiff or by the parties and assess the
adequacy of the settlement by the interests of that class as he
understands them. The alleged class definition is unlikely to be
correct, however. The named plaintiff, when drawing the complaint, will seldom know much about the actual situation of
absentees. The conscientious representative, to be sure of tolling
the statute of limitations for all whom discovery will show to be
actual class members 198 and to minimize the costs charged against
"' See note 159 supra.
"9 5 But cf. note i9o supra.
106 Rule 23(b) (3) provides "the court [must find] that . . . a class action is

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy."
107

Cf. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 701 (Tth Cir. 1975)

(asserting

policy in favor of settling class suits), cert. denied sub nor. Jimenez v. Mathews,
44 U.S.L.W. 3754 (U.S. June 29, I976) (No. 75-2114).
' See pp. 1449-54 infra.
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individual recoveries, will specify the class as broadly as his initial
understanding of the common issues will allow. Moreover, the
class attorney's own interest in ensuring an adequate fund from
which to collect his fee will provide additional incentive for a
broad class definition. The class opponent may acquiesce in the
alleged class definition to avoid the expense of litigating this issue
and, perhaps, to achieve the widest possible res judicata effect.
Alternatively, the named parties, seeking to reach a quick agreement, may adopt an improperly small class definition in order to
avoid a challenge to the settlement by persons who should be in the
class, but whose interests are being disregarded by the named
parties. Thus, a procedure which allows the actual entry of an
order defining the class before class facts are developed shifts
inertia to the side of misspecification, relieving settling parties
of the burden of demonstrating the adequacy of the class definition contained in the complaint or negotiated among themselves.
2. Using the Defining Function to Structure PretrialProcedure. - The foregoing description may misrepresent actual practice under rule 23 to some extent. Nonetheless, trial courts attempting to follow appellate guidelines may well structure pretrial
primarily to avoid one-way intervention and to afford individual
class members some opportunity to exercise control over the litigation of their claims. Yet neither of these issues seems to be an
appropriate focus of class action pretrial. As discussed above,
the search for mutuality will be somewhat fruitless. Attempts to
introduce individual control should be delayed until the court
decides that such control is desirable. Instead, class action pretrial procedures should concentrate on defining the range of interests presented by the class.
Pretrial procedures designed to serve this defining function will
include two major components. First, they will provide for a series
of hearings at which the judge can determine whether the party
structure of the litigation assures that all relevant interests of
absentees will be considered before the lawsuit is resolved. Second,
pretrial procedures will include formal occasions for modifying
the party structure by adding spokesmen for theretofore unrepresented interests if the hearings show that to be necessary. In short,
pretrial procedures should serve as the means of implementing
the constitutional requirement of adequate representation.' 9 9 As
such, class action pretrial procedures should be designed to generate information about absentees. Such information cannot be
gathered by examining the pleadings, for class allegations, like
100 See pp.

1410-1l supra; pp. 1472-7.5 infra.
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other allegations in the complaint, suffer from all the defects of
self-serving statements and lack of information that have caused
pleadings to be given a very limited office in the structure of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole.
In the unity theories of the class suit, such a defining function
is not needed. The interests of absentees under the community of
interest theory are simply not relevant to just adjudication of the
class suit; if absentee interests are a matter of legal concern, this
concern is taken into account at the moment of determining the
suitability of the action for class treatment, and class status is
denied. 00 In the consent theory, it is not the role of the judge to
determine adequacy of representation; instead, the focus of procedure is on alerting absentees to the pendency of the suit and
letting them decide whether to opt out of, or intervene or acquiesce
in, the representative suit.2 01 Under the substantive theory of the
class suit, however, the judge has primary responsibility for ensuring the fairness to absentees of either an adjudicated or negotiated conclusion of the action. Although the issue of the fairness
of a settlement is ultimately adjudicated, the judge's participation
in the structuring of settlement can be at the level both of negotiation and of adjudication and for this reason, it is useful to consider the defining function from the perspective of each mode of
dispute resolution.
In adjudication, the defining function can most usefully be
thought of as a requirement for a series of iterative steps - some
involving the gathering and assessment of information about the
class and others adjusting the party structure so that future
information obtained from the representative parties about the
interests and situations of absentees can be assumed to be true, or
will at least be subject to verification through some form of adversarial presentation. 0 2 Divided in this way, the defining function can be seen to combine elements of both judicial and private
control.
Since the pleadings are by their very nature documents within
See pp. X332-34 & note 15 supra.
'o' See p. 1342 supra. The consent theory may, however, require that the judge
make some inquiry into the facts underlying the complaint so that he can transmit
enough information to absentees through the notice sent them to allow an informed choice about what course to take with regard to the litigation. See note
146 supra; cf. p. 1403, note 66 supra (due process may require some form of knowing waiver).
202 This form of adversarial presentation need not be actual intervention
by
absentees. Instead, it may be sufficient that absentees may monitor the suit and
make motions to intervene when they think their interests are being compromised,
see pp. 1482-85 infra. Such motions would indicate to the judge a need to re-open
the definition question.
200
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the private control of the parties, the first task of the judge in
adjudicating a class action must be to subject the pleadings to a
verification process that will ensure correspondence between the
class allegations and the actual situations of absentees. Because,
at the time of filing of the complaint, neither the class representative nor the class opponent may have actual knowledge about the
absentees, °z some sort of discovery will generally be necessary at
the beginning of the verification process. Further, the parties'
interests at the outset of litigation may not be adverse, or may be
mutually adverse to the interests of absentees; 204 the judge will,
therefore, have to take the initative in scheduling and directing
information gathering. Once the judge has assured himself that
he can safely assume that the positions of the class representative
faithfully mirror those of the class as a whole, or has established
a party structure through subclassing, 0 5 intervention, 2

6

or

monitoring by absentees 207 that will provide an adversarial presentation of information about the class to the court, further control of the action can be remitted largely to private control with
the judge exercising control only if new information shows this
to be necessary. Of course, if the information gathered about the
class shows that a representative suit cannot be fairly concluded
without distorting substantive policies, the defining function will
end with an order dismissing class allegations.
The defining function required to achieve a fair negotiated
resolution of the class suit is somewhat different. If settlement is
understood to reflect a substantive choice to facilitate consensual
and autonomous ordering in society,20 8 as well as a convenient
method of clearing dockets, then it is clear that extensive judicial
involvement in structuring the outcome reached in negotiation is
counterproductive. Nonetheless, only the judge is in a position to
force the parties before the court to take absentee interests into
account. 20 9 Factoring such interests into the outcome of the
action is, however, a much different process than in adjudication,
203

See Note, supra note x66, at 1141.

204 See Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 197), aff'd in part, 459

F.2d 725 (ist Cir. 1972), discussed, pp. 1456-57 infr; cases cited p. 1377, note 24
supra.
20
1 See pp. 1479-82 infra.
200 See pp. 1482-85 infra.
20 See pp. 1566-68 infra.
208 See generally pp. 1375-76 supra.
20 Because a range of substantive outcomes will often be consistent with a

statutory mandate, the parties actually negotiating a settlement may adopt an
outcome furthering their private interests over absentee interests if such a course
is both consistent with the statute and more desirable than an outcome that
would be required to accomodate absentee concerns. See sources cited note 204
supra; pp. 1561-62 infra.
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where it is sufficient to bring the relevant interests to the attention of the court. As discussed in an earlier Section, participation
by the judge in negotiations as an advocate of absentee interests
poses grave problems of fairness. -10 Moreover, the goal of creating autonomous resolutions of disputes suffers if the interests of
absentees are filtered through the judge. Thus, for negotiations
to be fair and to further consensual goals, the defining function
must be concerned not only with identifying the interests of absentees, but with modifying the party structure of negotiations
through such techniques as inviting intervention 211 so that the
resolution of the suit itself reflects
the range of interests that will
2 12
be affected by the settlement.
The purpose of the defining function - preparing the class
action for fair disposition by either adjudication or negotiation determines the timing of procedures which implement that function as well. The judge ought to have at least begun to define the
action, and put the party structure in place, before he is asked to
rule on the merits or approve a settlement or dismissal. These occasions, however, mark only the last points by which definition
must have occurred. In fact, considerations of the dynamics of
settlement suggest that definition must begin at the outset of the
litigation, immediately after the filing of the complaint.
The filing of the complaint is, as a practical matter, the first
opportunity for a court to exercise control over a class dispute,
but it should not be understood to indicate an irrevocable decision
210 See pp. 1383-87 supra.
211 The judge may have other alternatives than asking parties to intervene. He

may appoint an absentee advocate, see pp. 156I-65 infra, or he may invite amici
whose institutional concerns closely match those of absentees to enter the negotiations, see Chayes, supra note 29, at 13oo-oi. In either case, the actual participation of a person sharing the views of absentees is essential. Moreover, since the
judge must defer in reviewing the settlement to an analysis of whether a negotiated decree is fair given the interests of the parties, as well as the strength of the
parties' cases on the merits, the judge will be handicapped in finding a yardstick
to measure the judgment. In this situation, perhaps the best that the judge can do
is make reasonably sure that each point of view has been at the bargaining table.
212 Although not a part of the defining function as developed in the text, the
judge must play a role in controlling bargaining weapons. See generally pp.
1375-83 supra. It is the judge who controls the procedures that will be
adopted in adjudicating the lawsuit and, therefore, the judge is the only one in the
position to ensure that procedures do not themselves become bargaining weapons
so powerful that they either defeat access (where access through the class device is
consistent with substantive policies) or force the class opponent to settle for an
outcome falling outside limits set by the strength on the merits of the class' claim.
In performing this function, however, the judge is not handicapped by the fact
that he must find out about unfair bargaining pressure from a representative of
those pressured-here it is the parties themselves who stand to be pressured,
and they can be expected to bring their interests to the attention of the court.
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by the parties to adjudicate their dispute. Instead, it is merely
one step in ongoing negotiations between the class and its opponent, and these negotiations may terminate in a proposed settlement at any time and without regard to either the interests of
absentees or the readiness of the action to proceed to any stage
of adjudication. If the action is not defined by the time the parties
move for a hearing on dismissal or compromise, it will be more
difficult to terminate the suit in a fair way. The judge will not
have the benefit of adversarial presentation on class issues that he
might have had before the settlement was reached, and his opportunity to inject absentee representatives into the bargaining
process will have been missed. Although the settlement could be
disapproved and new negotiations mandated with the appropriate
party structure, this course is not as satisfactory as putting the
party structure in place while the situation is still fluid and the
absentee representatives
do not have to contend with a preexisting
13
agreement.
Considerations other than the possible need to pass on the fairness of a settlement also dictate that the defining function start
immediately after the filing of the complaint. Indeed, initiation
of bargaining that can lead to an acceptable settlement may be
hampered until there is at least a tentative indication that the
class representative will in fact be allowed to speak for the class he
purports to represent.2 14 Similarly, at least in damage actions,
implementation of the access function requires that class attorneys
be given some assurance reasonably early in the lawsuit that the
fund upon which they expect to draw for their fees will exist if
the suit is won on the merits. Finally, motions under rule 12 or
for summary judgment can be made at any time after filing of the
complaint and in disposing of these motions the judge should be
aware of any relevant interests held by potential class members,
or he should at least be clear that the motion can appropriately
be resolved without reference to outsiders' concerns. 1 3
To say that the court must take control of the defining function at the outset does not, however, make it so. Courts usually
do not move unless litigants request them to do so, and it cannot
213
214

See generally pp. 1555-6o infra.
See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 701 (7th Cir. x975), cert. denied

sub nora. Jimenez v. Mathews, 44 U.S.L.W. 3754 (U.S. June 29, 2976) (No. 751114); pp. 1378-79 supra.
225 Cf. Elliott v. Weinberger, No. 74-1611, at 13-14 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 5975)
(when issues have been canvassed in other cases and commentary, there is no
need for intervention and due process does not require it), vacated and remanded on
other grounds sub non. Mathews v. Elliott, 44 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. May 25, 1976)
(No. 75-1234); Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 96o (W.D.
Mich. x974) (same).
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realistically be expected that trial judges will scan their new
docket entries for class suits. For this reason, a rule that would
require a class attorney to file a motion for an initial hearing on
class issues seems essential."' Such an initial hearing would not
be the certification hearing envisioned by present local rules of
court.2 17 Instead, the function of this hearing would be limted.
First, it would provide the trial judge with an opportunity to
determine whether settlement negotiations were already underway
and, if so, to bring those negotiations under judicial supervision.
Second, the hearing would give the class opponent a chance to
protect himself from any undue bargaining power which the filing
of the complaint had given the class by providing an occasion for
the judge to consider a motion to dismiss class allegations as improper on the face of the complaint. The test of such a motion
ought to be the same as that currently employed under rule
12(b) (6).2"8 Thus if the allegations of the complaint taken as
true cannot support a class action - for example, because the
representative is not a member of the class alleged, 210 or because
the theory of liability is inconsistent with class relief as a matter
of law 220
the class allegations should be stricken. Finally, the
hearing would provide the trial judge an opportunity to begin the
iterative process of developing information about the class. For
this purpose, the judge could take the occasion to issue an order
establishing a discovery schedule and 22
fixing a time for a hearing
to consider the discovered information. 1
After an initial round of information-gathering, the trial judge
should be in a position to enter a number of orders determining
the future course of the suit. For purposes of exposition, these
orders will be described as entered after a single hearing. It must
be kept in mind, however, that there is no need to have a single
climactic moment at which the future of the action is determined.
To the contrary, both the heuristic function of class litigation and
-

"'6 See M mAL rOR COMPLEX LiTiGATIOx, pt. i, § 1.40 (West 1973); Frankel,

supra note 7, at 41.

See, e.g., rules cited note 173 supra.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, all
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true, as well as all
reasonable inferences therefrom. See, e.g., Park View Heights Corp. v. City of
Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.3 (8th Cir. 1972).
1' See pp. 1458-63 infra.
220 See pp. 1359-66 supra.
"2 One such program of hearings and discovery was outlined by Judge
Fullam in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452
(E.D. Pa. 1967). There the parties exchanged statements of contentions on class
issues and then briefed the contested issues. Rebuttal briefs followed. Discovery
was to follow on disputed points, although in the actual case it was not needed.
Finally, the court was prepared to hear oral argument on certification issues.
See Newberg, supra note 177, at io5 n-17.
21'

218
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the constitutional requirement that the interests of absentees be
adequately represented mandate that orders redefining party
structure, sending notice or directing additional discovery be
entered as the judge thinks required fully to develop relevant information about the class. Moreover, even after the generic
identity of the class is set and an initial party structure is in
place, the judge must be willing to respond to unfolding events by
reopening class and party questions.
At the second hearing, the class opponent would be able to
move that the class allegations be struck if class facts showed that
there existed an irremediable conflict within the class,222 a want of
numerosity, or some other ground for the conclusion that a representative action should not proceed. The facts developed at this
hearing should further put the trial judge in possession of at least
a tentative picture both of the situations of class members and of
the party structure for the litigation which will be required to
represent absentees adequately. At the close of this hearing, therefore, the judge would for the first time be in a position to take
whatever procedural steps are necessary to deal with differences
within the class which would not justify termination of the class
aspects of the litigation, but which would require recognition if
adequate representation were to be ensured. Such steps might
include the creation of subclasses, encouragement of intervention,
redefinition of the class to exclude dissenting groups, or extension
to class members of the right to opt out.
At the close of the second hearing, the trial judge will also be
in a position to decide whether notice of the class action should be
given to class members and what form that notice should take.
The judge's other procedural decisions may make notice to at
least some class members useful or even necessary. For example,
an order that notice be given to the relevant class members would
seem to follow as a matter of course from a judge's decision to
create subclasses, encourage intervention among particular segments of the class, or extend an opt-out right to part of the class.
In each of these cases, it should be recognized that the sole function of notice is to allow absentees to respond to the pendency of
the lawsuit, in the first two cases by joining actively in it, in the
last case by leaving it. If it is not reasonably likely that class
members can be found who can indeed afford to intervene in, or at
least monitor, the litigation, then notice in the first two cases is of
no practical value. Similarly, if absentees do not hold individually
recoverable claims, there seems little practical value in notifying
them of a right to opt out of the suit; they have no other way to
recover and, if they choose not to recover, they can simply refuse
222

See pp. 1489-98 infra.
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to file a claim against whatever fund the lawsuit may eventually
create.
Although notice itself is not constitutionally required, a procedural step such as subclassing may be. If notice is necessary to
implement such a procedural step, then some thought must be
given to the form that notice should take, since the cost of at least
some forms of notice may be so great as to make class suit impossible."2 3 In this regard, it seems clear that individual notice would
22 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417

U.S. i56 (1974), which held that plaintiffs in rule 23(b)(3) class suits must bear
the cost of notice, id. at I77-79, there has been much concern that notice costs
would make class suits financially infeasible. Whether this fear is exaggerated is
not clear. In Eisen itself, the estimated cost of notice was $3I5,ooo, see id. at 167
n.4; however, Eisen involved an unusually large class, see p. X326 n.34 supra. The
Senate Commerce Committee Study, supra note i66, suggests that notice costs may
not be any more of a barrier to class suits than attorneys' or experts' fees which
have so far been thought not to create serious obstacles to class suit. The Study
found that, of 23 class actions in a nationwide survey, only four involved notice
costs greater than $25,ooo, and only 8 involved a cost of more than $5,ooo. Regardless of the magnitude of the problem, the trend in legislation appears to be
to overrule Eisen, with a number of state statutes providing for allocation of the
cost of notice between the parties. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 178, (West
1973); N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. ANN. 4:32-2(b) (S. Pressler ed. '975); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 426.iio
(1974) (state Commissioner of Banking bears the cost of notice in consumer
suits). At the federal level, there have been a number of consumer class action
proposals which have provided for dividing the cost of notice. See, e.g., Proposed
Federal Consumer Class Acton-ll, 4 CLAss ACTION REP. 342, 346 (1975) (discussing Consumer Class Action Act of 1976).
A court, faced with the prospect of expensive notice, has a number of alternatives available to it for financing notice other than placing the cost on the class
opponent. First, the court can allow the class attorney to put up the money in
the first instance, see pp. 1618-23 infra, subject to reimbursement as part of the
cost of suit taxed against the class recovery or the class opponent, see, e.g., Katz
v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 546 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (I974). Second,
the court may be able to redefine a subclass small enough to make the cost of
notice manageable. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 183-85
(i974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But cf. pp. 1456-58 infra (underinclusive class
definition may create problems of fairness). Third, the court can factor the
cost of notice into the form of notice that it will require in the first place. Thus,
if individual notice would be prohibitive, the court could adopt a form of publication or media notice, see notes 225-27 infra, that would allow suit to go on while
providing at least a limited opportunity for class members to make their views
known. See Watson v. Branch County Bank, 38o F. Supp. 945, 959-6o (W.D.
Mich. I974); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465, 472 (N.D. Ill.
2967) ("Given the necessity for preserving the viability of the taxpayer action
device, notice by publication would seem sufficient to satisfy due process requirements."); cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318I9 (i95o) (personal service on contingent remaindermen not needed because of
prohibitive cost of maintaining records of addresses; similarly, not necessary that
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seldom be required to implement the participation or monitoring
functions sought to be implemented by subclassing or intervention. Indeed, under current class action doctrine, intervention of
right is limited to those not already adequately represented in the
suit so that an attempt to intervene by each and every class member individually notified would be rebuffed.224 What is needed instead is some assurance that a cross-section of absentees is taking sufficient part in the suit to provide a check on the veracity of
assertions made about the class by its representatives. For this
purpose, the normal publicity generated in, for example, a plant
against whose owner a Title VII suit is pending, or in a city in
which a school integration suit is pending, may be sufficient
notice by itself if supplemented by a publicized procedure by
which the public may make its views known to the court.2 25
Alternatively, notice could be sent to a random sample of the
class, 22 or, more traditional publication notice could be used, but
only if a medium could be found that was likely to be read by class
members. °- 7
all who could be notified receive notice, expense may be limited so long as some
who share interest of absentees are notified). Finally, the court might tax notice
costs to the class opponent, but make the class representative post a bond. See,
e.g., Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 39 (S.D. Iowa) (dictum). Were
this course to be widely adopted, it is possible that the costs of notice in class suits
could be reduced generally, since wide use would allow a bondsman to set his price
on an actuarial basis, in effect creating an insurance fund to be tapped by losing
class representatives.
224 See, e.g., Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir.
1973); 3B J. MOORE, supra note 2, ff 23.90[2]; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note i75, § 1799.
225 Innovative use of publicity and other forms of publication has been
made

in a number of cases. In Elliott v. Weinberger, No. 74-1611, at 9 (gth Cir., Oct.
1,1975), which involved a class of claimants under the old age provisions of the
Social Security Act, the court ordered posters placed in every local Social Security
office, advertisements of a non-legal nature in two papers of general circulation,
and a mention of the suit in every communication from the Social Security
Administration to class members. See also Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483
(W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972)

(news media coverage); Dan-

forth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (press releases) ; Fujishima
v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (notice given to class of high
school students by posting and intercom announcements).
2
I See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
227 In the Antibiotic Drug Antitrust Litigation, West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), notice included the running of stories in consumer
publications and labor newsletters. See Shapiro, Processing the Consumer's Claim,
41 ANTITRUST LJ.257, 263-65 (1972).
Where notice is used to distribute damages to individual class members, a form
of notice reasonably likely to come to the attention of class members seems
essential. This does not, however, mean that notice by mail is required. Indeed,
in the Antibiotic Drug Antitrust Litigation, many of the claims were those of

1436

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1318

Even where modification of the party structure of the class

suit is not mandated, notice may nonetheless be desirable to implement individual control objectives. The tradition of private control of litigaton - of the individual day in court - is deeply
ingrained and should probably be recognized as a matter of
course. The value of private control should, however, be kept in

perspective. Both notice and participation in class actions are by
no means cost-free. 228 Absent statutory provisions to the contrary,
the cost of court-ordered notice must be borne by either the class
attorney or the named plaintiffs, at least pending the outcome of
the suit.2 9 Moreover, to intervene in a class action, a class member will generally have to find an attorney. Whether the fees for
such an attorney could be taxed against the class recovery, or,
under a statute, against the class opponent, is a complex question,
depending on such imponderables as whether the absentee will be
allowed to intervene at all, rather than just monitor the lawsuit,
and, if intervention is allowed, whether the absentee's attorney
will benefit the class as a whole, or contribute significantly to the
furtherance of statutory objectives by his presence.2 30 These facindividual consumers of drugs about whom the class opponents could not have
been expected to have records containing addresses.
228 See Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 959-60 (W.D. Mich.
,974) (refusing to order notice because of its expense and because it was not
needed to elucidate the issues through intervention).
229 See pp. 1618-23 infra.
20 There seems little doubt that an intervenor in an action can, in appropriate
circumstances, be reimbursed for his attorneys' fees out of either the fund created
by the lawsuit or under a statute that authorizes fee-shifting. See Wilderness
Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (x975). In brief, those circumstances are the following: (i) where the opposing party has acted in bad faith in
contesting the litigation or some part thereof; (2) where the intervenor has conferred a benefit on an identifiable group of people and taxing the fees against the
fund created by the lawsuit is an equitable method of distributing costs to all
benefitted; and (3) where the intervenor acts "in the public interest." See 495
F.2d at 1029-31. See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARv. L. REV. 849 (0975). The first condition might be
true in any class suit, but it is clearly not a matter under the control of the intervenor. It is conceivable that the intervenor, like the class representative, might
confer benefits on the class as a whole. But, since only intervention that is not
mandated for a fair adjudication of the class dispute is now being considered, it
cannot be assumed that the intervenor will in fact confer such a benefit- the purpose of allowing intervention is to vindicate the private interest in litigation control, not the class interest. In any event, to be in a position to confer benefit on
the class, an intervenor would have to achieve full participation status, and admission to such status is a matter of the court's discretion, see pp. 1482-85 infra.
Similarly, the "public interest" that justifies a fee award is the bringing of a
suit enforcing public policy that could not be brought unless fees were shifted. In
Alyeska Pipeline, supra, the Supreme Court held that fees could not be shifted
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tors will always be in doubt at the outset, and for this reason,
attorneys may not be willing to undertake intervention on a contingent fee basis. Thus, the most probable intervenors would be
those with such a stake in the outcome that they would be willing
to pay attorneys' fees. Unless, therefore, the information developed about the class makes it likely that at least some persons
hold large claims, or have access to a form of subsidized legal
service, the quest to implement private control may have little
effect except to make litigation more expensive for the class representative.
Beyond considerations of the functional possibility of private
control, fairness to the defendant may require that notice be
limited. For the class opponent, notice is a form of adverse publicity, particularly dangerous if class members treat the fact of
suit as conclusive of the class opponent's culpability and modify
their behavior accordingly. As was discussed above,23 ' the concern for unfair bargaining leverage which the class representative
may obtain through widespread notice caused the Third Circuit
in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp."3 2 to abandon the class suit altogether in favor of a test case procedure. Although such a procedure is probably the only response to the problems created by
the style of individualized notice mandated by the Supreme Court
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 233 it is an unsatisfactory alternative because, in protecting the defendant, it dispenses with concern for absentee interests even though the very fact that class
suit would be appropriate testifies to the importance of taking
those interests into account. A better procedure, but one admittedly barred under rule 23(c)(2) as presently interpreted,
would be to adopt a form of notice that would not be likely to
disrupt business relationships between the class opponent and
more than a random sample of the class. Such a limited form of
under this theory without statutory authorization. But even assuming such authorization, it is not clear that the intervenor here is intervening in the "public interest"
since the access function is fulfilled by the class representative's suit, and unless
intervention is required for the fair adjudication of that suit, no "additional"
vindication of public rights is being carried out. Indeed, it could be argued that the
imposition of multiple intervenors' fees on the class opponent would deter conduct
not in fact prohibited and would, therefore, be contrary to public policy. See pp.
1353-66 supra.
Where intervention or subclassing is needed for the suit fairly to adjudicate the

rights of absentees, it would seem that intervenors' counsel or the subclass' counsel
should be able to collect fees under either the second or third theories above. In
this case, intervention or subclassing is presumptively beneficial to the class as a
whole since the class suit could not go forward without it.
'31 See p. 1425 supra.
232
233

496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (,974).
417 U.S. i56, 175-77 (1974).
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notice would, in general, fulfill the heuristic function of the class
suit. In addition, were notice limited to those likely to obtain the
the potential for misunderlegal counsel necessary to intervene,
34
standing would be reduced.

...
4The appealability of orders entered under rule

23(c)

(1) isa matter much

mooted. See, e.g., J. MOORE,supra note 2, ff 23.97; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 175, § 1802; Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action
Allegations, 70 CoL m L. REv. 1292 (1970); Note, Class Action Certification Orders:
An Argument for the Defendant's Right to Appeal, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 621
(1974); Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. §
z292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 630-31 n.97 (1975). At present, the Second Circuit
is willing to review orders denying class status under the aegis of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970), if such a denial as a practical matter ends the lawsuit. See, e.g., Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d ri9 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. IO35
(1967); accord, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 5ol F.2d 639
(2d Cir. 1974); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 2O94 (2d Cir. 1974).
This doctrine has, however, been rejected by the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits. See Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 925 (1972); Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 928 (973); Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., No. 74-1908 (7th Cir. May
17, 1976); Falk v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 472 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1972). Although
some have urged that the interlocutory appeal provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 129 2(b)
(1970) should provide a basis for appeal, see, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 22, at 390
n.131, this use of § 1292(b) appears generally inconsistent with the legislative
purpose in passing the section. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal
Courts, supra.
Under the procedure proposed here, the appeal question is further clouded because there need be no order defining class status until a determination of the
merits and such an order is a prerequisite to appeal under any theory. On the
other hand, if the judge does dismiss class allegations prior to concluding the action
in the district court, an appeal would seem proper where (I) the trial court has
determined that the access function performed by class suits is consistent with
statutory policy and (2) access would be frustrated by the denial because the action
would, as a practical matter, be terminated as financially infeasible. Such a rule
would seem to meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine under § 1291,
see id. at 6o8 n.7 and sources cited therein, since there would be no occasion for
appellate review of the order. Nonetheless, the second prong of this "death knell"
rule, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, supra, at 12x, has caused courts difficulty because it is not always easy to determine when a litigation is practically terminated.
See, e.g., Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, supra, at io99-1oo. Because of this,
it would seem better to adopt a per se rule that allows appeal from denials of class
action status. Although such a rule is overbroad, it does ensure that an erroneous
denial of class status does not work as a stare decisis bar to future litigants seeking
access to court through a similar class suit. It further ensures that party structure
alignments needed for just adjudication should the class allegations be reinstated
on appeal can be made in a timely manner-even if the suit could go forward
individually, reversal of the denial of class status on final appeal might be impractical because a retrial with a correct party structure might be required.
On the other hand, appeal from orders affirming class status should not be
appealable except when they would otherwise create the conditions of appealability
required by § 2292(b). See Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts,
supra, at 930-31 n.97. There are two reasons for this. First, even though the class
opponent may feel more settlement pressure once the action is allowed to go for-
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3. Information Gathering from Absentee Class Members.In traditional single party litgation, the parties structure discovery
to ferret out information relevant to the substantive issues in the
case. The judge remains passive unless he is requested to intervene. -3 5 The threat of retaliation by the opposing party and the
protection provided by rule 26 23 are generally sufficient to contain any exploitation by one party of the liberal federal discovery
provisions to the detriment of other parties. 23' The class action,
however, both expands the range of discoverable issues to include
those relevant to questions of class procedure 238 and heightens the
potential for abuse of the discovery devices because of the presence of absentees who may be subjected to discovery but who do
230
not themselves engage in it.
(a) Discovery and Class Procedure.- At its outset, every
class suit must be governed by the judicial control paradigm. 4 °
In this paradigm, assurance of adequacy of representation requires that the judge obtain information about the class. In additon, the judge must have access to facts about the class if he is to
assess properly the suitability of the case for class treatment. The
most straightforward method for developing class information is
through ordinary discovery devices directed to absentees, and this
ward as a class suit, this is not likely to lead to unfair outcomes so long as the
class opponent can threaten an adjudication on the merits, see pp. 1375-83
supra, and there is no reason to think that this will not generally be the case.
As a result, the class opponent who adjudicates the action will get an opportunity
to raise class action issues on appeal from judgment and the settling opponent is
not unfairly prejudiced. Second, a decision to allow an action to go forward as a
class suit will often involve discretionary factors such as the ability of the court
to deal adequately with class conflict. Because of this discretion, such orders are
not likely to be reversed, see Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts,
supra, at 618 n.57, and, therefore, an appeal will probably not be worthwhile
given the delay and expense involved.
235 See 4 J. MooRE, supra note 2, ff 26.02(5) (2d ed. 1975).
230 "Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought
and for good cause shown," a district court may restrict or prohibit discovery.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
2 37
' See 4 J. MOORE, supra note 2, ff 26.02[3] (2d ed. 1975).
23 See, e.g., Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973); Burwell
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-70 (E.D. Va X975); Stokos v.
United States, 393 F. Supp. 24, 32-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ; Taliaferro v. State Council
of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1387-88 (E.D. Va. 1974).
2 Absentees are not ordinarily expected to make discovery of the class adversary or to seek protective orders. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, ioo5 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (Y972)
(allowing discovery from absentees only if justice requires); cf. American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552 (1974) (prior to certification, absentees are
expected
to be passive beneficiaries of action brought on their behalf).
2 0
1 See pp. 144-15 supra.
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course has been either adopted or advocated by courts and commentators. 4 '
Reliance on the parties to develop information about the class
-class

facts

-

is nonetheless hazardous.

Because one of the

purposes of discovery is to bring to light facts that would cause
the court to dismiss the class allegations for inadequacy of representation, 242 or to divide the class into subclasses, the named plaintiff's interests in the suit may run counter to the purposes of the
court and may cause the named plaintff to shade or conceal adverse
information. 2 3 Normally, the equal availability of discovery to
the defendant would check any such concealment by the plaintiff. In the class context, however, defendant discovery of absentees may itself have to be limited to prevent abuse. There is
danger that defendants will use discovery to intimidate absentees
with burdensome discovery requests in the hope that absentees
will opt out of the lawsuit, making it financially infeasible, or that
absentees will fall victim to sanctions of exclusion or dismissal
for failure to comply with discovery. 244 Alternatively, the defendant may point to a low response rate from absentees as an indication that their sense of harm is slight and that class relief ought,
therefore, to be limited, an argument that may be misleading if
the discovery requests are burdensome.
A simple solution to both problems would be to limit discovery
241
to class facts in records in the possession of the defendant.
Such information might well establish, for example, whether the
claims of the class and the named plaintiffs are likely to be similar.
Limiting discovery intended to generate data about absentees to
the defendant's files removes any chance of abuse by the defendant and also limits the potential for plaintiff distortion since the
defendant can be relied upon to bring any such distortions to light.
241 See, e.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (ist Cir. 1972) ;

Stavrides

v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 6o F.R.D. 634, 636 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Page v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 332 F. Supp. io6o, 1071 (D.N.J. 197) (by implication);
MANUAL FOR ComPLEx LITIGATION, pt. I, § 1.40 (West 1973); Frankel, supra
note 7, at 41-42.
242 Dismissal of class allegations will often make suit financially impossible
and
thus is clearly contrary to the named plaintiff's interest. Moreover, the named
plaintiffs may have an interest in controlling the form of relief sought in the suit,
and such control is threatened by the intervention of additional parties.
242
See also pp. 1597-i604 infra.
244 See, e.g., Wainright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 832, 843, 500 P.2d 621, 627,
103 Cal. Rptr. 7o9, 715 (1972); C. WRIGHT & A. MIruER, supra note 175, § 1792
n.96; cf. Carlson v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 640, io9 Cal. Rptr. 240 (0973)

(abuse of discretion for trial court to require absentees to submit to deposition or
waive claim).
24 See Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305-07 (5th Cir. 1973);
Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (rst Cir. 1972).
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Allowing the named plaintiff to discover class facts from the
defendant nonetheless gives the plaintiff a potent bargaining
weapon since discovery can be used to disrupt the defendant's
normal business operations.2 1 6 For this reason, defendants have
resisted the plaintiff's discovery request by challenging plaintiff's
"standing" to seek information about absentees,247 or by trying
to convince the court that the plaintiff is actually seeking to find
a class rather than to verify the existence of a class of which the
plaintiff has some extrinsic knowledge. 2 8 Although the court may

not be able to remove the potential for abuse entirely, a number of
ways of minimizing it do seem to be readily available. First,
the court can require the plaintiff to compile the requested class
data, or to pay for its compilation. 40 Second, the court can force
the plaintiff to make a showing analogous to probable cause to
demonstrate that discovery is not merely a fishing expedition for
a class that may not exist.25 ° Finally, the court could limit discovery to contested certification issues.2 5" This course, however,
should be a last resort since the court could never assure itself
that it had properly defined a class if the defendant controlled
access to information through the issues it sought to put in controversy.
To the extent that information about the class is not available
from defendant records, some sort of discovery of absentees will
be required to generate the information necessary to ensure adequacy of representation and suitability of the case for class treatment. Because private control of discovery may be inadequate
to provide the required information, the judge must actively oversee the information collection process. The ability of the plaintiff
to obscure or slant class facts can be limited if the court assigns
the plaintiff specific discovery tasks. The potential for harassment in defendant discovery requests can be similarly reduced if
the court approves proferred interrogatories, document requests,
and requests for admissions. 52 Alternatively, the court might
240 There is also a danger that wide-ranging discovery could invade the privacy

of class members or others employed by, or doing business with, the defendant.
247 See, e.g., Branch v. Reynolds Metals Co., 17 FED. RuLES SERV. 2D 494
(E.D. Va. 1972); Doyle v. Bresler's 33 Flavors, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. II 74,082

(N.D. Ill.
24

X972).

See American Finance Sys., Inc. v. Pickrel, 18 FED. RurLES SERV. 2D 314, 316

(D. Md. 1974).
.4 See Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1973).
2
. See Rossin v. Southern Union Gas. Co., 472 F.2d 707, 712 (ioth Cir. 1973).
251 See Doyle v. Bresler's 33 Flavors, Inc., 2972 Trade Cas. ff 74,082 (N.D.
Ill.

1972).

222 The constitutionality of such prior restraint on communications cannot be
assumed. See pp. 16oo-oi & note 95 infra.
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on its own initiative conduct a preliminary survey of the class

prior to certification. The form of this survey could be that of a
simple questionnaire 253 and could be addressed either to the class
as a whole or to a random sample. 54 In order to ensure that the
results of such a survey were correctly interpreted, the judge could
allow the parties to participate in the drafting of the form and to
present adversary argument on the meaning of the responses.
The current practice of sending proof of claim forms to absentees in damage actions 255 often performs the same function as
211

In Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D.

1o8, 112-14

(E.D.N.Y.

x969),

Judge Weintein used an interrogatory to determine how many class members
sought to return to a school from which they were expelled in order to assess the
need for preliminary relief. See also In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 278, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court supervised sampling of class members
superior to formal discovery), aff'd sub nor. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119
(3d22Cir. 197) (per curiam).
a See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76) (providing for random sampling in class suits).
The propriety of court contact with class members prior to certification was
recently questioned in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States District Court, 523 F.2d IO73 (9th Cir. 2975), noted in 44 FORD. L. REV. 421 (x975).
There, the Ninth Circuit granted mandamus to restrain a district judge's effort to
notify potential damage claimants of their opportunity to participate in an uncertified mass tort class action. The court of appeals felt that such notice might
stir up litigation in derogation of the traditional ban on solicitation, id. at 1077 &
n.3, ro78-79, and that it was not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The decision in Pan American seems justified since notice designed to bring
potential class members into an uncertified class action, and not to elicit information from them, does not seem to further any purpose of rule 23. The claims at
issue in Pan American -individually recoverable damage claims arising from a
single air crash-are those which the draftsmen of rule 23 found particularly inappropriate for class action treatment. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. o3
(1966). Consequently, the effect of the district judge's action would have been to
use the putative applicability of rule 23 to bring into court individual claims
which would not have been suitable for aggregation in a class suit. Pan American's narrow reading of the district judge's authority under rules 23(d) and 83
cannot, however, be the general rule, since it interferes too greatly with the main
task of the trial judge in class litigation -ensuring
adequacy of representation.
Indeed, the Pan American court itself noted that pre-certification notice intended
to determine whether the action should proceed as a class suit would present a
different case. 523 F.2d at 1078-79.
211 See, e.g., Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 43 (S.D. Iowa 1972);
Kom v. Franchard Corp., 5o F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y.), class designation withdrawn,
[i97o-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,845, at 9o,x66 (S.D.N.Y.
i97o), rev'd, 456 F.2d 12o6 (2d Cir. I972).
The proof of claim forms analyzed here are usually sent with class notice or
otherwise near the outset of the litigation to help the court determine the extent
and nature of absentee claims. Proof of claim forms are also sent to class members after adjudication of the common questions -usually concerning defendant's
liability-in order to distribute the class recovery.
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court-class communication designed to elicit class facts. Such
forms request absentees to state the size of their claim and their
intention to assert it if the class is victorious. 25 6 Frequently,
courts relying on the proof of claim device condition further par2 57
ticipation in the action on the return of the form by the absentee.
This practice, which has been criticized by courts 25 8 commentators 250 and the bar 260 highlights the general question of the ap-

propriateness of punitive sanctions for failure to respond to precertificaton discovery requests. If failure to respond bars the
claim, the class action effectively shortens the limitations period
for absentees.2 ' If a refusal to respond eliminates the absentee
from the class without depriving him of his individual cause 2of62
action, then effectively the absentee must opt in to the class suit.

2' See, e.g., Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04
(S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Harris v. Jones,
41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966). See also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 175, § 1787.
257 See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577-78 (D.
Minn. 1968); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966).
2.8See B & B Investment Club v. Kleinert's Inc., 62 F.R.D. 140, 146-51 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Ostroff v. Hemisphere Hotels Corp., 6o F.R.D. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Abulaban v. R.W. Pressprich & Co, 5i F.R.D. 496, 497 (S.D.N.Y. i97i).
2
. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 175, § 1792, at 195-96 n.96; Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision (d),
zo B.C. IND. & Corm. L. REv. 577, 589-91 (1969); Panel Discussion, Symposium on
Antitrust Class Actions, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 321, 339 (1972); Comment, Making
the Class Determination in Rule 23(b) (3) Class Actions, 42 FORD. L. REV. 791,
8o8-og & n.93 (1974). But see Ward & Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of
Rule 23 Notice, io B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 557, 567-68 (1969).
200 See Report of the Federal Courts Committee of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, reprintedin 2 CLAss AcTION REP. 89 (1973).
202 Id. at 94.
Punitive sanctions appear to have an efficiency rationale. See Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968). For
other instances in which the sanction of dismissal was adopted, see Lamb v.
United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 43 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Iowa v. Union
Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd, 409
F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. i969); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966). Whatever its defects when imposed at the outset of the action, dismissal with prejudice
may not be an unfair result when the proof of claim form is sent after the determination of defendant's liability in order to facilitate the distribution of the recovery.
See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 5o F.R.D. 57, 6o (S.D.N.Y.), class designation
withdrawn, [1970-7i Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. II 92,845, at
9o,166 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 456 F.2d 12o6 (2d Cir. 1972).
212 See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577-78
(D. Minn. 1968). In cases in which the defendant has some implicit leverage over
-class members-such as an employer would have over employee class members in
a Title VII action- requiring the absentee to opt in can effectively decimate the
class. A study commissioned by the Senate Commerce Committee found that use
of an opt-out procedure generally resulted in a Io% or less reduction in the class
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The 1966 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, deliberately avoided imposing this requirement in common
question litigation.2 3 Since discovery requests focusing on certification criteria are designed to provide the court with an understanding of absentee interests through communication with some
or all absentees, the application of sanctions should be sparing
and dictated by the exigencies of information gathering rather
than by any sense of adversarial symmetry." 4
(b) Discovery and the Merits. -To argue the merits of their
case, litigants in class actions need the traditional discovery
tools 205 available in single party suits. However, like discovery of
class facts, defendant discovery of information about the merits
of a class' case can be used as a tactical weapon to reduce the size
of potential liability. But, unlike discovery of class facts, developwhile the use of an opt-in procedure resulted in reductions of 39% to 73% in class
membership. Note, supra note z66, at xIso.
263

See

FED.

R. CiV. P.

23(c)(2); MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION, pt. I, §

1.45, at 37 (West 1973)

(opt-in requirement described as "clear abuse of discretion"); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 175, § 1787, at X57; Report of
the Federal Courts Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, supra note 260, at 93-94 (973); Kaplan, supra note 22, at 397-98.
264 Courts requested information but refused to impose sanctions for noncompliance in Unicorn Field, Inc. v. The Cannon Group, Inc., 6o F.R.D. 217, 228
(S.D.N.Y. 2973); Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 72 (D.D.C. '972);
Abulaban v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 51 F.R.D. 496, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 197I); Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 5o F.R.D. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y.), class designation withdrawn,
[1970-71 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 92,845, at go,166 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), rev'd, 456 F.2d 22o6 (2d Cir. I972).

A compromise solution that preserves the use of a sanction to facilitate response to proof of claim forms and yet disarms its tactical force was used in
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 7I0 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 2079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1972). Class members who failed
to file proof of claims in response to notice of a proposed settlement were barred
from the recovery. However the court ruled that such a failure to file "will
constitute an authorization to the Attorney General . . . to utilize whatever money
he may recover as your representative for the benefit of the citizens of your state
in such
manner as the Court may direct." Id. at 725.
.6 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
The discovery rules themselves refer specifically to "parties" and other "persons," but make no specific allowance for absentee class members. See id. Moreover, there is no explicit authorization of discovery in rule 23. A court might find
authority in the open-ended language of rule 23(d): "In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders . . . (5) dealing
with similar procedural matters." See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
45o F.2d 999, oo4-5 (7th Cir. 197i), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). But see
Note, Requests for Information in Class Actions, 83 YA E L.E.602, 604 (1974).
The revised version of rule 23 proposed in AmERxcA COLLEGE OF TRIAL LA-vYERS,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE SPECIAL

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2972),

tees by the class adversary. Id. at 3.

Comm.

ON

RULE

23

OF THE

provides for discovery of absen-
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ing facts about absentees which are necessary to prove his case
creates no apparent conflict of interest for the plaintiff. Thus, to
the extent that clas facts and information about the merits do not
overlap, no judicial control of plaintiff discovery is required.
The potential exploitation of discovery to the detriment of
absent class members can be controlled through increased judicial
control over the timing

26

and content

207

of discovery requests,

the range of absentees properly subjected to various forms of discovery, and the types of sanctions imposed for noncompliance
with discovery requests. As a basic principle, discovery of absentees should be discouraged because of the potential for abuse. 6 '
The defendant should be required first to seek the necessary information from the class representative. 26 9 In many cases, the
class representative will be able to meet defendant's needs for
information concerning common questions; discovery of information relating to individual claims can be deferred until the core
question of liability is settled. °
In those cases in which the defendant establishes to the satisSee note 270 infra.
207 See Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 466 (D. Utah

210

(permission to send interrogatories to class members denied after inspection
of proposed questions). To blunt the oppressive effect of absentee discovery,
information requests might be routed through the court so that the judge can
strike any portions deemed prejudicial or oppressive. See pp. 16o--04 infra;
Cf. MANUAL FOR CONPLEX LITIGATIoN, pt. i, § 3.21 (West 1973) (appointment of
master or magistrate recommended to supervise discovery in complex cases).
20' "The usefulness of Rule 23 would end if class members could be subjected
to Rule 33 and forced to spend time, and perhaps engage legal counsel, to answer
detailed interrogatories." Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D.
Ga. I972). The proposition that absentees ordinarily are not subject to discovery
appears to be accepted even by those courts willing to allow some discovery of
absentees. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999,
1005 (7th Cir. I97i), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (972).
200See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(permitting full discovery against two class representatives including discovery of
"work product" material); Bucalo v. General Leisure Prods. Corp., 15 FED.
RULES SERV. 2D 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (by implication). A court might also deny
the use of discovery against absentees when the necessary information can be
obtained by other means, such as a market survey. See Gardner v. Awards
1972)

Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 466 (D. Utah 1972).

Finally, it has been sug-

gested that problems of gathering information from the plaintiff class might be
handled without extension of discovery to class members by expanding the range
of discovery against named parties and requiring absentees with access to crucial
information to intervene as named parties subject to discovery. See Note, supra note
265, at 602, 616-18.
27
oSee Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. I18,119-21 (N.D. Ill 1973);
Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 463 (D. Utah 1972). See
also Note, Party Discovery Techniques: A Threat to Underlying Federal Policies,
68 Nw. U.L. REV. IO63, 1083 (I974).
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faction of the court that discovery of absentees is essential for the
prosecution of his case, the court could authorize limited discovery of absentees."' Normal party-discovery devices might
be used against absentees who participate in the suit as intervenors
or amici, or who are actively monitoring the suit. Active participation reflects a financial or emotional stake in the outcome of the
litigation of the same magnitude as that of the named parties. It
is, therefore, not unfair to require active participants to protect
their own interests through motions under rule 26 or through
counter-discovery motions. Those who have chosen to remain
passive beneficiaries of the representative suit merit more protection. This does not mean that passive absentees should be immunized from discovery, but only that the sort of discovery to
which any person with relevant information can be subjectednon-party depositions and subpoenas
should be used.
The ability and incentive of defendants to reduce class size
through discovery can also be limited by adjusting sanctions for
noncompliance with discovery requests rather than by imposing
limitations on the discovery process itself. Under the Federal
Rules, the district judge has discretion to modify penaltes meted
-2'

271 In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.

the court held that, in order for the defendant to obtain discovery of absentees, the information sought must be needed
for trial, the defendant must not take unfair advantage of the class members, and
the class members must be fully informed of the consequences of not complying
with discovery. Id. at ioo6. The court did not indicate what showing of "need"
would be required. Commentators have attempted to define what sort of need
supports class discovery. See Comment, supra note 259, at 8io-xx (situations of
necessity are those in which the "requested information is critical to the issue of
liability and is unavailable from any other source."); Note, supra note 270,
at 1080-82 (same); Note, supra note 265, at 619 (suggests a standard similar to
that required to obtain work product discovery of an attorney). Subsequent
cases in the Seventh Circuit, while applying the Brennan test, have denied class disX97), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972),

covery. See Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 5oi F.2d 324, 340-41 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (I974); Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. xi8,
120-21 (N.D. Ill. I973)

Cases outside the Seventh Circuit have been unreceptive to Brennan and
especially to its application of sanctions to absentees. See Gardner v. Awards
Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460 (D. Utah 1972); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp.,
54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129 (W.D.
Ky. 197).
272See FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 3i, 45; Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., S5
F.R.D. 460, 463-64 (D. Utah 1972); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D.

535 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559,
(D. Minn. 1968). See also Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.
3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972). Non-party depositions and
subpoenas are considerably more expensive than party interrogatories, requests for
admissions or document requests. With a class of any size, these devices would
be an impracticable means of reaching a large number of absentees and thus a
deterrent to the use of discovery to intimidate.
532,
582
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out to litigants for failure to respond to discovery.
Instead of
dismissing with prejudice the claim of an absentee who does not
respond, the judge might simply exclude him from the class or
7
perhaps impose no sanction at ally.
' The opportunity to use discovery for tactical purposes would be further reduced if the
absentees subjected to discovery were restricted to those thought
especially likely to have pertinent information.2 7 5 Such a limitation
respects the defendant's legitimate claim to have information
necessary to defend the suit while recognizing that even the reduction of sanctions may not prevent absentees from opting out of a
lawsuit rather than taking the time to answer discovery requests.
In determining the efficacy and fairness of sanctions in particular circumstances, a key consideration is the substantiality of the
class member's claim. 2 70 Those with individually recoverable

claims would be subject to discovery if they brought separate
actions; there is thus little prejudice in permitting such discovery
27' FED.

R. CIv. P. 37(b); see Local 251, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Town Line

Sand & Gravel, Inc., 511 F.2d 1198, 1299 (ist Cir. 1975); Krieger v. Texaco, Inc.,
373 F. Supp. IoS, 111-12 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); 8 C. WRIcHT & A. MILLER, supra note
175, § 2284 (1970).
274 See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 700-I (S.D.N.Y.
,975)

(no sanction); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga.
(same); Note, supra note 265, at 618; pp. 1443-44 & notes 261-63 supra. But
see Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 197), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). In Brennan, the court affirmed dismissal with prejudice of claims of identifiable absentees who failed to respond to discovery when
the defendant bad made sufficient showing of need and lack of intent to intimidate class members. The Robertson court distinguished Brennan by noting that if
discovery sanctions were imposed against absentees in a (b)(i) action, class members would have to choose between dismissal or compliance. In a (b) (3) action
such as Brennan, class members are able to opt out. Such self-exclusion gives a
choice only to class members with individually recoverable claims, however.
272 The practice of sampling discovery has been adopted by several courts.
See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 700-1 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 832, 836, 500 P.2d
621, 622, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709, 720 (2972) ; cf. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 278, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (while rejecting the general requirement of
proof of claims before judgment for a consumer class, the court suggested a
"sampling" of claims within a representative state or subdivision). Such sampling
discovery can be directed to class members on a random basis or to those thought
best able to satisfy defendant's informational needs. See Note, supra note 265, at
613. See also Note, supra note 270, at 1077-78.
A sampling scheme is open to criticism in that it imposes unequal burdens on
class members, especially if sanctions are imposed for noncompliance with discovery. Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 464-65 (D. Utah
1972).
211 Such a discriminating application of sanctions depends on precise knowledge
of the class and its claims, information that may be obtainable itself only through
some form of discovery - perhaps through court controlled information-gathering.
,972)
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with attendant sanctions in the collective suit. Sanctions are likely
to be similarly effective in ensuring compliance with discovery requests by those asserting moderate claims, although the fairness of
imposing such penalties is not as clear. For some small claimants,
however, the potential recovery would not justify the expense of
retaining counsel to answer information requests .2

For such

class members a threat of dismissal would be ineffective.
(4) Delay of Certificationand Statutes of Limitations.-

Both

rule 23 278 and the defining function described above envision that

a final determination of the appropriateness of an action for class
treatment may be delayed for some time. Any scaling down of the
class or denial of class status, however, creates a potential for unfairness to absentees excluded from the class suit. Relevant statutes of limitations may have run, leaving the excluded parties
without legal redress. 7 9 If, therefore, statutes of limitations were
not tolled by the filing of the class suit as to all those who might
reasonably assume that their claims were being pressed by the
class representative, protection of absentees would counsel a final
determination of class status and membership prior to the
running of statutes of limitations whenever such a course was
80
2

open.

The potential for harm to absentees from redefinition of the
class membership or denial of class status has, however, been
greatly reduced by the Supreme Court's decision in American
Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.21' There, the named plaintiff
brought an antitrust class action eleven days before the running
of the statute of limitations. 2 The class allegations were dismissed
277 See Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
The
advice of an attorney would be invaluable, if not essential, to a perplexed absentee
confronted with requests for information. For example, rule 33 appears to assume
that counsel will assist a party; objections to rule 33 interrogatories must be
signed "by the attorney making them." FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a). See also Note,

supra note 270, at 1076; Note, supra note 265, at 615.
278 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1) (a certification order "may be conditional, and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.").
279 In Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975), the Supreme
Court indicated that a class suit must be certified if mootness of the named plaintiffs' claims is not to make the whole action moot. Whether this developing doctrine dictates an early final decision on the appropriateness of an action for class
treatment will be discussed below, in conjunction with the Supreme Court's recent
mootness cases. See pp. 1463-66 & note 57 infra.
280 It is possible that the filing of a class complaint shortly before the running
of the statute of limitations would make any class determination practically impossible. This was probably the case in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538 (1974), discussed at pp. 1448-5o infra, in which suit was filed ii days
before the statute of limitations would have run, id. at 54x.
281 44 U.S. 538 (1974).
282 Id. at 541.

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS -

CLASS ACTIONS

1449

283 for failure to meet the numerosity requirement of rule 23(a) (i) in an opinion in which the trial court
noted that the other requirements of rule 23 (a) had been met.284
The trial court subsequently denied as time-barred motions to
intervene made by groups that would have been absentee class
members had the case been allowed to proceed as a class suit.28 5
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 28

some months later

the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running
of the statute for all purported members of the class who make
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit
inappropriate for class action status.
The American Pipe holding is itself narrow, limited to situations in which class status is denied for lack of numerosity and in
which the persons claiming the benefit of tolling seek to intervene
in the suit.2

7

Neither of these limitations seems required by the

reasoning of the Court, however. 288 First, the Court concluded
that the purpose of the statute of limitations would be met because the class allegations in American Pipe had given the defendants notice of "the substantive claims being brought against them,
[and also] the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment." 280 Second, the Court
concluded that it was not desirable to limit the tolling benefit to
persons who could demonstrate reliance on the filing of the class
suit. Such a limitation was not necessary to protect the interests
of the defendant2 " and a contrary rule would be inconsistent with
the purposes of rule 23. Absentees uncertain of their ability to
281 Suit was filed on May 13, 1969, and class status was denied on December 4,
1969. Id. at 541, 543. Former class members sought to intervene 8 days after
denial of class status. Id. at 543.
284

Id.

Id. at 544.
Id. at 553.
217 See id.
288 The American Pipe decision has subsequently been relied on by the Third
Circuit in an opinion in which class tolling was allowed. There, the named plaintiff had no standing as to one defendant and intervention by a party with standing
was opposed on the ground that the statute of limitations had run. The court
held that the named plaintiff's complaint tolled the relevant statute of limitations.
See Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1o83, 2o95-96 (3d Cir. 1975).
280 414 U.S. at 555.
200The Court apparently reasoned that the defendant would have notice of
all the purported class claims whether or not there had been reliance by any individual claimant, and therefore the imposition of a time bar to non-relying claimants would serve no purpose of the statute of limitations. Id. at 554-55. In a footnote, the Court implied that, should an intervenor attempt to raise a claim of which
the defendant would not have notice, the trial court could appropriately condition
intervention on the intervenor's dropping that claim. See id. at 555 n.25.
282
28

6
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show reliance might file protective complaints or motions to intervene in the class suit, a result undermining the efficiency justification of rule 23.291 In addition, the Court concluded that rule 23
evinces a-desire to allow absentees to remain the "passive beneficiaries" of the representative suit unless expressly called upon
by order of the court to take some action, and that a rule requiring active participation to protect against the running of statutes
of limitations would be inconsistent with such a theory of the
absentees' role.29
Even though it is arguable that judicial efficiency would be
little harmed by a rule contrary to that of American Pipe because few potential plaintiffs would actually rely on the class
suit to vindicate their rights 293 - a broad tolling rule nonetheless seems justified whenever the class complaint as a practical
matter puts the defendant on notice of the possible claims pending against it. 294 Since the class allegation in such a case would
291

Id. at 553-54. The Court's emphasis on the possibility that absentees

would attempt to intervene or would file protective suits, which would lead to
duplicative proceedings contrary to the efficiency rationale of rule 23, has been
challenged by one commentator on the ground that few persons would have knowledge of the suit in any event and, therefore, that there would be little reliance and
few proptective filings. See Wheeler, Predismissal Notice and Statutes of Linzitations in Federal Class Actions After American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,
48 S. CAL. L. REV. 771, 778-79 (1975). This argument has force if it is assumed
that the appropriate focus is on reliance by class members. If, instead, one focuses
on reliance by class attorneys, the argument is less persuasive. Especially in consumer class action litigation for damages, in which very few class members will
typically hold individually recoverable claims, the class attorney is deeply involved in organizing the suit. See pp. 1577-78 infra. Class attorneys may realistically be expected to refrain from filing overlapping suits. Cf. p. i61i, note I44 infra
(the filing of overlapping class suits might constitute unethical competition for
fees). But see COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1290-9X (E.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd sub nora. Goode v. Rizzo, 5o6 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 598
(1976) (three suits filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania all purporting to
represent the same class in a civil rights action against police force). Moreover,
given the low cost to an attorney of filing a complaint or motion to intervene,
class attorneys fearful of the running of the statute of limitations as to claims
they might represent could well make protective filings. More importantly, where
the majority of absentees hold individually nonrecoverable claims, they can be
protected only by the American Pipe tolling rule. As a practical matter, such
absentees can neither file individually -because of the cost of legal assistancenor demonstrate detrimental reliance since they would not have been able to sue
individually even if no suit had been brought. Thus, protection of absentee access
rights seems to require that, if a proper class suit is brought after an improper
one is dismissed, such a suit should not be time-barred so long as the defendant received the proper notice.
292 414 U.S. at 552.
293
See note 291 supra.
29"The central importance of notice in determining whether statutes of
limitations should be tolled for persons who would have been members of a class
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give the defendant the same information he would have if each
party individually filed a complaint, prejudice to the defendant
would result only in an unusual case. Similarly, a defendant faced
with information about a potential liability to a class cannot be
said to have reached a state of repose that should be protected.29 5
If the American Pipe tolling rule is restricted to those situations in
which the purposes of the statute of limitations are met by the
class complaint for all persons described as class members, then
the fact that some who have inexcusably slept on their rights are
aided is beside the point -there is no practical prejudice to the
defendant. Moreover, the importance attached to vindicating
public policy under the substantive theory of the class suit counsels hesitance in foreclosing individual suits that arguably further
compliance with statutory policy if such foreclosure is not needed
to protect defendant interests.
The American Pipe Court defined the notice that the defendant must have as twofold: The defendant must have fair warning
of both the subject matter and the size of the purported class
member's claim. Precisely what constitutes notice of the subject
matter of the prospective litigation is not clear, however. American Pipe itself involved antitrust litigation in which the actual
proof offered at least as to damages was unlikely to be identical
for all the plaintiffs, suggesting that identity of the facts to be
proved in the cases of the named plaintiff and those seeking class
tolling is not required. A clearer definition of what is required for
notice of the subject matter of prospective litigation can be derived by considering doctrine developed in the closely analogous
area of the relation back of pleading amendments under rule
29
i(c).
had one been certified was recently recognized by the Third Circuit in Haas v.
Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). There, the named plaintiff had
no standing to assert a Truth in Lending Act claim against one defendant. The
district court allowed another consumer who had standing with respect to that
defendant to enter the suit even though the latter consumer could not be represented by the original named plaintiffs and though the statute of limitations had
run as to the intervenor in the absence of class tolling. Id. at 1095-96. The Third
Circuit affirmed, noting that the purpose of the statute of limitations was fulfilled when the defendant had notice of the claim that might be asserted against
him and the number and generic identity of potential plaintiffs. Id. at 1097.
...See Note, Developments in the Law- Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAv. L.
REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) (only reasonable expectations "that the slate has been
wiped clean" are protected).
200 (c)
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party
against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is
satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (i) has received
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Rule 15(c) itself provides that an amendment will relate
back "[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Both
rule 8,297 which defines the requirements for a complaint, and
rule i5(c) envision that all relevant statutes of limitations are
tolled once the defendant is aware of the event upon which liability is predicated..2 9 Thus, amendments which state the plaintiff's
legal theory with greater clarity, or which allege specific facts of
which the defendant might have become aware in the course of a
reasonable investigation of the event alleged in the original complaint, relate back. 99 Such results seem inevitable in a system
that triggers tolling on the filing of a complaint, but which assigns
a very limited office to pleadings. Pleadings do not carry the
burden of defining issues for trial; this is left for devices such as
discovery or pre-trial conferences. 0 0 As a result, the typical
federal defendant will have very limited knowledge of the nature
such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in
maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known
that, but for a mistake . .. , the action would have been brought against
him.
FED. R. Civ. P. i5(c) [parts not relevant omitted].
297 FED. R. Civ. P. 8 states, in relevant part, "[a] pleading which sets forth a
claim for relief . . .shall contain . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." A perusal of the suggested forms for the complaint, FED. R. Civ. P. App. Fortas 3-17, quickly reveals
that the defendant will not get specific knowledge of the facts upon which the
plaintiff will rely or of plaintiff's legal theory. Nonetheless, such general notice
as the form complaints give is apparently sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for the named plaintiff. It would seem inconsistent with the structure of
the Federal Rules to require more exacting notice of the claims of absentee class
members, which are, after all, common to that of the namd plaintiff.
298 See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 US. 574, 58i (1945)
(relation back allowed even though amendment invoked additional statute and
required proof of additional facts; notice "that petitioner was trying to enforce a claim against it because of the events leading up to the death of the deceased in respondent's [railroad] yard" was sufficient); 3 J. MOORE, supra note
2, f1 15.1513]; 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILER, supra note '75, § 1497, at 495-99
('97').
299 See id. § 1498, at 5io-I1.
'°°See generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 175, § 1202 (1969). See
also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 4X, 45-46 (1957). The limited function of the
pleadings would suggest that the defendant carries the burden of collecting and
preserving evidence sufficient to rebut a wide range of contentions that may develop through discovery and trial. Cf. Barthel v. Stamm, X45 F.2d 487, 491
(1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878 (1945) ("When a suit is filed, . . .the defendant knows that the whole transaction described in [the complaint] will be fully
sifted, by amendment if need be . . . . "). For this reason, variations between the
case to be proved by purported class members and the case of the named plaintiff should seldom be prejudicial to the defendant.
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of the claim against him at the time the statute of limitations is
tolled."'
Where the amendment of the complaint adds an additional
party plaintiff to the lawsuit, the rulemakers intended the 1966
amendments to rule 15(c), relating to the addition of defendant
parties, to apply by analogy. 0 2 The relevant sections of amended
rule i5 (c) would appear to be that which requires a single transaction or occurrence and that which, read by analogy, would require that the opposing party "has received such notice of the
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits .

. . ."

Because there is no apparent

reason to require better notice for the class action defendant than
for the defendant in an ordinary lawsuit, the transaction or
occurrence and defendant prejudice provisions of rule 15 (c) ought
to determine the protection given the class defendant resisting
claims of purported class members. In the class suit context, of
course, the transaction or occurrence sued on by former absentees
may not be identical to that referenced in the named plaintiff's
complaint. Nonetheless, because the issues presented must be
common for the defendant to have the required notice of the
absentees' "substantive claims," there seems little difference
°3
between American Pipe and rule I 5(c) on this requirement.
In the specific context of the class suit, therefore, the relevant
rule for establishing adequacy of notice to the defendant would
seem to have two steps. First, tolling should be allowed if the substantive provisions of the intervenor's complaint, treated as an
amendment of a complaint identical to the named plaintiff's complaint, would be allowed to relate back under rule 15 (c) (assuming no practical prejudice to the defendant) and if the intervenor
is described by the class allegations in the named plaintiff's
complaint. Second, even if the first condition were met, tolling
should be disallowed if differences in the case to be made by the
named plaintiff and the intervenor are so great that the defendant would be prejudiced because discovery of the named plaintiff
would be insufficient to prepare its defense to the intervenor's
case and because delay in instituting discovery against the intervenor created the sort of stale claims problems statutes of limitations seek to avoid.3 0 4 The burden of showing that delay caused
' 0 ' See note 297 supra.
302 See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 83-84 (I966).
303 Moreover, the Court implied in American Pipe that tolling would not be
extended to claims so distinct from those raised in the named plaintiff's complaint that the defendant would not have notice of them. See 414 U.S. at 555
n.25.
304See Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(c): Relation Back of
Amendments, 57 MiNT. L. RFv. 83, 115 (1972) (urging same test for prejudice in
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prejudice should ordinarily be on the defendant for three reasons:
first, such prejudice is unlikely when the first conditions are met;
second, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally to be
construed in such a way that a court will decide a case on its
merits rather than on a technical objection if no clear unfairness
would arise from the former course;

305

third, the objectives of

the substantive theory of the class suit would generally be served
by proceeding to the merits whenever this is not clearly violative
of the policies embodied in statutes of limitations.
V. FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS SUIT
Representative procedures ought not to be used unless necessary; perhaps the most fundamental requirement for a class suit,
therefore, is the existence of a class too numerous for joinder to
be practical. Traditionally, "too numerous" has been a concept
given content on a case-by-case basis; the numerosity requirement is simply not susceptible of doctrinal analysis.' Numerosity,
therefore, will not be discussed here. Instead, this Section will
explore other prerequisites of class suit, attempting to determine
what constraints fairness and substantive law impose on the availability of class procedure.
A. Common Questions, Typicality, and Case or Controversy
i. Common Questions. - Although a class action may not be
brought under rule 23 unless there exists a common question of
fact or law,2 neither the rule nor the Advisory Committee Note 8
attempts to define what a common question is, and the federal
courts, when they have not ruled on the requirement without making their criteria explicit,4 have encountered difficulty in defining
case where new defendant is brought into action by amendment); c. Craig v.
United States, 413 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987
(I969) (finding prejudice where party sought to be added as a defendant had

notice of accident which was basis for amended complaint, but had no reason to
investigate facts respecting defenses that could be asserted against the amending
party).
0
'o
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (X957).

'See, e.g., F. CALVERT, PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQUITY 42 (2d ed. 1847).
'FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
3
See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. IOO (1966).
' See, e.g., Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74, 79 (M.D. Pa. 1973) ("It is
clear that there are common questions which will affect every class member");
Lewis v Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("There can be no dispute that the questions of law and fact . . . are common to ... the class
... . "); Iowa v Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 401 (S.D.
Iowa 1968) (questions of law and fact "[u]ndoubtedly" common), aff'd, 409 F.2d
1239 (8th Cir. 1969).
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it.' Content can be given to the requirement, however, if it is
recognized to be the first step in the process through which the
court identifies the situation it must deal with in adjudicating the
class action. The inquiry mandated can be understood to be an
effort to determine the persons whose claims would be resolved,
or whose interests would be affected, if the class representatives
were indeed to marshall the legal arguments and elements of proof
needed to establish the class claim as alleged and as further developed through initial rounds of discovery. A common question
is properly raised, then if the question states an element of the
claim and if the group that will be affected by adjudication of the
complaint is in fact described by the class allegations in the complaint. Judicial enforcement of this requirement is necessary
because the class attorneys, in framing the complaint, may not
know enough about the situation out of which the claim arises to
state an accurate definition.' In undertaking common question
analysis, therefore, the trial judge performs both the traditional
judicial function of moving beyond the pleadings to define the
actual problems of concern in the lawsuit, and the more peculiarly
class-action-oriented function of asserting judicial control over
the party structure of the suit.
Obviously the class definition as presented could be either overinclusive or underinclusive. Much commentary has focused on
the practical problems created when proof of the named plaintiffs' claims will not prove each and every element of every class
member's claim.' This, however, is not the kind of overinclusiveness to which common question analysis is addressed. The common question requirement by itself does not mandate complete
uniformity among the class members. Instead, considerations going beyond common question analysis, concerning the available
techniques for structuring the lawsuit, 8 as well as the fairness of
severing individuals with somewhat distinct claims, 9 will determine
the full extent to which class redefinition is necessary and possible
* Compare Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 300 (2d Cir. 1968) ("common
course of conduct"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969), with Entin v. Barg, 6o
F.R.D. 108, 113 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("a consistent and related pattern of . . . conduct").
' See Note, The Ride 23(b) (3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J.
1123, 1141 (1974).
' These discussions have generally focused on the question of -whether "fluid
recovery," in which class claims are proved in the aggregate, is proper, or whether
there must be individual trials of damages. For an analysis of this issue and citations to the literature, see pp. 1516-36 infra.
8 See pp. 1471-98 in ra.
9 If individuals with somewhat distinct claims will, as a practical matter, be
affected by the outcome of the lawsuit, it may be better to retain them in the suit
if available techniques for representing diverse interests within the class would be
sufficient to safeguard their claims even though the use of such techniques might
complicate the trial.
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in such situations of partial overlap. The only overinclusiveness
which common questions analysis will itself eliminate will arise in
situations in which the claims of class members raise such distinct
questions of law or fact that they are clearly severable in practice.' 0
Common question analysis of underinclusiveness raises issues
similar to those raised by traditional necessary and indispensable
party practice." The similarity is clearly apparent from consideration of problems confronted by the district court and court of
appeals in Castro v. Beecher. 2 Castro involved a suit brought on
behalf of black and Spanish-surnamed persons allegedly injured
by the discriminatory recruiting and hiring practices of Massachusetts state and municipal police departments.'
Judge Wyzanski's district court opinion, upon analysis of the named plaintiffs' claims, concluded that the cause of action those claims made
out was one having to do with discrimination against all "nonmainstream whites," not just black and Spanish-surnamed persons. 4 The named plaintiffs had apparently refused to represent this larger class,' 5 and Judge Wyzanski refused to certify
the class as alleged.' 6 Although the opinion does not make it express, the justification for this ruling seems to be that, as a
matter of equitable doctrine, it was not possible to grant relief to
one group of individuals when the effect would be to prefer that
group over other persons similarly affected by the class opponent's wrongful conduct.Y' By denying class treatment, Judge Wyzanski was in effect asserting that class litigation was improper
unless the class encompassed the totality of the group affected by
the litigation.
On appeal, however, the First Circuit reversed. Judge Coffin's opinion concluded that the named plaintiffs' claims did indeed
make out the elements of a cause of action shared by black and
Spanish-surnamed victims of the class opponent's discrimination.'8
Although the court of appeals ultimately held that the class was
oSee, e.g., Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435, 439-40 (W.D. Pa.
(dividing a class where some members had been affected by an administrative rule and others had been injured by a common law rule even though the
injury-having to pay out-of-state tuition fees-was common to all class members; the court treated this ruling as a typicality rather than a common question
ruling).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. x9.
12334 F. Supp. 93o (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd in part, 459 F.2d 725 (ist Cir. 1972).
13 334 F. Supp. at 934.
14 Id. at 943, 947-48.
" Id. at 948.
16
Id.
"1Id.
18459 F.2d at 729-3X.
1972)
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improper for other reasons,'" its opinion suggests that the appropriate inquiry under the "common question" requirement is
whether the named parties had the same case to prove as other
class members. If, however, Judge Coffin did not also mean to
assert that equitable doctrine did not constrain the district court's
ability to grant preferential relief only to blacks and Spanishsurnamed persons, then his focus on common proof ignores the
effect of relief on parties who would have an equal claim to modify
the status quo, thereby creating rather than resolving differences
within the class.
Judge Wyzanski's disposition of the case highlights a fundamental problem with class suits that are intended to resolve the
totality of a situation of overlapping claims. Class representatives,
in filing a complaint, can obviously be put under no obligation to
define a class as broadly as the situation may in fact warrant."
When the underinclusiveness of the class becomes apparent, moreover, the class representatives may refuse to bring suit on behalf
of the class the court thinks to be most appropriate. A court under
rule 23 could apparently condition continuation of the suit as a
class action upon the named plaintiffs' agreement to represent the
class as the court defines it.2 ' Such an approach, however, obviously raises problems of adequacy of representation. Regardless of
judicial control, class representatives must largely be relied upon
to bring differences within a class to the attention of the court,2 2
and if class representatives have already refused to take such
actions it is doubtful that the court's formal appointment will
indeed do much to change the realities of the situation. Alternatively, the court might treat the class the named plaintiffs wish to
represent as a subclass, and either appoint representatives for other
subclasses of the class as a whole, or order notice to be sent to
other class members inviting intervention.23
"0The court of appeals found that, with regard to hiring practices, the plaintiffs had failed to make out a prima facie case of racially discriminatory impact.
Id. at 732. With regard to the challenge to bias in recruitment, the court concluded that, since the named plaintiffs had been aware of police employment opportunities and had taken the entrance examination, they could not bring a class
suit challenging the dissemination of recruitment information. Id.
20 Until the complaint is filed, there can be no judicial control of the lawsuit.
Moreover, class attorneys may not be able to define the class with precision until
initial discovery is completed. See Note, supra note 6, at 14i.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (i). Indeed, a federal court may require a litigant
seeking to bring an individual action to convert his suit to a class action. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 406 F. Supp. 1195, 1i98 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
22 See p. 1593 infra (ethical responsibilities).
22 One court has ruled that it is improper for a court to contact persons not
class members for the purpose of soliciting intervention. See Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. United States District Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975). In
Pan American, however, the class claim, which arose out of an air crash disaster,
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Faced with class representatives unwilling to represent a full
class, a court could also consider alternatives beyond those suggested by class action procedure itself. For example, a court might
invite amici to represent the interests of those members whom class
representatives refuse to represent. As Professor Chayes has indicated,2" such virtual representation through amici appears to be
an increasingly common technique for reconciling the claims of
parties with others not before the court, and there seems no practical obstacle to shaping relief to take into account so far as possible the interests of those virtually represented. 25 The party
structure that would result from the participation of amici would
be similar to that created by subclassing, but would appear to be
subject to the same limitations as intervention, namely that it may
be difficult to be sure that the amici is indeed representing the
interests of any constituency larger than itself.2" A court could
also analyze the situation in rule 19 terms-

balancing the harm

to nonparties of going forward to judgment against the harm to
the present parties of refusing to adjudicate after considering
alternative forms of judgment that might lessen the impact on
outsiders.17 Judge Wyzanski's decision in Castro can be read to
reflect such a balancing- if equity would not allow blacks and
Spanish-surnamed persons to be advanced as a class over their
fellow victims of discrimination, then the harm to such victims was
clearly lessened by granting only individual preferences, and, as
compared with allowing no individual relief at all, such individual
relief adequately balanced the claims of the competing groups of
individuals.
2. Typicality. - Some courts, attempting to apply the language of rule 23 (a) (3)that "the claims or defenses of the reprewas probably not suitable for class treatment in any event. See Advisory Comm.

Note, 39 F.R.D. io3 (E966).

The underinclusive class situation is different since

the court has already determined that a class suit would be justified given the legal

questions raised and the situation of the absentees. Although there might be some
element of the "solicitation" that the Pan American court found improper, 523
F.2d at 1077 & n.3, no more litigation seems stirred up than would be caused
by other methods of dealing with absentees who should be joined if adjudication
is to be just, such as serving them with process in an attempt to join them under
rule 19, see FED. R. Civ. P. i9(a).
24 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAV. L.
Rav. 1281, 1300-o (I976).
25 Indeed, equitable doctrine has traditionally called for shaping injunctive
decrees to avoid hardship on those not before the court or to recognize public
interests transcending those of the litigants. See generally id. at 1293 & nn.56, 57.
2" See pp. 1482-85 infra (intervention); Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.. 470
(1976).
7
See FED. R. Civ. P. 1g(b).
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sentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,"
have imposed a distinct requirement of typicality in addition to
the common question requirement.28 In the leading case of LaMar
v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co.,20 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit treated the typicality requirement as a significant constraint on class definition. In
LaMar, the named plaintiff brought suits against the class of all
pawnbrokers licensed to do business in Oregon on behalf of the
class of the pawnbrokers' customers, to recover damages for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act."° LaMar, the named
plaintiff, had dealt with only one of the defendants,3 1 and for this
reason, the Ninth Circuit held that the suit could not be validly
certified as a class action. 2 Although the court conceded that a
common question was raised as to the legality of the various
transactions members of the defendant class entered into with
members of the plaintiff class, 33 it found that the claim of the
named plaintiff was not "typical" of the claims of other members
of the plaintiff class. "[T]ypicality is lacking where the representative plaintiff's cause of action is against a defendant unrelated to the defendants against whom the cause of action of the
members of the class lies." 8
The LaMar court justified its reading of the typicality requirement in terms of the institutional necessity for courts to confine
themselves to adjudication of "discrete complaints of injury by
one or a very small number of alleged wrongdoers." 3' This concern is similar to those underlying article 111,36 and, indeed, a
number of courts, in applying the typicality requirement, have
2" See,

e.g., Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp. 316,

372

(D.S.C.

1974)

("It is only

common sense that 'typicality' would not be established as a separate prerequisite
in Rule 23(a) (3)if it was not intended to have an independent meaning.").
29 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
" Id.at 462.
31
Id.
3
2Id.
3

'Id.at 465.

31 Id.The LaMar court also found that class suit was improper because the

named parties could not fulfill the adequate representation requirement of rule
23(a) (4), and because class suit was not superior to other methods of adjudicating
the claim, see FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (3). Id. at 468.
31 Id. at 463. The LaMar opinion attempts to interpret the provisions of rule
23 according to a theory of the "judicial process." The opinion is prefaced by a
philosophical disquisition on what the court perceived to be two distinctly different
methods of dispute-settlement- the judicial process and the administrative process - and the subsequent analysis of the requirements of rule 23 suggests that the
class action is antithetical to the former and must therefore be read restrictively
to reduce the number and size of class actions that may be brought. See id. at
463-64,
468.
3
0 See generally Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 48 U.S. 208,
220-22

(1974).
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treated it as a standing rule.3 It is not clear, however, what
article III policies the LaMar court might have thought its definition of typicality would serve, although it may have been concerned that LaMar was in some sense raising injuries to others
that he did not share since he had not dealt with some of the class
opponents. Traditionally, federal courts have not allowed plaintiffs so to raise the claims of third parties.38 More particularly,
the court may have been concerned over whether consideration
of the named plaintiff's claims would properly align a court's
perspective in dealing with the claims of other class members.
Despite the existence of a common question, it could be argued,
there may be differences in situation as between a named plaintiff and other members of a class. A court which judges the acceptability of a class suit solely in terms of the common question
requirement, and looks chiefly to the named plaintiff's situation as
a sample of those of other class members, may overlook these
differences and may consequently skew its adjudication of a
case.39 The typicality requirement, on this view, functions as a
prophylactic, screening out those class suits in which differences
in situation are likely- suits in which the named plaintiff lacks
claims against all of the defendants allegedly liable to the class.
Class actions may be categorized in terms of four plaintiffdefendant relationships. In order to assess the need for a prophylactic party alignment rule, it is helpful to make use of these categories to assess the risk of distorting adjudicated outcomes raised
by class actions that fail to satisfy the typicality requirement. In
the first category, the issues litigated in the class suit have to do
with a single act by the class opponent simultaneously affecting
the interests of all class members. Mass accident cases o and
37 See, e.g., Leonard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 F.R.D.
432, 434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp.
684, 694-7O (E.D. Pa. 1973); Haas v Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 60 F.R.D. 6o4, 6xo15 (W.D. Pa. 1973), af'd, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir 1976).
Although LaMar assumed that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain their
action in order to be able to reach the typicality question, the court implied that
plaintiffs' standing might successfully be challenged, and it discussed the standing
question in language similar to that subsequently used in the typicality portion of
the opinion. Compare 489 F.2d at 464 with id. at 465-66.
"8See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 7X YALE LJ. 599 (1962); note 88 infra.
19 Cf. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1732 (1975) (criticizing the "zone of interests" test for standing because,

in obscuring the basis for standing, the test may cause the court not to focus on
the legally relevant considerations).
4
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States District Court, 523 F.2d
1o83 (9th Cir. 1975); Causey v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D.
392 (E.D. Va. 1975); Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972); American Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D.
Ill.
x969).
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cases concerning the constitutionality of state statutes illustrate
this type. 4 ' Class suits falling into the second category concern a
series of acts by a class opponent (or opponents) which, if taken

together, give rise to a liability running to the class as a whole.
Rizzo v. Goode 42 is one illustration of this type; antitrust conspiracy cases,43 and securities cases in which scienter is inferred
from the repeated acts of the class opponent 44 are others. The
third category consists of cases where a single class opponent has

committed a series of separate but fungible acts, each act giving
rise to liability to a member or members of the class. Illustrations

of this category include class litigation of the materiality of separate but similar representations alleged to be violative of the

securities laws,4 5 as well as class suits under Title VII grouping
a number of equivalent but individually culpable acts of discrim-

ination.4 ' Finally, the fourth category is made up of class suits
"' See, e.g., Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 ( 4 th Cir. 1972); Long v.
Robinson, 436 F.2d 1116 ( 4 th Cir. 1971) ; Broughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 260
(S.D. Ala. x969); cf. Fujisbima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972)
(challenge to enforcement of Chicago Board of Education regulation); Basel v.
Butz, 66 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 1975) (attack on generally applicable administrative
regulation).
42 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976), discussed, pp. 1468-7o infra.
43
See, e.g., Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D.
581, 586 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Barr v. VWUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. IO9, 1I5 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); PDQ, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 374-75 (S.D. Fla. 1973);
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 278, 281 (S.D.N.Y. '97'); cf. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment,
48 F.R.D. 7, 1o (N.D. Ill. 1969) (conspiracy to violate civil rights held to present
a common question).
" See, e.g., In re United States Financial Securities Litigation, 69 F.R.D. 24,
42-44 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 480
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Memorex Security Cases, 6i F.R.D. 88, 99-IO (N.D. Cal.
1973); Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
45 See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 89i, 902-05 (9th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. March 5, 1976) (No. 75-1258); Korn v.
Franchard, 456 F.2d X2o6, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,
299-300 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 36, 40-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ; Aboudi v. Daroff, 65 F.R.D. 388,
39o-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Where the alleged misrepresentations are partially oral, 'however, courts have
generally denied class treatment on the ground that there is a high potential for
significant variations in the misrepresentations and that common questions will not
predominate. See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99-100 (ioth Cir. i968);
Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 411 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Morris v.
Burchard, Si F.R.D. 530, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
40 See, e.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340 (ioth Cir. 1975);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 4,7 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); Mack v. General Elec. Co.,
329 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Johnson v. ITT-Thompson Indus., Inc.,
323 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
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where the common issues are raised by the separate acts of several
class opponents, and each act individually gives rise to liability to
some members of the class. LaMar, of course, falls into this category, as do suits like Richardson v. Ramirez,47 challenging the
legality of acts performed by each of a class of local government
officials.4 8
Use of the named plaintiffs' interests and situations as a sample
raises few problems of distortion in the first two categories of class
suits. In the first category, since the act of the class opponent
that affects the interests of the named plaintiff is the same act
which affects the interests of all other class members, a court
47 418 U.S. 24 (i974). In Richardson, the plaintiff class of ex-felons in California
challenged the constitutionality of the state constitutional and statutory provisions
that barred plaintiffs from voting by bringing a suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief against the class of county clerks and voter registrars. See id. at 32-33. During
the course of the suit, the three county officials named as representative defendants
decided not to contest the action and agreed to register the ex-felons, including the

named plaintiffs to vote. Id. at 34, 36. Noting that the suit was a class action,
and finding with regard to the absentee plaintiffs and defendants that the controversy remained live, the Supreme Court held that the case was not moot and
proceeded to the merits. See id. at 36-4 o . Although the Court implied that as a
result of Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962), see pp. 1466-67 infra, the
class action might not have been permitted to go forward'since the mooting of
the named plaintiff's claim removed the named plaintiff from the class. See 418 U.S.
at 39. The Court did not imply, however, that the action would have been improper
absent the mooting of the named plaintiff's claim.
48
See, e.g., Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. io05 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 393 U.S. 266 (x968); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); cf.
Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 502
F.2d

1io7

(3d Cir.

2974).

In Samuel, the defendant class of state and state-related colleges and universities
in Pennsylvania was sued by the class of married female graduate students attending the defendants' schools. The plaintiffs sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against the use of an administrative regulation and a "similar common law rule" which classified the plaintiffs as out-of-state residents for tuition
payment purposes. See 56 F.R.D. at 437-38. The named plaintiffs were all students at the University of Pittsburgh, see id., and, therefore, as in LaMar, had no
personal claim against the other defendants. Finding the constitutionality of the
administrative regulation to be a question common to the plaintiff and defendant
classes, see id. at 439-40, the court permitted the suit to go forward. The court
limited the class action to the administrative rule, however, excluding those defendants employing, and those plaintiffs affected by, the common law rule since
that rule was found to present a different question than the administrative regulation. See id. at 440. Plaintiffs were thus considered to have standing to sue on
behalf of all those for whom the administrative rule presented a common question,
notwithstanding that the named plaintiffs had personal claims against only one
of the defendants. Similarly, in Wilson, supra, Washington, supra, and Gibbs, supra,
class plaintiffs were allowed to sue a class of defendant state officials even though,
in each case, the named parties had come in contact with no more than a handful
of the defendant class.
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looking to the situations of the named plaintiffs will see essentially
all there is to be seen, at least with respect to the characteristics
of the class opponent's act. In the second category, adjudication
of liability requires a court to look to the situations of class members other than the named plaintiffs, and thus any tendency on the
part of a court simply to assume that the situations of class members are interchangeable with that of the named plaintiff is externally checked. Class suits falling into the third and fourth
categories, however, do create a risk of distortion. In all these
suits, a court is required to adjudicate the liability of a series of
separate acts, by either one or more class opponents. Unreflective treatment of the named plaintiffs' situation as representative
of the situations of other class members accordingly creates a risk
of leaving unseen differences in the situations of class members
which may affect adjudication of liability or design of relief.
The foregoing analysis suggests that if a prophylactic typicality rule is in fact justified by concerns for distortion of adjudicated
outcomes, then it should function as a constraint in a wide variety
of cases. Such a sweeping conclusion is itself suspect, however,
since suits falling into the third category are routinely treated as
class actions. Suits in the fourth category have also been allowed
to go forward. 9 Thus, if LaMar is accepted, a significant number of suits routinely given class status would have to be treated
as individual' suits.
The novel sweep of accepting the necessity of a typicality
constraint if outcomes in class suits are not to be distorted indicates a need for further consideration of the premises supporting
that constraint. In the next Part, limitations placed on class representation by article III will be examined to determine whether the
Constitution mandates either a restrictive standing limit or a prophylactic rule to remove distortion. In the following Part, procedural steps for disaggregating the class in a manner that reduces any potential for distortion inhering in representative advocacy will be considered as alternatives to dismissing the claims
of some or all class members. The conclusion *reached in these
parts is, in summary, that the type of limitation envisioned by the
LaMar court cannot be justified by reference to article III, and
that a range of procedural options are open to a court, which make
dismissal an unnecessarily harsh remedy for any distortion that is
inherent in representative advocacy.
3. Class Actions and Article III in the Supreme Court: The
Emerging Doctrine.-The Supreme Court has only recently begun to consider the implications of the case or controversy requirement for class actions. Nonetheless, it is already possible to
49 See, e.g., cases discussed in note 48 supra.
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discern two distinct approaches underlying the Court's decisions.
An initial series of cases attempted to assimilate class actions to
ordinary litigation by treating the named plaintiffs as the focus of
the case or controversy inquiry. More recent decisions, however,
suggest that the class is the relevant actor, and that the case or
controversy requirement is to be analyzed in terms of the status
of the legal issues in dispute between the class and the class opponent.
The evolution in the Supreme Court's approach to class actions
is most apparent in the Court's mootness decisions. In Hall v.
Beals 50 and Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney,"t
the Court, without directly confronting the mootness issue, implied
that the satisfaction of a named plaintiff's claim would render a
class action nonjusticiable.52 In Sosna v. Iowa 11 and Franks v.
Bowman TransportationCo.,54 however, the need for a continuing
dispute between an identified plaintiff and defendant ceased to
be axiomatic in the Supreme Court's analysis."
Sosna held that, where a durational residency requirement continued to frustrate the efforts of class members to obtain divorces,
the fact that the named plaintiff had satisfied the residency requirement by the time the case reached the Supreme Court did
not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to review the requirement's
constitutionality." Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, without
attempting to identify any particular individuals disputing the
validity of the residency requirement, concluded that the case "remains very much alive for the class of persons" that the named
plaintiff was "certified to represent." 11 Sosna, although shifting
50396 U.S. 45 (1969) (per curiam).
409 U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam).
52 See id. at 541-42; 396 U.S. at 49.
53 419 U.S. 393 (975).
54 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976).
5 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), may be a transitional case.
There, the Supreme Court, although holding that a class claim was not moot
simply because the claims of the named plaintiffs had been satisfied, nonetheless
appeared to analyze the case in a manner consistent with the emphasis in Hall
and Burney on the existence of a continuing dispute between identified litigants.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion found subsumed within the formal structure
of the class litigation a distinct, continuing controversy between one of the representatives of the defendant class and an identified member of the plaintiff class,
and emphasized the existence of this dispute in holding the class action not to be
moot. See id. at 37-40. See also Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 88 HARv. L. REV. 373, 390-92 (1974); The Supreme Court, x973 Term, 88
HARv.L. REV. 41, IO6-07 (1974).
5

See 419 U.S. at 397-403.
P 9 U.S. at 401. The Supreme Court suggested in Sosna that, where a class
had not yet been certified at the time the named plaintiff's claim became moot,
the effect of the mooting "may depend upon the circumstances of the particular
57
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the emphasis in mootness analysis from individual litigants to the
class, limited the reach of its holding to cases raising issues " 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' "8 In Franks, however,
the Court abandoned this limitation, ruling that a class action is
not mooted by satisfaction of a named plaintiff's claim whenever
a dispute continues between a class opponent and other members
of the class. 9
Dissenting in Sosna, Justice White criticized the Supreme
Court's approach to mootness in class actions as substituting a
"legal fiction" for a "live case or controversy." 60 But treating the
class rather than the named plaintiff as the party in dispute 6 with
a class opponent neither nullifies article III's prohibition of federal trial of moot cases nor removes the obligation article III ordinarily imposes upon federal judges to ground their decisionmaking in the concrete circumstances of a particular case. Even
after Sosna and Franks, a class suit may become moot if the issue
in dispute ceases to affect the interests of every member of the
class.0 - If the claim of a named plaintiff becomes moot, therefore,
case," upon whether the trial court could have been "reasonably . . .expected to
rule on a certification motion" by the time the case was mooted, and upon whether
in reality the issue the case raised would otherwise "evade review." Id. at 402 n.i.
This last requirement may not survive Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct.
X251 (1976). The Supreme Court again applied this approach in Gerstein v. Pugh,
see 420 U.S. io3, ii-li n.II (1975). On the other hand, in Board of School
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam), the Court invoked the
certification requirement without engaging in the Sosna inqury, see id. at 129.
Where a trial court has affirmatively refused to certify a suit as a class action, the
significance of the mooting of the ostensible named plaintiff's claim is judged by
the ordinary mootness doctrine applied in nonclass suits. See Weinstein v. Bradford,
96 S. Ct. 347, 348-49 (1975) (per curiam).
The pretrial class action procedure developed in this Note does not call for a
certification order as such but does provide class opponents with repeated opportunities to challenge the propriety of class suit. See pp. 1430-36 supra. In deciding whether a case has become moot given this procedure, therefore, an appellate court should ordinarily be able to determine whether a trial court has
passed on the propriety of the class action, and thus need not conduct a fuller
inquiry of the sort which the Sosna Court held to be required in the absence of
certification.
58419 U.S. at 401.
51 96 S.Ct. at 1259-6o. Franks involved a Title VII class action brought against
a trucking firm and union on behalf of black employees who had been denied positions as over-the-road drivers. During the pendency of the suit, the named plaintiff had been properly discharged by the defendant employer, and thus no longer
had a personal stake in the outcome. See id. at 1258.
60 419 U.S. at 413 (White, J., dissenting).
" See also Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, i FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 430, 445-46 (1973).
02 Sosna and Franks, for example, do not disturb the holding in Spomer v.
Littleton, 424 U.S. 514 (1974). In Sponer, the plaintiff class members charged
defendant State's Attorney Berbling with violating their constitutional rights.
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a federal court must inform itself of the situations of other class
members, and confirm the existence of a continuing controversy
between class members and the class opponent, before it may
retain jurisdiction over the action.0 3 Thus, the effect of the two
decisions is not so much to diminish the relevance of the case or
controversy requirement in class actions as to redirect the focus
of a court's inquiry away from identification of proper party relationships per se and towards direct verification of the existence
of an actual controversy.
Similar movement is apparent in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the injury in fact requirement for standing mandated by
article III.4 "Injury in fact" may be given two meanings in the
class action context. One approach would condition class suit
upon the named plaintiff's personal satisfaction of the requirement. 5 A named plaintiff would not be permitted to sue on behalf
of a class unless he could have brought suit on his own consistent
with the constraints of article III. A second approach would not
separate the named plaintiff from the class. Rather, the named
plaintiff would -be permitted to assert an injury suffered in common by the class, provided that such an injury met the requirements of article III, even though the named plaintiff's own injury
taken in isolation would not have afforded him standing to raise
the claim he raises on behalf of the class. This second approach
would treat the situation of the class as a whole as the concern of
the lawsuit, and would thus permit the litigation of grievances
no single individual would have standing to assert.
On at least three occasions, the Supreme Court has been presented with an opportunity to choose between these two interpretations of the injury in fact requirement. Bailey v. Patterson00

involved a suit on behalf of a class of blacks threatened with
prosecution under Mississippi's breach of the peace statutes for
Id. at 515. Subsequent to the lower court's decision Berbling was replaced in oflice by Spomer. Id. at 519-2o. The Supreme Court held that the suit against
Berbling was moot since the conduct charged was personal to Berbling and not
the policy of the office. Id. at 521. The suit was thus moot for all members
of the class. See also Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam) (challenged statute amended); Bledsoe, supra note 61, at 436-37.
'3Thus, in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976), Justice
Brennan's majority opinion, after finding the suit not to be moot even though
the named plaintiff no longer had a claim, because it had been certified as a class
action, see id. at 1259-6o, proceeded to examine the facts of the case for the purpose of showing that a "live" and sufficiently specific dispute remained, see id.
at 126o.
"aSee Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924 (1976).
6
See Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DuxE L.J. 573, 578-79.
G6369 U.S. 31 (z962) (per curiam).
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violating allegedly unconstitutional state and local segregation
laws. 7 The named plaintiffs had not themselves violated the
segregation laws and had not been personally threatened with
prosecution."' They argued, however, that criminal proceedings
brought against other members of the class who had violated the
laws, as well as other acts by state and local officials, constituted
a generalized threat to all members of the class, including the
named plaintiffs, that was sufficiently immediate to permit the
named plaintiffs to represent all members of the class, whether
individually threatened with arrest or not. 9 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected the named plaintiffs' argument, finding that the
only individuals entitled to bring suit were those who had been
arrested or personally threatened with arrest. Since the named
plaintiffs did not fall into this category, they lacked the injury in
fact necessary to permit them to sue on behalf of the class of those
who did."°
It is not clear from the Court's brief discussion which of the
two approaches to injury in fact in class actions it adopted. On
the one hand, Bailey may be read as holding that the only individuals who had standing to sue were those who had been arrested
or personally threatened, and that the named plaintiffs, because
they could not satisfy this standard, could not bring suit, either
individually or on behalf of a class. Alternatively, the Court's
decision may be understood as recognizing that the status of the
injury to a class as a whole was the measure of injury in fact,
but at the same time holding that the arrest or threatened arrest
of specific individuals did not pose a sufficiently immediate threat
to the larger class of which the named plaintiffs were members
to create a justiciable controversy between that class as a whole
and the defendants.
O'Shea v. Littleton 71 is also ambiguous. O'Shea held to be
87
88

Id. at 32.
Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants at 16-17, Bailey v. Patterson, 369

U.S. 31 (1962).
" Appellants' Reply to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or to Affirm at 8-io,
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962). Although the class included individuals
who had been arrested, and whose prosecutions were pending in Mississippi state
courts, named plaintiff status was given only to others apparently as part of an
attempt to avoid bringing the case within the rule that a federal court will ordinarily not hear a request for equitable relief from an individual who is a defendant in an on-going state criminal prosecution. See Douglas v. -City of Jeannette, 329 U.S. 157 (i943). See generally P. BATOR, P. MisiiKiN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
IVECHSLER,

HART &

VECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

1009-5o (2d ed. i973); The Supreme Court,
151-69 (i97s).
70 369 U.S. at 32-33.
71 414 U.S. 488 (1974).

1974

Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 47,
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nonjusticiable a class suit for injunctive relief instituted on behalf
of residents of Cairo, Illinois, allegedly victimized by the discriminatory practices of a county judge and magistrate in setting
bail and fixing sentences in criminal cases.72 Looking to the
claims of the named plaintiffs,7 3 Justice White's majority opinion
found that, since any future injury necessary to justify the issuance of an injunction was contingent on the named plaintiffs' violating the law, but that the named plaintiffs "naturally do not
suggest that any one of them expects to violate valid criminal
laws," 74 the issues the named plaintiffs sought to raise were too
hypothetical to be capable of judicial resolution. 75 O'Shea thus
seems to take the approach of determining standing to sue through
analysis of the claims of the class representatives examined in isolation.
The circumstances of the case, however, diminish its significance. The objections the O'Shea majority raised as to the immediacy of the named plaintiffs' claims would have been equally
applicable had the Court examined the situation of the class as a
whole. As the Court interpreted it, the wrong the named plaintiffs
asserted was not a wrong committed against the class as a whole,
in the way the Bailey plaintiffs argued that the coercive acts at
issue there were, but a series of individual wrongs.7 6 The likelihood that any one class member would be arrested and come
before the class opponents was independent of the likelihood of
similar incidents involving other class members. The situations
the named plaintiffs asserted to be representative of the situations
of class members generally, therefore, would have appeared no
less hypothetical had the Supreme Court expanded the scope of
its inquiry.7 7
Recently, in Rizzo v. Goode,7" the Court appears to have had
to make a choice between standards for determining injury in
fact in class actions that it failed to make in Bailey and O'Shea.
Rizzo involved a class suit by Philadelphia residents against the
Mayor and Police Commissioner claiming that the defendants had
failed to take the necessary steps to curb allegedly pervasive police
misconduct and seeking an injunction ordering an overhaul of
disciplinary procedures.7" The Supreme Court initially analyzed
72

See id. at 490-93.

'7

See, e.g., id. at 495, 496.

74

Id. at 498.

11 See id.

76 See id. at 496-97. But see id. at og (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77 Justice White also noted that the class which the named plaintiffs purported
to represent had never been certified. See id. at 494-95 n,3.
78 96 S.Ct. 598 (X976).
9
'7 Id. at 6oi--2.
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Rizzo in much the same way as it had proceeded in O'Shea, by
looking to the claims of the named plaintiffs in isolation."0 The
representative plaintiffs' claim for relief, according to Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion, rested on the argument that "a
small, unnamed minority of policemen" 81 believed, because of
the failure to act on the part of the defendant Mayor and Police
Commissioner, that the police department was tolerant of misconduct, and that such policemen were therefore likely to mistreat
the named plaintiffs in the future.8 2 If the Court had been faced
only with the claims of the individual plaintiffs, such a theory of
causality would clearly have presented too hypothetical a claim
of injury to be justiciable.8 3
The Rizzo Court, however, apparently adopted an alternative
theory of case or controversy. The district court and court of
appeals had allowed injunctive relief against the police department
on the theory that a series of incidents of police misconduct involving some of the named plaintiffs and other members of the
class showed an "unacceptably high" level of police abuse inconsistent with supervisory officials' fulfillment of an obligation to
act to prevent such misconduct.84 On this theory, the relevant
injury would not be a threat to any specific individual, but the
threat directed to all class members that some of their number
would be abused in the future. Justice Rehnquist, after seeming
to distinguish O'Shea on the ground that it was not a class suit, 5
moved directly to an analysis of the correctness of the lower courts'
theory of liability, 6 thereby implying that the class injury as
defined by the lower courts was of a kind sufficient to meet article
III's injury in fact requirement and allow a decision on the
87
merits.
After Rizzo, a named plaintiff can apparently make either of
two showings in order to establish the requisite case or controversy. He may show that the impact upon his own interests of
the class opponent's conduct constitutes an injury in fact. Alternatively, he may show that the class opponent's conduct, because
of its impact upon the various class members, gives rise to a
statutory cause of action or claim of constitutional violation on
80 See id. at 604-05.
81

Id. at 6o5.

82

Id.

83 See id.

84 See Goode v. Rizzo, 5o6 F.2d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1974); COPPAR v. Rizzo,
357 F. Supp. 1289, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
85 See 96 S. Ct. at 6o5.
80 See id. On the merits, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' finding of
liability. See id. at 6o7.
87 The Supreme Court's silent resolution of the injury in fact issue, of course,
means that the Court's precise holding is ultimately ambiguous.
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behalf of the class as a whole, even if the threat to any specific
class member, taken in isolation, would be too hypothetical to
8
confer standing. 8
The case or controversy doctrine which has emerged in recent
opinions thus exhibits a willingness to consider constitutional
limitations on justiciability at the level of the class as a whole as
well as at the level of the individual situation of the named plaintiff suggested to be appropriate by early suits. Although the extent
to which the class will be allowed to replace the individual as a
relevant actor for article III purposes is still not clear, courts do
88 Given Rizzo, it appears that the Supreme Court's subsequent dictum in
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917 (0976), to the effect
that the fact of a class action "adds nothing to the question of standing," id. at
1925 n.20, is overbroad. Rizzo, however, does not remove the need for a standing
inquiry in class actions: while evaluation of the sufficiency of the quantum of
injury asserted may be affected by the fact of a class action, the fundamental
requirement that class representatives assert some injury, whether strictly individual or classwide, remains, see id.; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975);
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court seems not to have addressed the question of whether an
individual who has shown the requisite injury in fact may assert the rights of
a third-party class under the doctrine of constitutional jus tertii. Where the plaintiff is a voluntary association seeking to represent the class of its members, however, courts have examined plaintiff's standing to sue by reference to jus tertii
doctrines without determining whether the fact that the suit is a class action affects
the analysis. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d 763, 766
(8th Cir. I971); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d
920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968) (dictum); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 777

(8th Cir. 1966); Undergraduate Student Ass'n v. Peltason, 359 F. Supp. 320, 323
(N.D. Ill.
1973). An organization's assertion of the rights of its members, however, is a long established instance of standing to assert constitutional jus tertii.
See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme
Court, 7I YALE L.J. 599, 644-45 (1962). Moreover, to the extent that a court,
in examining the facts surrounding an organization's claim, is likely to learn of
the situations of other class members and determine the size of the class and the
scope of the action, fair litigation of the class claim may not be hampered by the
fact that the claim is waived by a third party. Whether a nonorganizational
plaintiff may be permitted to assert the rights of a class to which he does not
belong in cases where failure to allow jus tertii would result in the dilution of
the rights of class members is an open question. It has been argued that it "would
be absurd to hold" that a litigant has a "standing in the constitutional sense"that is, falls within the traditional jus tertii exception to the standing rules "but is barred by the technical requirements of Rule 23." Undergraduate Student
Ass'n v. Peltason, supra, at 323. On the other hand, where the plaintiff does not
belong to the class it will ordinarily be difficult for a court to make the inquiry
into the facts surrounding the claims raised and the identities and situations of
the absentees necessary for the fair litigation of the class action, as well as into
whether failure to grant plaintiff standing in the case would in fact result in dilution of the absentees' constitutional rights-the essential prerequisite for the
assertion of jus tertii. See generally Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional ins
Tertii, 88 HARv.L. REV. 423 (1974).
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appear to have some flexibility in substituting in place of party
alignment analysis a direct inquiry into the justiciability of a particular issue. The jurisprudence of article III, therefore, is inconsistent with the rigid party alignment approach of the LaMar
typicality requirement.8 9 Indeed, the case or controversy requirement, to the extent that it obliges federal courts to look beyond the
named plaintiff to the situations of other class members as well,
complements a court's duty to insure adequacy of representation
in rendering the typicality requirement unnecessary.
B. Adequacy of Representation
The requirement that class representatives "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" 90 is both a prerequisite
to class suit under rule 23 (a) (4) and a constitutional mandate as
well. Although the concept of adequacy of representation might
thus appear to be central to class action jurisprudence, commentators have devoted surprisingly little attention to the subject."
Moreover, although federal courts have had to confront the question of adequacy of representation on a regular basis, the doctrine
which has developed under rule 23 92 hardly extends beyond an
3
often empty requirement that class attorneys be competent 1
80 See p. 1459 supra.
0

oFED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a) (4).
o' Neither the Advisory Committee Note nor Justice Kaplan's article discusses
the adequacy of representation prerequisite of rule 23. See Advisory Committee
Note, 39 F.R.D. ioo (1966); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
z966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure I, 8i HARv. L. REV.
356, 375-400 (x967). The leading treatises chiefly confine themselves to a summary
of the case law. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 23-07 (2d ed. 1975) ; 7 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1765-69 (1972). Ex-

tended discussions of the question of adequacy of representation in the periodical
literature are few in number. See Degnan, Foreword: Adequate Representation
in Class Actions, 6o CALir. L. REv. 705 (1972); Class Action Symposium, 68 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1000, 1133-45 (i974); Note, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due
Process Requirements in Class Actions Under Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1217
(i975) [hereinafter cited as The Importance of Being Adequate]; Note, Class
Actions: Defining the Typical and Representative Plaintiff Under Subsections (a)
(3) and (4) of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U.L. REV. 406 (i973) [hereinafter cited as
Defining the Typical and Representative Plaintiff]. See also Note, Adequate Representation, Notice, and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, i16 U. PA. L. REV. 889, 899-905 (1968).
" The doctrine has been stated as follows:
Adequate representation depends on two factors: (a) the plaintiff's attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and (b) the plaintiff must not have interests antagonistic
to those of the class.
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5o8 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. IOI1 (1975).
0" Judicial inquiry into the qualifications of the class attorney is almost always
pro forma. See, e.g., Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1276
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and an unfocused hostility to classes whose members are in disagreement or in different situations." This Part, after discussing
the open-textured character of the constitutional obligation to
insure adequacy of representation, will consider from the perspective of the substantive theory of class actions the various techniques available to courts for dealing with problems of adequacy
of representation and the paradigmatic situations in which such
techniques may or may not apply.
i. General Considerations:ConstitutionalConstraintsand The
Substantive Theory. -Any
analysis of the adequacy of representation requirement in class actions must begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Hansberry v. Leeya Hansberryinvolved
a suit brought to enforce a racially restrictive covenant. 0
Over defendants' objections that the agreement was invalid for
n.3 (Ct. CI. 1972); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999,
ioo6 (7th Cir. ig7i), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Frankford Hospital v.
Blue Cross, 67 F.R.D. 643, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4,
13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ; Note, A (c) (z) Hearing on Maintainability of a Class Action
Should Not Determine Ultimate Merits of Individual Claim, ii HOUSTON L. REv.
732, 734 (2974). Reluctant to risk charges of bias, judges are generally hesitant
to evaluate closely the skills of the lawyers who come before them, especially if
such evaluation requires a determination that some attorneys are more competent
than others. See Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23,
io B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 527, 536 (1969). Courts, however, will examine
closely the competency of an individual seeking to represent a class pro se, see, e.g.,
Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 2975) (per curiam); moreover,
courts, while reluctant to evaluate competency, are less reluctant to find a failure
of adequate representation where a class attorney appears to be acting inconsistently with the requirements of professional responsibility, see, e.g., Conway v.
City of Kenosha, 409 F. Supp. 344, 349 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (finding of adequacy
precluded because city attorney bringing class action charged by law with duty
of responsibility to defendant city); pp. 1577-2623 infra. The judicial reluctance is shared by class opponents, who have no interest in raising an issue
which, if the case is resolved against the class, could provide the bais for subsequent appeal or collateral attack, see Fitzgerald, When Is a Class a Class?, 28
Bus. LAW. 95, O (1972).
In extreme cases, of course, courts will find class representation to be inadequate
on the basis of a conclusion concerning an attorney's competency. See, e.g.,
Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d ii68, 2270 ( 9 th Cir. 1975) (refusal to allow class action based on evaluation of attorney's competence- the
merits of the claim having been dismissed on the third amended complaint for
failure to comply with the court's orders). See also Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed at page 2394 n.i8 supra. But since the cases
are extreme, they will not be a focus of this discussion.
"aFor a discussion of the courts' confusion in their treatment of heterogeneous
classes, see note 29o infra. The requirement that there be no conflicts of interest
within a class has also been derived from the typicality requirement of rule
23(a)(3). See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 91, § 2764; Note, Defining
the Typical and Representative Plaintiff, supra note 91, at 408-09.
95311 U.S. 32 (1940).
96

1d. at 37-38.
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want of the requisite number of signers, the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld enforcement of the covenant on a theory of res
judicata. 7 In the earlier suit, Burke v. Kleiman,98 an action to
enforce the covenant, plaintiffs and defendants had stipulated that
sufficient signatures had been obtained to bring the covenant into
effect. 9 Burke had been brought as a class suit on behalf of all
owners of property governed by the covenant. 100 The state supreme court concluded that, because the Hansberry defendants
had been members of this plaintiff class, they were therefore
bound by the stipulation. 10 The United States Supreme Court
reversed. 0 2 Chief Justice Stone's majority opinion held that the
stipulation in the first suit did not bar the Hansberry defendants
from challenging the validity of the covenant. "In seeking to enforce the agreement the plaintiffs in [the first] suit were not representing the [Hansberry defendants] whose substantial interest
is in resisting performance [of the covenant]." 103
A number of commentators have attempted to tie the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Hansberry to some specific rule, such as a
requirement of notice of or a cohesive or unified class. 0 4 Chief
"' See Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939).

277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
9o Id. at 522.
100 Although the parties in Burke had stipulated that 95% of the owners of

land covered by the covenant had signed the restrictive agreement, in fact only
54% had done so. See Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. at 371-72, 24 N.E.2d at 38.
'o' Id. at 373, 24 N.E.2d at 39.
102 311 U.S. at 46.
103 Id. at 45-46.
104 Contemporary comment on Hansberry was confused. One view was that
the stipulated facts in Burke were fraudulent and collusive, rendering the judgment therein ineffective. See 89 U. PA. L. REV. 525, 527 (194i). The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, had specifically found that there had been no such
collusion, see Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. at 374, 24 N.E.2d at 39, and, although
Chief Justice Stone hinted at the possible presence of fraud in Burke, he did not
specifically rebut the finding in Lee or purport to rest his holding on that ground.
See 311 U.S. at 45-46. It was also argued that the Hansberry holding rested on
the fact that no notice had been given to the absentees in Burke. See, e.g., Keeffe,
Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CoRR'. L.Q. 327, 338-39 (1948)
("[T]he fundamental reason why the Supreme Court of Illinois was reversed in
the Hansberry case . . . was . . . the lack of notice to all members of the class
in Burke v. Kleiman . . . ."); 89 U. PA. L. REv., supra, at 526 n.7 (194x) ("The
Court . . . relied heavily on the fact that notice was never given to the present
defendants of the previous suit.'); 26 CoPN. L.Q. 317, 318 n.2 (1941). See also
49 YALE L.J. 1125, 1130 (1940) (analyzing the Lee decision and criticizing it for
the lack of notice). Unfortunately for this attempted explanation, the Supreme
Court did not discuss the question of notice in its Hansberry opinion.
Another analyst embraced a "community of interest" explanation, finding that
the class suit in Burke was improper because the interests of the landowners in
the enforcement of the restrictive covenant were "several" instead of "joint" or
common. See 39 MIcH. L. REV. 829, 83o-32 (i942). One recent commentator

1474

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1318

Justice Stone's opinion, however, sought to leave class action
procedure free from rigid constitutional structuring. "[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment does not compel state courts or legislatures to adopt any particular rule for establishing the conclusiveness of judgments in class suits." 105 Due process, Stone indicated,
did not require adoption of class action rules based on federal rule
23;106 nor did it mandate the choice of any particular theory of

class suit such as the community of interest theory. 0 7 Due
process would be served so long as the class action procedure
adopted "fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent
parties who are to be bound by it."'' 08 In Hansberry itself, the
Illinois Supreme Court had defended the preclusive effect given to
the Burke judgment by reference to the community of interest
theory.'
Chief Justice Stone applied this theory to the facts of
the case, found that since the obligations created by the covenant
were "several," no community of interests existed, and ruled that
"without more" in the way of procedural safeguards of absentee
interests Burke could not be treated as binding. 10
As it emerges from Hansberry, the due process requirement of
adequacy of representation assumes the form of an obligation
placed upon procedural rulemakers and judges administering class
actions to take whatever steps are necessary "to insure the full
and fair consideration of the common issue [s]." I" This duty is
to a large degree open-ended. Situations threatening "full and fair
consideration" not only vary with the facts of particular cases,
has also advanced the "community of interest" hypothesis, arguing that because
of the conflict among the landowners there were in effect two classes involved in
the Burke litigation- one group of owners wishing to enforce the covenant and
a second group opposing them-and that the decision won by the former could
not bind the Hansberry defendants since they were not in the same class. See
Note, The Importance of Being Adequate, supra note 9i, at 1224-29.
105311 U.S. at 42.
'06 See id.
107 See id. at 43.

SId. at 42; see Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 5x VA.
L. REv. 629, 640, 657 (i965).
106
See 372 Ill. at 373, 24 N.E.2d at 39.
110 See 311 U.S. at 44. The Supreme Court briefly considered the theory that
the interests of the class members opposing enforcement of the restrictive covenant - the defendant-petitioners in Hansberry- had been represented by the defendants in Burke. Suggesting, however, that Burke may have been a collusive
suit in which "it [did] not appear that the [Burke defendants'] interest in defeating the contract outweighed their interest in establishing its validity," the
Court dismissed that possibility. Id. at 46. Whether the interests of dissenting
absentees may be adequately represented by the class opponent is considered
further at pp. 1481-82 infra.
il 311 U.S. at 43. For a full discussion of the doctrinal origins of the constitutional obligation to insure adequacy of representation, see pages X402-13
supra.
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but are also inevitably contingent upon the strategic choices available to a judge or the judicial system. The fairness of class procedures depends upon their capacity to put before the court all
legally relevant interests. The ultimate measure of due process,
therefore, is the extent to which procedures that are available to
overcome any biases in the advocacy of the representative parties
are in fact used by the court.
A contemporary approach to adequacy of representation must
be particularly sensitive to three factors. First, the primary justification for class actions derives from the increased realization
of substantive policies which such suits make possible." 2 A program for insuring adequate representation which unnecessarily
narrowed the range of permissible class actions would not be congruent with this justification. Second, a chief function of the
class action is heuristic." 3 By making explicit for the trial judge
the range and magnitude of the interests affected by litigation, the
class action form increases the likelihood that the judge's decision
on the merits of a suit and award of relief will be informed by
consideration of these interests. The class action device, therefore, may have a great capacity for fairly accommodating even
extremely heterogeneous classes. Third, class action procedures
reflect a mix of judicial and party control."-4 At various points
during the course of a suit, responsibility for taking the measure
of the interests of class members may either be given to the trial
judge or, as is customary in nonclass litigation, delegated to the
litigants. The distribution of such responsibility turns both on the
assessment of the relative competence of the judge and the litigants, and on any extrinsic values, such as disinterestedness or
private ordering, which may be thought to be furthered by judicial
or party control. At the most practical level, fulfillment of the
obligation to insure adequacy of representation will involve a
series of judgments as to the proper combination of judicial and
private control.
2. Differences Within the Class: Accommodation or Exclusion.
Unless the trial judge possesses at least some information about
the characteristics of the class, there will be no way for him to
act to ensure that absentee interests are fully and fairly represented during the course of the suit. Judicial knowledge of the
circumstances of class members, however, may not alone be a
sufficient guarantee of adequate representation of class member
interests. Given the constraints of time and the judicial role, a
judge may not on his own be able to develop full information as
112

See generally pp. 1353-71 supra.

113

See pp. 1366-71 supra.
See p. 414 supra.

114
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to the interests of absentees, and thus may not by himself be able
to ensure that those interests are given full weight in the lawsuit,
either in its litigated or negotiated phases. Inevitably, therefore,
the trial judge will depend upon the representatives of the class
to identify and assert absentee interests. In order for such private
control to be successful, however, the judge must ensure that the
constituency of each representative is sufficiently uniform and
congruent with the interests of the representative that the position
of the advocate can safely be taken as a statement of the position
of the class as a whole. In order to ensure such uniformity, various
techniques of class division or of adding advocates are available
to the trial judge. The employment of these techniques presupposes that the judge has some source of information about the
class which circumvents the class representative himself, since it
will seldom be in the interest of the representative to admit that
a position he is advocating is not that of his constituency. Thus,
the discussion of available techniques for aligning advocates with
class points of view should be understood to be incomplete, depending on other techniques for checking the adequacy of class
representatives, some of which have already been suggested in the
discussion of the development of class facts,"" and others of which
will be developed in the discussion of professional responsibility."'
The discussion of the individual techniques which follows is
shaped by the conclusion that, so long as the judge is in a position
to obtain information about divergent points of view held by the
class, divergent class interests can in general be handled through
the class device. This point of view is different from that of some
federal courts, which have attempted to avoid having to take into
account divergent class interests. In some cases, these courts have
refused to certify class suits where the interests of members of a
proposed class differed." 7 On other occasions, courts have redefined classes in order to exclude from the lawsuit class members
with interests not in accord with the majority of a class." 8 In
damage actions brought under rule 23 (b)(3), moreover, class
z" See pp. 1439-44 supra.

""See pp.

1577-1623 infra.
"' See, e.g., Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d 362, 366-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 996 (1974); Lukenas v. Bryce's Mt. Resort, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 69, 71-72

(W.D. Va. 1975); Seligson v. The Plum Tree, Inc., 6i F.R.D. 343, 346 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (alternative holding); City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332
F. Supp. 285, 288 (N.D. Ill. x97i), aff'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th
Cir. 1972); Guttmann v. Braemer, 5i F.R.D. 537, 538-40 (S.D.N.Y. 197o).
11sSee, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 311 (6th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1975) (No. 75-393); Vineyard
v. Hollister Elem. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580, 585 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Partain v.
First Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56, 59 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
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119

members are permitted to opt out,
and this opportunity to exit
has probably served to siphon off dissent. A policy of excluding
divergent interests from class litigation is, however, potentially
inconsistent with both the access and heuristic functions of the
class suit recognized by the substantive theory. Where the full
panoply of class interests could be represented by a manageable
number of advocates, or by a combination of advocates and intervenors, a refusal to allow a class action to go forward is inconsistent with a policy of increasing access to courts, at least where the
necessary expansion in the number of advocates could have been
financially supported by the suit. Similarly, from the standpoint
of the judicial system as a whole, the outcome of adjudication is
"better" if that outcome reflects the totality of legally relevant
views, rather than only those of persons sharing the point of view
of the named plaintiffs. Thus, exclusion ought to be regarded as a
technique of last resort.
(a) The Requirement of a Determinate Class as a Prerequisite
to Protection of Absentee Interests. -Before
a court can ascertain differences of interest within a class, and take steps to accommodate those differences, it must be able to identify the
members of the class. The courts' duty to protect absentee interests, therefore, requires courts to impose a corollary obligation
on class representatives to define with some concreteness the class
upon whose behalf they are suing. A vague definition of a class is
not necessarily invalid: a class need be defined with only that
degree of specificity that can suggest to the court the inquiries
it should make in order to determine whether any differences exist
among the class. 20
For example, the class of "Indo-Hispano, also called MexicanAmerican and Spanish-American" individuals, which was held
to be too imprecise in Lopez Tijerina v. Henry," would pass
muster. As the opinion in Tijerina itself reveals, the indicia of
membership in this class, such as possession of a Spanish surname,
Mexican, Indian, or Spanish ancestry, or use of Spanish as a pri110 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(2) (A).

120 A certain degree of specificity may also be required of a class definition in

order for a court to ensure that the proposed class complies with the other requirements, such as the existence of common questions of law or fact, see pp. 145458 supra, and the predomination of such common components over individual
questions, see pp. i5o4-i6 infra. To the extent that the predomination inquiry reflects a concern for whether liability may be determined and relief delivered on a
class basis, the class definition standard may be more restrictive than adequacy
of representation would alone require. See pp. 15o4-16 infra. See also Comment,
Defining a Rule 23(b) (2) Class: An Expository Analysis, 12 SAN Diaco L. REv.
I5o (1974).
12148 F.R.D. 274, 275-77 (D.N.M. 1969), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 922
(970).
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mary or material language, 2 ' while perhaps overinclusive or underinclusive, 12 1 would nonetheless have afforded a court means of
identifying particular individuals whose interests could be compared with those of other individuals also apparently members of
the class. 24 On the other hand, a precisely stated class definition
may provide a court with no useful point of departure for an
adequacy inquiry. Thus, as the court recognized in Rappaport v.
Katz,'2 5 a class defined to include "all persons imminently seeking
to be married by defendant or his agents who also object to the
dress and ring rules he has promulgated" 12 would be "incapable
of ascertainment" 127 since to identify members of the class a
court would have to inquire "into the state of mind of each particular individual" proposed as a class member.
At least insofar as constraints on class definition derive from
the need for the judiciary to protect the interests of absentees,
the fact that the membership of a class changes during the course
of a lawsuit ought not in itself trigger rejection of the class.
122
1 22

20

1

So

1d.

3Id.

124 Dissenting from the dismissal of the appeal in Lopez

Tijerina, justice

Douglas found that in the context of the claims alleged and the relief sought, the
class definition was not impermissibly vague. "There can be no dispute that in
many parts of the Southwestern United States persons of Indian and Mexican
or Spanish descent are, as a class, subject to various forms of discrimination."
398 U.S. 922, 924 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Other courts have permitted class
suits to be brought on behalf of similarly-defined classes of Hispanic-Americans.
See, e.g., Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 58 F.R.D. 62, 63 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973) (public school children "for whom Spanish is their predominant or
only language"); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 35x F. Supp. 1279, 1280
(D.N.M. 1972), aff'd, 499 F.2d X147, 152 (ioth Cir. i974) ("minors of Spanishsurnamed heritage").
12' 62 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
126 id. at 515.
127 I"d.

12

1Id. Although classes defined solely according to the "state of mind" of

their members may properly be considered insufficiently precise to permit class
suits, courts have sometimes used the "state of mind" rubric too loosely and have
rejected class suits where the class members could be identified by some action
or other objective manifestation. Thus, in DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733
(5th Cir. i97o), an action on behalf of persons active in the "peace movement"
complaining of police harassment was' held to be nonmaintainable even though
both plaintiffs' and defendants' conduct provided objective characteristics by
which class membership could be ascertained. Similarly, in the leading case of
Chaffee v. Johnson, 229 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Miss. 1964), aff'd on other grounds,
352 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 956 (1966), the class of "all
persons who are workers for the end of discrimination .. . in Mississippi" was
held "vague and indefinite" since "the purported class depends upon the state of
mind of a particular individual," id. at 448, although the class definition was in
fact couched in terms of the actions and not the beliefs of the plaintiffs.
129See, e.g., Wallace v. McDonald, 369 F. Supp. 28o, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1973);
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long as individuals who are members of a class at any one point in
time can be identified, that the membership of the class does indeed change should not interfere with a court's efforts to insure
fairness to absentees. 3 ' Thus, classes defined, for example, to
include all individuals seeking divorces who are burdened by a
state's durational residency requirement ' 3 ' or all unmarried individuals barred by a state statute from obtaining contraceptives 132
would be sufficiently definite even though the membership of the
classes would be constantly changing.
(b) Subclassing as a Means of Structuring Heterogeneous
Classes. - Subclassing provides the trial judge with a means of
increasing the reliability of party representation of absentee interests by, in effect, adding additional parties to the lawsuit who
more accurately reflect in their own interests the interests of discrete groups of absentees. Absent subclassing, class representatives are likely to have to rank the interests of class members as a
precondition to advocacy.'3 3 The possibility emerges, therefore,
that the interests of some class members will either never be represented, because regularly given low priority, or only be sporadically asserted, because of changes in the representative's priorities
during the course of litigation. By dividing a class, a judge may
be able to redefine the responsibilities of class attorneys and named
plaintiffs in terms of the interests of distinct and relatively unified
portions of a class. The necessity for the ranking of class interests
by the parties may therefore diminish, and the likelihood that
diverse absentee interests will be presented to the court increase.
If subclassing is to be fully used to protect against failures of
advocacy, courts must be sensitive to the representational problems created for a single advocate even in circumstances in which
the differences in the situations of class members do not express
themselves as contradictory positions concerning the course of the
litigation. In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds,1 34 an interpleader class action involving a dispute over rights to helium extracted in the course of natural gas pumping operations,' 35 the
Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 330 & n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 39o U.S.
333 (1968).
23°See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 897
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
1"' See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (i975), discussed, pp. 1464-65 & notes 55-

59 supra.
132

See Baird v. Lynch, 390 F. Supp. 740, 746 (W.D. Wisc. 1974).

'33 See p. 1595 infra.
134 292

F. Supp. 61g (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other

grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971).
'3- Id. at 624. Six interpleader actions were brought to determine who was
entitled to the money paid by the United States for a helium-gas mixture which

it had bought from helium extraction companies and their parent pipeline corn-
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court may have erred in refusing to subclass the suit to reflect the
fact that the litigation was proceeding on alternative theories of
liability. 3 ' A group of landowners, seeking recovery for helium
taken from their property, argued both that helium was not "gas"
within the terms of relevant lease arrangements, 1 7 and that even
if it were "gas," recovery would nonetheless be justified on unjust
enrichment grounds. 38 The court held that subclassing to reflect
the alternative theories was not required because the two theories
were "mutually exclusive" '"Iand thus there was no "antagonism
or conflict of interest among the subclasses . ... 140 This latter
conclusion is open to question. The court noted that the subclass
arguing the theory that helium was "gas" but that recovery was
justified on unjust enrichment principles would also recover were
helium shown not to be "gas." 141 The subclass holding to the
theory that helium was not a "gas," however, would not necessarily
have had any interest in arguing the unjust enrichment theory
with equal force, and therefore, if there was no subclassing, class
members who saw their interests as best furthered by the unjust
enrichment approach would be at the mercy of the class attorney's
litigative priorities.
To be most effective, of course, subclassing should occur before
absentees' interests have been placed in jeopardy. In many cases,
therefore, a court may wish to organize subclasses at the outset of
litigation. Such preventive subclassing is made difficult, however,
by the fact that representatives of the proposed subclass may not
yet be parties to the litigation. If there is to be early subclassing,
therefore, a court may have to resort to notice in an attempt to
persuade members of the relevant subclasses to become parties to
the litigation, 4 2 order the class attorney, perhaps as a condition
of approving class suit, to find members of the proposed subclasses
willing to join in the suit,14

the subclasses.

3

or appoint counsel itself to represent

44

panies. The court grouped the rival claimants into three classes: the owners of
the lands from which the helium-bearing natural gas was produced, the "lesseeproducers" who actually extracted helium from the natural gas, and the pipeline
companies who processed and transported the gas for resale. See id. at 624-25.
..6 See id. at 634.
137

See id.

138

See id.

139 Id.

140

1d.

141

See id.
See pp. 1434-35 supra.
Once the class attorney finds such individuals it would be incumbent upon

142
143

the court to advise them to secure separate counsel. See MANUAL FOR COmPLEX
LrIGATioN § 142 (3d ed. 1975) ; p. 1593 & note 67 infra.
144 See Amos v. Board of School Directors, 4o8 F. Supp. 765, 773-76 (E.D.
Wis. 1976).
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A court may be able to reduce the administrative complexity
of subclassing by making use of the class opponent as the subclass
representative. Reliance upon the class opponent to protect absentee interests, however, is a technique of limited usefulness. The
court must be in a position to predict the coincidence of the interests of absentees and the class opponent. Such a prediction will
be possible only where the issue to which class differences are
relevant is one which can be resolved in a small number of ways,'4 5
and where there is one and only one resolution which furthers the
class opponent's interest.'4 6 Even if the number of resolutions of
a given issue is limited, if the class opponent is in the position of a
stakeholder, with no interest in any one particular resolution of
the lawsuit, reliance upon the class opponent to protect absentee
interests would not be warranted. 4 7
Dierks v. Thompson 148 presents the rare case in which a court
could use the class opponent to protect the interests of absentee
class members. In Dierks former employees of a corporation
brought a class suit against the trustees of the corporation's pension fund challenging the formula the trustees had used to calculate employees' interests.' 49 The suit turned on whether under the
terms of the pension plan the employees were entitled to a fixed
amount upon maturity of their rights or rather would be owed a
percentage interest in the fund. 50 The class representatives sought
the percentage return but a substantial number of absentees disagreedY' The trial court nonetheless proceeded with the suit. 5
On appeal, the First Circuit held that despite the dissension the
class suit was proper.

53

The pension plan was capable of only

one of two interpretations,5 4 and the defendants had "from the
14 If the issues at stake may be resolved in a variety of ways, then the class

members' interests may shift during the course of the litigation so that while the
opponent may have been an adequate guardian of absentee interests at the outset,
he might not be so later in the suit.
146 Even if the class opponent had just two or three optimal alternative resolutions for the dispute, one of which corresponds to that sought by absentee
class members, the opponent may order his priorities so that the result desired by
the absentees - while still something the opponent favored - will be ranked last.
147 The class opponent could not be regarded as the representative of absentee
interests in a "pure" or "strict" interpleader case, for example, since in such a
situation the opponent would be but a stakeholder, without an interest in the
result, and unwilling to advocate the absentees' interests. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 91, § 1701, at 352-53.
148 414 F.2d 453 (ist Cir. 1969).
149 See id. at 455.
150 See id.
1

I See id. at 456 & n.5.

152 See id. at 454.

5
3 See id. at 457.
1'4 See id. at 455.

Although the court initially stated that plaintiffs sought
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outset ...actively supported the position" of the dissident ab-

sentees. 155
(c) Intervention as a Supplement to Subclassing. - Subclassing is possible only if differing class members coalesce into discrete,
identifiable groups. Not all differences among class members,
however, will divide along such clear lines. State of mind differences provide an obvious example. Class members may disagree,
for example, over the relief that should be sought, 1 6 or even over
whether suit should be brought at all.1" 7 But while this disagreement may be quite real, it may not be possible for a court to
associate it with any particular subset of the class membership.
Even if class cleavages may be described in a way which connects
differing interests or situations with specific class members, it may
not be possible to define subclasses with sufficient clarity to provide a homogeneous constituency for subclass representatives. 1 8
"one

or the other of two alternative constructions of the plan," apparently
both of plaintiffs' interpretations would have resulted in a percentage return
under the terms of the pension plan. See id.
...Id. at 457. Dierks has been criticized as "jarring and illogical," Note, The
Importance of Being Adequate, supra note 9i , at 1254, on three grounds: (1)
the absentee may have sought a third interpretation of the pension plan different
from either of those espoused by the representative plaintiff and the defendant;
(2)
the defendant might have supported the absentees' position less vigorously
than a representative of the absentees would have; and (3) Dierks is barred by
Hansberry v. Lee. While the first two criticisms are undoubtedly valid in most
cases where the class opponent arguably represents absentee interests, they do not
seem correct in Dierks. The court of appeals determined that the issue in the
case was susceptible of only one of two results -percentage
interest or a fixed
interest in the fund-and that there was no third interpretation. The court
also determined that the defendants had "actively supported" their position.
Defendants' "vigor" is further indicated by the fact that they appealed from
their defeat in the district court and won on appeal, thus fully vindicating the
interests of the absentees. Cf. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir.
1973) (representative's failure to appeal decision adverse to most class members
evidence of inadequacy).
The suggestion that class opponent representation of absentees' interests is
categorically barred by Hansberry is also unfounded. Although the Hansberry
Court briefly raised the possibility that the interests of property owners opposing
enforcement of the restrictive covenant had been represented by the defendant in
Burke, the Court found that such representation had not in fact occurred in that
latter case. The Court, however, did not consider whether such representation,
where actually provided, could ever be considered adequate. See 311 U.S. at 46;
note iio supra.
""8See, e.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 68o, 683 (5th Cir. 1973); Hines v.
Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1973); Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 208, 209-10 (D. Conn. 1968).
157See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d
920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968); Housing Authority v. United States Housing Authority,
54 F.R.D. 402, 403-04 (D. Neb.), rev'd on the merits, 468 F.2d i (8th Cir. 1972);
Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927, 931 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
158 See, e.g., Henry v. Lopez Tijerina, 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969), appeal
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Provision for intervention by individual class members, therefore, may be necessary if the full range of absentee interests is
Through exerto be effectively represented in class litigation.'
cise of its power to invite, accept, or reject motions to intervene, a
court may act to fit into the lawsuit representatives of class interests not susceptible of subclassing, while at the same time screening out individuals who would assert points of view already
integrated into the party structure.10° Although the intervention
mechanism thus gives courts a useful tool for defining the shape
of class litigation, intervention is also an important means whereby class members themselves may assert a measure of control over
litigation brought on their behalf. Indeed, it is the opportunity
for class member initiative afforded by intervention which makes
the device such an effective complement to subclassing. Not only
are class members whose interests a court recognizes but cannot
group provided with a means for participating in the lawsuit,
but also class members whose differences with their fellows have
not been spotted by the court are given a way of calling attention
to their situation.''
Although an effective complement, intervention is not a substitute for subclassing. An intervenor asserts only his own interest.
The point of view he presents may change during the course of a
lawsuit, and therefore may cease to correspond to the perspective
of the absentees the court may have originally thought the intervenor represented. Moreover, an intervenor, especially if not
invited by the court, may have unique interests. His views may
be shared by few other class members, and positioning him as an
discussed, pp. 1477-78 & notes 121-124 supra,
922 (970),
in which the indicia of class membership -Spanish surname, ancestry, or language
-could be used to identify individual class members but could not be the basis
for subclassing because of the substantial overlap of individuals sharing more
than one of these characteristics.
"OThe discussion here concerns itself exclusively with intervention by class
members. Individuals other than class members may also have to be recognized
as intervenors in order to complete the party structure of a class suit. The
conditions under which such individuals may participate are defined (to the extent that such a distinction may be drawn) by the law of intervention, see, e.g.,
FED. R. Cry. P. 24, and not by the law of class actions, and are therefore not
discussed in this Note.
100 Since intervention, like subclassing, is prospective, and requires the identification of possibly antagonistic or unrepresented interests at a point perhaps
prior to any awareness by absentees that these interests may be in danger of
impairment, a court may encounter difficulty in attempting to identify and induce
particular absentees to come into the lawsuit. See p. 1480 supra.
11 See, e.g., 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 91, § 1799, at 252-53.
See generally 3B J. MOORE, supra note 91, fi 23.90[2]; Shapiro, Some Thoughts
dismissed, 398 U.S.

on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 8i HARV. L.
(1968).
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equal with representatives of the views of significant numbers of

class members may distort the picture of the class presented to
the court. 0

2

If subclassing is possible, therefore, it should be

preferred to recognition of intervenors.
As the federal rules are presently interpreted, the questions of

the circumstances under which intervention by class members will
be allowed and the participatory rights to be accorded intervenors
are matters for the discretion of the trial court. 3 The trial judge

decides whether the interests of absentees will be adequately represented if a class member's motion to intervene is denied; the

trial judge also decides whether the intervening class member will
be granted the status of a full party, or rather will be limited to
an ancillary role. Because the implications of a judge's duty to
insure adequacy of representation derive from the circumstances

of each particular case, proper intervention policy in class actions
probably cannot be reduced to rules. But while from the perspective of the judicial system as a whole discretion as to the circumstances and form of class member intervention may be inevitable,

it does not follow that trial judges themselves ought to regard all
questions of intervention procedure as equally discretionary. Class
member intervention is a useful complement to subclassing in part
because it affords a means for absentees to act on their own judgments concerning the adequacy with which their interests are
being represented, and thus provides a means for supplementing
the trial judge's superintendency of the litigation. If in passing
on motions to intervene trial judges simply rely on their own
views as to the completeness of the party structure, much of the
value of the intervention mechanism as a device for obtaining
fresh insight into the fairness of class suit will be lost. Courts
162 This problem might be corrected by limiting the extent of the intervenor's

participation. See Shapiro, supra note 161, at 752-56.
163 The extent of judicial discretion in permitting and conditioning intervention by class members was initially a matter of some debate among the commentators, and was related to the general question of the interaction of rules 23
and 24. Rule 24 provides that where an applicant proves that he has an interest
threatened with impairment in a pending suit, and that he is inadequately represented by the existing parties, he is entitled to intervene "of right." FED. R. Civ.
P. 24(a)(2). When an absentee class member is the applicant he invariably
satisfies the interest and impairment requirements, and thus, under a rule 24
analysis, an absentee ought to be considered as entitled to intervene as a full
party on a showing of a lack of adequate representation. Rule 23, however, vests
discretion in the trial courts to invite intervention where such intervention would,
in the opinion of the court, facilitate adequate representation, and also empowers judges to impose conditions on such intervenors. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2)
and (3). The dispute has been resolved by permitting courts to limit and condition intervention by absentees even where in a non-class suit such intervention
would be of right. See, e.g., 3B J. MOORE, supra note 91, ff 23.9o[2], 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 91, § 1799.
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therefore should at least begin their analysis of the need for intervention with a presumption in favor of the intervenor's motion.01
Of course, one consequence of a liberal intervention policy will be
an increased complication in the party structure, and thus a reduction in the manageability of the class suit." 5 This adverse
effect, however, may be minimized if courts reverse the presumption with respect to the participatory rights of intervenors. Ordinarily, intervening class members should be given the right merely
to witness class proceedings and to receive all briefs and other
official filings submitted by any of the full parties during the course
of the suit.'
Additional participation rights should be recognized only upon a showing that such rights are necessary if absentee interests are to be adequately protected.
(d) Elimination of Differences Through Class Redefinition
and Self-Exclusion by Class Members. - Differences within a class
may be reduced, rather than accommodated, in either of two ways.
The boundaries of a class may be redrawn to exclude class
members whose interests or situations differ from those of the class
representatives. Alternatively, class members may be granted a
right to exclude themselves from the lawsuit, and thus an opportunity to act on their own conclusions as to whether their interests
coincide with the interests furthered by class litigation. Under
rule 23, class redefinition is a matter left largely within the discretion of the trial judge.0 7 Rule 23 has been interpreted by the
federal courts to itself resolve the issue of the availability of
opt-out rights. Section (c) (2) of the rule grants class members
an opportunity for self-exclusion if a class suit is brought as a
common question action under section (b) (3). s Rule 23, however, makes no explicit provision for opt-outs in suits brought
under sections (b) (i) or (b) (2), and the federal courts have refused to exercise their discretionary power under section (d) to
extend a self-exclusion right to cover these suits. 9
164 See, e.g., 3B J. MOORE, supra note 9I,

fi 23.90[21, at 23-1627; 7A C. WRIGHT

& A. MILLER, supra note 91, § 1799, at 254; Note, Intervention in Government
Enforcement Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1186 (1976).
165 See, e.g., 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 91; Note, supra note
164, at 1175.
160See, e.g., McBroom v. Western Elec. Co., 18 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 1200,

1203 (M.D.N.C. i974). This right of the absentees to attend proceedings and
receive documents sufficient to enable them to scrutinize the litigation would appear to be the irreducible minimum component of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(C)
intervention. See Kaplan, supra note 92, at 392 n.137.
167 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1).
I" See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (C) (2) (C).
100See, e.g., Rhodes v. Weinberger, 66 F.R.D. 6oi, 604 (E.D. Pa. 2975);
Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 5o F.R.D. 295, 300 (E.D. La. 297o). Where

a court in a suit for injunctive relief has sought to permit absentees to exclude
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Because class redefinition turns on factors unique to the case
at hand, rule 23's treatment of this technique as discretionary
seems appropriate. In exercising their discretion, however, courts
should be attentive to the practical limits on the usefulness of the
technique. If exclusion is truly to protect the interests of class
members who differ with the remainder of a class, the excluded
group must first of all be capable of definition in a manner which
allows for the identification of the specific class members excluded.
Some differences within a class, just as they may be beyond the
reach of subclassing, 170 may also be too diffuse to be remedied
through class redefinition. Moreover, even if a dissident group
can be defined with the requisite particularity, exclusion of the
group may not protect the group's interests if the practical effect
of the class judgment would extend beyond the perimeters of the
redefined class. Failure to take this consideration into account
may explain the court's redefinition of the class in Insley v.
Joyce. 71' In that case, suit had been brought on behalf of all union
members denied credit under a pension plan, who would have
been covered by the plan but for the fact that they had temporarily left their jobs." 2 The court held this class to be improper
since "some of the members of the class so described might still
qualify for pensions in the future notwithstanding their loss of
credit," 17' and therefore these class members would have an
interest in denying relief to already retired class members in
order to reduce depletion of the pension fund. 4 The court subsequently redefined the class to consist only of the retired members
of the union who had been denied credit.Y7 This redefinition,
however, failed to protect the interests the court attributed to the
excluded class members: if the redefined class prevailed, the
pension fund would still be depleted, and the former class members would be no better off for having been left out of the lawsuit.
Judicial use of the redefinition technique to purge a class of
dissident elements should be checked by an awareness of the inconsistency of the technique with the functions of class suit. To
the extent that a class is narrowed, enforcement of substantive
policy is constrained. Moreover, redefinition of a class to screen
out class differences deprives the court of exposure to those difthemselves, it has usually chosen to define the suit as one brought under section
(b) (3) rather than permit opt-outs in a (b) (2). See, e.g., Smith v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, Inc., i9 FED. RuLEs SERV. 2D 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. '974).
170 See p. 1484 & notes x56-i58 supra.
171 33o F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
172 Id. at 1230-31.
73

' Id. at 1234.
See id. at 1234-35.
1 5 See id. at 1235.
174
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ferences during the course of the litigation, and thus may have
the effect of limiting the heuristic function of the class device. In
Swarb v. Lennox, 7 for example, the court redefined a class suing
to challenge the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's confession of
judgment procedures to include only individuals who had agreed
to the inclusion of confession of judgment clauses in contractual
17
agreements and who had incomes of less than $io,ooo per yearY.
This redefinition seems to have been prompted at least in part
by the court's apparent conclusion that individuals with incomes
above the cut-off level would be more likely to object to the adverse impact invalidation of confession judgments would have
upon the credit market. 78 If this division of interest in fact
existed, the court's redefinition had the effect of excluding from
the litigation a disagreement within the class directly relevant to
the merits of the suit. The confession of judgment procedure
had been challenged as inconsistent with the requirements of procedural due process. 9 One factor pertinent to a court's determination of what procedure a legislature is required to afford in
establishing a regulatory framework for commercial transactions
is the extent of the burden alternative procedures would impose
on debtors and creditors.8 0
Like class redefinition, the grant of opt-out rights makes sense
only if the individuals removed from the class can truly be insulated from the effect of the class judgment. Thus, the distinction
rule 23 draws between (b) (i) and (b) (2) classes, whose members
have no right to exclude themselves, and (b) (3) classes, whose
members may opt out, has at least some practical justification.' 8 '
Most (b) (i) and (b) (2) classes are suing for relief which
cannot be readily limited to only some class members. For example, all individuals who seek to claim from a common fund are
affected by a court's allocation of the fund regardless of whether
they have excluded themselves from the suit.8 2 Similarly, all
individuals burdened by an unconstitutional statute are affected,
even if they have opted out of class litigation, if the statute is
176 3I 4 F. Supp. iogi (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 191
(1972).

...See id. at io98-99.
178 See id.
179 See id. at 1095.

S°See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 46 U.S. 6oo, 6o4-io (1974); Note,
Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use
of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1510, 1531-32 (1975). See also p. 1371

supra.

181 But see pp. 1348-49 supra.
182 See, e.g., Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, Inc., 414 F.2d 311

Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (,970).

(Ist
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invalidated." 3 Rule 23 (b) (3) class suits, by contrast, are generally brought to recover money damages, relief which may be
awarded in a manner which distinguishes among individual class
members, and which therefore may be shaped to respect the rights
of individuals who have excluded themselves from a lawsuit. 8 4
The fact that relief is severable may be of limited significance for
class members offered the opportunity to exclude themselves who,
despite their disagreement with class representatives, nonetheless
do wish to pursue their claims: cut off from the class, individual
class members may not be able to afford the cost of litigation; 185
moreover, the stare decisis effects of the class judgment may frustrate existing class members' attempt to litigate independently in
any event. But at least for those class members whose disagreement with class representatives manifests itself in a desire not to
sue, the right to leave the lawsuit may be of value.
At a more fundamental level, however, provision of any optout right whatsoever is difficult to defend.18 6 Affording class members an opportunity to exclude themselves from a lawsuit is not
a reliable means of reducing difference within a class since there
can be no guarantee that all class members whose interests diverge
from the interests asserted by class representatives will indeed
remove themselves. 8 7 Moreover, the grant of an opt-out right
may in fact be counterproductive from the perspective of the class
action court. Class members who would take the initiative to exclude themselves from a suit may be the individuals who would
be most likely to participate actively in the suit, in order to protect their divergent interests, were no opt-outs allowed. Departure
of these individuals from the litigation would deprive the court
of an important source of information about the class, and may
therefore handicap the court's efforts to protect absentees. Because they sap participation, grants of opt-out rights should be
infrequent. 8 8 In general, invitations to opt out should not be ex183See, e.g., Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 808 (E.D.N.Y.),

rev'd,

447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971) (on the merits), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 965 (972);
Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927, 931 (N.D. Ill. x968).
184 See, e.g., 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9i, § 1777; Kaplan,
supra note 91, at 389-99.
185 See Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLum. L. REV.
609, 637 (I971).
186 Extension of an opt-out right is not required by due process. See generally

P.

1402-11
187

supra.

See, e.g., Phillips v. Klassen,

419 U.S. 996 (974);

502

F.2d 362, 367 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

Lukenas v. Bryce's Mt. Resort, Inc., 66 F.R.D.

69,

72

(W.D. Va. 1975); Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 6869 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D.
26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 3972).
' Federal courts have generally narrowly construed the self-exclusion pro-
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tended to an entire class. Rather, this technique would seem to be
best used as a supplement to class redefinition. If there is uncertainty as to whether the interests of a segment of a class are so
out of phase with the interests of the rest of the class that class
redefinition is warranted, that segment of the class could be afforded an opportunity to exit from the suit, and thus to judge the
divergency of their interests themselves.
3. Differences Within the Class: CharacteristicProblems.In view of the array of techniques available to courts for structuring class litigation to accommodate differences within the class,
there is room to wonder why a court would ever terminate a class
suit for fear that the interests of class members would not be adequately represented. Nonetheless, practice under rule 23 reveals
that federal courts frequently do cite intra-class differences as a
reason for refusing to certify a class action. 1 89 The courts, however, have not reached a consensus on the kinds of class differences
which justify refusals to hear a class suit.' 90 If there is to be a
vision of rule 23. Where an action can be maintained under sections (b) (i)
and/or (b) (2), and also under section (b) (3), courts have almost invariably
ruled that the suit should be brought under (b) (i) and/or (b) (2). See, e.g.,
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Moreover,
in a number of cases where the issue was whether absentees had moved to opt
out within the time set by the court, or, where pleading lack of notice or excusable neglect, the absentees filed motions for exclusion after the expiration of
the opt-out period, courts have placed the burden of proof on the absentees, and
have regularly ruled against them. See, e.g., In re National Student Marketing
Litigation v. Barnes Plaintiffs, 530 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ; Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1O64, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96

S. Ct. 1659 (I976); Manhattan-Ward, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 490 F.2d 1183,
1x85 (2d Cir. 1974).
"'0 See, e.g., Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 452 (M.D. Ga.
1975); Van Allen v. Circle K Corp., 58 F.R.D. 562, 564 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Lupia

v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 1974 CCH Trade Cas. fT75,046 at 96,687-88 (N.D.
Ill. 1972).
0
'" For example, while it has been held that disagreements among a class concerning the relief sought prevents a class action from going forward, see, e.g.,
Guttman v. Braemer, 51 F.R.D. 537, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), other courts have
disagreed, see, e.g., Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 51 (5th
Cir.

1974),

cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W.

3670

(U.S.

May

24,

1976)

(No.

75-718). Similarly, although some courts have ruled that opposition to suit by
some class members bars class suit, see, e.g., Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d
1112, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1970), other courts have allowed class actions to go for-

ward despite such opposition, see, e.g., Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Cooperative Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420, 428 (3d Cir. 1968) ; Gates v. Dalton, 67 F.R.D. 621,
63o-3i (E.D.N.Y. 1975). In securities fraud class actions, some courts have said
that named plaintiffs cannot represent shareholders who purchased stock after
they did, see, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 36, 42 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), but other courts have disagreed, see, e.g., Tucker v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). A similar pattern manifests itself in
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hierarchy of class conflicts, therefore, it cannot be divined from
current practice, but must instead find its origins in the theory of
adequacy of representation itself.
(a) Adequacy of Representation and the Accommodation oj
Dissent Within the Class Concerning Liability or Relief.- The
fundamental assumption underlying the theory of adequacy of representation which has been advanced in this section is that judicial
awareness of differences within a class is a sufficient protection of
absentee interests. If the differing situations of class members
are known to the trial judge, the judge will be able to assess the
significance of these differences in light of the substantive law
governing the suit, and give the various interests of class members
their due in reaching conclusions as to liability, relief, or the fairness of settlement. It is the end of judicial awareness which the
techniques discussed above are designed to further. Practical and
institutional constraints limit the ability of the trial judge, without
assistance, to discover differences in the situations of class members. As a result, the structure of class litigation must be adjusted
so that the trial judge can safely rely upon the class representatives
for an accurate picture of the class. If there are any intra-class
differences which justify a court's refusal to hear a class action,
therefore, those differences must either derive from the fact that
some class members have interests for which judicial awareness
provides no protection, or which undermine so irreparably the
integrity of class representatives that no adjustment of the litigative structure of the class suit can enable the trial judge to
obtain a clear view of the class. Differences which do not raise
questions as to the very legitimacy of the class action process,
however, but which merely reflect variances in view as to the
proper outcome of a suit, do not provide reason for a court to refuse to hear a class suit. Such differences can be taken into
account, and absentee interests thus fairly protected, in the course
of the class action itself.
Most differences in situation or interest among class members,
therefore, should not bar class suit. If the factual circumstances
underlying class members' claims differ, 9 ' or if class members
Title VII class actions: some courts hold that a plaintiff employee cannot represent persons never employed by the defendant company, see, e.g., Freeman v.
Motor Convoy, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 196, i99 (N.D. Ga. 1975), while other courts do
not find the difference in situation to be important, see, e.g., Kohn v. Royall,
Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d
1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
"'i For example, the problems arising out of differences among the fact situations of the claims of particular plaintiff class members have become especially
significant in securities fraud class actions with the growth of the "common
scheme" or "common course of conduct" doctrine. Under the common scheme
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disagree as to the proper theory of liability, 192 the trial judge,
through use of techniques like subclassing or intervention, may incorporate the class differences into the litigative process, and give
all class members their due in deciding what is the proper outcome
of the litigation. Even if differences among class members are more
fundamental, having to do with the type of relief which should
be sought 93 or indeed with whether the class opponent ought
approach, plaintiffs who have purchased securities over a long period of time or in
response to a number of prospectuses or financial statements may pool their
claims in one large class action. See Note, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule
x ob-5, 38 U. CHr. L. REv. 337, 360 (,971). In such a securities action, a representative plaintiff who purchased at the very early stages of defendant's alleged
deception would have an interest in proving that the defendant's duty to disclose arose at the outset and might sacrifice the interests of some absentees by
passing up a settlement in which the defendant would have admitted a breach
of his duty to disclose, but would have placed that duty later on. See Stull v.
Baker, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 9I94,227 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
See also Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 36, 41-42 (S.D.N.Y. x975);
Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 113, 117 (N.D. Ill. 1972). On the other hand,
a late purchaser might too readily accept such a settlement offer and not fully
protect the interests of early buyers.
Similar potential conflicts might also affect the amount of damages particular
plaintiffs could recover, as well as whether they could recover at all. Thus, where
the plaintiff claims that defendants' misrepresentations inflated the price of stock
traded on the open market, some class members might desire to maximize the
inflation existing at a given date while others would desire to minimize it. An
early purchaser who has already sold his stock might seek to maximize the deflation due to an intervening corrective disclosure in order to maximize his
losses, but in so doing he would put himself in conflict with a late purchaser
interested in maximzing the inflation in the price which he paid. See Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3614 (U.S. March 5, 1976) (No. 75-1258). See also B&B Investment Club v.
Kleinert's Inc., 62 F.R.D. 140, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
102See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 1041, 1042-43
(D.D.C. 1971); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 634
(D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (ioth
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (971).
113 See Note, Defining The Typical and Representative Plaintiff, supra note
91, at 422-24. Such differences commonly arise in suits on behalf of a class of
franchisees or land purchasers in a real estate development alleging antitrust violations or fraud in the franchise or sales agreement, since some plaintiffs may
be seeking rescission of the contract and a restitution of their payments under
it while others would prefer to maintain their business relationship with the defendant and would settle for an award of damages. See, e.g., Lukenas v. Bryce's
Mt. Resort, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 69, 71-72 (W.D. Va. 1975); Seligson v. The Plum
Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343, 345-46 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58
F.R.D. 74, 80 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
Although this type of conflict may occur among class members who are otherwise similarly situated, often it is symptomatic of an antagonism between class
members who continue to have ties to the defendant and those whose ties have
been severed. Thus, in an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of
the class of past and present employees who allege that a practice followed by
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to be held liable at all," judicial accommodation appears to provide a sufficient mechanism for the protection of absentee interests.
So long as a dispute concerns the outcome of litigation, the trial
judge is in a position to isolate the differing positions, judge their
validity in light of the substantive law governing the case, and
shape the outcome of the suit to give the various class interests
the weight to which the law entitles them.
The ability of the trial judge to accommodate dissent within a
class would appear to be most severely tested when members of
the class align themselves with the class opponent and claim that
their interests would be better served were the class opponent not
held liable. Disagreement of this sort split the class allegedly
represented by the suit at issue in Hansberry v. Lee. 9 ' Federal
courts acting under rule 23 have frequently found objections by
class members to the value of holding class opponents liable to
be a bar to class suit.'96 Analysis of the bases for absentees' claims
of unfairness in this context, however, reveals no objection which
cannot be dealt with through the class action process itself.
One argument dissenters might make is that their interests
have been disadvantaged by the increased access to courts class
actions make possible. But for the availability of the class device,
class members seeking to hold the class opponent liable would
not have been able to act on their views. 97 This objection is not
one peculiar to absentee members of a divided class. It could be as
easily raised by a class opponent facing a united class. The inquiry the objection suggests is into the compatibility of class
the defendant is unlawful, former employees who were discharged by the defendant pursuant to the allegedly discriminatory practice may demand nothing
less than reinstatement and an award of back pay while the present employees may
be satisfied with declaratory relief and an injunction against further discrimination. See Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.,
490 F.2d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (974).
See also
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. I975);
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., i8 FED. RULEs SERV. 2D 517 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
"4 See, e.g., Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d 362, 366-67 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 996 (i974); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, iix6-i7 (7th
Cir. 1970); Gates v. Dalton, 67 F.R.D. 621, 630-32 (E.D.N.Y. i975); Cortright

v. Resor,

325 F. Supp. 797, 807 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on the merits, 447 F.2d 245
(2d. Cir. 197i), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (972);
Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47
F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.D.C. i969); Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. I65, 168 (E.D.

La. 1968). See also Note, Defining the Typical and Representative Plaintiff,
supra note 91, at 418-22, 424-27.
U-S.

(1940), discussed, pp. 1472-74 & notes 95-111 supra.
528 F.2d 551, 553-54 (5th
Cir. 1976); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, ixi6-17 (7th Cir. 1970);
Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.D.C. 1969).
197 See Note, Defining the Typical and Representative Plaintiff, supra note
91, at 429.
195311

9'See,

32

e.g., Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc.,
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actions and a given cause of action, an inquiry obviously a part of
the class action process itself. 9 ' A second argument would hold
that class suit may significantly impair any right class members
have to forgive a statutory violation. 99 Formally, the right remains: even if individual class members have no right to opt out,
they may still refuse to claim the relief to which they are entitled. Practically, though, once classwide liability is found, the
right to forgive may not be of much significance. Each class member, fearful that other class members will claim their recovery,
may conclude that forgiving the class opponent will have little
practical effect, and take the "second best" course of seeking relief.
It is not necessary, however, to ban class actions where some
class members would absolve the class opponent in order to afford
such members a meaningful opportunity for forgiveness. Class
members could be informed that if the number of class members
who file for recovery is above a threshold level, class members
who refrained from filing, perhaps because they felt the class
opponent should not be held liable, would be given a second chance
to file, in order to be able to benefit from the suit if they conclude
that too few class members have abstained for forgiveness to have
any practical effect.200 Under this scheme, class members who
think the class opponent should not be held liable would be free
to vote their convictions by not filing a claim on the first round,
since, should their action prove ineffectual, they would have an
opportunity on the second round to protect themselves.
(b) Judicially Irreconcilable Class Differences: Objection to
the Fact of Class Suit Itself. - Objection to the very fact of class
suit itself, rather than to its result, is perhaps the most obvious
example of the kind of class member dissent which cannot readily
be judicially accommodated. For the trial judge to be able to
protect the interests of dissident class members, those interests
must be capable of being furthered by an adjustment in the outcome of the litigation. If class member interests are adversely
affected by the very process of litigation itself, the trial judge,
who can act only through that process, can be of no assistance.
See p. 1359 supra; pp. 1504-10 infra.
100 Such a right cannot be said to exist in any meaningful sense, of course,
108

unless the claims of class members are severable.
"'The opportunity that would be afforded dissenting class members by this
procedure would not be an opportunity to terminate the lawsuit, but rather a
chance to reduce significantly the impact of the suit upon the class opponent. It
would be necessary for the court to set a threshold level of nonforgiveness as a
precondition for a second round of filing since, given an unconditioned second
round, dissenting class members, uncertain of the extent of forgiveness which
their fellows would regard as meaningful, might find it prudent to file a claim
even if each dissenter personally found the results of the first round satisfactory.
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Class members are most likely to regard class litigation, whatever its outcome, as inimical to their interests if they have joined
with the class opponent in a continuing business relationship. The
litigative process, by itself, could be destructive of that relationship. The costs of litigation might burden the class opponent to
the point that his business activities were impaired."' The risk
of classwide liability,20

feasance, 0 3

2

as well as the public charges of mal-

might hamper the class opponent's efforts to attract
investment capital or to obtain or retain continuing relationships
with customers or other individuals with whom the class opponent's business requires him to deal2 04 The constraints on communication class litigation imposes might impede class members
and the class opponent in their efforts to coordinate business activities. 0 5
Claims that the very fact of class litigation threatens to injure
some class members raise the possibility of a radical conflict of
interest within a class. If the existence of absentee interests which
would be injured without regard to the outcome of litigation bars
class suit, the interests of other class members, which would have
been furthered by the increased bargaining power and litigative
economies class suit promises, will be frustrated. But from the
perspective of absentees who object to the fact of class suit itself,
continuation of the class suit would be unfair. These absentees,
included within the class without their consent, would increase
the bargaining power of the class through their forced inclusion,
but would be without means to shape the process of class litigation
in order to protect their own interests.
2o See, e.g., Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26

(S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Free World, a former franchisee of the defendant automobile
distributor brought an antitrust action on behalf of the class of present and former
franchisees. The court found that the interests of the present and former franchisees were adverse since the current Alfa Romeo franchisees wanted the defendant to remain in business in order to assure their supply of automobiles,
while the named plaintiff's only interest was in obtaining damages. Id. at 29.
Judge Weinfeld, noting that "the defendant has a minimum share" of the
American automobile market, concluded that the defendant might prefer to terminate all existing dealerships rather than incur the expenses of defending the
action or risk the threat of a substantial judgment. Id. See also Class Action Symposium, supranote 91, at 1142.
202 See p. 1355 supra.

203 See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757-58 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 888 (1975) ; p. 1380 supra.
204 The maintenance of the class suit may similarly harm absentee class members since litigation challenging the legality of a franchise agreement, automobile
dealership, or land sales contract may lower the market value of the franchise
of property or make it more difficult for an absentee plaintiff to sell.
205 See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l,
Inc., 55 F.R.D. 50, 5o-5I (E.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 770 (2d

Cir. 1972). But see pp. 1597-i6o4 infra.
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In a given case, close analysis may reveal that there is in fact
no conflict. The injury to absentee interests alleged to result from
class suit may be too conjectural or too insignificant to warrant
judicial solicitude. 0 The absentees who object to the fact of class
suit may comprise a discrete group within the class, and therefore
may be able to be excluded from the class without jeopardizing
the continuance of litigation.2 0 7 Class members who are not injured by the fact of suit itself may all hold individually recoverable
claims, and may therefore not be significantly injured if the class
action is not allowed. 05 The first responses of a court faced with
allegations that class suit itself injures absentees, therefore, should
be to obtain information about the situation of class members,
and then to consider the usefulness of available judicial action less
20 9
draconian than termination of the class suit.
If a conflict is not false, the court, in order to decide whether to
allow a class suit to go forward or to terminate it, must come to
a conclusion as to the relative importance of the conflicting interests of class members. The source of the court's hierarchy must
be the substantive policies the court understands to be reflected in
the cause of action under which the class suit was brought. The
balance between regulatory needs and the need not to discourage
unduly the conduct regulated is one which is central to any statutory scheme.2 10 To ignore such a balance would be to cut off the
class suit from its justification as a means to fuller realization of
21
substantive policy. '
(c) Judicially Irreconcilable Class Differences: Radical Individualism as a Threat to the Integrity of Class Representation.If the judge hearing a class suit is to protect absentee interests, the
interests of each absentee cannot be antagonistic to the interests of
206Thus, in Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26

(S.D.N.Y. 1972), discussed in note 201 supra, the court took steps to verify the
claim that the fact of suit itself would indeed injure the interests of plaintiff
class members. See id. at 29.
207 Such a focused opt-out would be preferable to a redefinition of the class
to exclude dissident absentees since self-exclusion would permit the absentees
themselves to decide whether or not to participate in the suit and the possible recovery.
208 See, e.g., White v. Deltona Corp., 66 F.R.D. 560, 564 (S.D.
Fla. 1975);
Seligson v. The Plum Tree, Inc., 6i F.R.D. 343, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Abercrombie
v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 394 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344
F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. I972).

20" A general extension of a right to opt out would not be a satisfactory means
of dealing with the problem of objection to the fact of suit itself since class members other than those with the particular objection which prompted the offer
of the
exit right may take the opportunity to leave. See also p. 1488 supra.
2 10
See generally pp. 136o-6" supra.
211 See generally pp. 1353-7, supra.
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every other absentee. Such all-pervasive antagonism would deprive
class representatives of any function: no member of the class could
confidently speak for any member of the class but himself. Moreover, there would be -too many possible permutations of interests
for the trial judge to accommodate without assistance. Radically
individualist classes could arise in either of two ways. Mutual
antagonism might be the natural state of class members. Outside
the context of litigation, the situation of class members may be
such that each benefits from the others' losses. For such class
members, class litigation may present itself -as an opportunity to
carry on ordinary competition by other means. Alternatively, the
war of all against all may be occasioned by the litigation itself.
The legal consequences of the events giving rise to class suit may
be such that class members not only have claims against the class
opponent but also against each other.21 s
Such Hobbesian classes are occasionally encountered in practice. Class members in antitrust actions are often competitors
outside the context of litigation.2 13 Usually, enforcement of the
antitrust laws is of common benefit to class members, and thus
the fact that class members are competitors does not threaten the
integrity of the class procedure." 4 Particular antitrust causes of
action, however, may make class litigation a theater for competition, and thus ultimately inappropriate. For example, in Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 215 purchasers of beet sugar,

who competed with each other in the sale of sugar-based products,
brought suit against their suppliers, charging illegal price fixing,
monopolization, tying, and price discrimination. 2 " The trial judge
held that class suit was proper in connection with the price fixing
and monopolization claims, but refused to certify class litigation
of the tying and price discrimination issues.21 7 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.218 If the class
prevailed on the tying and price discrimination charges, Judge
McWilliams reasoned, "the defendants would necessarily be en212 Such a situation should not be confused with a so-called "limited fund"

situation, in which class members are in competition with each other for shares of
a limited recovery, see, e.g., Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311
(ist Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1o37 (I97O). In the limited fund situation,
the claims of the class members, while in competition with each other, are made
against the class opponent, and not other class members.
212See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D.
452, 463-64 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
214 See Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641, 65o-6i (DS.C.
1975).
215 5o3 F.2d 459 (ioth Cir. 1974).
26 Id. at 46o-6i.
217 Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 62 F.R.D. 43 (D. Utah 1973).
218 5o3 F.2d at 465.
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joined from pricing their beet sugar on the base point pricing
method" presently in use."'9 A new price structure would have to
be substituted, "which would be disruptive" of the established
"competitive position of the various members of the class . .,, 220
Class members' mutually antagonistic interests as competitors
would thus be affected by the lawsuit, rendering the class procedure improper. By contrast, the Albertson's court found, litigation of the price fixing -and monopolization claims would not
affect "the defendant's system of pricing." "I As to these issues,
therefore, class suit would be in order.2 22
Courts have chiefly had to deal with only a weak form of mutual
antagonism among class members deriving from the litigation
itself. Not all class members are potentially liable to each other:
instead, it is only the class representative who must seek recovery
from the class opponent while at the same time protecting himself
from other class members. Class representatives in securities actions, if previously in the position of "insiders," have been particularly apt to draw charges that they are themselves liable to
the class they purport to represent. 2 3 Suit by a union on behalf
of its members under Title VII to challenge discriminatory provisions of a pension plan has been similarly attacked: the union
helped draw up the plan and was therefore itself at least arguably
liable to its members for the discrimination.224 It does not follow
from the fact that a particular named plaintiff is potentially liable
25
to a class that no reliable class representatives may be found.
Courts, therefore, have been rightly reluctant to treat claims of a
class representative.s liability to -a class as bars to class litigation.
Indeed, courts have gone so far as to hold, at least where only one
of a number of named plaintiffs is implicated, that denial of class
certification would not even be considered if a named plaintiff's
liability is not clear and no claims have been filed against the
Id. at 463.
Id. But see 1974 UTAir L. REv. 842, 849 (arguing that in fact there may
have been no competition).
221 Id. at 464.
12
Id. at 464. See also Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641,
219

220

65o-5i (D.S.C. 1975).
223

See, e.g., Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 1o3

(D. Colo. i97i); Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 468-70 (S.D.
N.Y. x968).
224 See Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 83-84 (S.D.N.Y. '973).
2 In a class suit where there are several representative plaintiffs, antagonism
between some of the named parties and some group of absentees may be remedied and the class suit permitted to go forward if the other named plaintiffs
can adequately represent those absentees' interests. See, e.g., Lamb v. United
Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 29-30 (S.D. Iowa I972).
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or if the named plaintiff's liability traces

from a theory other than the theory under which suit is brought
against the class opponent.117

Rather than halt a class action,

one court simply removed a named plaintiff potentially liable to
the class, and ordered the remaining class representatives to
obtain a new attorney.228
C. Manageability and Predomination:An Overview

Previous Parts of this Section have analyzed class action procedure from the perspective of the class members, considering
the inquiries a court must make, and the actions it must take, in
order to become sufficiently informed of the situations of class

members to be able to insure adequate representation of their
interests. This Part and the next Part adopt a different point

of view, in effect looking at class action procedure from the
vantage point of the causes of action under which class actions are

brought in order to determine whether the results of class actions
will be consistent with the policies which the causes of action

reflect. This Part briefly sketches an outline of manageability
and predomination analysis. The next Part illustrates the analysis

through an extended discussion of the problem of damage distribution.
. Manageability as a Threshold Inquiry. - Rule 23 treats
"the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action" 229 as simply one of a number of factors which federal

courts should take into account in judging the propriety of class
actions brought under rule 23 (b)(3).'30 A number of federal
2

. See Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 1o3 (D.

Colo. 1971).
227 See, e.g., Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D.
335,22341-42 (D. Minn. 1971).
See Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 83-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (3) (D).
230 See id. 23(b) (3). Under the rule, manageability is one consideration which
courts are supposed to take into account in deciding whether common questions
predominate and whether a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. See id. Predomination analysis, however, has come to involve an independent inquiry. See pp. i5o4-i6 infra.
The concept of superiority has not actuired a distinct content. The language of
the Rule suggests that a determination that a class action is superior requires
consideration of the efficacy of available alternatives to class suit, see FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b) (3) ("a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy"), but federal courts appear to have
been reluctant to involve themselves in serious comparative analysis. Compare
Amalgamated Workers Union v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 478 F.2d 540, 542-43
(3d Cir. 1973) (superiority analysis does not involve inquiry into efficacy of administrative alternatives), uith Kamm v. California City Develop. Co., 509 F.2d
2o6, 211-13 (9th Cir. 1975) (administrative alternatives should be considered).
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courts, however, have appeared to treat "manageability" as a
self-contained criterion for evaluating class actions, and have
placed primary reliance upon the conclusion that a class action
was unmanageable in holding that class litigation should
not go forward.23 ' Although it is apparent that the manageability
inquiry ultimately involves a judgment concerning the usefulness
of the expenditure of judicial resources entailed in the litigation
of a class action, the courts have not attempted to develop a
general doctrine of manageability, but rather have limited their
analysis to the identification of the "unmanageable" features of

particular class suits. 232 Two key questions, therefore, remain
See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 91, § 1779. Often the analysis
which courts undertake under the superiority rubric may be more accurately characterized as predomination analysis, compare, e.g., Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F.
Supp. 173, 182 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified on other grounds sub nom. Doe v. Beal,
523 F.2d 6i (3d Cir. 1975), and 3B J. MOORE, supra note 91, f 23.45131, with pp.
i5o4-I6 infra, or as an investigation of manageability, compare, e.g., In re Hotel
Telephone Charges, 5oo F.2d 86, 90-92 (9th Cir. 1974), and Shaffner v. Chemical
Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329, 335-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), with pp. 1500-04 infra.
211 See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 5o F.2d 86, 90-92 ( th Cir. '974);
9
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d IOO5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156
(1974); Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School, 367 F. Supp. 536, 54041 (1973),

reconsideration denied, 381 F. Supp.

oo3,

1o9-2o

(D.D.C.

1974);

Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599 (N.D. Ill. 3973); Cotchett v.
Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); City of
Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 70-74 (D.N.J. 1971); United Egg
Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 397o).
232 See Note, Federal Rule 23 Class Actions: The Manageability Problem,
4 Sw. U.L. Rav. 112, 113 (1972). Among the features frequently identified are
the following: the size of the class, see, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 5oo
F.2d 86, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589, 599 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Stem v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365
F. Supp. 433, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1973); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53
F.R.D. 45, 7X (D.N.J. 1971), the costs of notice, see, e.g., Appleton Elec. Co. v.
Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 136 (7th Cir. 1974); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 2005, 1o6-i7 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156
(1974); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972);
Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203, 209 (W.D. Va. 1972), the insignificance of
the individual claims, see, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, supra, at 91;
Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School, 367 F. Supp. 536, 540-41
(1973),

reconsideration denied, 38

F. Supp.

oo3,

oig-2o

(D.D.C. 1974);

Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
problems in identifying class members, see, e.g., Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp.
808, 814-xI n.29 (D.D.C. 1973); Lawson v. Brown, supra, difficulties in distributing relief, see, e.g., Al Barnett & Sons, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64
F.R.D. 43, 56-57 (D. Del. 1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., supra, at 6o6;
City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., supra, at 71-74, and the general administrative complexity of the litigation, see, e.g., Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car
Sys., Inc., supra; Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
X972); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319, 321
(S.D.N.Y. i97o).
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open: What is the standard by which manageability is measured?
How do courts derive their conception of the "normal" procedural
structure for class litigation whose manageability in the particular context is judged? Consideration of those questions suggests that manageability is not indeed an independent inquiry,
but rather one aspect of a broader substantive analysis.
A conclusion that a class action is manageable or unmanageable, it could be argued, is the result of a cost-benefit analysis.
To determine if a class action is manageable, a court weighs the
costs to it in terms of the expenditure of judicial resources
against the benefits which would accrue to the class members
should their action prove successful."' This formulation, however, is unsatisfactory. Class actions may not require courts to
"expend" judicial resources in any straightforward sense. As
Professor Dam has noted, a court's backlog of cases can serve a
rationing function. 3 4 Individuals may decide that certain suits
simply are not worth the wait. In refusing to expend its resources
hearing a class action, a court gains the opportunity to hear other
cases instead; it does not, however, ultimately relieve its backlog,
and thus realize a true saving of resources, since the temporary
shortening of the delay in getting into court will make litigation
attractive to otherwise discouraged claims holders who, in bringing suit, will return the backlog to its original state. A court may
be said to "expend" judicial resources in allowing a class suit to
go forward only if it can be concluded that the claims which
would be filed in response to a shortening of the backlog resulting from a refusal to hear the class action are in some sense "more
important" than the claims aggregated in the class action. Such
an evaluation of the relative significance of claims brought in
different suits, however, is a suspect enterprise. It will amost invariably require judicial ranking of statutes in terms of their importance, a practice traditionally thought to be improper in the
absence of legislative guidance and only recently criticized by the
Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
35
2

Soc'y.

The manageability requirement can be interpreted more narrowly in order to avoid weighing the importance of claims. On
this view, class action procedures would be unmanageable if
23 See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, Soo F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1974);
Gneiting v. Taggares, 62 F.R.D. 405, 407 (D. Idaho 1973); Cotchett v. Avis
Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lah v. Shell Oil
Co., 5o F.R.D. I98, 200 (S.D. Ohio 197o). See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 91, § 1779, at 59.
234 See Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 51-53 (975).
235
See 421 U.S. 240, 263-64 (975).
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litigation of a class suit in accord with those procedures would
in the end confer no benefit on class members. 236 No assessment
of the relative importance of various claims is required in order
to conclude that judicial resources would be wasted if an action

conferring no benefits were litigated in place of suits which would
result in at least some relief, no matter how important or unimportant. This interpretation appears to conform closely to the
results of the cases in which courts have undertaken manageability analysis under rule 23. Class actions have been held to
be unmanageable, for example, where the size of the class was

so large that the amount of information which could be expected
to be generated in the course of the litigation would overburden
the litigation process to the point of collapse,2187 where attorneys'
fees and other administrative costs would so deplete a recovery
fund that no worthwhile relief would be delivered by the action,2 38
where the cost of necessary notice was so high, given the size of
the class, that the action would never be able to proceed beyond
preliminary stages, 3 9 or where class members could not be
identified with sufficient accuracy to make delivery of relief possible.240
At first glance, a conclusion as to whether class members
would or would not benefit from a class action might appear to
presuppose no more than familiarity with the characteristics of
a given class action and a practical sense of the dynamics of class
litigation. In other words, a court's decision concerning man230 See, e.g., In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D.
398, 404 (C.D. Cal. 1970); 3B J. MooRE, supra note 9i, g23.4514.-41, at 23893; Comment, Notice, Preliminary Hearings, and Manageability in Federal
Class Actions, ii HOUSTON L. REv. 121, 132 (,973); Comment, Management
Problems of the Class Action Under Rule 23(b) (3), 6 U. SAN FR. L. REv.
343, 343-44 (1972).
237 See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90-91 ( th Cir.
9
,974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599-60o (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 446 (E.D. Pa.
1973). But see Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d
126, 127, 139 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Kekich v. Travelers Indem. Co., 64
F.R.D. 66o, 664-65, 668 (W.D. Pa. 1974); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l
Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319, 321

(S.D.N.Y. 1970).

238 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d ioo5, 1017 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (I974); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D.
549, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203, 209
(W.D. Va. 1972); In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 290,
modified, 333 F. Supp. 291; 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 197).
239 See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91 ( 9 th Cir. '974);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d ioo5, ioi6-i7 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated,
417 U.S. i56 (i974); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D.
Fla. 1972).
2

"°See Rice v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F.R.D. 17, 19-20 (E.D. Pa.

1974).
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ageability could be seen as essentially pragmatic and ad hoc.
In fact, however, this manageability inquiry is by no means so
straightforward. Class actions may confer multiple benefits
Even if administrative costs were to absorb all except an insignificant portion of a class damage recovery, for example, the
class action might still benefit class members inasmuch as the
class opponent would be forced to disgorge ill-gotten gains, thus
setting an example to deter future violations of statutory directives. To determine if a class action is manageable, therefore, a
court must identify the benefits which might conceivably accrue
from its litigation. If judicial analysis is to be consistent with the
Rules Enabling Act,2 4' such a process of identification cannot be
trusted simply as a matter of discretion. The range of benefits
a class action may be said to confer must be seen to depend upon
the content of the policies reflected in the cause of action to which
the class action gives force. 42
The connection between manageability analysis and the relationship of class action procedures to substantive law is also
visible in the process by which courts define the particular sort
of class action procedures whose manageability they judge. Some
courts seem to treat the class action as it is described in the complaint as the subject of manageability analysis.243 This approach
ignores the discretion which rule 23 grants courts, through such
techniques as subclassing and conditional orders, 44 to reshape a
class, and thus, for example, to bring the size of a class within
manageable bounds.245 The more sophisticated practice, however,
has been to judge the manageability of a class action only after
U.S.C. § 2072 (i97o); see pp. 1357-58 supra.
Thus, for example, in In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 5co F.2d 86 (gth

241 28
242

Cir. 1974), the conclusion that a class action was unmanageable was not treated
as following immediately from the fact that the claims of class members were
so small that the suit would serve little if any compensatory purpose, see id. at
91, but rather was held to require an antecedent conclusion that a private action which only served "to 'punish' and 'deter' antitrust violations," id. at 92,
would be inconsistent with the policies underlying the antitrust cause of action,

see id. at

91-92.
243 See, e.g., Kekich v. Travelers Indem. Co., 64 F.R.D. 66o, 665 (W.D. Pa.

x974); Stem v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 445-46
(E.D. Pa. X973); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 70
(D.NJ.
1971).
244
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(I), (c)(4).
242 Compare, e.g., Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D.
Fla. 1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 725 (W.D. Cal.
2967) (recognizing court's power to alter size of class to make suit manageable),

with, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599-6oo (N.D. Ill.
1973); Stem v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 44546 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (no consideration of reducing class size in holding class
action unmanageable). Narrowing a class to render an action manageable is
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first determining which of the range of class procedures will be
able to be used in the litigation. 40 In some cases, notably those in
which the cost of notice creates the barrier to going forward, the
rigidities of rule 23 have been held to preclude resort to procedures which would have rendered the action manageable. 47 But
in other cases, a more fundamental reason - the constraints
imposed by the cause of action under which suit was brought has been invoked to explain why certain procedures, classwide

calculation of damages and fluid distribution, for example, cannot
be taken into account in judging manageability. 24
The fact that the manageability inquiry ultimately converges
with the question of the congruence of class action procedures
and substantive law suggests that use of manageability as though
it were an independent criterion of the propriety of class actions
may be misleading. A focus on the question of whether a court
will waste its time if it allows a class action to go forward could
distract attention from the more fundamental question of the
limits of the compatibility of class procedures and a given cause
of action, a question to which the manageability inquiry itself
requires an answer. 49 Manageability, therefore, is best treated
as a threshold matter. Instead of first determining which class
only possible, of course, if the claims of class members are sufficiently severable
that those excluded from the class will not have their interests affected in practice in any event. See Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203, 209 (W.D. Va.
1972); pp. 1485-87 supra (class redefinition). See generally Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d ioo5, 1023 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Bennett, Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin: Supreme Court Calls for Revamping of Class Action
Strategy, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 8oi, 827-29; 3 HosTsn L. REv. 178, 196-97 (1975).
240 See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 88-92 (9th Cir.
1974); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d zooS, ioi5, x106-17 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Al Barnett & Sons, Inc. v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 53-56, 56-57 (D. Del. 1974); Stern v. Lucy Webb
Hayes Nat'l Training School, 367 F. Supp. 536, 538-40 (1973), reconsideration denied, 381 F. Supp. 1003, X019-20 (D.D.C. 1974). See also Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 814-15 n.29 (D.D.C. 1973).
2 47

See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d OO5, 1015, IOI6-17 (2d
Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
241 See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 5oo F.2d 86, 89-go ( th Cir.
9
1974); Al Barnett & Sons, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 55,
56-57 (D. Del. 1974).
241 See, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 600 (N.D. Ill.
,973) (concluding that damages could not be distributed without considering
the propriety of fluid recovery); Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329,
336-37 (S.D.N.Y. X972) (use of manageability arguments predicated upon need
for individualized modes of proof in response to argument about availability of
class-wide proof); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72
(D.N.J. 1971) (discussion of propriety of fluid recovery without consideration
of substantive policy).
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action procedures are appropriate under a given cause of action,
and only then determining whether a class action making use of
the available procedures would be manageable, a court should
first identify what combination of procedures would make possible the most expeditious litigation of a class suit, and then
consider whether the procedures fit with the cause of action, and
what the consequences are if they do not. Such a reorientation
not only clearly separates the concern for conservation of judicial resources from the need to conform class action procedures
with substantive values, but also redefines the manageability concern per se in affirmative terms as an obligation imposed upon
courts always to look for the least cumbersome class procedures,
and this increases the likelihood that judicial resources will be
conserved even in actions which would not raise problems of unmanageability.
2. A Substantive Approach to the PredominationInquiry.
The question of whether the modes of procedure required for litigation of a class action are compatible with the values reflected in
the cause of action under which the class suit is brought is of
course a central one given the substantive theory of class actions.
It is not only through this inquiry that a judge decides whether
class litigation would indeed contribute to the full realization
of substantive policy,2 50 and thus be consistent with tht Rules
Enabling Act,251 but it is also through this inqury, at least in
part, that the judge becomes aware of the implications of the
situations of class members for the outcome of the litigation, 5 2
and thus acquires the information needed not only to decide the
question of compatibility, but also to protect the interests of
absentees should the class suit go forward. 3 In judging the congruence of class procedures and substantive policy, a judge will
have to consider whether aspects of a given cause of action render
class suit inappropriate regardless of the precise form of class
15 0

See p. 1353 supra.
251 29 U.S.C. § 2072 (1972); see pp. 1357-58 supra.

1366-71 supra.
. Although this section separates the questions of the fairness and substantive
compatibility of class actions, the two issues are of course interrelated. The interests of absentees are ultimately adequately represented if they are given what the
cause of action provides as their due; protection of absentee interests therefore
presumes judicial familiarity with the values reflected in a cause of action and the
adjustment of class procedures to fit those values. On the other band, a judgment concerning the substantive compatibility of class action procedures cannot
be made unless the situations of class members and the procedural implications of
those situations are known; the inquiry into substantive congruence thus presup252 See pp.
2

poses the inquiry into adequacy of representation.
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procedures.254 Ordinarily, however, if it is to be answered fully,
the question of compatibility will also require consideration of
the specific forms which substantive values dictate that class
procedures should take, as well as evaluation of the consequences
for those substantive values if class litigation does proceed through
the mandated forms. The analysis required to resolve these latter
two inquiries - the subject of interest here - will henceforth
be called "predomination" analysis: it is under the predomination rubric that federal courts applying rule 23 have engaged in
the kinds of investigations which give content to the substantive
theory's requirement of congruence.
The importance of predomination analysis, and its relevance
to the substantive theory of class actions, is not immediately apparent from the surface of class action doctrine as it has developed
under rule 23. Under the rule, a court is expressly required to
determine whether "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members" only in cases where class representatives attempt to justify a class action under section (b) (3). 25 The
Advisory Committee Note suggests that the chief purpose of the
predomination inquiry is not to measure the compatibility of class
action procedures with substantive law but to determine whether
a class action will in fact realize any litigation economies.25
Given the increased access to courts which class actions make
possible, in most cases the goal of litigation economy is probably
chimerical.257 But courts attempting to articulate a test of predomination which would provide a way of measuring the economies a class action might make possible have also discovered that
a useful standard of economy is quite difficult to formulate. The
most straightforward test, which would hold that common questions predominate whenever the time spent litigating both the
issues which all class members may try in common and the issues
254 For an illustration of this kind of analysis, see pp. 1361-65 supra.
2.
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3).

See Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. IO3 (x966).

See also Kaplan,

supra note 9i, at 390.
257 See pp. 1353-55 supra. The subversion which the access function of
class action works upon the idea of litigative economy should be distinguished from
Professor Dam's critique of the concept, see p. i5oo & note 234 supra. The
fact that a court's backlog operates as a rationing device suggests nothing about
whether it would be desirable to try more cases within a given period of time:
it is possible to acknowledge backlog rationing and still value litigative economy.
The backlog becomes relevant only when the issue is whether there is any point
to a class action going forward at all. It is the substitution effect resulting from
the fact of the backlog which causes manageability analysis be ultimately substantive. See pp. "5oI-o3 supra.
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which class members must try separately would be less than the
total time spent if all class members separately litigate all questions,2 8 would be satisfied so long as there was one issue which
could be tried in common, and therefore in essence renders the
predomination requirement nugatory. Instead of gauging economy, therefore, courts have looked for standards for weighing the
relative importance of issues which must be tried in common or
rather must be judged separately. It has been suggested that
common questions predominate only where the total amount of
time which would be spent on proof of the common issues in a
class action would be greater than the time which would be devoted to trial of issues individual to each class member in the same
action. 259 This standard has been rejected, 20

however, chiefly

because its use would block most class actions from going forward inasmuch as only the most complex of common questions
would require more time for trial than the repeated adjudication
of issues which must be evaluated separately with respect to each
class member.20 ' Increasingly, courts have asserted as their formal
test of predomination an essentially empty standard of significance, 26 2 finding common questions to predominate whenever a
class action would resolve a "goodly proportion of what appears
to be the overall dispute." 263
If the content of predomination doctrine as it has developed
under rule 23 thus does not explicitly reveal the kind of approach
which a substantive theory of class actions would suggest, practice
under rule 23 nonetheless conforms rather closely to the substantive model. Before a court can judge whether common questions
are more "significant" than individual questions, it must first
determine which elements of a cause may in fact be litigated in
common and which elements will require separate showings by
each class member. This preliminary inquiry is unabashedly substantive: a court must come to a conclusion concerning what
modes of proof are permissible under a given cause of action.
2 58

See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 281, modified, 333

F. Supp. 29I; 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y.

i97i).

259 See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D. Minn.
i968); Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-ProcedureDilemma, 47 So. CAL. L. REV. 842, 86x (974).
2
11 See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 91, § 1778, at 52; Note, Rule
23 and Class Action Development, 12 WASHBuRN L. . 343, 356 ('973).
21 See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D. Minn.
1968). See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 91, § x778, at 52-53.
212 See, e.g., Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 330, 336 (W.D.
Va. 1972) (common question "supercedes particular issues"); 7A C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 9i, at 53, 55. But see id. at 54; 3B J.MOORE, supra note 91,

J 2345[2],
263

at 23-755.

Landers, supra note

259,

at 862.
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The question of whether proof of securities fraud is made out
merely by showing the materiality of a class opponent's misrepresentations- a showing which can be made without regard
to the situations of individual class members and is thus "common" - or rather whether securities fraud is shown only if there
is a demonstration that each individual allegedly injured actually
relied upon the asserted misrepresentations provides perhaps the
best known illustration of the kind of substantive issue which

federal courts have had to resolve prior to determining whether
common questions predominate.2

64

However, consideration of a

second example - the question of what kinds of proof are proper
for showing "tying" in violation of the antitrust laws -

affords

a more complete view of the range of choices which a court may
be required to make.

Under the antitrust laws, a showing of illegal tying is made
out by proof of: (i) "an agreement by a party to sell one product

but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product"; 265 (2) "sufficient economic power" on
the part of the seller "with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product"; 206 and (3) "a 'not insubstantial'" effect on interstate
2 4

A substantive inquiry into whether reliance must be shown has emerged only
gradually as the control element of predomination analysis in securities class actions. Particularly in the cases heard soon after the adoption of revised rule 23,
courts tended to pass no judgment on the question of reliance but assumed that
separate trial of reliance issues would be proper, see, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp.,
456 F.2d 1206, 1212-13 (2d Cir. I972); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301
(2d Cir. 1968); Fogel v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), or that a
showing of reliance would be required but that common questions nonetheless
predominated, see, e.g., Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 330, 336
(W.D. Va. 1972); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Graphic Enterp., Inc., 52 F.R.D.
335, 345-46 (D. Minn. 1971) ; Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 6o, 64
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 47, (S.D.N.Y.
1968); cf. Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 533-37 (S.D.N.Y. 197) (assuming
reliance required and finding no predomination). These approaches have been
criticized as changing substantive law de facto without full consideration of the
issues involved. See Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule xob-5, 38
U. Cmi. L. REV. 337, 337-38, 345-47 (197i). The most recent decisions, however,
reveal a trend on the part of courts to face the reliance issue, and to resolve it on
the merits, see generally Note, The Reliance Requirment in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule xob-5, 88 -ARv. L. R!v. 584 (1975), before judging the question of
predomination per se, see, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-08 (9th Cir.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. March 5, 1976) (No. 751258) ; Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 288-91, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ; Crasto v.
Kaskel, 63 F.R.D. I8, 23-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
26 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see Pearson,

Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 6o Nw. U. L. Rav. 626, 627-31 (1965).
266356 U.S. at 6; see Austin, The Tying Arrangement; A Critique and Some
New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88, 103-12.
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commerce as a result of the agreement. 67 Most tying class actions brought since 1966 have concerned the practice of franchising.2 6 8 Franchisees have claimed that as a precondition to
obtaining rights to a franchisor's trademarks and processes of
doing business, they have had to agree to acquire such things as
equipment, supplies, and building leases from the franchisor as
26 9
well.
The first important franchisee class action, Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 270 did not raise substantial questions as to the propriety of classwide proof. 7 1 In that case, the standard franchise
agreement entered into by the franchisor with each of the franchisee class members expressly conditioned the franchisees' rights
to trademarks and business methods upon the purchase from the
franchisor of various supplies. 2 The chief matters at issue in
the litigation concerned whether, as a matter of law, the standard
agreement did indeed constitute a "tie," 273 and whether, as a
matter of fact, no alternative to the tie existed for purposes of
insuring quality control, thus justifying the arrangement.27 4 Resolution of neither matter required separate consideration of the
circumstances of each class member. The district court found
for the class on the first issue and a jury returned a special verdict for the class on the second. The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment except with respect to the question of the measure of
damages. 5
In the wake of Chicken Delight, many franchisors modified
their standard agreements to remove any express ties. 270 Franchisees, however, have continued to bring class actions, alleging
that tying practices continue sub silentio. 277 These second gen267

356 U.S. at 6. Tying arrangements may be illegal under § i of the Sherman

Act, I U.S.C. § 1 (1970), § 3 of the Clayton Act, I U.S.C. § 14 (1970), or § S
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, I5 U.S.C. § 45 (958).
See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 85 n.14 (E.D. Pa. I975), reversed on other grounds,
531 F.2d 12XX (3d Cir. x976).
28 For a discussion of tying actions in the franchise context generally, see McCarthy, Trademark Franchisingand Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CAIF.
L. REv. 2O85 (I970).
269

See generally id.

270448

1090-92.

F.2d 43 ( 9 th Cir.

2972),

cert. denied, 405 US. 9 5 (1972)

; 271

F. Supp.

(N.D. Cal. 2967), modified sub nom. Chicken Delight, Inc v. Harris, 412 F.2d
830 (9th Cir. I969).
271 See 272 F. Supp. at 726-27.
27
2 See 448 F.2d at 46.
273 See id. at 47-49.
2 74
See id. at 50-52.
27
See id. at 52, 53.
276
See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 6S, 78 (E.D. Pa. 2975), rev'd
on other grounds, 531 F.2d 12
(3d Cir. 1976).
277 See, e.g., Smith v. Danny's Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459, 46o-6i (N.D.
722
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eration suits raise serious problems concerning the compatibility
of class procedures and the requirements of the antitrust laws.
To determine if a tying arrangement exists despite the absence of
an express agreement, it may be necessary to examine the details
of a franchisor's business relationships with franchisees in order
to see whether the franchisor in practice demands that franchisees,
as a condition of retaining their franchise rights, make purchases from the franchisor or designated third parties. Such an
examination would require separate consideration of the franchisor's dealings with each franchisee; as a result, common litigation of the matter would become impossible. Most federal
courts have indeed concluded that in the absence of express,
standardized tying arrangements, individualized analysis of
Recently, howfranchisor-franchsee relationships is necessary.
ever, in Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc.,270 one district court, criticizing the prevailing view, held that generalized modes of proof,
and thus class actions, may be proper even in second generation
franchisee suits.2 8 0 The district court's opinion, taken together
with the court of appeals' response,2 8' provides a clear picture
of the kind of analysis characteristic at this stage under the
substantive theory.
Cal. 1974); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 128, 136-37 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 388-89, 390-91 (S.D. Fla.
1972).

278 See, e.g., Thompson v. T.F.I. Co., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 140, 146-48 (N.D. Ill.
1974); Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc, 345 F. Supp. 387, 391-93 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Lab v.
Shell Oil Co., 5o F.R.D. 198, 199-2oo (S.D. Ohio 1970); In re 7-Eleven Franchise
Antitrust Litigation, 1972 Trade Cas. 9I 75,156 at 92,830 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Fran-

chise class actions continue to be allowed where the tying arrangement is an
express part of a common contract. See, e.g., Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc.,
v. Tayloe, 67 F.R.D. 44o, 448-5o (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also In re Clark Oil &
Refining Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 1974 Trade Cas. ff 74,88o, at 95,972 (E.D.
Wis. 1974).

The courts have referred to the showing necessary to establish a tie in the
absence of an express agreement as a showing of "coercion." See, e.g., Abercrombie
v. Lum's Inc., supra, at 39X. "Coercion" in this context, however, should be regarded as a term of art. As commentators have noted, it is difficult to speak of
voluntary economic arrangements as coercive without challenging the legitimacy of
all agreements, not just tying agreements, in which the parties are of unequal
bargaining power. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 265, at 632-34. The term "coercion" may perhaps be best understood here not as a description of the subjective
experience of the bargaining process but as a measure of a court's confidence that
the evidence before it does indeed establish that a defendant connected the sale of
two products-in purchasing the tied product the plaintiff acted so automatically
it was if he were coerced.
279 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d
Cir. 1976).
28
See id.at 1i6, 141-43.
281 Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 531 F2d. 1211 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Two features of the district court's approach in Dunkin'
Donuts are noteworthy. First, the court attempted to connect
its conclusion concerning appropriate modes of proof to what it
took to be the fundamental policy underlying the statutory cause
of action. Although much of the Dunkin' Donuts opinion is devoted to a discussion of precedent," 2 that discussion is shaped
by the judgment, reached at the outset of the opinion, that the
harm of tying lies not so much in the restrictions it places upon
the franchisees as in the injury to society as a whole resulting
from the restraint on competition, 28 3 and therefore that a precise
focus on the details of franchisees' dealings with the franchisor
is not among the requirements of the cause of action. Second,
the generalized modes of proof which the court held to be appropriate derive their persuasiveness at least in part from the classwide character of the tying allegations. In addition to direct
investigation of the franchisor's dealings with individual franchisees, the court identified two alternative showings, each of
which would support the inference of a tie: "proof of a resolutely
enforced company policy to persuade or influence franchisees
to buy only from the franchisor or its designated sources" 284 or
"proof that large numbers of franchisees have accepted a burdensome or uneconomic tie." 285 The first showing, which requires
an inference to be drawn about the likely effects of the franchisor's acts, is analagous to the materiality showing permitted
by securities fraud causes of action, 88 while the second showing,
which requires an inference to be drawn from the effects of the
franchisor's acts about the character of those acts, is similar to
the discriminatory impact showing permitted in Title VII class
actions.28 7 The fact of class suit is relevant to both showings in
that the reliability of both showings is statistical: the greater the
number of instances in which the relevant act or effect occurs, the
greater the likelihood that the suggested inference is correct, and
.2 See 68 F.R.D. at 84-11.
2 83
See id. at 88.
284
Id. at z6.
2 85

288

Id.

See Note, supra note 264, at 593 ("proof that the deception was material

-that it would influence a reasonable investor-is persuasive circumstantial evidence that a sufficient number of traders in the market did indeed rely").
287 E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (197)
("If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited"); see Note, Beyond the Prima Fade

Case in Employment DiscriminationLaw: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 387, 391 (975) ("under Griggs, the inequality itself raises an inference
that a specific discriminatory process is functioning to cause the observed disparity").
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thus the greater the reliability of a conclusion that a tie has occurred.
Although the court of appeals reversed the decision of the
district court, 28 it disagreed only with the district court's conclusion and not with its substantive approach. Like the district
court opinion, the court of appeals decision in Dunkin' Donuts
concerns itself largely with a discussion of precedent.2 89 Analysis
of the cases here, however, is structured by a distinctly different
view of the precision of proof required by the policies underlying
the tying cause of action: the objectionableness of tying is not
2 °
general but derives from the injury it causes those bringing suit.

As a result, the precise character of the injury asserted is a matter
of concern, and the tolerance of inexact modes of proof is therefore low. The injury to a franchisee from franchisor tying is unclear in any event since a franchisor's "package deal" may appear
either reassuring or constraining at various points in the franchise relationship depending upon the degree of confidence a
franchisee has in his own operations.2

1°

Against this back-

ground, the indeterminacy of the inferences required by the
modes of proof which the district court approved becomes unacceptable. Because the injury to the franchisee is itself unclear,
the franchisor cannot properly be held liable unless conditioning
of franchise rights upon agreement to purchase other goods can
be clearly seen.2"2
The substantive approach to identifying common and individual issues which the tying cases illustrate could easily be extended to govern treatment of the predomination question itself.
The predomination inquiry, which ideally should come after a
preliminary identification of the modes of procedure which would
make possible the most expeditious litigation of a class action,2 93
as well as an analysis of the compatibility of the most manageable
procedures with the values reflected in the pertinent cause of action, would concern itself with the consequences for the progress
of the lawsuit if some elements of a cause of action can be established only by modes of proof which require separate inquiries
into the situations of each class member. This analysis would
confront the kind of problems many courts have addressed under
the manageability rubric. The administrative costs of individual
proceedings, for example, might be greater than the claims with
F.2d at 1226-27.
id. at 1218-22.
29
1 See id. at 1220-2X &n.7a.
211 See id. at 1223. See also P.
288 531
28

1 See

ed. x974).
292 See 531 F.2d at 1224-25.
29
See pp. 1503-04 supra.

AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, ff 554, at 617 (2d
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which the proceedings would be concerned, and thus in all likelihood class members would choose not to come forward. 4
Even if it were rational for class members to come forward, the
time it would take for a court to conduct all of the necessary
hearings could be so long that the lawsuit would seem to be impractical." 5 Substantive predomination analysis would deal with
such propositions, however, not simply by attempting to determine
their validity, but also by undertaking to ascertain the effect such
propositions would have, if true, upon the substantive fairness
of the outcome of the litigation.
If litigation of certain issues in a class action is rendered impractical given that trial of such issues would require a separate
inquiry into the situations of each class member, the lawsuit's
settlement dynamic may be altered. Despite suffering defeats in
the litigation of common questions, class opponents may refuse
to settle, knowing that class members have no practical means
of proceeding with the trial process, unless the class agrees to
only token relief. 9 Alternatively, it may be the class opponent
who will settle at a loss: even a small possibility of having to
incur the expense of repeated litigation of the separate issues may
prompt the class opponent to offer the class a premium in order
to end the lawsuit.29 7 Given these possibilities, the task of substantive predomination analysis is to determine whether the
absence of the adjudicative check which is ordinarily an important
means of guaranteeing the fairness of the settlement process indeed so increases the likelihood of a settlement outside the bounds
of substantive fairness that the class action ought not to be allowed to get underway. 9 ' Such a substantive predomination
analysis may be resolved in favor of letting a class action go
forward for any of three reasons.
294See,

e.g., Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553

(S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also note 252 supra (manageability case breakdown).
211 See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 5oo F.2d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1974)
("In a class of forty million, assuming only ten percent of these unknown members come forward with claims, and assuming the proof of each claim required
only ten minutes, approximately one hundred years would yet be required to
adjudicate the claims").
296 See Landers, supra note 259, at 881.
217 See Handler, The Shift From Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits- The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLum. L. REv. i,
9 (1971).
298 On this view, predomination analysis may be seen as a prospective form

of settlement scrutiny, see pp. s569-76 infra. Arguably, this interpretation of the
predomination requirement is constitutional in origin: its purpose is to determine
whether the litigation process, in the absence of an adjudcative check, will reliably produce judgments falling within the constraints set by the cause of action
upon the legislative delegation of authorty to the courts. See generally pp. 1373-91

supra.
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First, it may not in fact be the case that no adjudicative check
exists to restrain settlement negotiations. If separate trials are
required to adjudicate counterclaims, for example, settlement of
the counterclaims is likely not to be unconstrained, even if the
separate trials would be impractical in the class action context,
since the class opponent retains the threat of withdrawing the
subject of the counterclaims from the negotiations and initiating
actions on the counterclaims against at least a sample of the
class.2 9 Class procedure itself might provide an adjudicative
check in the form of settlement review, at least with regard to
issues which, although required to be individually tried, are nonetheless susceptible of mechanical resolution.3 0 0 Damages issues
involving only mechanical questions concerning the application of
the measure of damages, 301 and not more complex questions of
whether the injury alleged does indeed constitute an injury under
the governing statute, 30 2 provide perhaps the paradigm illustra29 Practice under rule

23

conforms to the result suggested by this argument.

Although the existence of counterclaims has been cited as one of the various
factors which in combination prevent common questions from predominating, see,
e.g., Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D. i89, 193 (C.D. Cal.
1972); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 5o F.R.D. 198, ig9 (S.D. Ohio 1970), courts have
generally ruled that counterclaims alone do not prevent a class action from going
forward, but rather may be held for separate trials after common issues have been
resolved, see, e.g., Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 6o F.R.D. 5, 8 (N.D. Ill.
1973) ; Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 485, 489-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), noted il 87 HARV. L. Rav. 470 (1973). Courts, however, have
also concluded that class members are not parties for purposes of rule 13, see,
e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1974), and therefore have preserved class opponents' option to raise counterclaims separately by
creating an exception to ordinary compulsory counterclaim practice.
300 See pp. 1569-70 infra.
'o' Price-fixing class actions brought under § i of the Sherman Act, i5 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2970), provide a paradigmatic example. Proof that class opponents fixed
prices is necessarily also proof that the class opponents' customers were injured;
as a result, if price-fixing may be shown by modes of proof which do not require
separate inquiries into the situations of each class member, the showing of injury
or standing required by § 4 of the Clayton Act, I5 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), will also
be made in common. The only element of the cause of action which may require
individualized inquiries, therefore, is the relatively straightforward issue of the
measure of damages, an issue whose individual character, courts have said, does
not block a class action from going forward. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 67-68 (D.N.J. 1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row
Publ., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 489 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Iowa v. Union Asphalt &
Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 402 (S.D. Iowa x968).
.2 In contrast with proof of price-fixing, see note 3o supra, proof of the
existence of a monopoly violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(,970), does not also establish the identity of those who were injured by contravention of the antitrust laws. Courts hearing monopolization class actions,
therefore, have had to consider separately the questions of whether injury may be
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tion of individual issues whose settlement might be subject to
effective subsequent review. Indeed, where damages issues are
of this simplicity, courts have generally not regarded their individual character as a barrier to allowing class actions to go
forward.303

Second, it may be possible to conclude that the values associated with the elements of a cause of action which must be tried
individually are of such little weight relative to the values associated with other elements of the cause of action that, even if
such values were not given their due in the course of litigation,
the outcome of the suit could not be said to be unfair. Such a
judgment appears at least in part to underlie the holding of
courts hearing class actions charging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII that all class members need not file complaints
with the EEOC prior to the class action despite the apparently
contrary thrust of section 706 of the statute.3 0 As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in the leading
case of Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,30 ' not only would additional filings appear to contribute little to realization of the value
of conciliation underlying the filing requirement once the EEOC
30 0
had failed to secure a voluntary resolution of a first complaint,
but also insistence upon full compliance with the filing requirement should, in order not "to frustrate our system of justice and
order," be subordinated to "'the highest priority' " policy of
remedying racial discrimination.30 7 It is important to recognize
that such weighing is not absolute, but rather is a relative process
which must be undertaken independently under every cause of
action. Thus, although the pertinent language is identical to that
in Title VII, courts hearing cases under the Age Discrimination
established through proofs which do not require separate inquiries into the situations of each class member and of whether class suit may go forward if individualized proof is required. Courts have generally answered "no" to both questions, see,
e.g., Shumate & Co. v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 5o9 F.2d 147,
XSI-52 (sth Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 131 (1975); San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435, 443 (W.D. Tex. 1975); Kinzler v. New York
Stock Exch., 62 F.R.D. 196, 200-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 356 F. Supp. 138o, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds, 495
F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974), a not surprising response in view of the complex considerations involved in defining the injury caused by a monopoly.
303 See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. March 5, X976) (No. 75-X258) (securities class
action); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d 763, 768 (8th Cir.
1971) (employment discrimination backpay suit).
304 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5 (197o).
305398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
30 8
See id. at 498.
307

Id. at 499.
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in Employment Act,3" 8 which places great weight on conciliatory
resolution of complaints, 30 9 have been reluctant to allow such
suits to go forward unless all class members have complied with
the filing requirement.3 1 Moreover, in Weinberger v. Salfi,3 1
the Supreme Court, noting the need to prevent "premature interference with agency processes," 312 ruled that class actions challenging certain Social Security regulations could not go forward
unless all class members had first exhausted administrative
31 3
remedies.
Third, it may be the case that the class action can be structured so that issues whose litigation requires separate consideration of the situations of each class member are either eliminated
or rendered practically amenable to adjudication. If it is only
certain class members whose claims give rise to issues inappropriate for common adjudication, the class may be redefined to
exclude such class members from the lawsuit.3 1 4 If a class appears
to be so large that individual litigation of damage issues, for
example, would be impracticable, a court could perhaps require
class members to file proof-of-claim forms at the outset of the suit
as a precondition to benefiting from any judgment, 33 and thus,
since presumably only a relatively small number of class members
would comply, 1 6 reduce the number of individual proceedings
required. Obviously, such draconian techniques should be used
only as a last resort, and only after it is determined that use of
the techniques is not itself unfair. In many cases, it may not be
possible to insulate excluded class members from the practical
308 29 U.S.C.

§§ 621-34 ('975).

309 See 29 U.S.C.

§ 626(b) (i975).

310 Compare Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 36x F. Supp. 6,7, 623-25 (D. Kan. 1973)
(allowing named plaintiff to represent three class members who had not complied with the filing requirement but had otherwise given the Department of Labor
notice of their grievances) with Oshiro v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 378 F.
Supp. 80, 82 (D.Hawaii 1974) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend complaint to
add five parties who had not complied with filing requirement and apparently
distinguishing Burgett on an actual notice theory).
311422 U.S. 749

(1975).

"IId. at 765.
3 3

' Id. at 764.

I16, 1120 ( 4 th Cir. 1971); Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56, 59-6o (M.D. Ala. 1973). In some
cases the less drastic remedy of subclassing may be feasible. See, e.g., Ellkind
31"4See, e.g., Long v. Robinson, 436 F.2d

v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 36, 40-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Dale Elec., Inc.
v. R.C.L. Elec., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 533 (D.N.H. 197X); City of Philadelphia
v. Emhart Corp., 5o F.R.D. 232, 235 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

315See, e.g., Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 43 (S.D. Iowa

1972).
3

'6See pp. 1443-44 & note 262 supra.
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effects of a class judgment.3 7 Moreover, such exclusion is not
only inconsistent with the access function of the class suit, but
because it artificially homogenizes the class, is inconsistent with
the heuristic function as well.
D. Calculation and Distribution of Damages
Class actions for damages pose special problems for judicial
administration since conventional mechanisms for calculating
and distributing damages may not be practicable in the context
of a suit brought on behalf of many small claimants. 31 s If all or
even a substantial portion of the class members seek individual
damage trials, the court may be intolerably burdened.31 9 Moreover, class members may not come forward if the burden of
proving damages outweighs any potential benefit of doing so. 20
Finally, in some actions, it may be impossible to identify class
members so that, if relief is to be distributed at all, it must be
through some indirect process. These problems often merge:
claims which are too small to justify any sort of individualized
proof may often arise out of transactions of which no records
are kept and may also be so numerous that they would
take a
3 21
great deal of time to process through individual trials.
317 See, e.g., Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203, 209 (W.D. Pa. 1972). The
strongest justification for use of proof of claim forms, a practice otherwise
properly criticized, see p. 1444 & note 263 supra, may arise in cases where
a class is too large for separate trials of individuals issues to be within
the realm of practicality, the individual issues are too critical to the cause of
action to be ignored in settlement negotiations unconstrained by an adjudicative check, and the situations of class members are too interrelated to allow
for a narrowing redefinition of the class. The proof-of-claim requirement in
this context may be the best of a set of bad alternatives: although class members who do not file the forms will have their interests affected in any event, a
sample of the original class may still be part of the action, increasing the
possibility of adequate representation of the interests of excluded absentees,
and the action will be able to go forward, providing at least some vindication
of substantive policy.
318See, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 600 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 65, 72-73
(D.N.J. 1971).
31See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1388-89
(S.D.N.Y. i972), modified on other grounds, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. X974);
Morris v. Burchard, 5I F.R.D. 530, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 97i).
320 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72-73
(D.N.J. 1971); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1oo5 (2d Cir. X973), vacated and
remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
321For example, the claims of Philadelphia area consumers pressed in
Hackett v. General Host Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 11 73,879 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972),
would fall into this category. Buyers of bread, the members of the plaintiff
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A range of techniques, including reference to masters, streamlined summary judgment procedures, shifts in burdens of proof,
class-wide calculation of damages, administrative processing of
individual claims, and the so-called fluid class recovery - in
which damages are calculated in the aggregate and distributed
through a proof-of-claim procedure with any residue being distributed for the benefit of class members - have been proposed as
means for making delivery of relief feasible in class actions involving individually nonrecoverable or nonviable claims.322 Some
of these innovations have been attacked on the ground that they
alter substantive law, and several have even been labelled unconstitutional. 32 3 This Part of the Note will first describe the spectrum of possible damage calculation and distribution mechanisms
in terms of the extent to which they can deliver relief to small
claimants and the resulting degree to which policies of precise
compensation - by which is meant compensating only those who
are actually hurt and who feel hurt to the degree that they are
willing to come forward and claim damages 324 -

deterrence, and

disgorgement of unjust enrichment are served. After arguing that
all of these mechanisms are constitutionally permissible and are
not foreclosed by rule 23, the discussion will conclude with an
analysis of whether particular techniques are compatible with
statutory policy in selected areas of the law.
i. The Spectrum of Damage Calculation and Distribution
Mechanisms. - Schemes for calculating and distributing damages
can be grouped in four broad categories, arranged by degree of
individualization in proof and distribution, as follows:
First, damages can be claimed through the traditional device
of a full evidentiary hearing with each class member having a
separate day in court, complete with such procedures as a right
to jury trial.325 These individual trials could follow either "decerticlass, would ordinarily keep no record of their grocery purchases, nor would
retail sellers of bread keep records of who had purchased foi them. In addition, the size of the claims-the named plaintiff sought nine dollars, 455 F.2d
at 620-as well as the numbers in the class, some 1.5million, id., would make
any sort of individual claim process unworkable.
322 For an explanation of these terms see p. 1356 supra.
323 See, e.g., Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 7,
CoLum. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1971) (discussing fluid recovery) [hereinafter cited

as Twenty-Third Review]; Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of
Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 386 (,973).
24 "Precise
compensation," therefore, is a composite of structural and
and remedial values. See generally pp. 136o-66 supra.
323 See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 448-49, 452-54
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fication" of the class after resolution of liability issues or notice to
all class members informing them of the opportunity to intervene
in the class suit. Under this approach, the goal of precise compensation would be meticulously served since damages would be
awarded only to class members whose claims could survive a trial
procedure. Policies of deterrence and disgorgement of unjust enrichment, on the other hand, would be served only to the extent
consistent with such precise compensation.
Although common trial on liability issues might reduce the
expense of trying individual claims, making possible delivery of
relief to some class members with otherwise individually nonrecoverable claims, individual damage trials would usually be
sufficiently burdensome to foreclose compensation of smaller
claims. 2 6 For example, in Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh,3 27
a case in which the court decertified the class after invalidating
certain residency requirements for married students' tuition rates,
only four class members attempted to gain restitution of previous
overcharges, none of them successfully. 28 Alternatively, the anticipated burden on judicial resources of a multitude of individual
trials could be so great that a court might be unwilling to let an
action go forward as a class suit from the outset because the impracticality of relief would make trial of common liability issues
a sterile exercise. 29
Second, in some cases it may be possible to adopt innovative
summary judgment procedures to ease the burden of individualized proof of damages on class members as well as the court thereby allowing greater compensation, deterrence and dis(5th Cir. 1973); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 3o (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 566 (2d Cir. I968); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. rXg,
1136-37
(W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 5o6 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1974).
2
1 1 Individual damage trials might create a heavy burden on the defendant
as well. See Twenty-Third Review, supra note 323, at 8-9.
327395 F. Supp. 1275 (1975).
32
1Id. at 1281.
329 See, e.g., Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 6z F.R.D. 427, 432-33 (W.D.
Mo. 1973); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72-73

(D.N.J. 1971); Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 536 (S.D.N.Y. '97').
One court estimated that individual trials would take eleven years to complete.
City of Detroit v. Gr~innell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, X388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
modified on other grounds,495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974). See also pp. 1511-16 supra.
Masters might be used to reduce the burden on the court. The cost of such
an administrative scheme could, however, consume any class recovery. See generally Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2971), rev'd
on other grounds, 479 F.2d oo5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 407 U.S.
156 (1974); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 2oz F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass.
1962), as reported in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, supra at 259.
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gorgement - without abandoning the individual trial requirement
or significantly increasing the danger that unharmed individuals
will recover. One commentator has suggested, for example, that
in an antitrust case where it could be shown that each consumer
had paid a uniform overcharge, the representative should move
that any absent class member who furnished an affidavit and
some documentation of his purchases would be entitled to a grant
of summary judgment on his individual claim, with recovery based
on the demonstrated surcharge, unless the defendant filed a
counter-affidavit which raised a material issue of fact3 30

Al-

ternatively, if some risk of paying unharmed individuals would
be acceptable in order to achieve broader compensation of those
who were injured, burdens of proof could be lightened for plaintiffs at the individual trials. 33 ' Either of these procedures might
still be so burdensome, however, that many3 class
members would
32
be dissuaded from prosecuting their claims.

Third, to compensate small claimants and deter activities imposing significant but diffuse harm, as well as to disgorge profits
resulting from such behavior, it may be necessary to replace individual damage trials with calculation of damages on a classwide basis, before a jury if the defendant wishes.3 33 In cases such
as Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,334 in which defendants were
accused of fixing the odd lot price differential charged to purchasers and sellers of securities, the aggregate damages suffered
by the class could easily have been calculated by multiplying the
number of transactions, as revealed in defendant's records, by
the uniform overcharge. 335 One commentator has suggested that
330

Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class

Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 877 (I974).
31 See generally Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 970-71 & n.74 (D.C. Cir.
ig7), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (,973).
332 See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 282 (S.D.
N.Y.), mandamus denied sub nom. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d ri9 (2d Cir. 19711);
Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class
Actions, 70 Mica.L. REV. 338, 363 (1971).
...
Where damages are to be distributed to the class "as a whole" through a
fluid recovery mechanism, see pp. 1520-23 & notes 339-40, 346-54 infra, the total
damages inflicted upon the class must be calculated. In other circumstances, classwide calculation may involve derivation of a formula for determining approximate
damages to individual class members, based on some sort of averaging process
across the entire class or some fraction thereof. See, e.g., Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 261-63 (5th Cir. I974) (use in Title VII suits
of class-wide formulas to calculate damages due to individual class members),
discussed, p. 1528 & note 377 infra; Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 6i F.R.D. 427,
431-33 (W.D. Mo. I973).
33452 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d ioo
5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
333
Id. at 262, 265.
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such straightforward cases will be relatively rare, however, at
least in the price-fixing context, and that class-wide calculation
of damages will not be possible in other circumstances."' Nonetheless, in many cases a reasonable estimate of the damages inflicted by a defendant might be acceptable. 37 Even in complicated cases it may be possible to use sampling, averaging, or other
statistical techniques to generate close approximations of class
damages.338
Unlike the individual damage trials procedure, in which the
type of distribution follows ineluctably from the method of calculation, class-wide calculation can be accompanied by distribution to individual class members or by some sort of distribution
to the class "as a whole." 33' To be worthwhile, of course, the
method of damage distribution must be less burdensome on class
members than individual proof at trial. Worthwhile reductions
in cost might be achieved by establishing a quasi-administrative
claim processing procedure, 340 possibly under the control of masters or a committee of counsel,3 4' that would distribute damages
upon some showing of individual proof. Fairly rigorous procedures could be used where class members are likely to have
kept, or have access to, records of transactions needed to prove
claims. 42 In such circumstances, absentees could be required
to submit affidavits stating the claimed loss, with copies of appropriate supporting documents. The court might also order
33 Malina, Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases,

47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 477, 482-92 (1972). See also Comment, supra note 332, at 364.
"'See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946),
discussed, pp. 1535-36 & notes 422-25 infra; Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260-63 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed, pp. X528-29 & notes 3768o infra.
33' See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 22I, 263 & n.154
(5th Cir. 1974); Shapiro, Processing the Consumer's Claim, 41 ANTITRUST L.J.
257, 270-73 (2972). See also Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 1973
CCH Trade Cas. fI 74,593 (2d Cir. 1973) (formula used to distribute settlement
fund).
3" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. i97i), rev'd,
479 F.2d oo5 (2d Cir. i973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S.
156 (974).
340See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 21, 26x63 & n.I54 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 259-60,
262-64 (S.D.N.Y. 297I), rev'd, 479 F.2d ioo5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 427 U.S. 156 (1974).
41 See Shapiro & Springer, Management of Consumer Class Actions Ajtet
Eisen: Notice and Determinationof Damages, 26 MERCER L. Rav. 851, 867 (2975);
Shapiro, supra note 338, at 264-65. The judge would make final approval of the
claims. See Shapiro, supra at 266.
342 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 263-64 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d ioo5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. z56 (1974).
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verification procedures, such as a rigorous auditing of a sample of
the claims submitted, to control the danger of fraud. 3" If complete records are not available, distribution of damages will be
possible, only at the risk of paying individuals who were not in
fact harmed. For instance, in a case brought to recover illegal
overcharges on name-brand gasoline, 4 each motorist could be required merely to submit a sworn affidavit stating that he had
purchased gasoline from a name-brand station during the relevant time period, supported by evidence that he had operated
an automobile.
So long as the total amount of damages to be distributed is
set by an accurate calculation, some degree of inaccuracy in setting individual claims can be tolerated. It can be expected that at
least some class members will fail to file claims and that the
resulting residue can cover spurious or overstated claims. Nonetheless, if the purpose of transferring funds from the class opponent to the class is solely to compensate for actual damage done,
it is clear that this limited compensation objective is less well
served to the extent that each individual's claim is not subject to
verification. Thus, as imprecision in proof increases to accommodate smaller and smaller claims, precise compensation goals are
submerged in goals of deterrence and disgorgement of unjust
enrichment. To offset this emphasis on deterrence and disgorgement, therefore, any residue not claimed can be returned to the
defendant, 34 5 thereby making the ultimate amount of funds transferred to the class more equivalent to the amount that might
have been distributed if only those who were hurt had submitted

claims.
Fourth, a procedure similar to the third procedure could be
used, but with the residue used for the benefit of the class, where
deterrence and disgorgement are dominant goals.340 This fluid
...The settlement of the Pfizer litigation, see West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), suggests a possible claim verification procedure
which preserves a compensatory focus. A committee of counsel verified all claims
over $1,ooo by mail or phone when the class member fully documented his claims,
and by personal interview when claims were less completely supported. Smaller
claims were examined by lawyers looking for obvious errors. See Shapiro, supra
note 338, at 265-66. If a judge wanted to add another check to -this procedure,
he might require in-depth verification of a sample of smaller claims.
...The hypothetical is based on the facts of City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. i97i).
"' Of course, where class-wide calculation consists of deriving a formula for
computing individual class members' damages, rather than an assessment of the
aggregate damage inflicted upon the class, see note 333 supra, there will never be
a residue following individual distribution.
34GAn alternative method of obtaining fuller deterrence and disgorgement without use of fluid recovery, as such, would be to distribute any residue to class mem-
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recovery scheme is a response not only to deterrent and disgorgement policies, but is also useful where persons actually hurt are
likely not to be able to come forward and prove that fact because,
for example, they will not be in a position to be given notice of the
action, or because they will not keep records that would allow
proof of damages with any acceptable degree of accuracy. The
theory of fluid recovery resembles that of the cy pres doctrine
in testamentary interpretation: where funds cannot be delivered
precisely to those with primary legal claims, the money should
if possible be put to the "next best" use.347 There are two commonly discussed versions of fluid recovery. In one, the residue of
the class damages fund is distributed through the market, usually
in the form of a reduced charge for an item the defendant previously overpriced. 348 In the other, the money is given to the
state to use on a project likely to be of interest to class members
or, if that is not possible, for general purposes.34 9
Such procedures will not always be appropriate, however,
since they achieve their broad coverage only by sacrificing a considerable amount of precision in matching those injured with those
paid. Class members who successfully comply with the individual proof-of-claim procedure will be compensated twice, and
individuals who begin trading in the affected market after the
violation, 350 or who live in the relevant state but never dealt with
the defendant, will be compensated even though they were never
harmed. 35 ' As a result, fluid recovery in some cases may fit more
bers who did come forward, either pro rata or by the proportion of each claim
to total claims. See Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 978 (2d Cir. X952).
...See Note, The Cy Pres Solution to the Damage Distribution Problems of
Mass Class Actions, 9 GA. L. REv. 893, 894 (I975); Note, Damage Distribution In
Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. Ciri. L. REV. 448, 452-53 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as Cy Pres Remedy].
"'8 See Bebchick v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 318 F.2d x87, 203-04 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
52 F.R.D. 253, 265 (S.D.N.Y. '97x), rev'd, 479 F.2d zoo5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (974); Cy Pres Remedy, supra
note 347, at 458-63. See also Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324, 326
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (settlement); Comment, supra note 332, at 366 n.x86, discussing
subsequent settlement of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732,
63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (z967).
.49 See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 715 n.x5, 433 P.2d 732, 746
n.z5, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 738 n.zS (1967); Cy Pres Remedy, supra note 347, at
453-58. See also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 44o F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (x971)
(settlement).
3
' The decreased market price resulting from fluid distribution may attract new
customers, increasing the number of individuals who will share in the recovery
though never injured. See Cy Pres Remedy, supra note 347, at 461-62.
351 Of course, class members who have moved to a different state or who have
changed their activity will still not be compensated, even indirectly.
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easily into a deterrence or disgorgement rationale. Indeed, if the
entire class damage fund, minus attorneys' fees, reverts to the
state, the action becomes similar to a qui tam suit, in which a
private party is authorized to bring an action for a civil penalty
on behalf of the government and, as an incentive, is allowed to
retain part of the recovery. 5 To be sure, some forms of fluid
distribution will be more likely to compensate injured individuals
than others, as when the state can sponsor a project of direct
and exclusive interest to class members or when the market used
to distribute the fund is largely and repeatedly used by class
members.8 53 But even in these situations there will clearly be
imprecise compensation; moreover, it may be difficult to find
such ideal projects and markets.3 54
2. Tailoring Damage Calculation and Distribution to Fulfill Statutory Policy. - Some have asserted that class-wide
damage assessment violates due process or deprives defendants
of their seventh amendment right to a jury trial.355 In one of
the appellate reincarnations of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
(Eisen III),356 for example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, without explaining its reasoning, held that
fluid recovery violates due process.357 Although the Supreme
352 See generally Crumplar, An Alternative to Public and Victim Enforcement
of the Federal Securities and Antitrust Laws: Citizen Enforcement, 13 HARV. J.
LEG. 76, 80-82 ('975); Note, Qui Tam Suits, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 446 (1972).
35 In contrast ,perhaps the least compensatory version of fluid distribution
would be to add the residue of the class damages fund to the state's general
treasury.
" See Malina, supra note 336, at 482-92.
Fluid distribution through the market may raise additional problems in some
circumstances. Supervision of the defendant's pricing policies may require an unacceptable amount of court time unless a regulatory agency is available to administer the remedy. Comment, supra note 332, at 370, 373. See also Note, Mass

Compensatory Relief: The Inadequacy of the Class Action and the Need for
Procedural Alternatives, 24 SYRACUsE L. Rav. 1341, 1359 (X973). On the other
hand, if such a regulatory agency does exist, use of fluid distribution may constitute an intrusion into its jurisdiction. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479
F.2d 0oo5, 1oxo-il (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417
U.S. 156 (z974).
"'2 See, e.g., Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLU.
L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Twenty-Fourth Review]; TwentyThird Review, supra note 323, at 7-8; Note, supra note 354, at 1356-58; Note
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: Applying the Axe to the Green Bay Tree, 35 U.
Pxrr. L. Rav. 450, 465 (X973). But see sources listed in note 359 infra.
"'Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d loO5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and
on other grounds, 417 U.S. i56 (1974).
remanded
357 Id. at ioi8. The opinion does not make clear whether the panel felt that
class-wide calculation of damages without a fluid distribution mechanism would
violate due process. Indeed, the Second Circuit earlier passed up an opportunity
to reverse an opinion in the antibiotics antitrust litigation which indicated that
class-wide calculation would be employed. See Pfizer v. Lord, 449 F.2d iig (2d
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Court has not ruled on constitutional challenges to class-wide
damage assessment and fluid recovery, 8 ' the arguments do not
appear compelling. The defendant's seventh amendment right
would appear to be satisfied by the opportunity to adjudicate
the class-wide damage assessment before a jury.5 9 Thus, in a
case brought under the 1938 version of rule 23,30 o the Second
Circuit held that defendants do not have the right to separate
jury trials on each claim when class members are given the
chance to intervene and share in a judgment fund after liability
has been found and class-wide damages have been determined.3 '
The nature of the due process argument is not clear. Because of
the constraints of substantive law, class-wide calculation of damages would be inappropriate where the class opponent has defenses that he could assert against class members on an individual basis.3 62 In the absence of such necessarily individualized
inquiries, however, the class opponent hardly seems prejudiced
Cir.), denying mandamus in In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278
(S.D.N.Y. I971).
...The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's Eisen III opinion without
reaching the fluid recovery issues. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(U974).
9
" See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9I,

§ 1784, at 122 (974);
Jacoby & Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rule 23, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. I, 24 (974); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 n.34 (1941); Landers, supra note 330, at 868; Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in
Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b) (3), 54 F.R.D. Soi, 5o6 (1972); Comment,
Due Processand Fluid Class Recovery, 53 ORE. L. RaV. 225, 237 (1974); Note, Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid Recovery, Minihearings, and Notice in Class
Actions, 54 B.U. L. Rv. 111, 123-24 (974); Note, Managing the Large Class
Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REV. 426, 453-54 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Eisen Note]; Comment, supra note 332, at 364.
The only constitutional objection that appears possible is that defendant's
seventh amendment right to jury trial may be infringed if issues of liability and
damages are closely intertwined, yet are decided by separate juries. See United
Airlines v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924
(i96i) (propriety of exemplary damages in negligence actions closely related to
degree of culpability, and thus separate juries impermissible). However, no
case was found where this objection was raised in a class action context; moreover, satisfaction of the predomination requirement, see pp. x5o4-16 supra, should
ensure that individual damage issues are sufficiently distinct from common liability
issues that separate jury trials would not be unfair.
30 Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952).
36 Id. at 98o-81.
Cases holding that defendants are not entitled to a separate jury trial on each
claim in an ordinary multiple joinder case also lend support by analogy to the
constitutionality of class-wide damage assessment. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra
note 359.
362 Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S.
441, 445-46 ('9'5), with Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (igo8).
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by being restricted to only one hearing on common issues. Even
though the calculation of damages might involve issues on which
a hearing would ordinarily be required by due process, it has
never been thought that due process required multiple hearings
where there was one full and fair adjudication of the merits.
Indeed, if this were not so, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
which allows parties losing one action to be estopped on common
issues in subsequent suits either for or against nonparties, 63
would be constitutionally suspect. Such a novel result would
seem to require much more support than adherents to the view that
class-wide proof violates due process have so far mustered. Indeed,
even if the estoppel situation is technically distinguishable
from that of the class suit - in that the estopped party does
indeed get a second hearing, but only on the issue of the fairness
of the hearing received in the first lawsuit - the resulting
anomaly that a defendant could be bound by a judgment favorable to all those similarly situated to an individual plaintiff in
subsequent suits if the first of a series of litigations was fair,
but would not be "bound" when such individuals had in fact been
parties to a fairly adjudicated class suit, casts great doubt on the
validity of the due process argument.
In the absence of any constitutional obstacles, it might be
argued that the availability of particular damage calculation and
distribution mechanisms should turn on an interpretation of rule
23. Thus, the Second Circuit in Eisen III treated the permissibility of fluid recovery as a question of whether it was appropriate to read such a procedure into the rule.3 4 The court concluded that fluid recovery was improper, reasoning that the Rules
Enabling Act 315 forbids procedural rules which "modify, abridge,
or enlarge" substantive rights and that reading fluid recovery into
rule 23 would alter the substantive standards under section 4
of the Clayton Act, 6' the statute pursuant to which the action
was brought. 6 7 While the court's interpretation of the Clayton
Act may be questioned,"os its general approach of examining the
substantive law to determine the appropriateness of a damage
mechanism is clearly correct. 36 9
36 See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 934 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America, i9 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942); PP. 1394-1402 supra (res judicata).
114 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d ioo5, 1012-14, 1o18 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 4,7 U.S. i56 (1974).
365 28 U.S.C.

§ 2972

(1970).

U.S.C. § I (97o).
307 See 479 F.2d at 104, ioi8.
'6' See pp. 1532-34 & notes 400-14 infra.
261 See generally pp. 136o-65 supra. Treating damage remedies in class ac360 15

tions as a question of rule 23 interpretation may be affirmatively misleading to
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Where the relevant statute expressly authorizes class-wide
calculation of damages, flexible proof-of-claim procedures, or
fluid distribution, such devices are clearly permissible. For example, the proposed Consumer Class Action Act30 would make
available a five-step fluid recovery mechanism for class actions
brought to enforce § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.87 1
On the other hand, a statute may on its face prohibit particular
damage calculation and distribution mechanisms, or establish
requirements for class actions which preclude the possibility of
some or all class-wide remedies. Fluid distribution of damages,
for instance, would appear to be inconsistent with the requirement
of the Fair Labor Standards Act that class members affirmatively
opt in at the outset of class litigation,7 2 since the opt-in requirement evinces an objective to compensate only those who feel
hurt and are therefore willing to come forward and make a
claim.
Where the statute is less explicit, courts must engage in a
more complex analysis if statutory directives are to be carried out
accurately. Although courts have an obligation to develop remedies which effectuate statutory policies,173 the potential for
the extent that the unit of analysis becomes class actions in general rather than the
set of policies underlying the particular statute being enforced. Untenable distinctions between class actions and non-class actions may be encouraged while
real distinctions among statutory causes of action may be ignored. See note 382
infra.
37Printed in Proposed Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation-II, 4
CLASS ACTION REP. 342 (1975).
371 See id. at 344-45 (§ 8 of proposed Act).

After calculation of the aggregate damage inflicted upon the class and distribution to individual class members,
any remainder of the damages fund would be distributed under a cy pres principle for the benefit of the class; any further remainder would be contributed to a
Class Action Defense Costs Fund, the unused balance of which would be credited
to the federal courts' operating budget at the close of each fiscal year. The proposed Act would apparently make this fluid recovery mechanism available in all
class actions brought in the federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970)
(jurisdictional authorization for actions arising under legislation regulating commerce), as well as those brought under the Act. See id. at 344 (§ 8(b)).
372 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (197o), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974) ; see pp. 1633-34
infra.
371 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (x964); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 13ox (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1oo5 (971);

P.

BATOR, P. MiSExiN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WEcEsLER, HART AND WECUSLER'S THaE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTMa 830-33 (2d ed. x973); Eisen Note,

supra note 359, at 451-52. But see, e.g., Jacoby & Cherkasky, supra note 359, at
27; Landers, supra note 330, at 872.
Some commentators have argued that class-wide damage mechanisms are
foreclosed by Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), which held that individual
claims of class members could not be aggregated to meet the $io,ooo jurisdictional
minimum required in diversity actions by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (,970). See, e.g.,
Twenty-Fourth Review, supra note 355, at 39-40. The Eisen III court used this
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greater deterrence, compensation, or disgorgement of unjust enrichment is not sufficient in and of itself to justify judicial creation of expansive systems for delivering damages. In the presence of a relevant statute courts are not free to attach whatever
weights they choose to enforcement policies, but must tailor class
action remedies to fit the matrix of policies they have attributed to
the statute in interpreting its substantive provisions.

74

Thus, the

process of determining appropriate methods for delivering damages in class actions should proceed by analyzing whether the
policies served by particular mechanisms for calculating and distributing damages match statutory policies.
This approach, while relatively easy to describe, will often be
difficult to apply. In order to determine how far along the spectrum of damage mechanisms the statute extends, the court will
have to assess the strength and scope of the statute's concern
for deterrence, disgorgement, and compensation. For example,
the polar extreme of class-wide calculation of damages with a
fluid distribution in which the bulk of the fund escheats to the
state could only be justified if the statute displayed a deep concern for deterrence and disgorgement regardless of the possibility
of windfall recoveries for third parties or some class members.
This policy mix would be likely only where the danger of overdeterrence or excessive punishment through private enforcement
is low: for example, where the substantive law is quite clear, where
deterrence of borderline conduct would not cause any serious
consequences, or where good-faith violations are exempt from
argument to support its denial of fluid recovery in an antitrust class action, citing
Snyder for the proposition that "the claims of many may not be treated collectively." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d oo5, 1014 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. i56 (1974); see pp. 1531-32 &
notes 397-405 infra. Such a broad reading of Snyder is clearly unwarranted. The
Supreme Court's recent decisions addressing the issue of mootness in class actions,
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251, 1258-6o (976); Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975), indicate that at least for article III purposes the
claims of class members may indeed be treated collectively. See pp. 1464-66
supra. More importantly, Snyder merely involved interpretation of a particular
jurisdictional statute, whose purposes and policies do not necessarily coincide with
the purposes and policies underlying the various causes of action enforced through
class suits. Indeed, the Snyder Court expressly noted, 394 U.S. at 341, that its
holding would not affect the availability of the multitude of federal question class
actions which can be brought without regard to jurisdictional amount, see, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) (antitrust actions and suits under legislation regulating
commerce). See also Eisen Note, supra note 359, at 450 (explaining Snyder Court's
reasons for reading jurisdictional statute narrowly). Certainly, courts fashioning
class-wide damage remedies in Title VII suits, for example, see pp. 1528-29 & notes
376-80 infral have not felt constrained by Snyder's interpretation of the diversity
jurisdiction statute.
174 See pp. 1368-71 & note 182 supra.
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coverage.37" Distribution of damages through a flexible proof-of-

claim procedure, with the remainder of any class-wide damages
fund returned to the defendant, may be appropriate in some cir-

cumstances where fluid distribution would not. Since distribution
to individual class members serves a compensatory function more
precisely than distribution to the class "as a whole," this pro-

cedure may be available even under statutes which do not recognize deterrence or disgorgement as legitimate goals for private

enforcement, except to the extent that they are byproducts of
compensatory relief. Where a defendant has caused moderately

small amounts of injury to a number of similarly situated individuals, the proof-of-claim technique may be the most accurate

approach practically available for making injured parties whole.
Of course, to the degree that the statute embodies independent

deterrence and disgorgement values, the case for class-wide calculation of damages coupled with individualized distribution is

strengthened. On the other hand, the proof-of-claim mechanism, although less dangerous than fluid distribution, may be unacceptable if there is still a strong possibility that overdeterrence
or unfair penalties would result. Where the statute evinces concern for protecting borderline conduct, where crippling liability
is threatened, or where diffuse injury is not objectionable, adherence to a fully individualized approach would be proper.

Despite the complexity of the underlying considerations, courts
have read some statutes to permit class-wide damage remedies
even though no provisions expressly authorized such mechanisms. In Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,37 the Fifth

Circuit sanctioned a variety of techniques for class-wide calculation of back pay awards in Title VII suits, with distribution of

relief to individual class members through a proof-of-claim pro3 7
cedureY.
To reach this result, the court followed the basic ap-

375 See generally pp. 136o-66 supra.
376494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
177Id. at 260-63 & nn.i5i, 154. Methods endorsed by the court included generation of a formula for individual class members' damages through averaging
of pay rates across the different pay groups in question, id. at 262; see Stamps v.
Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 121-22 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 35 (6th Cir. 1975),
or across a comparable group of employees who were not the victims of discrimination, see 494 F.2d at 261-63 & n.i5i; United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal
Lathers Union, Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429, 443-45 (S.D.N.Y. ig7i), motion for
stay pending appeal denied, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. X972), aff'd, 471 F.2d
408 (2d Cir. i973). The latter approach, characterized by the court as a "formula
of comparability or representative employee earnings formula," 494 F.2d at 262,
apparently would also be permissible if utilized to calculate the aggregate damages
inflicted upon the class as a whole, which would then be distributed in pro rata
shares to similarly situated class members. See id. at 262-63 & n.154; Cf. F.W.
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proach of analyzing the policies underlying the statutory backpay provisions and then tailoring the relief mechanisms to fulfill these policies. The court determined that the purpose of backpay awards is to compensate victims of discrimination for eco-

nomic loss and rejected a defense based on the defendant's good

faith.37 8 The court then noted that some imprecision in cal-

culating backpay awards must be tolerated: to effectuate the
statutory purpose of making injured parties whole, unrealistic

accuracy in assessing damages should not be required, and uncertainties should be resolved against the discriminating em-

ployer." 9 When class size or the nature of defendant's conduct
makes individualized damage determinations impracticable, a

class-wide approach is necessary and appropriate, the court concluded.380

The more radical remedy of fluid distribution was found by
the District of Columbia Circuit, in Bebchick v. Public Utilities

Commission,38 ' to be similarly authorized under a statute governing ratemaking by the local public utilities commission.38

Plain-

tiffs challenged a commission order authorizing an increase in tranWoolworth Co. v. NLRB, X2 F.2d 658, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1941) (pro rata distribution 78of back pay award by NLRB).
3 See 494 F.2d at 251-53.
7
'Id. at 26o-62.
38
o See id. at 261-63. Fluid distribution schemes, however, may not be proper
under Title VII. Language in the recent case of Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
96 S. Ct. 1251, 1268 n.32 (1976), appears to suggest that the defendant must be
granted some sort of opportunity to challenge individual class members' claims. In
any event, fluid distribution is unlikely to be necessary in the Title VII context,
since claims will usually not be so small as to be nonviable. See note 322 supra.
As is the case under Title VII, class-wide calculation of damages with distribution through a proof-of-claim procedure should be permissible in class
actions under the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranty Act, see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 231o(d)(3), (e) (Supp. IV, 1974). While fluid distribution appears to be incompatible with the Act's amount-in-controversy requirement, see note 372 supra,
class-wide calculation may be necessary in order to deliver compensation to injured consumers with moderately small claims. Moreover, § iio(e) of the Act,
25 U.S.C. § 231o(e)

(Supp. IV, 1974),

provides strong protection against any

danger of overdeterrence or undue penalty: a class action may not be brought
unless the defendant has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to cure the alleged violation. See also Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranty Act, §
iio(a), I5 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (informal dispute settlement procedures).
381318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (2963).
282 See id. at igo (discussing § 4 of Franchise Act) ; id. at 203-04 (supplemental
opinion authorizing fluid distribution).
The Risen III court attempted to distinguish Bebchick on the ground that it
was not a class action. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 2102 (2d
Cir. 2973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. i56 (2974). However, since the source of authority for fluid distribution lies not in rule 23 but in
the courts' power to effectuate statutory policies, see pp. 1525-26 & notes 369, 373
supra, this distinction seems irrelevant.
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The appellate court

invalidated the order 384 and required that a special account or
fund equal in amount to the total of the overcharges be established
by the transit company.3 85 The court left the disposition of this
fund to the discretion of the utilities commission, but ordered
that the money be applied for the benefit of transit users - for
example, to decrease the fares which otherwise would prevail.3 8
Although the court did not discuss the underlying statutory
policies in detail, it appears to have been motivated by a desire
to compensate individuals who paid overcharges, as well as to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the transit company.387 If many
of the overcharged transit customers would use the company's
facilities in the future, thereby benefiting from the decreased fares
resulting from application of the fund, fluid distribution would
indeed serve a substantial compensatory function in this context.
Moreover, where fluid distribution is used to compensate a class
of individuals charged an amount greater than a rate fixed pursuant to statute, there is little danger that the regulated entity
will be unduly penalized or deterred from engaging in socially
beneficial conduct, inasmuch as the entity is merely required to
refund revenues in excess of a proper rate computed according
88
3
to statutory criteria.

Although the courts have not yet had the opportunity to address the issue, the 1974 Amendments to the Truth in Lending
Act389 in effect direct the courts to undertake the type of purposive analysis advocated in this Note. Prior to the 1974 Amendments, courts generally construed the Act to bar damage class
actions entirely, on the ground that the $ioo statutory minimum
recovery for each individual would have imposed crippling liability on defendants if aggregated through class suits. 3 9 0 The
1974 Amendments make the $ioo minimum inapplicable to class
383318
384

F.2d at i89.

Id. at

196.

315 Id. at 203-04
388 See id. at 204.
8

(supplemental opinion).

. See id. at 203-04.
...See Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d X26,

135 (7th Cir. 1974) (danger of "legalized blackmail" feared by Eisen III court
not present in class action for refund of excess rate charge). Indeed, the prospect
of a fluid recovery might be necessary to deter regulated companies from trying
to charge more than the rate fixed by a regulatory commission. See id. at 133;
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 715 n.I5, 433 P.2d 732, 746 n.IS, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 738 n.i5 (1967), subsequent settlement discussed in Comment, supra
note 332, at 366 n.186.
389 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. 93-495, Title IV, §§ 406-08(d), 88 Stat. 3538,
amending 15 U.S.C. § 364o (1970).
390See, e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412

(S.D.N.Y. I972) ; P. 1362 supra.
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actions and impose a ceiling on the total recovery available in class
suits- the lesser of $ioo,ooo or one percent of the net worth
of the defendant. "I So long as the ceiling is not exceeded, the
court may exercise its discretion in computing the amount of
damages awarded; however, the court is directed to consider the
amount of actual damages, the frequency and persistence of
statutory violations by the defendant, the defendant's resources,
the number of injured persons, and the extent to which the defendant's failure to comply with the Act was intentional, as well
as any other relevant factors.392 Class-wide calculation of damages, with or without fluid distribution, is not expressly authorized. Even so, given the list of factors which Congress considered relevant to damages calculation, and the clear deterrent
purpose of the Act,393 the full range of class action damage
mechanisms would appear to be available. The danger of crippling liability potentially raised by fluid distribution or flexible
proof-of-claim procedures is virtually eliminated by the ceiling
on total recovery, 394 and by the court's power to reduce the award
to reflect the amount of defendant's resources. Overdeterrence
should not be a problem if remedies are adjusted to take into
account the extent to which defendant's failure to comply with
the Act was intentional: 35 where defendant acted in good faith,
class-wide remedies could be withheld; where defendant's conduct
was persistent and willful, even the version of fluid distribution
in which the damages fund escheats to the state might be proper. 396
Unlike the amended Truth in Lending Act, the antitrust laws
do not have any special provisions for computing damages in
class actions. As a result, courts have little choice but to apply
the treble damages remedy created by § 4 of the Clayton Act 397
to class as well as individual suits.3 9 Since treble damages were
391 15 U.S.C. § 164o(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
392 I5 U.S.C. § 164o(a) (Supp. IV, 1974); see Comment, The z974 Amend-

ments to the Truth in Lending Act, 53 N.C.L. REv. 1259, 1290-91 n.i58 (1975).
'"See Comment, supra note 392, at 129i. The $ioo minimum recovery

in

individual suits is clear evidence of a deterrent purpose independent of the degree
to which compensation is served.
294 See Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., 5X2 F.2d 114, 1I7-18 (5th Cir. 1975).
.9 Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945) (use of specific
intent requirement to cure problems of statutory vagueness).
...Of course, the larger the amount of actual damages suffered by the class,
the larger the compensation interest at stake will be. Thus, where actual damages
are substantial, some class-wide remedies could perhaps be justified as a means
of delivering compensation, even if the creditor-defendant's conduct was not
willful. In such cases, however, punitive damages ordinarily would not be appropriate.
30715 U.S.C. § 15 (,97o).
...See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 5o8 F.2d 226, 235 ( 9 th Cir. z974),
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designed at least in part to encourage private enforcement of the
antitrust laws, 399 simultaneous use of class-wide damage mechanisms which themselves significantly increase access to courts
arguably, could result in overdeterrence or imposition of undue
penalties. Courts must therefore consider whether the treble
damages mechanism should be deemed to "pre-empt" other remedies.
In Eisen 111 400 and In re Hotel Telephone Charges,40' the
Second and Ninth Circuits respectively rejected fluid recovery
in antitrust class actions on grounds independent of the potential
unfairness of trebling damages awarded to the class "as a

whole." 402 However, neither court's reasoning appears fully to
justify the conclusion it reached. Aside from unconvincing argu4°4
ments based on the Constitution 4 3 and on Snyder v. Harris,
the Eisen III court appeared to rely on the danger that class actions seeking huge amounts of damages might subject defendants
to strong pressure to settle regardless of the merits of the class'
claim.40 5 But given summary judgment procedures 400 and hourscert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d
873, 878 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1978).
399 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 8oo,
130-31 (1969); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 68-69 (2d ed. 8974); Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction oj All
or Part of a Business, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1566, 1566-67 & n.6 (8967); p. 1533 infra.
40 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d ioo5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
401 5oo F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
402 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Eisen III decision without
reaching the fluid recovery issue. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
Prior to Eisen III and the Hotel Telephone Charges case, fluid recovery
mechanisms had been utilized in settlements of several antitrust class actions. See
Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324, 326 (N.D. Ill. 8972); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 733-34 (S.D.N.Y. 197o), aff'd, 440
F.2d 8079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). By agreeing to these settlements, however, defendants presumably waived any objection that this form of
relief was not authorized by the Clayton Act.
403 See pp. 1523-25 & notes 355-63 supra.
404 See note 373 supra. The court also cited Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251 (1972), but that case does not appear to be dispositive. See Eisen Note,
supra note 359, at 450-5x; p. 1533 & notes 409-10 infra.
4o See 479 F.2d at OI8-19.
406 Although summary judgment is not generally favored in antitrust actions,
see, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962),
recent cases suggest that defendants may gain such relief when plaintiffs' claims
clearly lack a factual or legal basis. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 686-87 (1975) (class action); First Nat'l Bank v.
Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 274-90 (8968); Solomon v. Houston Corrugated
Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 393-96 (5th Cir. 1976); ALW, Inc. v. United Air Lines,
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worked standards for computing attorneys' fees,4" 7 this danger
of "legalized blackmail" would not appear to be significant enough
to warrant denying relief to small claimants. The Ninth Circuit
endorsed Eisen III's analysis 40 and advanced the additional
rationale that the Clayton Act only authorizes private suits in
which a compensatory function is served.40 9 Although this reading of the Clayton Act is probably justified,41 ° it only eliminates
the version of fluid distribution in which the residue of the class
damages fund reverts to the state treasury. Where fluid distribution is made through a market in which most future participants
are likely to be class members, a substantial compensatory function is served. Thus, unless there was insufficient evidence in the
Hotel Telephone Charges case that the market for defendants'
services met this condition, the Ninth Circuit appears to have
underrated the efficiency of fluid distribution as a means of compensating class members injured by the defendants' alleged price
fixing.
Although the reasoning of the Eisen and Hotel Telephone
Charges cases thus does not provide a convincing basis for rejecting all forms of fluid distribution in antitrust class actions, the
fact that damages are trebled in antitrust actions suggests that
judicial reluctance to allow fluid distribution may not be without foundation. A chief purpose of the treble damages penalty
is to increase enforcement of the antitrust laws through private
litigation by increasing the attractiveness of litigating otherwise
uncertain claims.4 ' There is inevitably a risk in creating incentives for the litigation of borderline claims: fearful of the prospect of being sued, individuals may refrain from conduct not in
fact proscribed. This risk of overdeterrence, it could be argued,
should not be run unnecessarily. Treble damages actions should
be allowed only where the individuals who benefit from the penalty
Inc., 5Io F.2d 52, 54-57 (gth Cir. 1975); Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers
Ass'n,
4 7 456 F.2d 1361, 1371 (ioth Cir. 1972).
° See pp. i6i-i5 ifra (hours-worked standard reduces likelihood class attorney will negotiate a "strike" settlement).
408 5oo F.2d at 9o, 92.
400

See id. at

91-92,

citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.

251 (1972).

The court also appeared to be concerned with the expenditure of judicial resources
which litigation of the case would require. See id. at 91. But see pp. x5o5-o6 & notes
256-63 supra (rejecting this argument as basis for disallowance of class suit).
10 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-65 (1972); Gray
v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 748 & n.5 (gth Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
943 (1973).
41 The treble damages provision also serves two other purposes: to ensure
that individuals receive full compensation notwithstanding the imprecision of jury
determinations; and to punish and deter wrongdoers. See Note, supra note 399, at
1566-67. See also P. AREEDA, supra note 399.
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provision were plainly injured by the antitrust violation. On
this view, fluid distribution mechanisms, because they extend relief to individuals who may not in fact have been injured or who
would not have otherwise sought redress for their injury, may be
inappropriate.
The existence of the treble damages provision, however, need
not be seen as a bar to use of fluid distribution mechanisms in all
antitrust class actions. Concern for overdeterrence is inapposite
in cases where the misconduct alleged would, if proven, constitute
a clear violation of the antitrust laws. In such cases, therefore,
fluid distribution schemes could perhaps coexist with the award
of treble damages. This analysis would not change the result in
Eisen. There, while the defendants were accused of the archetypal
antitrust offense of price-fixing, they had a strong claim of immunity from the antitrust laws.412 On the other hand, the class
in Hotel Telephone Charges appeared to allege a "hardcore"
violation of section one of the Sherman Act 13 - an express
agreement to fix prices without any claim to immunity. 4 Hence,
denial of fluid distribution in that case may not have been justified.
Both Eisen III and the Hotel Telephone Charges cases deal
with situations in which most class members' claims were too
412

The defendant brokerage houses argued that fixing the odd-lot price differ-

ential was necessary to effectuate the securities laws, and therefore exempt from
the antitrust laws under Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (z963).
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d moo0,
X012-r3 (2d Cir. X973), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The Second Circuit did not
reach this issue in deciding the case, however. See id. Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions indicate that defendants' conduct was indeed immune from antitrust
prosecution. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 420 U.S. 920 (,975) ;
United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 420 U.S. 904 (1975),
noted in The Supreme Court, z974 Term, 88 HARv. L. RaV. 47, 202-11 (975).
4' See In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 88 ( 9 th Cir. X970) ; In re
Hotel Telephone Charge Antitrust Litigation, 34x F. Supp. 771, 772-73 & n.4
(J.P.M.D.L. 1972). It is difficult to discern plaintiff's theory from the text of the
opinions. If the plaintiffs were, for example, merely alleging "conscious parallelism"
rather than an express agreement, the defendants' conduct would not constitute
a clear violation of the Sherman Act. See generally Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal,
75 HARV. L. Rnv. 655, 655-84 (1962). In that case, Hotel Telephone Charges
should be analyzed in the same manner as Eisen III.
414 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 15o, 223-24
(1940) (per se rule applied to price-fixing). As the Eisen case demonstrates,
allegation of a per se violation would not be sufficient as such to satisfy this "clear
violation" standard. The per se rule must clearly apply to the facts alleged.
See also note 413 supra (Hotel Telephone Charges may not have involved clear
violation).
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small to warrant the expense of a proof-of-claim procedure.41
The Eisen III panel directed its discussion primarily at the fluid
distribution aspect of fluid recovery, and did not make clear
whether class-wide calculation of damages and distribution to individual class members through a proof-of-claim procedure, with
the residue of any fund returned to the defendant, would be permissible under appropriate circumstances. 41 6 Indeed, in an earlier
case, 417 the Second Circuit had declined an opportunity to reverse
a class certification granted on the assumption that class-wide
calculation could be utilized if necessary.418 On the other hand,
the Ninth Circuit appeared to read Eisen III to foreclose all approaches involving class-wide calculation of damages; '19 moreover, the Ninth Circuit's own analysis implied that all of the parts
of the fluid recovery procedure were unacceptable.42 ° Purposive
analysis of the Clayton Act indicates, however, that class-wide calculation of damages without fluid distribution should not be
foreclosed, and Eisen III and the Hotel Telephone Charges case
should therefore be read narrowly on this issue.
The principles governing damages assessment in antitrust
actions are quite similar to those which the Fifth Circuit called
upon in Pettway to justify classwide calculation in a Title VII
case. 421 In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,Inc.,422 the Supreme
Court held that "the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data," and noted that "the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own
wrong has created." 423 Where a wrongdoer has caused a substantial amount of harm to a class, but the relatively small amount of
injury imposed on each class member makes individual damage
trials impracticable, class-wide calculation of damages with distribution through a proof-of-claim procedure would appear to be
the most precise method available for compensating injured individuals.4 24 Although this procedure might lead to overcompen41' The average treble damages claim was $6.oo in Hotel Telephone Charges,

see 5oo F.2d at 88, and $3.90 in Eisen, 479 F.2d at ioio.
410 See 479 F.2d at 104, ioi6-i8.
417 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), denying mandamus on In re Antibiotic
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. ig7i).
418
See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y.),
mandamus denied sub nom. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 197i). The
Eisen III court attempted to distinguish this case on the basis that it arose at an
early stage in the litigation. See 479 F.2d at 1012.
410 See 5oo F.2d at 9o.
42 0
See id. at 89-go.
421 See pp. 1528-29 & notes 367-80 supra.
422327 U.S. 25X (1946).
423
Id. at 264-65.
424 Utilization of statistical techniques should therefore be permissible unless
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sation of some persons, utilization of appropriate safeguards in
the proof-of-claim stage 425 should preclude the substantial windfalls to non-class members which are possible with a fluid distribution mechanism. Given the strong deterrent and disgorgement polices of the Clayton Act, 426 the degree of compensation
achieved by a proof-of-claim process should satisfy the Act's requirement that private suits carry out a compensatory function.
Finally, in contrast to fluid distribution, the purpose of the Act's
treble damages provision is served by the proof-of-claim mechanism. Since individuals are required to come forward and file
claims, trebling the claimants' actual damages affords necessary
encouragement for private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Thus,
regardless of whether treble damages are considered to preempt
fluid distribution, the proof-of-claim procedure does not appear
to be preempted.
VI. SUPERVISING SETTLEMENTS

Most class actions for damages brought under rule 23 have
been settled or dismissed before trial.' Formal settlements in
suits seeking injunctive relief have also been common.' Moreover, in formally litigated actions for complex structural injunctions, judges have often relied on a process of negotiation between the parties to aid in shaping the final decree. Because of
the pervasiveness of negotiation in the resolution of class suits, a
class action procedure that does not take settlement into account
is incomplete.
Negotiation presents a serious threat to the attainment of a
major purpose of class litigation - full realization of substantive
policies I- unless privately controlled decisions are harmonized
they would not generate a reasonably accurate estimate of each class member's
damages. But see, e.g., Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 431-33
(W.D. Mo. 1973).
425 See pp. 1520-21 & note 343 supra.
426
See Note, supra note 399, at 1566-67.
1 See p. 1373 n.5 supra.

'See, e.g., Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 1462 (1976); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d
114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 124 (1975); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. (PPG Indus., Inc.), 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.
900 (,974); Consent Decree in Full Settlement of Civil Action, Wells v. Bank of
America, Civil No. 7i-4o9 CBR (N.D. Cal. May 30, 1974); Purcell v. Keane, 54
F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Even when liability in a class action brought for injunctive relief is litigated, a damages component, such as back pay may be settled.
See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258 (5th Cir. 1974).
3
See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, supra at 1298-99.
4
See p. 1353 supra.
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with public interests.' Even when negotiations are completely in
good faith, the outcome may not reflect the range of substantive
concerns underlying the regulatory statute pursuant to which
suit has been brought, because the parties may not share such a
broad range of interests. 6 In addition, the parties may be willing
to trade statutory entitlements for benefits to which they have
no legal claim.' Consistency between adjudicated and negotiated
resolutions of the class suit can thus be maintained only if the
parties are required to obtain permission from the judge before
settling. Indeed, especially if the settlement produces a decree
which will modify the behavior of the class members, the concern
that all affected interests be heard in the shaping of relief implicates essentially the same role for the judge as when he supervises
negotiation of a decree after liability has been found at trial."
Moreover, judicial supervision of the settlement may be essential
for creating a constitutionally binding judgment,9 and such binding effect is both desirable from the standpoint of efficiency and
necessary to allow the class representative to bargain in the name
of the class as a whole.10
Private negotiations of class action issues raise a particularly
great danger of inadequate representation because the attorney
negotiating on behalf of the class must ordinarily forego some relief beneficial to some or all class members in order to avoid the
need for trial and must therefore rank possible outcomes in order
of preference. During bargaining the class attorney may be forced
to rely more heavily than usual upon the named plaintiff to determine class desires." A plaintiff and his attorney may erroneously conclude that the representative party's views mirror those
of the class, leading them to make concessions which are disproportionately costly from the perspective of absentees. Moreover,
the danger will exist that a plaintiff and his attorney will deliber*ately shift the burden of a compromise to parties not before the
court. In its crudest form, this sort of compromise involves a sellout by the named plaintiff and the class attorney, in which they
agree to discontinue the class suit in return for personal reward."2
Before approving a settlement, therefore, the judge must assure himself that the class has been adequately represented during
2

See pp. 1373-75 supra.

"See, e.g., Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 530 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. x973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (2974).
'See, e.g., Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 455, 459-60 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
See generally Chayes, supra note 3; at 1294.

"See

pp. 1411, 14I4-x5 supra.
See p. 1379 supra.
"' See p. 1593 infra.

10

12 See pp. I54o-46 infra.
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settlement talks,' 3 a conclusion which will not follow automatically
from a finding of adequacy for litigation purposes. Indeed, the
judge may not even have an opportunity to evaluate the sufficiency
of the named plaintiff and his counsel before they propose a compromise or seek to dismiss the actions. Settlement may come at
any time in the litigation, including the period before certification.
Even the propriety of class treatment and the definition of the
class may be among the issues the parties attempt to decide for
themselves.' 4 The judge who delays inquiry into the special problems of private negotiations in class actions may be faced with an
impossible task once the parties have settled. At that time, all
of the active litigants will have an interest in obtaining court
approval for their settlement, and may be unwilling - or unable
- to engage in adversary proceedings which could expose deficiencies in the agreement and the process which produced it.' The
judge will also have missed the opportunity to introduce into the
bargaining process additional participants whose presence might
have been necessary to produce a fair result.'" Although such
parties could be asked to participate in hearings on the adequacy
of the settlement, or could be added into another, court-ordered
round of negotiation, their impact would be diminished in the first
situation by a comparative lack of knowledge of the background
of the casd, and in the second, by having to work to upset an agreement already formulated.
The Federal Rules recognize that settlement in class suits presents exceptional problems not present in traditional binary litigation where settlement is not only freely allowed, but actually
encouraged as a method of managing complex cases.' 7 Thus, rule
23(e) provides that:' 8
"aCourts have recognized that the judge must act as a "guardian" for the
interests of absent class members. E.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 523 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.
1975); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 124 (i975) ; Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 932 (i97i); Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 455, 460
(E.D.Pa. 1972); Zerkle v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 52 F.R.D. iSI, 259 (S.D.N.Y.
x97) ; Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 926 (D. Mass. x958) (derivative
suit).
14 See pp. I54o-46, i555-6o infra.
x See Chayes, supra note 3, at 1300.
6 See pp. i56o-65 infra.
17 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITiAcmvoN, pt. i § 1.21 (West ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (e).

Rule 23.1, which governs derivative actions by shareholders, includes a virtually identical notice and approval provision. The most important distinction between class and derivative suits rests in the fact that a corporation has
but one indivisible claim from which shareholders can derive a cause of action.
Thus, once a shareholder accepts a dismissal of the claim with prejudice,
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A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
The threat presented by dismissal or compromise should not, however, be overstated. These devices are still important methods
for disposing of suits which prove to be meritless or which can be
resolved in an entirely acceptable manner without trial. The challenge is to create procedures that will foster settlements which
adequately protect absentees' interests, or at least serve to identify
unfair outcomes when they are presented to the court.'" This
further litigation is foreclosed. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
(hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. In contrast, if the named plaintiff in a class action seeks a dismissal with prejudice to
himself only, other members of the class remain legally free to litigate their causes
of action on an individual or group basis. As a result, extreme care must be exercised when using derivative suits as precedents for analyzing pre-certification
dismissals of class actions; only derivative suits dismissed without prejudice may be
relied upon legitimately in that context. Nevertheless, many of the standards
developed in derivative suits for evaluating a compromise apply equally well to
class actions settled on behalf of the entire class. Indeed, when reviewing such
settlements courts often cite the two types of cases interchangeably. See, e.g.,
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974) (class action) ;
Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (x972)
(derivative suit.)
Similarly, the court approval requirement in original rule 23(c) resembles
the one in rule 23(e), although the notice provisions differ. Therefore, much preI986 precedent continues to have validity. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 1797 at 226.
" Rule 23(e) can also serve as a limited aid to defendants. First, defendants
benefit to the extent that notice and court approval ensure that the class will be
bound to the settlement. See Panel on Class Actions, 28 Bus. LAW. 133, 154 (March
AND PROCEDURE § 1840 (,972)

1973)

(remarks

of Ruder);

pp. 1378-79

supra; p.

1559 & note

126

infra

(discussing defendants' willingness to pay costs of rule 23(e) notice). Second,
the incidence of strike suits in which the plaintiff brings a non-meritorious class
claim in order to coerce settlement of his individual claim may decline: inasmuch
as rule 23(e) requires that other class members be given notice and an opportunity to intervene and pursue class or individual claims, see pp. 154o-46 & notes 2o54 infra, defendants may be put in a position where it would be irrational to enter
into an individual settlement with the strike suiter. See, e.g., Rothman v. Gould,
52 F.R.D. 494, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Frankel, J.). See also T. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22-28 (1963).

Knowing that it will be difficult to obtain

individual settlements, plaintiffs may choose not to bring a suit at all.
On the other hand, to the extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to pursue nonmeritorious claims on behalf of the entire class, in the hope that defendants will
settle the class claim rather than risking enormous damages liability, see pp.
1361-65, 1381-82 supra (discussing "legalized blackmail"), defendants might
actually be made worse off by the requirement of rule 23(e). The source of
protection against such "legalized blackmail" would appear to lie instead in summary
judgment, see pp. 1419-20 supra, predomination requirements, see pp. 1504-16
supra, hours-worked standards for calculating class attorneys' fees, see pp. i6i-iS
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section of the Note, although working largely within the framework of rule 23, will attempt to sketch a general approach to settlement procedure.
A. Pre-CertificationDismissals and Settlements: Problems with
Relief Offered to Class Members as Individual Litigants
i. Settlements of the Named Plaintiffs' Claims.- In the precertification context, the settlement problem will often arise in the
form of a motion to dismiss class allegations or to dismiss the action altogether. Either of these motions may follow a legitimate
decision that a claim is atypical or meritless, but they may also
be the culmination of a process in which the representative plaintiff increases his bargaining leverage by filing a class suit and then
attempts to abandon the class when his personal objectives have
been met. Such a use of the class action may properly be called
an abuse 20 because none of the policies underlying the creation of
the device are advanced."- These tactics will seldom succeed when
class members' claims could support individual suits since the
defendant would not be able to avoid subsequent litigation by
buying off the plaintiff in the filed action. However, when claims
are small, the defendant might feel that settlement of the named
plaintiff's claim would, as a practical matter, foreclose the possibility of further litigation.22
Whether or not the named plaintiff has been bought off by the
defendant, dismissal of a class allegation may upset justified reliance created by the filing of the class suit. Class members with
individually recoverable claims 2 may have relied upon informal
publicity about the existence of the class suit and abstained from
filing individual or class claims, and class attorneys may have refrained from initiating additional class actions on behalf of small
claimants.24 Although the statute of limitations is tolled when a
infra, and, if deemed necessary, expanded use of preliminary hearings, see pp. 142426 supra, or fee awards to prevailing defendants, see p. 1632, note 41 inira.
20 Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 97o) ; see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
21 Cf. W. CARY, CASFS AND MATERIALS ON CoRPORATIoNs 666-81 (4th ed. x969)
(corporate opportunity doctrine).
2' This would be true in a situation where the named plaintiff or a settling class
attorney has unique financial or other resources to carry on the litigation or where
it is unlikely that another class member would be willing to shoulder the burden
of being a class representative. See Comment, Continuation and Representation of
Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 3974 DUKE L.J. 573,
587 n.6o.

"2 The terminology utilized in this Note for describing class members' claims
according to the feasibility of individual recovery is set forth at p. 1356 supra,
24 See Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 197); Yaffe v. Detroit
Steel Corp., 5o F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. x97o); Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61
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class suit is filed,25 it begins to run again if the case is dismissed.2"
If a class member learned that a suit had been filed, but not that
it had been terminated, he might lose his claim. Even if the class
member learned of the dismissal in time to overcome the statute
of limitations, the intervening delay might make the gathering
of evidence and preparation of a case more difficult.2 7 Moreover,
judicial failure to protect pre-certification reliance would disserve
the policy of increasing access to courts, as well as judicial economy, since putative class members might be compelled to file overlapping class or individual suits in order to protect themselves.28
Thus, while pre-certification dismissal does not legally bind
absent class members, 29 notice may be appropriate under some
circumstances to afford absentees an opportunity to intervene
and take over the class suit, 30 or to file individual claims.3 ' The
F.R.D. 396, 398 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Informal publicity would be particularly likely
to reach members of the plaintiffs' bar, who might then counsel class members not
to file additional class suits, see Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824,
832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973). For instance, Class Action Reports, a newsletter directed
largely to lawyers who bring class actions, lists newly filed cases even when no
official notice has been given. See, e.g., Developments, 4 CLASS AcrIoN REP. 2, 76,
Of course, attorneys for class members with individually recoverable
92 (1975).
claims may also rely on this information and advise their clients not to file individual suits.
Failure to consider the role which attorneys play in determining whether suit
is brought has led at least one commentator to underestimate the potential for
reliance. Wheeler, Predismissal Notice and Statute of Limitations in Federal Class
Actions After American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAr.. L. REv. 771,
8o4-06 (I975).
2
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (i974).
26 See id. at 561 (dictum).
27 See Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Beaver
Assocs. v. Cannon, 59 F.R.D. 508, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (derivative suit). But
see Elias v. National Car Rental Sys., 59 F.R.D. 276, 277 (D. Minn. 1973).
28 See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551-52 (i974).
29 See, e.g., Beaver Assocs. v. Cannon, 59 F.R.D. 5o8, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 690 (E.D.N.Y. i97i), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437
(2d Cir. 1972); Polakoff v. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 264 F. Supp. 925,
917 (D. Del. 1966) (original rule 23).
0
3 See, e.g., Washington v. Wyman, 54 F.R.D. 266, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 197) ; Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Comment, Involuntary Dismissals of Class Actions, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 783, 8oI (1973); cf. LaReau v. Manson,
383 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Conn. 1974) (contacting legal clinic to handle further
prosecution). The court should withhold approval of any dismissal of the class
claim pending notice to the class. If no suitable substitute for the original plaintiff
comes forward, the judge will be forced to dismiss the claim, albeit without prejudice to absentees. See Rothman v. Gould, supra at 498; Comment, supra at 80304.
31 See, e.g., Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 2282, 1285-86 (M.D. Tenn.
2974); City and County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 638-39
(D. Colo. 1971). See also American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 4r4 U.S. 538, 54344 (1974).
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judge's authority to order notice in the pre-certification situation
is clear; the only question is when he should do so.3 2 Requiring
a named plaintiff or the class attorney to pay the cost of notice
before a class allegation can be dismissed could discourage the
initiation of class actions.3 This problem can be controlled to
32 Since rule 23(e) isapplicable only upon dismissal of a "class action," courts
have justified notice of a pre-certification dismissal by presuming that a class allegation is valid during the period between filing and any certification decision. E.g.,
Rotzenburg v. Neenah Joint School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 1Si, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 5o F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. i97o); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
If rule 23(e) does not seem germane for some reason, the judge could order notice
under rule 23(d)(2). See Rothman v. Gould, 52"F.R.D. 494, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). Of course, after certification rule 23(e) clearly governs any dismissal of the
suit. McGough & Lerach, Termination of Class Actions: The Judicial Role, 33 U.
PiTr. L. REv. 445, 458 n.5i (1972).
If the judge relies upon rule 23(e), the rule's language might appear to leave
him no option but to send notice whenever a class suit is dismissed. The mandatory
aspect of the rule, however, has been interpreted to apply to the approval requirement only, leaving the court free to omit notice that would not further class interests. See 3B J.MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 23.80 [2.-I] (2d ed. 1975). But
see Wheeler, supra note 24, at 8xo (reading rule 23(e) to require notice in all
cases to which it applies). If a court believes that rule 23(e) makes notice mandatory, it could utilize the analysis of this Note by rejecting application of rule
23(e) to pre-certification dismissals and operating instead under rule 23(d)(2)
see id. at 8og-ii. However, because the flexible interpretation of rule 23(e) avoids
such a formalistic approach, it seems more compatible with the functional orientation of the 1966 amendments.
" Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 297), rev'd
on other grounds, 479 F.2d ioo5 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 4,7 U.S.
x56 (I974) (Eisen IV) (certification notice). This problem would, of course, be
mitigated if the defendant were required to pay for notice. Eisen IV appears to
leave open the possibility of charging a defendant when his own activities in the
litigation produce the need to contact the class. See 417 US. at 178-79; notes
6I, 75, 79 infra.
Measures designed to protect the interests of class members from sellouts by
the class attorney and named plaintiffs may have the undesirable side effect of
encouraging attorneys to attempt to negotiate individual settlements before filing
a complaint. Prefiling bargaining is particularly open to abuse: an attorney may
threaten to file a class suit unless the claim of a particular individual is settled. This
practice isinconsistent with full realization of substantive policy-the justification
for providing class procedures- since substantive policy simply does not factor into
the settlement process. Potential recovery in a class suit may be so much greater
than the individual claim sought to be settled that the person threatened with
class suit may satisfy the individual claim regardless of the merits of either the individual or the class claim.
The existence of summary judgment procedures, see pp. 1419-20 supra,
may reduce the likelihood that a person threatened with a class suit will indeed
agree to settle if he believes the class claim to be frivilous. Moreover, because the
attorney raising the specter of class suit cannot guarantee that a representative suit
will not be brought by another attorney should the individual claim be settled, the
defendant may conclude that settling the individual claim would be pointless. Cf.
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a large extent, however, by ordering relatively inexpensive forms
of notice.34 Some courts and commentators have asserted that
notice should follow a voluntary dismissal, but ordinarily may be
omitted after an involuntary dismissal. 35 Although this distinction may serve as a rough guide, analysis in terms of the substantive policies implicated by pre-certification dismissal shows that
notice may be unnecessary after some voluntary terminations,3 6
and provides criteria for identifying cases where notice should be

ordered even though the dismissal is involuntary."
Several courts have ordered notice to absentees when the

named plaintiff has moved for dismissal of a class allegation following satisfaction of his claim. 38 Other courts, after first finding
that the class would not have been certified even in the absence of
an individual agreement, have dispensed with notice in such circumstances on the grounds that a proper class action did not
exist. 30 The latter approach would seem to be unwise. Given the
lack of adversary proceedings where both parties support disP. 1379 supra (binding effect necessary precondition to class bargaining). But
since there is no justification for allowing attorneys to use class suits as a whipsaw,
there seems to be no reason not simply to prohibit the practice as an unethical
abuse of process.
" Both rules 23(e) and 23 (d) (2) - unlike rule 23 (C) (2) - leave the form and
extent of notice to the trial court's discretion. See Adv. Comm. Note to 23(d), 39
F.R.D. Io6-o7 (x966). Individual mailed notice is not always given. See, e.g.,
Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 5o (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (publication notice); West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 3r4 F. Supp. 710, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 44o
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (I971) (same).
3
E.g., Baham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 53 F.R.D. 478, 478 (W.D. La.
1972) (notice not required where involuntary dismissal on merits); Dolgow v.
Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 69o (E.D.N.Y. I97i), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972)
(notice not required after non-collusive involuntary dismissal); 3B J. MOORE,
supra note 32, ff 23.80 [2.-11-[31 (notice required for all voluntary dismissals;
notice at discretion of court for involuntary dismissals); 7A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 8, § 1797, at 235; Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part 1, 22 Sw. L.J. 767, 776 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Haudek
I]; Mazawey, The Gentle Art of Terminating Class and Derivative Actions, I
CLAss ACTION REP. 63, 64 (1972).
11 See pp. I545-46 & notes 48-49, 51, 54 infra.
"I Under such a functional approach, the fact that an unopposed dismissal
granted pursuant to a defense motion is formally "involuntary" would not have
any significance in and of itself. Nor would it be necessary for the parties to act
out an involuntary dismissal to avoid notice costs.
"8 E.g., Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Yaffe v.
Detroit Steel Corp., 5o F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Rotzenburg v. Neenah
Joint School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 18i, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (semble).
39
E.g., Held v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 64 F.R.D. 346, 351 (S.D. Tex. 1974)
(adequacy of representation); Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396, 399
(N.D. Ohio 1973) (numerosity); Berger v. Purolator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542,
545 (S.D.N.Y. z966) (predomination and superiority).
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missal4 ° the judge cannot be confident that all factors which might
bear on the propriety of certification will be brought to his attention. Where payment has passed, the probability that the class
device has been abused is very great, and reliance interests may be
at stake as well. 4 Payment to the plaintiff strongly suggests that
absentees' claims have merit, and a good faith representative would
not be unduly deterred from initiating class suit by a requirement
that he either pay notice costs or wait until the class claim has
been resolved before compromising his own claim.4 2 Therefore,
a prophylactic rule requiring notice in all cases where the parties
fail to satisfy the judge that payment has not passed- whether
voluntary or involuntary dismissal is sought 4 3 - appears to be
appropriate.4 4
40

See Rothman v. Gould,

52

F.R.D. 494, 500 (S.D.N.Y. '97i).

See also Saylor

v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896,

9oi (2d Cir. 1972).
41 When individual class claims are large enough to support separate lawsuits,

the likelihood that the defendant settled with the named plaintiff largely to eliminate the sole suitable representative for the class is reduced. On the other hand, the
possibility is greater that class members who would have filed their own suits
refrained from doing so because of informal publicity about the class complaint.
42 Indeed, if potential liability for notice costs deters bad faith representative
plaintiffs from filing class suits, substantive policy will be served. However, since
the possibility that defendant might agree to pay notice costs as part of the individual settlement could mitigate this deterrent effect, courts might consider exercising their ancillary powers, see Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (derivative suit); Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v.
Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 324 (3d Cir. X944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945)
(dissenting opinion); Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 6o F.R.D. 634,
637 & n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1973), to block consummation of an individual "sell out"
agreement reached before or after certification, or to order the putative representative plaintiff to return any payment he has received. See Dole, The Settlement of
Class Actions for Damages, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 971, 980-81 (i97I). Such court
control would appear more feasible than the alternative of allowing class members
to sue an unfaithful named plaintiff or class attorney for breach of fiduciary duty,
since the costs of bringing such a suit might be prohibitively high and the defendant
might be judgment-proof.
"3 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 69o (E.DN.Y. '97), ajl'd, 464
F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972). Involuntary dismissals must be scrutinized because the
plaintiff may have covertly agreed not to prosecute the action, or not to oppose a
defense motion for summary judgment, to dismiss the claim, or to deny class
certification. See Dole, supra note 42, at 982; Haudek I, supra note 35, at 776-79;
Comment, supra note 3o, at 791-92.
44 If the defendant withdraws his offer of an individual settlement when the
court indicates it will order notice, the named plaintiff may decide he wishes to
continue the class suit. However, a plaintiff who has attempted to obtain an individual compromise which ignores absentee interests ordinarily should not be certified as an adequate representative. Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 197I); see Comment, supra note 3o, at 799-801.
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46
Some cases,4" and the American College of Trial Lawyers,
have suggested that this prophylactic rule identifies all cases in
which notice is necessary. However, given the possibility that a
payment may be hidden successfully from the judge,4 7 as well as
the potential for reliance independent of the presence of a payment, notice may be appropriate in other circumstances as well.
Thus, where a representative plaintiff contends that discovery or
further study has indicated that his claim is untenable, notice
probably should be ordered unless the claim is patently non-meritorious. 8 While neither fairness nor any other substantive policy
requires that notice be sent if absentees' claims are groundless,49
a searching inquiry into the merits, or a requirement that reliance
be demonstrated, would seem to be impracticable in a non-adversary context.
Moreover, if the plaintiff seeks to drop his class allegation
on the basis of a failure to qualify under rules 23(a) or (b),
or if a motion to deny certification is granted, the need for
notice would appear to turn upon the composition of the class and
the specific reason the named party's class allegation fails. If some
absentees have individually recoverable claims, notice should

45 See, e.g., Berse v. Berman, 6o F.R.D. 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. x973); Elias v.
National Car Rental System, 59 F.R.D. 276, 277 (D. Minn. 1973).
46
See SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
35-37 (I972) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS].
47 The Rules Advisory Committee is reported to be considering addition of a
new rule 23 (f) which would require a report to the court of any payment to a
party or an attorney made as part of a pre-certification dismissal. See 4 CLASS
ACTION REP. 290-91 (1975). Such a policing mechanism could mitigate the problem
of uncovering covert settlements, since attorneys might hesitate to ignore the rule
from fear of stiff sanctions if their noncompliance were discovered. Nevertheless,
even with such a rule notice might still he required in the absence of payment in
order to protect absentee reliance interests.
4 The burden of proof upon the parties hoping to avoid notice should be
analogous to that used in motions for summary judgment, see FED. R. CIv. P. 56;
R.

FIELD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 6o-68

(3d ed. I973). Since most complicated class suits present at least one colorable fact
issue, an exemption from the notice requirement because the claim turned out to
be patently non-meritorious would probably occur with greater frequency in
cases turning on questions of law. Even so, affidavits or other pre-trial evidence
may be sufficient to establish that no material issue of fact exists. See Laurenzano
v. Texaco, Inc., 14 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 1262, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. i97i). Of course,
under this approach, if the court dismisses an action for failure to state a claim
or actually grants a motion for summary judgment against the named plaintiff
or the class, notice need not be ordered.
49
See Laurenzano v. Texaco, Inc., 14 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 1262, 1263 (S.D.N.Y.
i97I); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 46, at 36-37; Dole, supra
note 42, at 982 & n.7x. But see Comment, supra note 3o, at 804 (merit of claim
irrelevant to need for notice).
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be ordered as a matter of course to protect their reliance interests.5" Assuming, however, that no class members have claims
which would justify individual suits, notice would be pointless if
class suit would fail because of a flaw, such as lack of predomination or numerosity, which could not be cured by any substitute
plaintiff." Although the judge will not always have the advantage
of an adversary proceeding, notice probably is not necessary when
he is convinced that such a flaw exists: if the finding is correct
there is no possibility of meaningful reliance. As a result, in the
absence of any indication of abuse, the balance would appear to
shift in favor of protecting good faith representatives from the
burden of sending notice. On the other hand, where dismissal is
based on a problem of inadequacy of tepresentation which a
different plaintiff might be able to correct, notice should normally
be ordered to protect possible reliance. For example, where dismissal of a class allegation is sought because the plaintiff cannot
afford ordinary rule 23 (c) (2) notice costs, the court should order
some kind of notice 52 to class members so that they may intervene
as representative plaintiffs. 3 However, to avoid undue deterrence
of plaintiffs acting in good faith, an exception might be made if
the representative could not reasonably have anticipated his shortcoming. 54
Rather
2. Settlements Offered Individual Class Members.than settling with the representative plaintiff alone prior to certification,5 5 a defendant might contact a portion, or all, of the putative class members with individual offers of settlement.", Indi"°See City and County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 62o,

628

(D. Colo. 1971) (numerosity).

5' See, e.g., Marcus v. Textile Banking Co., 38 F.R.D. x85, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(personal jurisdiction over defendant) (original rule 23); cf. Katz v. Aspinwall,
342 F. Supp. 286, 288 (N.D. Ala. x97i), aff'd mem., 459 F.2d IO45 (gth Cir. 1972)
(derivative suit) (no notice when claim dismissed because corporation dissolved).
See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 197x), aff'd, 464 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1972).
12 Relatively inexpensive publication notice should normally suffice to announce
the termination of a class suit for failure to meet the rule 23(a) and (b) prerequisites. See Berse v. Berman, 6o F.R.D. 414, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Rothman
v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ; Comment, supra note 3o, at 8o5.
"aSee generally Berse v. Berman, 6o F.R.D. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
" See generally Beaver Assocs. v. Cannon, 59 F.R.D. 508, 510 (S.D.N.Y. I975)

(alternative holding) (notice not ordered where named plaintiff would fail to meet
typicality requirement).
" Claim satisfaction offers made to individuals after formal certification and
notice may require a somewhat different approach by the trial court. See Weight
Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.); note 66 infra.
" These offers usually take one of two forms: payment in exchange for a release
of the individual's claim, see, e.g., American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65
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vidual claim satisfaction may be an efficient means of accelerating
settlement when a defendant anticipates losing the class suit or
fears adverse publicity from extended litigation. 57 In other circumstances, however, claim satisfaction may be used to prevent
the full realization of substantive policies. Although class members whose claims have not been satisfied are not legally bound,
their interests may be practically impaired. Premium settlements
might be offered to selected members of the class, including named
plaintiffs, whose resources or claims are necessary for the class
suit. Even if offers are made to all class members,58 acceptance by
only a fraction of the class might prevent the class suit from going
forward, either because numerosity would be destroyed, or because the damages or settlement fund that the remaining claims
could produce would not cover litigation costs.5" If a putative class
member fears he will be left without a remedy, he may be coerced
into accepting a settlement he considers inadequate. In addition,
F.R.D. 572, 574 (D. Md. I974) (Title VII); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward,
6z F.R.D. 558, 562 (S.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975) (negligence), or mooting of the alleged wrong by .purchasing the property which gives
the individual legal standing to assert the claim, see, e.g., Berley v. Dreyfus & Co.,
43 F.R.D. 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (securities); Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v.
Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 318 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (i945)
(same). Although only the first form involves a formal release of the legal claim,
the practical effect is the same, and courts should analyze both types of offers in
the same manner. See Dole, supra note 42, at 999.
" See Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 53
F.R.D. 647, 649 (E.D.N.Y. i971).
"8 See, e.g., Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"9See, e.g., Nesenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 5oo, 5o3 (E.D.N.Y. I974); Dole,
supra note 42, at 991. See also American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65
F.R.D. 572, 574, 576 (D. Md. 1974) (acknowledging possibility).
Plaintiffs' attorneys might hesitate to bring class suits if the defendant could
deprive them of a fee by making a successful claim satisfaction offer. See Dole,
supra note 42, at 994 & n.I63. It seems clear, however, that if the offer comes in
response to a filed or threatened class suit the class attorney is entitled to a fee.
Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 16I, 166-67, 174 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 474-75 (2d Cir. 1968)
(attorney entitled to fee if corporation makes settlement in response to threat of
derivative suit); see Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest
Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REv. 849, 891-93 & n.167 (1975) (Title VII cases). If
possible, the defendant should channel claim satisfaction through the court in
order that a pro rata share of a proper fee, see pp. 16o6-i8 infra, may be deducted
from each class member's recovery. If the defendant makes such a deduction impossible, for instance by sending checks directly to class members, then he should
be required to pay the fee himself, see Kahan v. Rosentiel, supra at 166, on remand,
315 F. Supp. 1391, 1392 (D. Del. 1970). This system of fee awards should prevent
undesirable deterrence of class action filings. See Dole, supra note 42, at iooo.
Even so, it does not give any incentive for further litigation on behalf of nonaccepting class members since it provides no basis for charging settling individuals
with the legal costs of those who wish to pursue their claims further.
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the defendant might induce class members to accept inadequate
settlements by making fraudulent or misleading statements. Class
members who have little legal sophistication or who are in an ongoing relationship with the defendant may be particularly subject
to manipulation 0
The potential for abuse of process creates a central issue in
pre-certification claim satisfaction - the degree to which the
court should control the terms of the defendant's offers. If claim
satisfaction leads to a motion to dismiss the class allegation, the
court has the power to exercise supervision pursuant to rule
23 (e)." Prior to that time, control may be asserted under rule
23 (d),62 local court rules governing communications with class
members, 63 or the.equitable power of a court to enter orders ancillary to the matters before it. 4 Of course, one possibility would
be to prohibit pre-certification individual claim satisfaction altogether. However, statutes should not be interpreted as prescribing so heavy a bias in favor of class action unless such a policy is
clearly stated. 5 As a matter of litigational efficiency, absentees
should presumptively be given the opportunity to settle their disputes individually without being forced to become active participants in, or opt-outs from, a class suit.0 0
60 For example, such problems are likely to arise in Title VII cases, see, e.g.,

American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 576 (D. Md. 1974)
(class members may be ignorant of rights); Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.
Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (former employee better plaintiff than current
employee because free from "possible coercive influence" of employer), and in
antitrust franchise litigation, see, e.g., Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight
Watchers Int'l, Inc. 53 F.R.D. 647, 65o, 653 (E.D.N.Y. 197X) (allegation of threats
by franchisor to franchise operators).
6 See American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 576 (D. Md.
'974); Dole, supra note 42, at 987. A presumption that 'the class allegation is
proper will be necessary for rule 23(e) to apply if claim satisfaction precedes
certification. See note 32 supra. Because the defendant's activity creates the need
for informing the non-accepting individual class members that they must prosecute
a separate suit to protect their interests, he should pay the cost of notice. See
Dole, supra note 42, at 992; note 33 supra.
62 E.g., Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 53 F.R.D.
647, 651 (E.D.N.Y. 197).
63 See pp. 1597-98 & note 81 infra.
64 See note 42 supra.
6 Cf. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (197o) (requiring that employers bargain with union rather than individual employees).
66 In contrast, individual claim satisfaction following certification and notice
but prior to resolution of the class claim generally should not be permitted. Once
the court has determined that class action is appropriate and, in b(3) actions,
given class members the opportunity to opt-out, the defendant should not be
allowed to fragment the class through individual settlement offers. See generally
In re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation, 1972 Trade Cas.

II 73,864 (W.D. Mo.

1972).

In the unlikely event that a representative plaintiff

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS-

CLASS ACTIONS

1549

When all class members have individually recoverable claims,
minimal judicial control will normally suffice.37 Any class member
who does not receive, or who rejects, the settlement offer will be
able to bring his own suit. In addition, putative class members
are likely to have the assistance of an attorney,6" thus decreasing
the possibility of fraud or coercion. If fraud is subsequently
discovered, collateral attack will usually be financially feasible."
If the class is composed of a mix of individually recoverable
and non-recoverable claims, or solely of individually non-recoverable claims, a more active judicial role is necessary. Class members with non-recoverable claims often will not be able to afford
a personal attorney to evaluate the fairness of the offer and check
for fraud or inaccuracy, and collateral attack probably will be
infeasible even if fraud is uncovered. 70 The court should therefore ensure that defendant's statements are clear, accurate, and
complete through supervision either immediately prior or subsequent to the communications. 71 However, such oversight may not
or class attorney unreasonably rejects a settlement offer which is quite favorable
to the class, the court should treat the issue as one of adequacy of representation.
See generally note X78 infra (discussing objection by named plaintiff).
67 See Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 55 F.R.D.
So, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972)

(defendant
not required to retract unsupervised communication with the class) ; cf. Greenspun
v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 382 (ist Cir. 1974) (no obligation in derivative suit to
include supporting and opposing arguments in settlement notice); Matarazzo v.
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (unsupervised
solicitation of opt-outs and releases allowed); Philadelphia Housing Authority v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 378 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (preliminary approval), 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa:) (final approval),
modified on other grounds sub nor. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane., 453
F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 197)
(including objections to settlement in notice to class
unnecessary).
08 See Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. 55 F.R.D.
5o, 5I (E.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972) (requiring
presence of class attorney at negotiating sessions between defendant and individual
class members). See also Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114,
121 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 124 (i975) ; Hartford Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 52 F.R.D. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 197); Note, Factors Considered in Determining
the Fairness of a Settlement, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 1146, 1153 (,974).
65 See pp. 1394-1402 supra (res judicata).
See generally Note, Collateral
Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARv. L. REV. 589
(1974); Note, Collateral Attack of Judicially-Approved Settlements of Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 74 YALE L.J. 1140 (1965).
70 In theory, small individual claims could be consolidated into another class
action. However, the total incremental recovery if fraud were shown might be
insufficient to support expensive class litigation.
71 See pp. 1597-16o4 infra.
To be complete, the communications should contain an explanation of all of
the options available to a class member -including the possibility of refusing the
offer and remaining in a litigating class. The notice should also point out, however,
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sufficiently protect absentee interests where class members are

not legally sophisticated.72 In such cases, the class attorney should

be permitted to enclose a rebuttal statement in the defendant's
communication. 73 Although less effective, supervision of defendant communications would be possible as late as the rule 23 (e)
hearing which should follow a motion to dismiss the class allegation after a claim satisfaction. linally, even if settlement offers
are not fraudulent or misleading, the court should ensure that the
type of relief
offered does not contravene constitutional or statu74
tory policy.
The court could minimize the coercion arising from the interdependency of class members' individual settlement decisions by
requiring a defendant to leave open his original offer for a reasonable period of time following dismissal of a class allegation as a
result of claim satisfaction. 6 Under this system, class members
could make their initial choices without fear that a decision not
to settle might result in no recovery at all. Additional judicial
scrutiny is required when the defendant limits his offer to part of
the class. Given the substantial danger that the defendant's sole
objective is impairment of the class suit,70 the court should permit
claim satisfaction to be offered exclusively to a segment of the
class only when the court first approves that segment as a legiti-

mate subclass.
that further litigation may not be possible if enough class members accept to
destroy numerosity or to make the suit financially infeasible.
72 See p. 1548 & note 6o supra.
" American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 576, 581-83 (D.
Md. 1974); see p. 16o3 infra.
In the event the class attorney supports the claim satisfaction offer, see, e.g.,
Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 322 (3d Cir. 1944) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945), the court might appoint another
lawyer to prepare an opposing recommendation, see p. 1561 infra (creation of
subclasses) ; pp. 1561-65 infra (absentee advocate), or possibly even prepare a list of
opposing reasons itself, cf. Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2972)
(proposed settlement of entire class claim).
' For instance, the steel industry consent decree approved in United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. i (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 826
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1684 (2976), allowed the defendants to
offer each class member a back pay settlement in return for release of his Title VII
claims. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit interpreted these releases to apply only to past
incidents of discrimination, noting that prospective waivers would violate statutory
policy. 517 F.2d at 853-55. If such supervision is necessary and valid for a government-negotiated consent decree, it would also appear to be appropriate for private
settlements.
" If additional notice is necessary to inform class members of this opportunity,
the defendant should be responsible for it. See note 33 supra.
70See Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442, 443 (N.D. Ga. 2968)
(semble); Dole, supra note 42, at 99o-9i.
77 See pp. 2479-8I supra.
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Even if the defendant does not improperly limit the scope of
his offer, however, enough class members may initially accept the
defendant's offer so that, without judicial intervention, numerosity would be destroyed or further class suit would be made financially impracticable.7 One commentator has suggested that for
purposes of numerosity all original members of the class should
be counted, and that class members who have accepted the offer
should continue in the suit as a separate subclass interested in the
possibility that further litigation will uncover fraud in the satisfaction process. 70 While providing a possible solution to the numerosity issue, this proposal does not expressly deal with the more
difficult question of the extent to which the costs of further class
litigation may fairly be imposed on those class members who have
accepted defendant's offer.
A better approach would be to analyze acceptances by a portion of the class as a disagreement over whether suit should be
brought.80 Class members who accept claim satisfaction should
be viewed as equivalent to absentees in suits not involving claim
satisfaction who opt-out or, where opt-outs are not permitted, oppose class suit. Thus, if opt-outs would be permitted to defeat
numerosity or practically foreclose class litigation, partial acceptance of a class-wide claim satisfaction offer should also be
allowed to do so. If a class certification would be refused upon
a showing that a given percentage of the class opposed the suit,
then certification should also be denied where the same percentage
accepts claim satisfaction.81
On the other hand, where an equivalent number of opt-outs
or absentees opposed to the filing of suit would not be sufficient
to defeat class certification, claim satisfaction should not bar
class suit. In such situations, class members who accept a claim
satisfaction offer should normally be treated as full members of the
class both for numerosity purposes and for sharing of the total litigation costs of the suit. 2 The amount accepted as a claim satis78 See p.

1547 & note 59 supra.

71 See Dole, supra note 42, at 991-92. The court in American Finance System,
Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572 (D. Md. 1974), cited Dole's suggestion with approval.

Id. at 576. However, rather than adopting the subclass concept, the Harlow court
indicated that it would apply a lenient standard for numerosity when ruling on a
certification motion after a claim satisfaction offer had been made. Id.
80 See pp. 1493-95 supra.
8 However, when individual class claims would justify litigation, the defendant
should provide notice to absentees informing them of their option to file a separate
suit. See p. 1542 & note 33 supra.
82 Additional fees could be collected from any incremental recovery produced
by further litigation or by requiring the defendant to withhold actual payment of
claims until it is determined whether.those who accept the offer will bear litigation
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faction should be set off against the final recovery of these class
members.
B. Settlements Negotiated On Behalf of the Entire Class
There are three major sources of antagonism that may undermine adequacy of representation in the context of a settlement
negotiated on behalf of the entire class:"" conflict between the
attorney and the class; conflict between the representative plaintiff and the rest of the class; and conflict among competing interests within the class. Greatest attention has centered on attorney-class conflict." In damage suits, the attorney may be
tempted to accept a settlement inadequate from the class' perspective if the terms of the agreement guarantee him a large attorney's
fee."0 Similarly, especially in class actions seeking structural injunctions, the attorney may attempt to pursue his own ideological
goals without regard to the desires of class members., 7 Although
such behavior would appear to violate the attorney's obligation
to the class,8 8 it is probably not realistic to expect voluntary compliance with this duty in all casesY9
costs. If the defendant prevents such assessment he should become responsible
for the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. See note 59 supra.
83 Of course, this approach may cause defendants to condition their claim
satisfaction offers upon dismissal of the class litigation, in which case the set-off
issue will never arise.
84 These categories are not intended to cover every conceivable situation
in
which a class action settlement should be disapproved, but to provide a structured
analysis for many of the more difficult issues facing a reviewing court. The problems that do not easily fit within one or more of the conflicts- such as a grossly
inadequate settlement negotiated in good faith by an incompetent attorney-can
be considered under a more generalized notion of "fairness" in the context of
evaluating the strength of the plaintiff's case. See pp. 1573-74 infra.
8- See pp. 1592-1604 infra.
88See p. 16o5 infra. This problem can be controlled to some extent by requiring fees to be set by the court, see Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D.
454, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); MANuAL, supra note X7, pt. 1, § 146, at 45-46;
pp. 16o4-x8 infra, on the basis of a formula focusing on the number of hours
worked rather than the amount of the class recovery, see pp. 16iz-z infra. Control
of fees will not, however, remove the conflict entirely since the lawyer must still
recover something for the class to get any fee and may therefore be tempted to
settle a difficult case.
8" See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-93, 5o5-XI (1976) ; Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Haav. L. Rav. z667, i765-66
(1975).
88
See pp. 1592-97 infra.
89 To the extent that formally litigated actions for structural relief involve
substantial elements of negotiation between the parties, see Chayes, supra note 3,
the ideological conflict of interest can be expected to arise at trial as well as
at settlement.
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Conflicts of interests between the representative plaintiff and
the rest of the class perhaps arise most frequently in the context
of settlement agreements binding only on the representative and
the defendant. 90 However, such conflicts may also occur in settlements negotiated on behalf of the entire class, when the representative plaintiff designs an allocation plan that gives him a
disproportionate share in the class relief." For example, when a
state is acting as the representative plaintiff in a consumer class
action, it might attempt to increase its own final recovery by agreeing to a distribution scheme in which consumers must file a claim
within an extremely short time limit if they wish to prevent their
shares from being forfeited to the state."
When the position advocated by the named plaintiff is shared
by some class members but opposed by others,93 the antagonism
should be analyzed as a conflict between competing interests
within the class. Although some intra-class conflicts can be anticipated and dealt with early in the litigation, 94 many will not surface
until the resolution stage. In structural injunction actions, whether
formally settled or litigated,99 class members who agree that the
defendant has violated their constitutional or statutory rights
may disagree as to the proper institutional change which the court
should order.9" In Calhoun v. Cook,9 7 for instance, different as9

See, e.g., Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 64 F.R.D. 346, 35o-5i (S.D. Tex.

1974); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); pp.

154o-46 & notes

20-54 supra (pre-certification dismissals).

o" The possibility of a plaintiff-class conflict also arises when the settlement
gives the representative plaintiff a payment in addition to his share of the class recovery. While such arrangements are not per se unacceptable, they should be
carefully scrutinized to insure that the extra compensation is justified by personal
and financial sacrifices made by the representative for the benefit of the class.
"2 This scenario is suggested by West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314
F. Supp. 71o (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 44o F.2d io79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
871 (i97i), although in Pfizer the plaintiffs conducted a publicity campaign to
stimulate response from absentees. See Shapiro, Processing the Consumer's Claim,
41 ANTITRUST LJ. 257, 264 (1972).

An inequitable distribution of relief is less likely to be attempted at trial since
the judge exercises more constant supervision. Nonetheless, in some cases the
judge may grant prospective relief to the entire class while limiting retrospective
relief to the named plaintiff only. If the plaintiff does not oppose this limitation,
his representation of the class usually should be considered inadequate. See
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1973).
3
. See, e.g., Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 415 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
o' See pp. 1489-93 supra.
o See Chayes, supra note 3.
6 See, e.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1975); Rodriguez v.
East Tex. Motor Freight, 5o5 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974) (split over desirability of
merging seniority lists in formally litigated Title VII case).
97 522 F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1975).
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sociations claiming to speak for Atlanta's black parents " agreed
on the need to correct past school segregation, but split dramatically over the proper remedy. Some insisted upon busing to
integrate the classrooms while others contended that increasing
the number of black school administrators would be more productiveY9
In damage actions, identically situated class members may
disagree as to what constitutes a fair settlement of their claims.
More fundamentally, objective differences within the class may
become the source of conflict when the class representative bargains for a settlement which does or should include different
amounts of relief for different groups of class members. For example, in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.' the defendants
in an antitrust case offered plaintiffs, including consumers, retailwholesalers, and governmental agencies, $ioo million to be allocated among them. Disagreement over the proper division of the
fund produced the only real controversy over the adequacy of
the settlement. 10 1
The problems can multiply when the available remedies include
a mixture of structural change and compensatory relief, and the
settlement involves trading off one form of relief against the other.
Thus, in Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Association, Local
55o v. American Airlines, Inc., 02 former employees who had been
fired due to a no-pregnancy regulation which violated Title VII
preferred immediate reinstatement with full seniority for the
period between dismissal and rehiring, while current employees,
though pleased to see the regulation eliminated, wished to preserve
their own seniority advantages. °3 Moreover, within the subclass
of former employees, some preferred immediate reinstatement,
8 The organizations included the national NAACP, the Atlanta chapter of the
NAACP, and CORE. Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1250 & n.2 (N.D. Ga.),
aff'd, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975).
" After bitter conflict inside the courtroom, see, e.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 362
F. Supp. X249 (N.D. Ga.), remanded, 487 F.2d 68o (5th Cir. 1973), new order all'd,
522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975); Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. i97i),
rev'd, 469 F.2d io67 (5th Cir. 1972), and outside as well, see Trillin, U.S. Journal:
Atlanta Settlement, NEW YORKER, March 17, 1973, at xoi, the district court finally
ordered a plan relying upon voluntary transfers rather than widespread busing.
See 522 F.2d at 718-i9.
100334 F. Supp. 71o (S.D.N.Y.

1970), affd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 87i (197).
10'

See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079

(2d

denied, 404 U.S. 871 (197i).
102 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
'03 See id. at 640.

Cir.), cert.
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while10 4others were willing to accept some delay to obtain back

pay.

i. Structuring the Settlement Process to Promote Adequacy
of Representation.- Two procedural strategies are available to
the judge to minimize the potential for conflicts of interest or to
identify and correct them when they occur. First, the judge can
supervise the party structure of negotiations to facilitate the likelihood of a fair settlement. Second, the judge can create procedures
that will channel information to him during negotiation so that
he can better evaluate the fairness of any final proposal. These
strategies, while analytically distinct, reinforce each other. To
the extent that oversight is made effective, the parties, in seeking
to avoid reversal, are more likely to reach an adequate settlement
on their own; similarly, to the extent that the parties can be
trusted to reach a fair settlement on their own, the burden on the
court is lessened.
(a) The Problem of the Tentative Settlement Class. - The
most elaborate settlement mechanism developed for class actions
is the tentative settlement class, in which the parties negotiate the
definition of the class as well as the content of the relief.'0 5 After
agreement is reached the judge is asked to give preliminary approval and to authorize notice to class members,' informing them
of the terms of the settlement and, in effect, giving them four
options: to opt-out; 0 7 to accept the settlement and file a claim;
to file a claim and remain in the class but to protest the settlement
at a final approval hearing; or to do nothing, in which case they
are bound without the chance to share in the recovery. The
judge then holds a final hearing and rules on the appropriateness
104 Id.
105

See, e.g., Girsh V. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir.

I975);

City of Detroit v.

Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464-66 (2d Cir. I974); Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 826 (3d Cir. 1973) ; In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 58 F.R.D. 19, 31 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Philadelphia Housing Authority v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 373 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (preliminary approval), 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa.) (final approval),
modified on other grounds sub nom. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co.,
453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 197i). See also Note, The Tentative Settlement Class and
Class Action Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 72 MIcH. L. RBV. 1462
(1974); MANuAL, supra note 17, pt. 1, § 1.46, at 43-45.
100 Usually, one wave of notice is designed to fulfill the requirements of both
23 (c)() and 23(e). See, e.g., Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (preliminary approval), 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa.) (final approval), -modified on other
grounds sub nor. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
1971). But see note xo8 infra (discussing Pfizer).
107 If formation of a tentative settlement class comes after the court has already certified and sent out notice for a smaller class, see pp. 1559-6o infra, only the
"new" class members should be given.an opportunity to opt out.
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of the class definition and the adequacy of the settlement. If the
judge rejects the proposal, or if an unexpectedly large number of
class members opt out, the defendant may renounce his class stipulation aid either oppose class treatment altogether or argue for
a narrower definition. 08
Characteristically, parties using the tentative settlement class
device have succeeded in minimizing judicial involvement pending completion of the settlement package. 09 Apparently assuming
that this absence of early supervision is an inherent part of the
tentative settlement class process, the Manual for Complex Litigation concludes that tentative settlement classes "should never
be formed." "o The Manual's basic arguments appear to be that
this procedure fails to provide adequate representation of absentees' interests and, as a result, dilutes their bargaining power; de'SA somewhat analogous procedure was adopted in West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 72o (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aifd, 44o F.2d io79 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (i97I). Facing over 6o class actions brought by govern-

ment entities, wholesale druggists, and retail drug stores, the Pfizer defendants
attempted to satisfy all of them at once with a $So,oooooo offer. To administer
the settlement, the court created a "temporary national class action," id.at 723,
and sent a notice to governmental entities acting as representative plaintiffs, inquiring whether they wished to participate in the "global" settlement, either as
members of the temporary class or independently, id. The judge also consolidated
all class actions brought by wholesale druggists and retail drug stores.
After all but seven of the state class representatives accepted the settlement
offer, id. at 724, the judge certified the classes, id., and ordered rule 23(c) (2)
notice to be given to class members. The defendants, however, reserved the right
to adjust their offer to reflect the number opting out after either of these notices,
or to withdraw it completely if the number participating in the settlement diminished significantly. Id. at 723. When the defendants elected to continue, with a
reduction in the settlement fund attributable to the seven self-excluded states, the
accepting plaintiffs were given an opportunity to devise an allocation system, id.,
but since they could not agree among themselves, the defendants finally selected
one, id. at 731. At that point the judge ordered 23(e) notice, id. at 723, 732,
and, subsequently, approved the settlement, id. at 744.
The Pfizer approach differs from a tentative settlement class procedure inasmuch
as the class actions were actually certified before the settlement was approved and
separate notice was sent for certification and settlement approval. If the judge had
rejected the compromise, the defendants might have been forced to accept these
classes for litigation. See Note, supra note io5, at 1466-67 n.32. However, the
Pfizer parties clearly expected the settlements to win approval and understood that
the defendants acquiesced in the formation of a class including all claimants only
for settlement purposes. Moreover, the defendants' option to withdraw or revise
their offer after the results of the opt-out notice were known resembles the mechanics of a tentative settlement class. Pfizer, therefore, provides much relevant
insight into the issues posed by a finely tuned tentative settlement class procedure.
109 See, e.g., Helfand v. New America Fund, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 86, 89 (E.D. Pa.
1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir.

1975) (ruling on pre-certification motions delayed) ; In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws
Litigation, 58 F.R.D. 19, 3X (W.D. Okla. 1972) (certification decision delayed).
110MANWuA, supra note 17, pt. I, § x.46, at 43.
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lays the opportunity for class members to pursue individual litigation; and does not generate the information necessary for class
members and the judge to evaluate intelligently the settlement
proposal."' Proponents of the tentative settlement class respond

to criticisms by contending that the mechanism is actually helpful to absentees, since it allows them to opt out with knowledge
of the specific benefits of remaining in the class." 2 Proponents
also contend that settlements of large consumer class actions would
not be possible without tentative settlement classes, 11 3 and that
problems of representation in a tentative settlement class are no
worse than in any class settlement." 4
When all class members have individually recoverable claims,
a tentative settlement class may be acceptable. In that situation,
class members have a genuine option to opt out of the settlement
and can benefit from specific knowledge of the amount of recovery
they can expect from remaining in the class. Moreover, since a
class member with a recoverable claim is likely to have his own attorney "I and an incentive to investigate his claim, he may be
able to make an effective evaluation of the settlement despite the
lack of information supplied by the negotiating parties. To the
extent that absentees are able to exercise supervision over the
settlement, the weak posture of the judge becomes less troubling.
On the other hand, large claimants might be able to gather even
more detailed information about the actual negotiations if there
"'Id. at 43-44. The Manual also condemns tentative settlement classes as
unauthorized by rule 23. Id. at 43. However, a tentative class would appear to be
a form of conditional certification, sanctioned by rule 23(c) ), see, e.g., Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (ioth Cir. 1968), cert denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969) (class
definition may be revised); Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 667-68 (E.D.
N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); pp. 1418-27 supra, and
its acceptability should therefore be analyzed in terms of the purposes of class
actions. As to the propriety of delaying certification while settlement talks progress, see pp. 1558-6o &notes 122-128 infra; pp. 1426-27 supra.
112In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 58 F.R.D. 19, 31 (W.D. Okla.
1972) ; see, e.g., Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 374 (ED. Pa. 1970) (approving tentative settlement class), 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa.) (approving settlement), modified on
other grounds sub nom. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30
(3d Cir. X971) (affirming settlement and tentative settlement class procedure).
Under the procedure utilized in the Pfizer case, see note io8 supra, the consequences
of class membership were not fully established prior to the deadline for opting out,
since the allocation plan had not been formulated.
112 See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinneli Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 466 (2d Cir. '974);
Panel Discussion, Antitrust Class Actions, 41

ANTITRUST

L.J. 321, 347 (,972) (re-

marks of Clark concerning Pfizer litigation).
114 See Note, supra note ioS, at 1468.
115 See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 121 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 124 (197s) (settlement approval hearing); Hartford
Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.) 52 F.R.D. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. '97') (same).

1558

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1318

is early certification with the opportunity to intervene. In addition, an absentee might have his own suit delayed if all similar
cases are consolidated for pre-trial proceedings and the judge
refuses to allow any discovery until the tentative class settlement
has been negotiated." 6 On balance, however, these costs would
appear to be offset by the advantage of being able to opt out with
knowledge of the benefits of remaining in the class.
In contrast, when a significant number of class members'
claims are non-recoverable or nonviable, the Manual's concerns
about inadequate representation appear well-founded. Defendants may exploit the possibility of attorney-class conflict by
shopping among attorneys who claim to represent the class until
they find one with "reasonable" demands."17 Intra-class conflicts
are also likely since both the class attorney and the defendant will
often have incentive to stipulate to an overly broad class. The
class attorney may want to increase the size of the class in order
to maximize his fee.1 8 If subsequent class or individual suits are
probable, the defendant may want to save litigation costs by
quieting all claims with a single payment. 10
When individual claims are small, absentees probably will be
unable to protect themselves against inadequate representation.
Small claimants will seldom be able to hire a lawyer to help them
evaluate the offer. Opting out will often be an illusory choice,
since the individual cannot afford to bring his own suit and will
probably not wish to gamble that a sufficient number of other absentees will opt out to form a new class. 20 Thus, effective judicial
supervision becomes vital. The judge's lack of information, however, may prevent him from fulfilling his guardian role.'
These problems can be overcome, however, if the judge exercises early supervision of the settlement process. The judge
. 6 See In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 488-89 (J.P.M.D.L.
1968). But see MANUAL, supra note 17, pt. I, § 1.21 (possibility of settlement not
grounds to delay discovery).
" See Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir.
1971); Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class Actions, 1976 RESEARCH J. 251, 293-95.
1"' This danger will be present even if the court calculates fees on the basis of
an hours-worked standard: one of the factors usually taken into account is quality
of performance, which might be measured at least in part by the size of the settlement. See pp. 1611-15 & note 146 infra. Moreover, the class attorney may not resist
a defendant's desire for a large class if the procedure includes some mechanism for
easing the financial burden of notice costs.
119 See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 71o (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (197).
1 0 Since individual suits are unfeasible in this situation, the Manual's objection
that use of a tentative settlement class unfairly delays litigation of the claim,
MANUAL, supra note 17, pt. 1, § 1.46, at 44, is inapplicable.
121 See Girsh v. Jepson, 52x F.2d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1975); MANUAL, supra note
17, pt. I, § 146, at 44; Note, supra note xo5, at 1479-80.
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should prevent plaintiff-shopping and similar abuses by designating one attorney as the official class negotiator.' 2 The court might
initiate some discussion of proper class size among the parties so
it can benefit from adversary proceedings on the issue before both
sides find it advantageous to argue for a large class. Where appropriate, the judge should form subclasses to ensure that all viewpoints are represented in subsequent negotiations. 23
In many cases, the judge need not actually certify the class and
order notice, but may rely upon more informal control. 4 In fact,
if Eisen-type notice that would strain the named plaintiff's financial resources is required, 25 class interests may be advanced by
delaying notice until a settlement is imminent and the defendant
may be willing to pay the costs. 26 On the other hand, if the case
raises complicated intra-class conflicts, the judge might order
sampling notice to help him decide whether subclassing is neces27
sary.

Given effective early supervision,

expansion of class size

solely for the purpose of settlement may be unobjectionable. Such
expansion would appear to be appropriate when the defendant
makes the enlargement possible by waiving a right, such as an indi-

vidual hearing on each class member's damages, that might have
made full litigation of the class claim unmanageable. 2 9 For ex122

See Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir.

1971).
See pp. 156o-6i & notes 136-137 infra.
See pp. 1441-44 supra.
125 See p. 1403 supra.
128 See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 454 (2d Cir. 1974).
123

124

See also Panel on Class Actions, 28 Bus.

LAWYER

133, 154 (Mar. 1973)

(Ruder

remarks discussing defendant concern over protecting settlement from collateral
attack).
127

See pp. 1431-35, 1441-42 supra. Alternatively, he might appoint an absentee

advocate to monitor the negotiation. See pp. I561-66 & notes 138-162 infra.
12 The court's insistence that it establish early control over the case might
encourage the parties to negotiate a settlement before the complaint is filed. In
order to bind absentees, however, the parties will need to file suit and obtain court
approval. Although the parties might attempt to disguise a prefiling agreement
by acting out a series of talks, the judge should be suspicious when the parties
settle a complicated case with unusual speed. Participation by an absentee advocate,
see pp. 1561-64 & notes 138-152 infra, would make this strategy particularly
difficult to implement. Moreover, the judge could require counsel from both sides
to submit affidavits stating whether any prefiling discussions had taken place, see
McGough & Lerach, supra note 32, at 467, which would make perjury charges and
other stiff sanctions possible if the lawyers were caught concealing early discussions.
129

See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1388-89

(S.D.N.Y. 2972), rev'd on other grounds, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (trial
would take 5-11 years if defendant contested each claim); In re Four Seasons
Sec. Laws Litigation, 58 F.R.D. i9, 38-39 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (large number of
individual questions).
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ample, in Wells v. Bank of America,130 a sex discrimination case,
the judge exercised significant control over the litigation, through
conferences with all of the parties, while settlement talks took
place. Although the court initially determined that problems of
proving individualized harm and measuring damages would make
a class encompassing more than a single department of the bank's
headquarters unmanageable, 3 ' after the parties reached an agreement the judge certified a bank-wide class for settlement purposes
only and approved their compromise. 32 An expanded settlement
class would also appear to be appropriate when the defendant
agrees to pay notice costs which otherwise would have forced the
representative
plaintiff and his attorney to define the class more
33
narrowly.

Nevertheless, a tentative settlement class should not be permitted when the judge would have created subclasses for the settlement negotiations had the larger class been involved originally,
or if the expanded class includes unresolvable conflicts which
would have prevented the class suit from going forward." 4 Assuming that additional class or individual suits are possible, confining
the benefits of the initial class action to a smaller number of individuals is preferable to approving a settlement made possible
only by undermining absentees' right to adequate representation.

5

(b) Participantsin the Settlement Negotiations.-Adoption
of an active role in settlement negotiations gives the judge greater
insight into the fairness of any final compromise and tends to encourage the parties to weigh absentee interests more carefully.
However, the judge in a class suit must take care that any attempt
to mediate the dispute does not prejudice his final assessment of
a settlement under rule 23(e), nor lead him to favor one side over
the other if the case goes to trial. 3 6 In addition, mediation designed to protect absentees' interests as well as to bring about an
Civil No. 7x-4o9 CBR (N.D. Cal., May 30, 1974) (Renfrew, J.).
131 See Consent Decree in Full Settlement of Civil Action, Wells v. Bank of
230

America, Civil No. 7I-409 CBR, at 3 (N.D. Cal., May 30, 1974); Reporter's Transcript, May 16, 1974, Wells v. Bank of America, Civil No. 7i-4o9 CBR, at io, 12-13
(N.D. Cal., May 30, 1974). Indeed, another action brought on behalf of a bankwide class was dismissed by the same trial judge. Goetz v. Bank of America, Civil
No. 72-1014 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 20, 1972).
132 See Consent Decree in Full Settlement of Civil Action, Wells v. Bank of
America,
No. 71-409 CBR, at 3 (N.D. Cal., May 30, 1974).
33
' See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. x56, 179-82 (0974) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (division of class into subclasses to overcome obstacle posed by cost of
individual notice).
134 See pp. x493-98 supra.
135 See MAxuAL, supranote 17, pt. i, § 146, at 46-47.
130 See p. 1385 supra.
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agreement might consume an unreasonable amount of the judge's
time. Therefore, the judge should attempt to identify intra-class
conflicts at the outset of negotiations and should introduce a
spokesman for each interest through the creation of subclasses."3 7
Even so, initial subclassing will not always be an effective judicial
response to the conflicts threatening adequacy of representation.
Intra-class conflicts may not emerge until negotiations are in
progress, at which point they might be overlooked by the judge
and ignored by the bargaining parties. Moreover, when subclassing is inappropriate because there are no intra-class conflicts,
attorney-class or representative plaintiff-class conflicts may still
occur.
Thus, in some cases it may be useful to create a new court
officer -

an "absentee advocate" -

whose task would be to moni-

tor the negotiations on behalf of absent class members. This
official would be appointed when the court determined that settlement negotiations were imminent.3 The absentee advocate would
"27 See,

e.g., Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Air-

lines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974)

(suggesting need to create separate subclasses for current and terminated employees
in Title VII suit); Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65, 69 (D. Conn. 1973) (threejudge court), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391
(1975) (subclass created for illegitimate children in § 1983 suit by mothers attacking welfare statute requiring identifications of fathers) ; Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 340 v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 373, 376 (D.Kan. 197I) (subclass created for dissident union members in Title VII action). Trial courts have
assumed without substantial discussion that if a subclass is created the judge may
appoint counsel to represent its members. See, e.g., Doe v. Norton, supra at 69;
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra at 376.
Each subclass representative presumably would have some form of veto power
over a proposed settlement. In class actions for damages, the subclass representative could refuse to include his group in the compromise, but the defendant would
be free to settle with the rest of the class. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
314 F. Supp. 710, 723-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 44o F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 87, (1971) (seven states acting as class representatives opted out
of compromise). In a suit seeking a structural injunction, where a subclass could
not effectively remove itself from the impact of the settlement, failure to satisfy
a subclass spokesman ordinarily should force the entire case to trial. See Calhoun
v. Cook, 487 F.2d 68o, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1973) (trial court not allowed to treat
case as settled when several plaintiff attorneys repudiated proposed compromise).
Regardless of the form of relief, however, the subclass representative's veto could
be overriden upon a showing that the veto constitutes inadequate representation.
138 To enforce this requirement, the judge could refuse to consider any compromise negotiated before the parties gave him a chance to appoint an absentee
advocate. See also note 128 supra (means for regulating prefiling negotiations).
In contrast, when the court desires assistance in drafting a formal decree after
a litigated finding of liability, appointment of a master, see generally Kaufman,
Masters in The Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 CoLum. L. Rav. 452 (1958); Note,
Masters and Magistratesin the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. RaV. 779 (1975), might
be more appropriate since the judge would be delegating traditional judicial duties.
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familiarize himself with the case 139 and attempt to identify conflicts threatening adequacy of representation. The advocate's
participation in negotiations would give him access to information
about the actual bargaining - including the options considered
and rejected, the topics discussed, the defendant's reaction to
various proposals, and the amount of compromise necessary to
obtain a settlement - that the judge needs to evaluate effectively
any final proposal. 40 Moreover, if the absentee advocate identified a new intra-class conflict during the course of the negotiations,
he would have the duty to inform the judge that further subclassing might be necessary.' 4' If the advocate determined that
the class attorney was ready to accept too little for the class or that
a plaintiff was exploiting his representative status for his own ends,
he could caution the parties and, if his warning were unheeded,
bring the problem to the judge's attention.'
Finally, the absentee
advocate might have the time and background to mediate the dispute to a limited extent and help the parties reach an acceptable
compromise.
The concept of a special participant to protect absent interests in a lawsuit is not new. Although an absentee advocate as
such does not appear to have been used in a class action, staff
members of government agencies have occasionally participated
in private settlement negotiations. For instance, in Wells v. Bank
of America,' the EEOC intervened to protect absentee interests
when a lack of resources led the named plaintiff to consider accepting a settlement that the agency deemed inadequate. 4 ' In
See, e.g., Draft Recommendations of the Special Masters, Morgan v. Kerrigan,
Civil No. 72-911-G (D. Mass., Mar. 21, 1974). See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 53.
139 The absentee advocate might use methods similar to those used by a class or
subclass attorney. See pp. 1592-97 infra.
140See pp. 1565-76 infra (final settlement hearing).

See also Chayes, supra

note 3, at 1300-01 & nn. 86-91.
141

Of course, even if no absentee advocate were appointed, the judge presiding

over a class action should remain alert to the possibility that intra-class conflicts will

emerge during settlement discussions, and should create new subclasses when appropriate.
142

Unlike subclass representatives, see note 137 supra, the absentee advocate

would have no direct veto power over a proposed settlement since he would not
be the primary representative of the class or any portion thereof.
143 There is some question, however, concerning the degree to which an advocate can function as an effective mediator. See p. 1386 .supra. Moreover,

if the judge wishes to refer pretrial controversies to a judicially created officer,
see Kaufman, supra note 138, at 465, he should appoint a master, rather than
giving such responsibilities to an absentee advocate who could not rule on these
disputes impartially. See also note 138 supra.
1 Civil No. 71-409 CBR (N.D. Cal., May 30, 1974).

"5sSee Consent Decree in Full Settlement of Civil Action, Wells v. Bank of
America, Civil No. 71-4o9, at 2-3 (N.D. Cal., May 30, 1974). See also Pettway
v. American Cast Iron & Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 21X,

258 (5th Cir. 1974).

But see
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any event, courts appear to have the power to create an absentee
advocate pursuant to rule 23 (d) or, more generally, the courts' inherent power to provide "appropriate instruments" for carrying
out judicial work.'

Absentee interests may be sufficiently protected and an absentee advocate as such may therefore be unnecessary when a
government agency with expertise in the appropriate body of law
chooses to intervene in a class action. 14 7 However, before depending upon agency attorneys to guard class rights, the judge

should satisfy himself that the agency viewpoint does not significantly diverge from class concerns.

48

In doing so, the judge

should consider the likelihood that class members would accept
some risk of agency bias in return for government protection

which is supplied free of charge.
In the absence of an acceptable government intervenor, 4 9

the judge might conclude that an absentee advocate should be
appointed to help ensure adequacy of representation. Among

those he might consider appointing would be attorneys donating
their time as part of a pro bono project, other attorneys, and retired judges. An absentee advocate from either of the last two
groups presumably would charge a fee for his services, so the
source of compensation and the method of computing it must be

considered in determining whether use of an absentee advocate
would be appropriate 0

Because the absentee advocate's function would be to protect
the interests of class members, his compensation should be subAir Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.,
455 F.2d io, io7-o9 (7th Cir. 1973) (denying EEOC attempt to intervene), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (,974).
146See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (2920). While the functions
of an absentee advocate may not fit squarely within those enumerated for masters
in FED. R. CIV. P. 53, that rule has never been interpreted to be the exclusive
source of power for creating judicial assistants. Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case in Judicial Flexibility, 6o CORNELL L. REV. 53, 57 (I974); see
Mathews v. Weber, 96 S. Ct. 549, 555-56 (,976) (magistrates).
147 See p. 1643 infra. An absentee advocate may also be unnecessary if a government expert will evaluate any settlement proposal as part of the final approval
process. See p. 1571 & note 201 infra.
148 See Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Pa. i975).
See generally Stewart, supra note 87, at 1685-86 (agency capture by regulated
entities).
140 Informal intervention might suffice: an agency might allow a staff member
to participate even though it is unwilling to make the resource commitment required for formal intervention, see p. 1571 & note 201 infra.
150 Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.D.R. 253, 262 (S.D.N.Y. i971), rev'd
on other grounds, 479 F.2d oo5 (2d Cir. 2973), vacated and remanded, 4X7 U.S.
is6 (1974) (use of master to calculate damages might be prohibitively expensive).
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tracted from any settlement or damages fund."" However, while
the litigation progressed, or if no damages were recovered, the representative plaintiff or his attorney would be responsible for the
advocate's fee," 2 unless the defendant agreed otherwise." 3 In
order to avoid pressure on the absentee advocate to accept an inadequate settlement, his fee should be computed on an hourly
basis "I and should not be contingent upon recovery by the class.
The representative plaintiff, therefore, should be required to post
security at the time the advocate is appointed by the judge.'"
Although placing this financial burden on the class might appear
to have the undesirable effect of increasing the class attorney's
incentive to accept an early settlement inadequate from the class'
perspective, the advocate's presence would itself provide a check
against this danger. On the other hand, the financial burden might
in some cases prevent the class suit from going forward.'
Even if an attorney is willing to fill the position on a pro bono
basis, creation of an absentee advocate would not be costless. Injection of an additional participant into settlement negotiations
may hinder the bargaining process and discourage continuation
of class suit. - 7 An absentee advocate should, therefore, be appointed only in those cases in which a significant number of class
members are likely to receive a net benefit from his activities after
all relevant costs are considered. To determine the potential
benefit of an absentee advocate, the judge must evaluate the prob"-" If the governing statute allows the plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees, he
should be able to collect the absentee advocate's fee as well. Without a statutory
fee award, use of an absentee advocate might become an intolerable financial
burden on plaintiffs in injunction cases that do not generate a damages fund.
If the fear of becoming liable for the cost of an absentee advocate has an undesirable chilling effect on the filing of meritorious suits or if it forces cases to trial
that should be settled, the court might absorb the cost itself, on the ground that
the advocate makes fulfillment of the judge's rule 23(e) responsibilities possible,
cf. MxruAr, supra note 17, pt. i, § 3.40 (experts) ; Kaufman, supra note 138, at
468 (masters).
1252This arrangement is analogous to that for notice and other litigation costs.
See pp. x618-23 infra.
153 Cf. Stipulation Re Class Actions, Masterson v. Union Oil Co., Civil No. 69331-ALS (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. i6, 1969) (agreement by defendant to pay for three
special masters).
"4 There is little danger that the absentee advocate would purposely delay
negotiations to increase his fee; once the parties believe that their agreement is
fair they can present it to the judge and argue against the advocate's reasons for
disapproving it. See note 142 supra (absentee advocate cannot veto settlement).
'
Cf. 5A J. MoORr, supra note 32, fI 53.04[I), at 2928 (masters).
1C6 Cj. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 669 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464
F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) (notice costs).
1,7 On the other hand, the absentee advocate's role as a mediator might advance
agreement. See McCray v. Beatty, 64 F.R.D. 107, 109 (D.N.J. x974); P. 1562 &
note 143 supra.
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ability that conflicts threatening adequacy of representation will
arise, and the availability of alternative means for controlling

them.
If each class member's claim is individually recoverable, if
there has already been subclassing, or if the judge has an unusual
amount of information about the case, 5 8 there will usually be
sufficient checks against any intra-class, representative plaintiffclass, or attorney-class conflicts that might arise. On the other

hand, in cases where an enlargement of the class for settlement
purposes is likely," 9 an absentee advocate might prevent over-

expansion that would cause intra-class conflicts. Similarly, an
advocate might be useful in a very complicated case in which the

judge might not be able to identify all appropriate subclasses until
bargaining is in progress '-o or might have difficulty evaluating the

fairness of a settlement without specific information on the negotiations. For example, in a class suit seeking a structural injunc-

tion, an absentee advocate might be warranted when the case excites strong intra-class or attorney-class conflict over the proper
remedy for defendant's violation of class members' rights.'0 In a
damage action, such special supervision might be necessary when
the class is composed of a large number of individuals holding

small claims, since the probability of an attorney-class conflict is
high, and the dispute over the allocation of a settlement fund may
not surface until very late in the negotiations.' 62
2. Review of the Settlement Proposal.- When the negotiating parties reach agreement and propose a settlement of the class
claim, the notice and court approval requirements of rule 23 (e)

must be met. Normally, the judge makes a preliminary evaluation
of the proposal "03 and, if the proposal is not rejected on its face,
1"8 See,

e.g., In re Brown Co. Sec. Litigation, 355 F. Supp. 574, 578 (S.D.N.Y.

(nine months of discovery); Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 455, 459, 462
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
151 See pp. i559-6o & notes 129-135 supra.
160 See, e.g., Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 330, 334 (W.D. Va.

1973)

(concern over possibility of intra-class conflict deferred until relief stage);
Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 259, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same); Sol S.
Turnoff Drug Distributors, Inc. v. N.V. Nederlandsche, 51 F.R.D. 227, 233 (E.D.
Pa. i97o) (same).
161 See, e.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1250 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 522
F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975).
162See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 726-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 44o F.2d 1o79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (197i).
'63 MANUAL, supra note 17, pt. :, § 1.46, at 39-40. A formal hearing may not
be necessary at this stage. See Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (preliminary
approval), 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa.) (final approval), -modified on other
grounds sub nom. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
197i); Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 732-33 (M.D. Fla.
1972)
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orders notice to the class members informing them of the settlement's terms and of their right to appear at a formal approval hearing 164 in which the proponents of the plan have the burden of
demonstrating its adequacy."0 5 Since the parties who negotiated
the settlement are not likely to expose its weaknesses, the court
usually must rely upon objecting class members, discovery materials, outside experts, an absentee advocate if there is one, and
its own efforts to uncover deficiencies in the settlement.
(a) Notice and the Role of Objectors.- In class actions
seeking structural injunctions, sampling or publication notice will
usually suffice, since its major purpose is to encourage class members to come forward to help the judge identify conflicts over the
proper form of relief.'-6 Similarly, when the judge is assuming
primary responsibility for ensuring adequacy of representation
in a damage action, 6 7 informing the class through the sampling
or publication method should be acceptable. 08 On the other
hand, if class members in an action involving monetary relief are
heavily relied upon to determine the adequacy of the settlement,""
or if the notice includes a proof-of-claim form or instructions about
making a claim, 1 0 "best practicable" notice would appear to be
required by due process "I and, in any event, will be necessary if
x970), aff'd'mem., 441 F.2d 72-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971).
But see MANUtA, supra note 17, at 39.
164 MANUAL, supra note 17, pt. x, § 1.46, at 40. Unless class members have not
previously been given an opportunity to exclude themselves from the class, see
pp. i559-6o & notes 129-133 supra (discussing tentative settlement class), they
should not be given a chance to opt out at this stage of the litigation. Defendants
might be discouraged from settling if class members were given a second opportunity to opt out. See p. 1379 supra.
165 E.g., United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447
F.2d 647, 65i (7th Cir. 1971); Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479,
482 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Zerkle v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 52 F.R.D. xSx, 159
(S.D.N.Y. 197X); Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 5o F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y.
X970); Norman v. McKee, 29o F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Cal. x968), aff'd, 431 F.2d
769 (gth Cir. X970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971); McGough & Lerach,
supra note 32, at 460.
166 See pp. 1441-44 supra.
167 See p. I568 & notes X77-i78 infra.
16
8 See Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
"6'See pp. 1567-68 & note 176 infra.
170 See, e.g., Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir.
1973) ; Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 597, 622 (D. Colo. 1974) ; It re

Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 58 F.R.D. X9, 32 (W.D. Okla. 1972) ; Shapiro,
supra note 92, at 263-64.
' See Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc. 483 F.2d 824, 833-34 (3d Cir. X973);
If the settlement notice includes a proof-of-claim form, there will be an obvious
need to contact directly as many class members as possible so they can share in the
distribution of the fund, particularly if the relevant statute mandates maximum or
exclusive use of individualized damage distribution mechanisms. See pp. 1525-
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benefits are to be distributed to the proper individuals. 1 2 In this
situation, the cost of best practicable notice should not deter
meritorious suits. The plaintiff or his attorney 173 can advance the
costs knowing that if the proposal is approved he will quickly be
reimbursed from the settlement fund. In addition, defendants
may often be willing to pay for notice to protect the binding effect
of the settlement against any subsequent collateral attack." 4
Thus, in damage cases, many courts have ordered individual
notice of the settlement hearing without giving the issue any elaborate consideration. 1 5
If each class member has a large interest at stake, the judge
can legitimately rely upon absentees to respond to notice and appear before the court if they have any significant objections to
the settlement. If no objectors appear, there should be a strong
presumption that the agreement is fair.1 6 But in actions in which
27 supra. Even if the communication with the class does not include a proofof-claim form, extensive notice will normally be necessary for the judge to insure
that representation of absentee interests has been adequate enough to meet constitutional requirements. But cf. pp. 1402-x6 supra. See also Grunin v. International
House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 120-22 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 124
(1975). Best practicable notice will usually mean individual contact with all
readily identifiable class members. However, where class members cannot be
readily identified, or cost of individual notice would consume any recovery, publication notice should be used. See generally MA usA, supra note 17, pt. I, §§ 1.4546, at 38-4o.
172 An adequate settlement notice should summarize the terms of the settlement, explain the consequences of an approval, make clear what participation and
opt-out rights a class member has, anticipate major questions class members will
want answered, and, unless a subsequent notice is to be sent, indicate what steps
a class member must take if he wishes to make a claim. See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122-23 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 96 S. Ct.
124 (1975); United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
447 F.2d 647, 654 (7th Cir. X972); MANuAL, supra note X7, pt. i, § 246, at 40;
Shapiro, supra note 92, at 263 n.i5. Moreover, where class members are not
likely to have the assistance of counsel, notice should be presented in a manner
intelligible to class members. See Shapiro, supra note 92, at 267 n.2i (misunderstanding of Pfizer notice). For instance, in Blankenship v. UMW Welfare &
Retirement Fund, Civil No. 2186-69 (D.D.C., Jan. 2, 1973), at least one round
of notice distributed to class members was written in layman's English. But see
Milstein v. Werner, 57 F.R.D. 515, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (objection that notice
not in layman's English overruled).
173 See pp. 16"8-23 infra.
174 See note 126 supra.
172E.g., Voege v. Ackerman, 67 F.R.D. 432,

435 (S.D.N.Y.

2975);

In re

National Student Marketing Litigation, 68 F.R.D. 151, 252 (D.D.C. 2974); In re
Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 58 F.R.D. 19, 32 (W.D. Okla. 2972); Schleiff
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, i76 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (derivative suit).
171 See, e.g., Hartford Hospital v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 132, 137 (S.D.
N.Y. 1971).
If some class members come forward in a suit in which all class members have
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many class members have a relatively small interest at stake,
the judge cannot depend solely upon absentees to expose deficiencies in the settlement. The cost of appearing at the settlement hearing may exceed the likely benefits to the individual class
member, particularly if he anticipates a hostile reaction to his
efforts.17 7 Thus, even if no objections are made the judge must
undertake an independent evaluation of the fairness of the settlement proposal. 7 8 Of course, if objectors do appear, their argument should be considered by the judge; the fact that only a few
class members come forward should not be taken as evidence that
their positions
are weak or that no other class members share their
17 9
concerns.

Although objectors have the clear right to present evidence
at the settlement approval hearing, 8 ° they may encounter difficulties in convincing the court to grant discovery time. 181 In deciding
whether to allow discovery by an objector, the court should balindividually recoverable claims, the significance of their numbers should vary
according to the nature of their arguments. On some issues, the majority of class
members should be free to control the resolution of the lawsuit. For example, if
the dispute is over the sufficiency of the total amount of damages awarded the
class, the court might require a majority of the class to advance written or oral
objections before disapproving a settlement. In other instances, however, the
court should not allow a majority, no matter how large, to impose its decision on
the minority. If the dispute concerns the allocation of a settlement fund, for
example, objection by a few disadvantaged class members should trigger independent judicial scrutiny of the compromise since the burden of the settlement should
not be shifted arbitrarily to a small group of class members.
T17See Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 197)
(objectors
criticized); Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, I58-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (derivative suit) (same).
178 Indeed, some courts have indicated that an absence of objectors heightens
the responsibility of the trial judge. E.g., Heddendorf v. Goldfine, x67 F. Supp. 9x5,
926 (D. Mass. 1958) (derivative suit).
17'See generally MANuAL, supra note 17, pt. x, § 146, at 42. The judge should
remember that these objectors will be confronting opponents who enjoy the advantage of disproportionate familiarity with the litigation.
The named plaintiff himself may object to the settlement, see, e.g., Finn v. FMC
Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1175-76 ( 4 th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. (Mar. 22,
,976); Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 55o v. American Airlines,
Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 637 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (,974); Saylor
v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 898 (2d Cir. 1972) (derivative suit) ; Purcell v. Keane,
54 F.R.D. 455, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1972), but courts should not give the named plaintiff an absolute veto over a compromise since his views may not fairly represent
those of the class. See Flinn v. FMC Corp., supra at 1174 & n.i9; Saylor v.
Lindsley, supra at 899-900 (dictum).
180E.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974);
Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir. 1973); Cohen
v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 1942) (derivative suit).
181 See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975); Saylor v. Lindsley,
456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1972) (derivative suit).
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ance the objector's need for additional information against the
cost of delay to the settling parties and the danger that an objector will abuse the process by simply blocking approval until he is
bought off.182 If an objector has not made use of material or time
already available to him,' 83 if his objection does not involve factual
issues which could fruitfully be developed through discovery,
or if discovery would impose unreasonable costs on the proponents of a settlement, 184 the objector's request should be denied. On
the other hand, if the settling parties have undertaken little discovery, leaving class members and the judge with little information
to evaluate the proposal,' 8 5 or if the judge intends to rely heavily
upon objectors, discovery time should normally be granted.
(b) Review by the Trial Court. - Although rule 23 (e) requires
the trial judge to review any proposed settlement of a class action,
it gives no indication of the proper scope of review, the standards
to be used, or the rigor with which those standards should be applied. Even so, it is clear that the court should insist that any procedures designed to promote adequacy of representation have been
followed. Thus, reported settlement proceedings have required the
proponents to demonstrate that the proper parties were allowed to
participate in the discussions and decisionmaking,' 86 that sufficient
notice was given,8 7 and that the plaintiffs' attorney undertook
sufficient trial preparation to represent the class effectively in the
88
bargaining sessions.
Such procedure-oriented review, however, will not be enough
"82 See McGough & Lerach, supra note 32, at 464 & n.78 (danger of abuse).
.8.E.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) ; Zerkle v. ClevelandCliffs Iron Co., 52 F.R.D. I5I, 157 (S.D.N.Y. i97i ) ; Bok v. Ackerman, 3o9 F. Supp.
710, 715 (E.D. Pa. 1970); McGough & Lerach, supra note 32, at 463-65.
' 4 See, e.g., Bok v. Ackerman, 3o9 F. Supp. 71o, 715 (S.D.N.Y. I97o).
185 See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. '975) ; Weiss v. Chalker,
S5 F.R.D. i68, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 5o F.R.D.
473, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 297o) (derivative suit); Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp.
ioo6, oo8 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 22o F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 194i) (derivative suit).
18'E.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 9oo (2d Cir. 1972) (derivative suit);
Pittson Co. v. Reeves, 263 F.2d 328, 329 ( 7 th Cir. 1959) (same); Masterson v.
Pergament, 2o3 F.2d 315, 321-22 (6th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
.346 U.S. 832 (i953) (same).
187 E.g., Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. i973);
Sertic v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Dist. Council, 459 F.2d 579, 58i (6th Cir.
,972).

"'8 See, e.g., In re National Student Marketing Litigation, 68 F.R.D. 1S', 155
(D.D.C. x974); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 17 FED. RuLES SERV.
2d X32, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
X972) ; Note, supra note 68, at I149-So. Thus, an unusually quick settlement of a
-complicated class action should raise suspicions not only because it may indicate
collusion, see p. 1575 & note 225 infra, but also because it is unlikely that the attorney had time to prepare his case properly.
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to protect absentee interests and fulfill statutory policy. Conflicts

of interest between the attorney and the class and the representative plaintiff and the class may not be evident without examining
the terms of the proposed settlement. Moreover, even good faith
bargainers may fail to identify and accommodate all class concerns. Therefore, as most courts have recognized, an inquiry into
-the substantive fairness of the agreement is necessary. 189
The effectiveness of such substantive review may be proportional to the judge's familiarity with the legal and factual issues
of the case. Some information can be gathered from the proponents' presentation at the approval hearing; however, its value
must be discounted to account for the parties' natural tendency
to omit factors that would undermine the compromise they have
just negotiated.' 90 More reliable background may come from the
absentee advocate, if there is one,"" and from the judge's own observations of the progress of the litigation. Indeed, if the judge
has properly exercised early supervision over the suit, 02 he should
be relatively familiar with the issues by the time of the approval
they may also
hearing. Of course, if objectors come forward, 93
provide insight into the fairness of the settlement.
Although discovery materials can be a useful source of information,' they may be inadequate as a basis for court approval 195 in many class actions - particularly those in which one
of the defendant's reasons for settling is to avoid extensive exam189

See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114,

123

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. X24 (1975) (settlement must be "fair, reasonable,
and adequate"); Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971) (same);
Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1971) ("fair and adequate to all
concerned"); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 740 (S.D.N.Y.
,970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) ("fair,

reasonable, and adequate").
19o See Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Action -Part
II: The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 793 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Haudek II].
See also Note, supra note 68, at 1154.
191 See p. 1562 supra.

192 See pp. I558-59 supra. See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 543 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (i97i).
193 See, e.g., Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 5o F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 197o)
(settlement rejected); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. xoo5 (S.D.N.Y. x966)
(settlement revised); Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., [1966-67 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 9x,8o6 (S.D.N.Y. x966) (derivative suit) (settlement
revised). Indeed, if all class members have individually recoverable claims, the judge
may in some circumstances be able to rely almost totally on a survey of their
views. See note 176 supra.
194 See McGough & Lerach, supra note 32, at 459.
195 See, e.g., Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 50 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 197o);
Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp. xoo6 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd men., 12o F.2d 329
(2d Cir. 194i) (derivative suit).
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ination of its operations.' 9 6 The judge can postpone his decision
until the parties assemble more information,' 9 7 but unless an effective objector 198 or an absentee advocate participates in the process, such post-settlement discovery will be non-adversary and
may be slanted to favor the settlement.'99
In a complicated suit, the judge may wish to call upon outside
experts to help him analyze the agreement.200 Government agencies may be willing to assist in the review of a settlement, and perhaps to provide some of the technical data the judge needs to
evaluate the proposed compromise. For instance, the SEC regularly comments on settlements, either by appearing at the approval
hearing or by submitting an amicus brief.2 0 Private associations
with expertise in the area in question may also be willing to contribute. 20° Finally, if the case is very complex and the judge cannot obtain voluntary assistance, he may wish to appoint his own
expert.2 3
...See p. 1381 supra.
197 See, e.g., Weiss v. Chalkcr, 55 F.R.D. i68, 169 (S.D.N.Y.

1972); Percodani
v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 5o F.R.D. 473, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 197o); Piccard v. Sperry,
36 F. Supp. ioo6, oo8-o9 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 12o F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 194)
(derivative suit).
198
See, e.g., Weiss v. Chalker, 55 F.R.D. x68, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
go At the other extreme, discovery may be too extensive and the judge may be
confronted with an unmanageably large and largely incomprehensible amount of
data.
See Haudek II, supra note I9o, at 794.
2 0
1 See MANUAL, supra note 27, pt. I, § 1.46; Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494
(S.D.N.Y. '97'); cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 378 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. x974) (litigated structural injunction).
201 See, e.g., Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975)
(unsuccessful amicus); Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972) (derivative suit) (SEC notified of hearing); Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F.R.D.
597, 627 (D. Colo. '974) (SEC issued no-action letter); Schimmel v. Goldman,

57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (unsuccessful amicus); Cannon v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 5s F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (SEC declined to make in-depth

evaluation, but appeared at hearing); Kurach v. Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (unsuccessful appearance); Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29
(N.D. Cal. x968), aff'd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 197o), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912
(1971) (successful amicus). See also Note, Control over Settlement of Shareholders' Suits, 54 H~Av. L. Rav 833, 839 (1941) (discussing proposed but rejected
legislation empowering SEC to investigate and submit advisory reports on the
fairness of derivative suit settlements). But see Voege v. Ackerman, 67 F.R.D. 432,
436 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. i975) (SEC declines invitation to comment) (derivative suit);
Josephson v. Campbell, [1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 92,347
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (SEC notified of hearing, but did not participate).
The EEOC also has participated in settlement approval proceedings. See, e.g.,
Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Indus., Inc.), 494 F.2d 799, 803 (3rd
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1975) (amicus).
202 Cf. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 13o8 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974)
(litigated
structural injunction).

203 See MANUAL, supra note 17, Pt. I, § 3.40. The Manual strongly urges the
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At the same time, since settlements have the welcome effect
of saving court and private party resources,20 4 and of ending litigation on a more amicable basis, 0 5 the judge should not convert
the approval hearing into a full trial on the merits 20 and should
not reject settlement proposals unnecessarily. 2 7 Unless the earlier
court finding that the class attorney and the named plaintiff adequately represent the class 208 is meaningless, some degree of deference to the parties would appear to be justified. Thus, some
courts have suggested that in evaluating a settlement proposal the
"business judgment" of the parties 209 and the recommendations
of counsel should be respected. 210 This suggestion is sound if it
means that the participants' preferences should be honored if they
fall within a range of acceptable compromises defined by the
judge to obtain economic information before evaluating an antitrust settlement and
mentions the possibility of the court's hiring an expert to provide this data. Id. pt.
x, § 146, at 41-42. However, the judge may wish to solicit help from government
or private volunteers before spending limited court funds on his own experts.
204 See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 467 (2d Cir. X974);
Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re Four
Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 422, 429 (W.D. Okla. X974), aff'd, 525
F.2d 5oo (ioth Cir. 1975).
02
' See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 543 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 4o6 U.S.
976 (1972) ; p. 1391 supra.
201 See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 16o (3d Cir. 1975); Grunin v.
International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
124 (1975) ; City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1974); Saylor
v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 9o5 (2d Cir. 2972) (derivative suit) ; cf. Florida Trailer
& Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 296o) (bankruptcy).
207 It should be remembered, however, that a settlement disapproval often will
not result in full litigation; the parties may instead return to the bargaining table
and reach an acceptable compromise. See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of
Pancakes, 53 F.2d 114, 119-120 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. X24 (1975)

(discussing renegotiation and approval after first settlement rejected) ; Percodani v.
Riker-Maxson Corp., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. g 93,153
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (approving settlement negotiated after first proposal rejected).
208 See pp. 147X-72, 1474-77 supra.
211 See, e.g., Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (ist Cir. 2974) (derivative
suit); United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d
647 (7th Cir. 197); Voege v. Ackerman, 67 F.R.D. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 597 (D. Colo. 2974); In re Four Seasons
Sec. Laws Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 422 (W.D. Okla. 1974), aff'd, 525 F.2d 5oo (ioth
Cir. 1975); Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (derivative suit); Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 151 (S.D.N.Y. x964) (derivative
suit).
210 See, e.g., Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., 17 FED. RuLES SERv.
2d 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.
N.Y. 1972); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. X974); Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D,
455 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Note, supra note 68, at 1154.
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court.2 1 ' Of course, any agreement including terms void as against

public policy should not be approved, regardless of whether absent
class members are benefited, harmed, or left unaffected by such
terms.212 Thus, the court in Grunin v. International House of
Pancakes 213 indicated that it could not sanction a settlement that
would perpetuate contracts including per se violations of the antitrust laws. This outer constraint will not suffice in most cases,
however, since a compromise that does not directly contravene
the law still may not be in the best interests of absentees. Although some opinions appear to imply that the range of acceptable
compromises should be very broad, and that a settlement should
not be rejected unless it is clearly unfair on its face, 14 trial courts
more frequently, and more appropriately, attempt to subject the
settlement proposal to a more searching analysis. 1
Reviewing judges usually try to define the zone of acceptability
by first comparing the terms of the settlement to the likely benefits of further litigation. Under the standard outlined by the
Supreme Court in Protective Committee v. Anderson,1 6 a bankruptcy approval case that is frequently quoted in class action decisions, 21 7 the court must consider factors such as the strength of
See, e.g., Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
(X972) (derivative suit). See also Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375,
378 (ist Cir. 1974) (derivative suit) ; United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971).
212 See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, X23-25
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 124 (1975) (stating principle, but approving
settlement); United States v. Allegheny-Lundlum Indus., Inc., 5r7 F.2d 826 (5th
Cir. i975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1684 (1976), discussed, note 74 supra; Ace
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. i97i) (settlement
provision interpreted not to waive right to appeal, in order to avoid "serious public
policy question"); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (settlement including provision designed to release settling defendants from
contribution obligation to non-settling defendants disapproved).
213 513 F.2d 114, 123-24 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 124 (I975). The court
went on to find, however, that the agreement before it included no such per se
violations. Id. at 124.
214 See, e.g., Voege v. Ackerman, 67 F.R.D. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2975) (derivative
suit); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Schleiff
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2967) (derivative suit).
215 Even courts using the "unfair on its face" terminology may actually give a
more thorough evaluation. See, e.g., Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. I44 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (derivative suit).
216 390 US. 414 (1968).
217 E.g., In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 58 F.R.D. 19, 36 (W.D.
Okla. 1972); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y.
,972); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 495 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1974); Philadelphia Housing
Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364,
376-77 (E.D. Pa. i97o) (preliminary approval), 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa.)
211
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the plaintiff's case, the availability of affirmative defenses, the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of further litigation,
and the ability of the defendant to pay a judgment larger than
that provided for by the proposed settlement.""8 The range of
acceptable settlements can be narrowed when the judge has greater
confidence in his evaluation because the legal issues are clear 210
or because he has unusual familiarity with the facts of the case.220
The Protective Committee standard should identify situations
where the class attorney has settled too quickly in order to guarantee his fee, and guide the court's judgment in cases in which
the only issue is the sufficiency of the total amount of relief offered
to the class. 21 In other circumstances,.however, comparing the
terms of the settlement to the likely benefits of further litigation
will not provide sufficient protection for absentee interests unless
the court carefully scrutinizes the trade-offs which the class attorney and the representative plaintiff have made among available
forms of relief, and is sensitive to the possibility of conflicts undermining adequacy of representation. 22
(final approval), modified on other grounds sub nom. Ace Heating & Plumbing
Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
314 F. Supp. 71o, 74o-4, (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1o79 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (i97i).
211 Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25 (i968). See also City
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1975) (outlining similar
test) ; Note, supra note 68.
211 See, e.g., Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. x97x)
(derivative
suit brought under section x6(b) of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
220 See, e.g., In re Brown Co. Sec. Laws Litigation, 355 F. Supp. 574, 578
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 455, 459, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
221 See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 53 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 124 (1975) (sufficiency of injunctive relief); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Indus., Inc.), 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (,974) (sufficiency of back pay award) ; Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd,
68 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (sufficiency of damages award); Schimmel v.
Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. '973) (derivative suit) (same); City of Detroit
v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 138o (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 495
F2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (same); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 17I, 174-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (same); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 17 FED.
RuLs SERV. 2d 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 455,
46o-62 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (sufficiency of restitution without admission of guilt).
222 If
representation has been inadequate, approval of the settlement would
both damage absentee interests and thwart the effectuation of substantive policy.
Thus, where the benefits of a settlement proposal deviate significantly from the
obvious benefits of going to trial, some courts might refuse approval on the
ground that the settlement does not produce the consequences envisioned by the
statute in a given fact situation, and thus violates statutory policy. See, e.g., Lewis
v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (clear violation of section x6(b)
of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). Such an analysis should be distinguished
from one in which the proposed relief on its face violates public policy. See p. 1573

&notes

212-213

supra.
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Thus, the court should usually reject or revise settlements
which include questionable fee arrangements between the class
attorney and the defendant 22 3 and agreements negotiated by a
lawyer who turns out to have a serious ideological or other conflict of interest with the class. 21 4 And, while the class lawyer will
be expected to take a less enthusiastic stance on his case once he
becomes a settlement proponent, a sharp reversal of position without any apparent basis in discovery or new case law should be
suspect as evidence of a possible sell-out.2 25 Similarly, the court
should refuse approval of settlements in which the named plaintiff or a segment of the class would receive a disproportionate allocation of damages or other relief, 226 as well as proposals in which
the form of relief is tailored to carry out an ideological position
held by the representative plaintiff but not by the rest of the
class.2 27
The judge has a more difficult task in cases in which the class
is seeking a structural injunction as well as damages. In this situation, the defendant may be willing to offer additional structural
reform or additional damages, but not both, and class members
may disagree on the most desirable mix.2

28

Moreover, even when

class members agree that only injunctive relief is needed, they
may disagree on its proper content.2 0 In these circumstances, a
court passing on a settlement must both formulate and apply its
standard of review in the context of the particular case. The source
of the standard, of course, will be the policies underlying the
22See Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975);

City of Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 345 F. Supp. 454, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 36 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 431 F.2d
769 (gth Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (197).
224See, e.g., Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, Local 340 v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 373, 375 (D. Kan.
1971). See also Bell, supra note go; Stewart, supra note 87, at 1765-66.
22
5 See Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
226 See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 340 V. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
52 F.R.D. 373, 374 (D. Kan. 1971) (discussing previously rejected settlement that
excluded part of class); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710,
744-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 44o F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(97)
(unsuccessful challenge to settlement on these grounds).
227 See, e.g., Purcell v. Keane, 54 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
228 See, e.g., Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 55o v. American
Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
(1974), discussed, pp. 1554-55 & notes X02-04 supra.
229 See, e.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1975) (school desegregation plans). See also Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211,
251 (5th Cir. 1974) (judicial order) (Title VII back pay requirements); Gates
v. Dalton, 67 F.R.D. 621, 632 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (certification) (LMRDA protection for union members); Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 1972 CCH Trade Cas. ff 73,980,
at 92,090 (certification) (antitrust policy to end conspiracies).
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statute pursuant to which the cause of action has been brought.
In some cases, statutory policies might suggest a clear hierarchy
of relief, and the fairness of a settlement may be readily judged
in terms of that hierarchy. 3 In many cases, however, the bierarchy of values a court can articulate may be more indeterminate.
Within this range of indeterminacy, the best a court may be able
to do is ask whether there is any reason, such as a failure of the
procedural
requisites of fairness, that the bargain 131 should be
22
upset.
23 0

An example of the common law of remedies being suggested here is the
"rightful place" theory of Title VII relief. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 243 (5th Cir. I974); Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 8o HiAv. L. REV. 126o (x967). Even this
theory may not provide a determinate choice between two settlement proposals
both of which restore "rightful place" but in different ways. Cf., e.g., Air Line
Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 55o v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d
636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (0974) (remanding for renegotiation among the parties and recommending subclassing).
231 Private control may itself be a value recognized by statute and may, in any
event, be important to effectuating any remedy. See p. 1374 supra.
22 Effective appellate review is necessary not only to catch settlements
that should have been rejected below but also to encourage trial judges to be
more careful in their initial oversight. Trial court approval or disapproval of a
class action settlement will be subject to review by a higher court if a dissatisfied
named plaintiff continues to reject the compromise, see, e.g., Flinn v. FMC Corp.,
528 F.2d iz6g (4 th Cir. I975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S., Mar. 22, 3976),
or if an objecting class member exercises his right to intervene and appeal, see,
e.g., Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. x97x); Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d xo59 (7th Cir. 1970) (also suggesting
that appeal be limited to issues raised at settlement approval hearing). Disapproval
of a settlement has been held to be an appealable order. Norman v. McKee, 43r
F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. z97o), cert. denied 403 U.S. 9X2 (3973). See also
In re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation, 487 F.2d 303 (8th
Cir. x973). (deciding appeal of disapproval without comment on appealability issue).
Of course, before effective appellate review is possible, the court must know the
basis of the decision below. If the opinion and record do not sufficiently reveal
the basis of the trial judge's action, the appellate court should immediately remand
for clarification. See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d x53, 159 (3d Cir. 3975); Grunin
v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d X4, 325 n.9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 324 (975) ; Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Indus., Inc.), 494.
F.2d 799, 804 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 4X9 U.S. 900 (1974) (reasoning found suffident). Assuming the opinion and record are adequate, the appellate court can
ordinarily determine whether proper procedures were followed in the negotiation
and approval of a settlement, and therefore should insist upon procedural regularity.
See Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 3039
(1972) (derivative suit). Settlement approvals should be reversed when the court
acts without knowledge of possibly important facts concerning the claim, see Grunin
v. International House of Pancakes, supra, at 125 (noting requirement but finding
it satisfied) ; City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464 (2d Cir. 1974)
(same); Newman v. Stein, supra, at 692-93 (derivative suit) (same), when discovery by the parties is insufficient, see Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d.
Cir. 3972) (derivative suit) (alternative holding), when objectors are not granted.
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VII. CLASS ACTIONS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility reflects the traditional understanding of the role of the
lawyer in individual-plaintiff litigation. The lawyer is sought out
by a person with a recoverable claim; I through conferences with
his client, the lawyer develops a view of his client's interest; 2 the
lawyer single-mindedly advocates this interest within the rather
sufficient participation rights, see Girsh v. Jepson, supra, at 157; Cohen v. Young,
127 F.2d 721, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1942), when notice is inadequate, see, e.g., Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. '973); Sertic v. United Bhd.
of Carpenters, Dist. Council, 459 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1972); Pittson v. Reeves,
263 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1959), or when the class attorney is guilty of improper
behavior, see, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, supra, at goo-oi. Similarly, appellate judges
should feel free to reverse when the trial judge has based his approval on an erroneous understanding of the legal issues of 'the case, see, e.g., Zients v. LaMorte, 459
F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Upson v. Otis, x55 F.2d 6o6 (2d Cir. 1946) (derivative suit), or when a settlement contravenes public policy, see p. 1573 & notes 212213 supra.
The appellate court shares with the trial court the responsibility for scrutinizing the substantive fairness of the compromise and uncovering any conflicts which
indicate inadequate representation of absentee interests. Although most appellate
courts have purported to use an "abuse of discretion" criterion, see, e.g., Grunin v.
International House of Pancakes, supra; City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., supra;
Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Indus., Inc.), supra, when evaluating
the lower court's conclusion, the leniency implied by this standard seems inappropriate for class actions. Judge Friendly suggests that the prevalence of this
standard may follow from the general policy favoring settlements, the feeling that
one judicial examination of a settlement should suffice, and from an analogy to
bankruptcy proceedings in which the trustee's recommendations are rarely disturbed on appeal if the trial court has approved them. See Newman v. Stein,
supra, at 692-93 & n.7. As he also notes, however, none of these reasons is compelling in the class action context. The importance of protecting absentees tempers
the usual pro-settlement policy of traditional litigation, see MANUAL,supra note 17,
pt. I, § 1.21, and counterbalances the argument that one review is enough. Moreover, the differences between a bankruptcy trustee and a representative plaintiff
are significant enough to require more stringent review of the latter, especially
since a bankruptcy plan before a court of appeals may already have been evaluated by a referee as well as a trial judge. See Newman v. Stein, supra, at 692 n.7.
On the other hand, an appellate court should be wary of venturing too deeply
into factual issues, lest it inadvertently harm the interests of class members. For
example, in Upson v. Otis, supra, at 611-12, the Second Circuit reversed approval of
a derivative suit settlement because it felt the facts showed a strong case for the
plaintiff based on a theory for which damages would be considerably higher than
the compromise. On remand, the plaintiff prevailed as predicted, but on a different
theory. When damages were calculated under this second theory, the recovery
turned out to be less than the amount which had been offered in the settlement.
See Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), reaff'd, 169 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. X948).
' See generally AsamwcAwr BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESrONSInhLnIY,
Canon 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA CoDE].
I See id. EC 4-I, EC 7-7.
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commodious limits necessitated by the lawyer's alternative role as
an officer of the court; 3 if the lawyer wins the case, he is paid according to an individually bargained contract between lawyer and
client; 4 if not, the client may pay the lawyer nothing, but, in any
event, the client is ultimately liable for the expenses of the litigation.5
In the class suit, especially one aggregating nonrecoverable
claims, these traditional assumptions are inapposite. The holder
of a nonrecoverable claim will not have a financial incentive to
underwrite the costs of litigation, and may have no incentive even
to spend the time necessary to select a lawyer. If he should find
an attorney interested in his problem, that attorney will nonetheless be unwilling to go to court unless a class can be formed - an
adequate fee may come only from the fund that litigation might
create. The lawyer's fee will generally not be set by a bargain
between "client" and attorney, but by a court if the attorney wins
or settles; there will be no fee if the attorney is unsuccessful. Nor
can the named plaintiff demand that single-minded allegiance of
his attorney envisioned by the traditional model. The attorney is
the representative for the class and it is improper for him to ignore
the interests of absentees. On the other hand, no very clear idea
of precisely what is meant by a duty to represent a class has
emerged, especially where the class is organized only for the purpose of trying a common legal question.
The disparities between the theory and practice of professional
ethics in the class setting have not gone unnoticed, and, indeed,
have grown into one of the more controversial aspects of class
litigation. This Section of the Note analyzes three areas of special
concern: the interaction of the attorney's role as organizer of
class litigation and traditional bans on advertising and solicitation; the nature of the lawyer-client relationship when the lawyer
is a representative of the class; and, finally, the problem of court
supervision of attorneys' fees and the relationship of fees to traditional prohibitions on maintenance.
A. Initiating the Class Action:
The Propriety of Advertising and Solicitation
In the individual-plaintiff model, the only proper way for a
lawyer to obtain a client is to do nothing.0 The client, it is assumed, will recognize his legal problems and his need for the
' See id. Canon 7.
4
See id. EC 2-I9.
5 See id. DR 5-io3

ISee

(1970);

(B).

B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 128-29
H. DRiNxER, LEGAL ETHICS 21O- 5 (I953).
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services of a lawyer, and will, after canvassing the reputations of
local attorneys, approach the one best qualified to serve him.
Despite recent modifications, the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility even now restricts advertising to a great degree, and direct
attorney solicitation of clients is still forbidden.' Some observers
have charged, however, that class action attorneys unethically
ISee ABA

CODE,

supra note

i, DR

2-IO,

2-102,

2-Xo3,

2-104

(1975).

The

Disciplinary Rules prohibit advertising by private attorneys, with exceptions for the
publishing of certain limited information in professional cards, law lists, and telephone
directories. The ABA House of Delegates on February 27, 1976, adopted amendments to the ABA CODE somewhat expanding the information permitted in telephone directories to include certain biographical facts, and expanding the information permitted both in telephone directories and reputable law lists or directories
to include information concerning the acceptance of credit cards, fees for initial
consultations, the availability upon request of a written schedule or estimate
of fees for specific services, and specialization if permitted by local rules. The
proposal of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility to expand further the allowable information and to include "directories
published by a bona fide consumers' organization" in the category of permitted informational media was rejected by the House of Delegates. See 44 U.S.L.W. 2390
(Feb. 24, X976); 62 A.B.A.J. 309-10 (1976).

Solicitation by private attorneys is forbidden by ABA CODE, supra note i, DR
2o3

2-

(A)-(B) and DR 2-io4(A). The general rule is relaxed, however, in the case of

a "close friend, relative, former client . . .or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client." ABA CODE, supra note i, DR 2-Io4(A) (1).
A special exception to the rules on advertising and solicitation is provided for
qualified legal assistance organizations including legal aid offices and certain
other "bona fide organizations" providing legal services without profit to themselves
and not designed to procure "legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner." ABA CODE, supra note i, DR 2-03(D). The Committee on Le-

gal Ethics of the District of Columbia Bar Association has published an opinion approving radio and newspaper advertising by a public interest law firm. See Ethical
,onsiderations in the Practice of Public Interest Law, 42 J.B. ASS'N D.C. 92, 20209 (1974). But see Note, Legal Ethics-Advertising and Solicitation by Public
Interest Law Firms, 51 TEXAS L. Rv. 169, 276-79 (2973) (interpretive problems
in reading DR 2-2o3(D) to permit advertising and solicitation by lawyers in
public interest firms). Because advertising and solicitation by public interest
groups is thus already proper, this Note will focus on the issues associated with
lawyer-initiated client contact undertaken by private attorneys.
About two months before the ABA House of Delegates' February, 1976, meeting, the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility published
a tentative draft of proposed amendments "to remove all restrictions against
advertising, except any public communication containing a 'false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive or unfair statement or claim.'" ABA Press Release, at z (Dec.
6, 2975). The proposed amendments, however, were not meant to "affect the
Code's prohibitions against lawyers soliciting business on a one-to-one basis." Id.
Comments from lawyers and bar associations induced the Committee to delay any
such broad proposals until the House of Delegates' August, 2976, meeting. See
Special Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Recommending Amendments to and Continued Study of Canon 2 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility 2 (undated).
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solicit their clients." Because this charge is not implausible, courts
have allowed class opponents to attempt to discover from named
plaintiffs whether class attorneys have solicited their participation.' And at least one federal judge has cited solicitation of class
representatives as justification for refusal to certify a class. 10
Whatever the accuracy of this charge, it is by no mean§ apparent that concepts of solicitation developed in individual litigation 11 are appropriately applied in the class action context. 12 A
better analysis starts from the proposition that ethical precepts
are not immutable, but will be acceptable only if consonant with
the goals society wishes the adjudicative process to serve. These
precepts must be construed both to prevent abuse of that process 13 and to avoid conflict with the policies implicit in society's
' See, e.g., Simon, Class Actions -Useful

Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55

F.R.D. 375, 392 (1972).

' See, e.g., Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 6o F.R.D. 634, 637
(W.D. Pa. 1973); Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Tex.
,972); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 16 FED. RULES Srv.
2D X02X (N.D. Tex. X972). But see Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc.,
458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972) (vacating trial court's dismissal of class suit on
grounds of solicitation); Giordani v. Hoffmann, 278 F. Supp. 886, 8go-891 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (discovery as to solicitation not relevant). See generally Hausmann, Legal
Ethics and Litigation Tactics, 2 CLASS AcToN REP. 3 (1973).
10See Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Tex. 1972)
(Estes, C.J.); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 16 FED.
RuLEs SERV. 2D 1021 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (Estes, C.J.). But see Bill Minielli
Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381, 390-91 (S.D.
Ohio 1973) (unsuccessful attempt to obtain plaintiff by solicitation did not bar
certification). See also Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 7 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (dictum that there should be no allowance of attorneys' fees if charges of
solicitation were true). But see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (NAACP
lawyers have constitutional right to organize civil rights actions).
,1See generally B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 6, ch. 4; Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Professional'sDuty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J.
1181 (1972); Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674 (1958).
12 The ABA CoDE, supra note I,makes one concession to class attorneys in DR
2-104(A)(5). This provision provides that "[if success in asserting rights" of a
client in class suit is "dependent upon the joinder of others," the attorney "may
accept, but shall not seek, employment" from others contacted to obtain their
joinder. This concession is a relatively minor one since the special treatment is
granted only to attorneys who already have obtained a named plaintiff for suit.
The December 6, i975, tentative draft of the Standing Committee on Ethics would
have made a rather ambiguous modification of the rule, allowing attorneys to
"accept employment from those he is permitted under applicable law to contact
for the purpose of obtaining their joinder." ABA Press Release, at io, Dec. 6, 1975.
12 An alternative argument often advanced in defense of the prohibition on
lawyer-initiated contacts is that these would cause commercialization of the legal
profession. See, e.g., H. DRzNxKE, supra note 6, at 211; Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VA. L. REv. 677, 678 n.9 (1954). Treating the fear of
commercialization as the basis for the advertising ban affords an explanation for
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choice to have class suits. Whether these policies militate for or

against the adoption of traditional rules regarding lawyer-initiated client contacts is the subject of Part i below. The next Section considers the propriety in class litigation of two specific types
of lawyer-initiated contacts, advertising and solicitation. The final
Section examines the impact of antitrust and constitutional considerations upon regulation of advertising and solicitation by class
action attorneys.
r. Lawyer-Initiated Contact with Class Litigants: General
Considerations.- In all likelihood, lawyer-initiated contact would
increase the number of class actions, thereby apparently contributing to the greater realization of substantive policies, which
is the justification for allowing class suits in the first place. 4
Individuals may not be fully aware of how to vindicate their legal
rights, 5 and in particular, may be unaware of the availability of
the class action as a means for vindicating rights at a cost lower
than that of ordinary litigation. The consistency in gross between
policies sought to be furthered by class actions and lawyer-initiated
contact exceeding the bounds of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility may, however, be misleading. The large fees that class
actions can generate may create a conflict of interest between the
attorney and the named plaintiff ' and can provide an incentive
the exception made for nonprofit organizations, see note 7 supra. But if the
danger commercialization ostensibly threatens is that the public will lose confidence
in the legal profession, it is by no means clear that allowing advertising and
solicitation would indeed have such an effect. The public is more likely to be
impressed by the quality of services rendered by the bar than by the bar's noncommercial tradition. See B. CmSTENSEN, supra note 6, at 152. Moreover, the
suggestion that the noncommercial tradition is essential to preserving a "professional
milieu" fostering adherence to ethical norms, see id. at 154-57, loses much of its
significance given the many extant commercial aspects of the profession. Not only
does the private practice of law involve the furnishing of services for a fee, but
many lawyers, especially the more successful ones, do in fact solicit business in
unobtrusive ways falling within exceptions to the solicitation ban. See M. FREEDCritics of
MAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcS 3N AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 116-17 (1975).
the advertising ban suggest that the true basis of the commercialization argument
is a desire on the part of established lawyers to preserve existing patterns of
competition. See Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons
as a Group Moral Code, 37 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 244, 256-60 (1968). Competition
between established firms and younger or less successful firms is particularly
relevant in the class action context, where the plaintiffs' bar consists largely of
small firms, viewed as "impudent, upstart outsiders." See Andrews, The Class
DocTOR, Jan. 1974, at 18. This reason
Action Bar: It's All Cat and Mouse, Jus
for the advertising ban is, of course, plainly indefensible, especially in view of the
antitrust laws.
4
See p. 1353 supra.
5
S B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 6, at 129-35.
5ee
'o The potential for a conflict of interest between the lawyer and his client is
not unique to the class action, but may arise more generally in situations where
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to abuse the class action process by bringing suits of questionable
legal merit.
The very unfamiliarity of potential clients with their legal
rights, which makes lawyer-initiated contact a potentially valuable adjunct to the full realization of substantive policies, may
make those contacted vulnerable to misrepresentations of the
benefits and burdens of participation in class litigation. Thus
potential class members may be unaware of possibilities for individual settlement, 17 or they may not understand the substantial
commitment they will have to make to the class suit in terms of
personal involvement 18 and delay in settling their own claims.
Moreover, the attorney may not adequately advise potential class
plaintiffs because it is against his personal interest to do so.
Finally, the very fact that the class representatives are recruited
may be to the disadvantage of the class as a whole. The recruited
class representative may have less interest in the litigation than
would a volunteer, and so prove less likely to provide information 11 for the attorney as to the identity and interests of the class
and may less enthusiastically oversee the attorney's loyalty to the
class. Lawyer-initiated contact may also be unfair from the perspective of the class opponent. It is possible that the incidence of
frivolous claims,20 at least some of which class opponents would
lawyers play an active role in initiating litigation. For example, one commentator
has noted the potential conflict of interest between the ideological positions of
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the interests of the plaintiffs it represents.
See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976). This conflict became actual
in the Atlanta school desegregation case where members of the plaintiff class
reached a settlement unacceptable to the national NAACP, see id. at 485-88, and
appealed from the district court's affirmance of the settlement. See Calhoun v.
Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. x975), aff'g 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. x973).
See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (X972) (public interest lawyers
refused to amend pleadings to show injury in fact; case dismissed for lack of
standing).
1" See Franks, Rule 23.- Don Quixote Has a Field Day: Some Ethical Ramifications of Securities Fraud Class Actions, 46 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. I, 3-4 (x969).
Franks discusses the danger that an attorney, approached by an individual with
a claim, may seek to escalate the suit into a class action, even when the individual's
interests are not best served thereby. The litigation, he notes, may become more
protracted than necessary, and a class action may deplete the defendant's assets
so the defendant cannot fully satisfy proven claims. Id. at 3-4.
8 For example, the named plaintiff might be called upon to respond to detailed
discovery requests by the defendant, as well as to factual inquiries made by the
class attorney. See p. x445 supra.
19 See In re Goldchip Funding Co., 6i F.R.D. 592, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. I974).
20 Some commentators have suggested that solicitation or advertising outside
the class action context increases the incidence of fraudulent or frivolous claims.
Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rv. X82, I87-88
See Note, Legal Ethics-Ambulance
(i955); Comment, Settlement of Personal Injury Cases in the Chicago Area, 47
Nw. U.L. Rav. 895, 898 (i953). Christensen, however, argues that courts are able
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settle, 2 1 would increase disproportionately were class attorneys
allowed to recruit.
Allowing lawyer-initiated client contact may increase the chilling effect of class actions to the point of deterring potential class
opponents from engaging in conduct not in fact statutorily proscribed. The possibility of such contact would be a matter of indifference to persons contemplating action likely to impose substantial injuries on particular individuals, because the injured
individuals will have sufficient incentive to retain counsel on their
own initiative. To an individual considering action injurious to
a class, however, it may matter that advertising or solicitation is
permitted. Although injury to a class as a whole may be substantial, injury to individual class members may not reach the
point where they would seek legal assistance on their own. Permitting class attorneys to contact potential plaintiffs, because it
increases the likelihood that class suits will be brought even where
the injury to individual class members is small, may cause individuals to take into account the prospect of a substantial liability
to a class.
Up to a point, this would not be unfair to the potential class
opponent. Increased deterrent effect may simply increase the
likelihood that an individual will comply with statutory directives.
In some circumstances, however, the deterrent effect of class
actions, even unenhanced by relaxed client contact rules, may distort rather than further statutory policies, as individuals refrain
from conduct that a statute was not intended to prohibit. 2 Allowing lawyer-initiated contact may increase the situations in which
such distortion occurs.
Relaxed contact rules may also have distributional consequences unfair to class opponents. Suits aggregating claims held
by individuals who had not previously sought out an attorney are
those most likely to increase. If failure to seek out an attorney
reflects the potential client's feeling that he has not been hurt,
then it seems questionable to impose substantial burdens on the
class opponent since no benefit of apparent importance to anyone,
except the attorney, would be produced. 3 On the other hand, if
to weed out frivolous or fraudulent claims, see B. CHRiSTENSEEN, supra note 6,
at 145-46, and also maintains that the "remedy, if one is needed, should be directed

to the fraudulent and frivolous claims themselves and not to legitimate ones," id.
at 146.
21 But see Note, The Rule 23(b) (3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62
GEO. L.J. XX23, 1154 (1974) (discounting the danger that class attorneys bring

frivolous claims as blackmail weapons to obtain settlement).
22 See pp. 1353-66 supra.
"2 See generally Simon, supra note 8, at 377-78; Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - the Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 CoLum. L. RFv. i, 9-io (1971).
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the failure to contact an attorney reflects an unawareness that one
has suffered a legally cognizable injury, or simply the high cost of
finding a competent attorney when there is no easy way of determining which attorneys litigate the type of suit the client would
like to bring, then advertising that reduces this information barrier to litigating a felt harm cannot be said to have unfair distributional consequences. Thus, the risk of unfair distributional
consequences can be reduced if permissible lawyer-client contacts
require the potential client to take independent steps to initiate
litigation.
2. Advertising and Solicitation by Class Attorneys: A Comparative Analysis.- A comparison of advertising and solicitation
indicates that a rule banning solicitation but allowing advertising
would screen out the worst aspects of lawyer-initiated client contact without significantly impairing realization of substantive
policies this contact makes possible. At the outset, it is important
to distinguish the two forms of contact. Advertising encompasses
all communications initiated by lawyers with potential clients in
circumstances not involving personal contact. Personal contact is
the key element in solicitation: 24 The lawyer approaches a potential client directly, recommending his own employment and hoping
to secure
the potential client's immediate consent to the arrange25
ment.

Solicitation presents greater opportunities for abuse than
advertising. There exists a greater danger of misrepresentation
by the attorney, since solicitation, unlike advertising, is not readily
subject to scrutiny by the legally informed. A soliciting attorney
may be able to pressure an individual into an immediate decision
to bring class suit, before the individual is able to give the matter
adequate thought.2 An individual approached through advertising, on the other hand, can decide to contact an attorney alone,
21
in a less coercive atmosphere.
Individuals who agree to become class representatives after
responding to an advertisement have demonstrated at least some
interest in pressing a claim. Solicited class representatives, by
contrast, may be individuals who were required to take little initi24 See Note, supra note ii, at 118x n.4.
25
The classic example of solicitation, ambulance chasing, involves a lawyer
approaching an accident victim at the scene or at his hospital bed to secure
immediate agreement to the lawyer's pursuing the victim's claim.
28 See Note, supra note ix,at ix99 (proposing that solicitation as well as advertising be allowed but recommending a specific prohibition against such "overreaching" in solicitation).
27 Obviously, advertising can also be abused; however, the more serious forms
of misrepresentation and deception are amenable to regulation. See generally
Developments in the Law- Deceptive Advertising, 8o HAv. L. RFV. ioo5, io63ix63 (z967).
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ative beyond simply assenting to a lawyer's proposal, and thus are
less likely to have actual interest in the progress of the litigation.
Indeed, it is possible that a solicited class representative's consent was prompted solely by friendship with the soliciting attorney,2 8 rather than by any concern for redressing injury. Solicited
class representatives, therefore, are more likely to take a passive
role, insufficiently checking any tendency of the class attorney
towards prosecution of frivolous claims. Moreover, advertising is
unlikely to persuade an individual who stands to gain no significant benefit from class suit, or who himself feels no injury, to seek
out an attorney. The effect of solicitation may not be similarly
limited. Therefore, objections to lawyer-initiated client contact
based on the risk of overdeterrence and concern for distributive
justice count more heavily against solicitation than advertising. 9
"aIn Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Tex. 1972),
one of three named plaintiffs solicited by the class attorney was a personal friend.
Id. at 239-40. ABA CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-104(A)(i) provides an exception
from the solicitation ban if the solicited client is a close friend of the attorney. The
court failed to note this exception in citing the attorney's solicitation of named
plaintiffs as one ground for refusing certification, see 54 F.R.D. at 240, but the
fact that two out of three named plaintiffs were not friends may have rendered
the exception inapplicable. In addition, the court may have felt that the peculiar
dangers of solicitation in the class action context militated against the application
of this exception.
2 The problem of the passive class representative becomes especially obvious
when the attorney obtains the participation of his law partner or spouse as named
plaintiff, or when the attorney designates himself as named plaintiff. Nevertheless,
at least two courts have tolerated such practices. See, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific
Control Corp., 67 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (interim order); Lamb v. United Sec.
Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 30-31 (S.D. Iowa 1972). Most courts, however, have refused to recognize class attorneys, their spouses, or business associates, as named
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 20 FED. RuLES SERv.
2D 859 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Stull v. Pool, I8 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 1000 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973);
Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Cotchett v. Avis
Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Kriger v. European
Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 1o4 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56
F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Ariz. 1972). One reason often cited by the courts for rejecting
such a dual role for the class attorney is the conflict of interest thereby created. The
attorney's interest as class attorney in the fees accruing as a result of a class recovery
is likely to outweigh by far the attorney's interest as a class member in the recovery
per se, at least where the individual claims of class members are small. As a result,
the attorney may recommend a settlement relatively unfavorable to the class which
a vigilant named plaintiff might have vetoed. See Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973); Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D.
545, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1972). But see Umbriac v. American Snacks, Inc., E1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I994,963, at 97,312 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (conflict of interest neutralized by fact that any settlement would be accompanied by
notice to class and court approval). One court also thought that the lack of an independent named plaintiff raised doubts as to whether the suit would produce
any significant benefits of interest to class members. See Cotchett v. Avis Rent A
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Advertising may be just as effective as solicitation in furthering class action objectives. Obviously, it is possible through advertising to inform potential class litigants of their rights, of the
efficacy of the class action device, and of the availability of a willing class attorney. The chief advantage of solicitation over advertising is not communication of information but persuasion.
It is this very persuasive
force, however, which is the source of
30
solicitation's dangers.

3. Antitrust and ConstitutionalRestrictions Upon Regulation
of Advertising and Solicitation by Class Attorneys. - In general,
restraints on advertising are a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.3 ' The Supreme Court, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 2
has held that the legal profession is not exempt from restrictions
Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Courts rejecting a dual role
for the class attorney have also noted that the dual role constitutes a "questionable
method of soliciting legal business," Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448,
450 (D. Ariz. 3971), and would give rise to problems were the attorney-plaintiff
to be called as a witness, see Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. X04,
io5-o6 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also ABA CODE, supra note 1,DR 5-302. See generally
Andrews, supra note 13, at 18; Comment, The Class Representative: The Problem
of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1133, 1137-39 (974); Note, Ethical Obligations of the Attorney Under Rule 23-Abuses and Reforms, 12 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 224, 237-40 (1974).
30

A rule banning solicitation by class attorneys should not, however, be enforced in the class action forum, but rather in separate disciplinary proceedings.
Cf. Fisher Studio, Inc., v. Loew's Inc., 232 F.2d 199, 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 836 (1956) (non-class suit where judge refused to disqualify attorney
who solicited plaintiffs). Disqualification of the class attorney opens the way to
delaying tactics and harassment by defendants at the suit's inception, see
Hausmann, supra note 9, at 3-6, and also may be unfair to the solicited named
plaintiffs or other class members who have relied upon the attorney's assistance.
See also Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 75-7234 (2d Cir., Dec. 12, 1975)
(non-class suit).
"' See United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688, 69x (7th Cir.
196i) (prohibiting agreement to restrain advertising among retail gasoline dealers) ;
United States v. House of Seagram, Inc., 1965 Trade Cas. ff 71,517, at 81,269
(S.D. Fla. 1965) (prohibiting similar agreement between liquor producer and
liquor retailers). See also Louisiana Petroleum Retail Dealers, Inc. v. Texas Co.,
1956 Trade Cas. ff 68,566, at 72,267 (W.D. La. 19S56) (given agreement prohibiting
advertising among retail gasoline dealers, Clayton Act injunction denied because
of plaintiff's "unclean hands").
The Justice Department has filed suit against pharmacists challenging the
prohibition upon advertising of retail prices of prescription drugs in the pharmacists'
code of ethics. See United States v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Civil No.
G75-558 (W.D. Mich., filed Nov. 24, X975), reprinted in 5 CCH TRADE RaG. REP.
ff 45,075, at 53,63X. The FTC has issued a similar complaint against the American

Medical Association, charging that the prohibition on advertising and solicitation

in the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics violates section 5 of the Federal Trade

Commission Act. See In re American Medical Ass'n, Complaint Dkt. No. 9o64
(FTC Dec. 39, 1975), reprinted in 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 21,o68, at 20,939.
32421

U.S. 773 (1975).
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upon anticompetitive conduct,3 3 and many commentators, in the
wake of GoldJarb, have suggested that rules restricting legal advertising fall within the Sherman Act's prohibition. 34 Indeed, the
American Bar Association has indicated that it regards present
35
limits on legal advertising as vulnerable to antitrust attack.
The applicability of antitrust analysis to advertising and solicitation by class attorneys, however, is not immediately clear.
The per se rule against advertising restraints was developed by
courts as a response to attempts to limit price advertising.3 6 At
first glance, price advertising might appear to be of little relevance

in the class action context, since the fees class attorneys charge
33 Id. at 785-88. In Goldfarb, enforcement of a minimum fee schedule published
by a county bar association was held to be anticompetitive conduct within the
scope of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that learned
professions are excluded from antitrust regulation on the ground that they are not
"trade or commerce" within the language of section x of the Sherman Act. Id.
The force of the holding was somewhat tempered, however, by the Court's recognition that the "practice of professions [is not] interchangeable with other business
activities. . . . The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently." Id. at
787-88 n.,7.
"' See Address by Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Ass't United States Attorney General,
Combined Meeting of Idaho and Alaska State Bar Associations, June 27, 1975
(Press Release); Wilson, Madison Avenue, Meet the Bar, 6i A.B.A.J. 586 (,975);
Goldfarb: How Will It Affect Legal Services Delivery?, 2 ALTERNATivES (ABA),
August, 1975, at i. See generally Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust
Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 89 HARV. L. REV. 7,5,
716 & n.7 (i976) ; note 31 supra.
* See Special Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, supra note 7, at i; 62 A.BA.J. 53, 53 (1976).
" See United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc., 285 F.2d 688, 691 (7th
Cir. i96I); Louisiana Petroleum Retail Dealers, Inc. v. Texas Co., 1956 Trade
Cas. II 68,566, at 72,267 (W.D. La. 1956) (involving schemes by retail dealers to
stabilize retail gas prices and avoid price wars). In United States v. House of
Seagram, Inc., 1965 Trade Cas. 1171,517, at 81,269 (S.D. Fla. 1965), the liquor
producer attempted to enforce a ban on advertising by retailers in order to
maintain the resale prices. Similarly, the target of the justice Department's suit
against the APA, see note 31 supra, was the APA's prohibition of advertising of
retail prices of prescription drugs, and the resulting suppression of price competition. On the other hand, the FTC's complaint against the AMA appears to
have a broader focus. The FTC has charged that the AMA has prevented members
from "(A) [s]oliciting business by advertising or otherwise; (B) [eIngaging in
price competition; and (C) [o]therwise engaging in competitive practices."
(emphasis supplied). In re American Medical Ass'n, Complaint Dkt. No. 9064
(FTC Dec. 19, 1975), reprinted in 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 21,o68, at 20,939.
The complaint charges that the result has been the stabilization of prices, restraint
on competition among doctors in providing medical services, and deprivation of
consumers of "information pertinent to the selection of a physician and of the
benefits of competition." Id. Presumably factors other than price are pertinent
to the selection of doctors, as they may be to the selection of attorneys.
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are often fixed by courts at the conclusion of litigation. 1 Class
attorneys might nonetheless be able to engage in price competition, and thus find price advertising useful. For example, class
attorneys could advertise their willingness to accept only the
lesser of the court-awarded fee or some specified amount. Moreover, the utility of service advertising is unaffected by judicial
control over attorneys' fees. Restraints on advertising, therefore,
may have as significant an anticompetitive effect in the class action
milieu as in other areas of legal service.
Whatever the potential for enhanced competition in the provision of legal services, there is little reason to exempt prohibitions on legal advertising from the present per se antitrust rule
since most of the benefits of an advertising ban can be realized in
ways more consistent with competition. As to the prohibition of
solicitation, however, the case is quite different. Solicitation can

have, at best, only a marginal competitive effect given the existence of advertising, and its potential for abuse in the legal context seems clear. Furthermore, the possibilities for deception and
misrepresentation are a traditional concern of the Federal Trade
Commission, the only plaintiff under present law that can challenge prohibitions on legal advertising on a nationwide basis. 8
The FTC, if it finds the policies supporting solicitation bans persuasive, even if not strictly cognizable in antitrust terms, 0 may
in its discretion take no action. Thus it seems likely that current
prohibitions on solicitation will not be affected by the antitrust
laws, while prohibitions on advertising will be found to contravene
antitrust policy.
" See
38

p. i6o8 infra.
The Supreme Court, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (x975),
did not reject the state action exemption from the Sherman Act enunciated in
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 34x (1943).

It merely held that the exemption did

not cover minimum fee schedules, since the only state involvement, a general grant
of rulemaking authority, did not constitute a decision of the state to implement
minimum fee schedules, at least for purposes of the Parker doctrine. See 421
U.S. at 788-92. Parker's state action test, however, is likely to be met with respect
to restraints on advertising and solicitation by lawyers. The Code's prohibitions
have "acquired the force of law in at least thirty-three states," either through
statutory enactment or through adoption as rules of court by state supreme
courts. Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and
Advertising, 8 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 77, 78 n.8 (973); see Note,
supra note 34, at 716 n.7. Parker's requirement that anticompetitive conduct be
compelled, rather than merely permitted, by state law thus appears to be met.
Therefore restraints on advertising or solicitation could not, at least in a majority
of states, be attacked directly under the Sherman Act. The Parker doctrine
probably does not limit action taken by the Federal Trade Commission. See id.
at 731-34. The FTC, therefore, is in a position not only to take action against
advertising restraints but also to decide whether to challenge solicitation bans.
"9 But see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 n.17 (1975).

discussed in note 33 supra.
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The conclusion that current rules against lawyers' advertising cannot stand is further buttressed by constitutional considerations. In Bigelow v. Virginia,40 the Supreme Court extended
constitutional protection to advertisements concerning matters not
illegal and within the "public interest." 4' Advertising by class
action attorneys plainly falls within the compass of the Bigelow
rule. Like the abortion referral service 4' advertisement at issue
in Bigelow, an advertisement informing potential class members
of a possible violation of their statutory or constitutional rights
and of the existence of an inexpensive means of redress would
not "simply propose a commercial transaction" but would contain "factual material . . . of potential interest and value to a

diverse audience ...
If the subject matter of class action advertisements is thus constitutionally protected under Bigelow, attorneys, under traditional
first amendment analysis, have a right to engage in such advertis-

ing, and members of their potential audience have a right to receive it,44 in the absence of a compelling justification for restrictions. 45 Although the Bigelow Court styled its analysis simply as
"balancing," 46 justice Blackmun's majority opinion in fact closely
40421 U.S. 809 (1975).
4 See id. at 821-26.
42 Id. at 8XI-12.
43 Id. at 822.
44 In Bigelow, a newspaper editor's

right to publish an abortion referral
service advertisement was at issue. He was contesting a conviction under a Virginia
criminal statute prohibiting such advertising. Id. at 811-i5. See also Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 687
(E.D. Va. 1974) (overturning Virginia statute banning advertising of prescription
drugs in an opinion emphasizing the consumers' "right-to-know"), aff'd, 96 S. Ct.
1817 (976).
A right to receive information was first recognized in Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (943), where the Supreme Court, in overturning the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness under a municipal ordinance prohibiting personal delivery of
leaflets door-to-door, emphasized the rights both of "those desiring to distribute
literature and those desiring to receive it. . . ." Id. at 149. This reference in
Martin to the right to receive information is notable in that there was no specific
evidence that any of the local homeowners had expressed a desire to receive the
information. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 3899o (i969). In a number of subsequent first amendment cases, a right to receive
information has been recognized by the Court upon the urging of the potential
recipients. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 38x U.S. 301 (1965) (postal
delivery of communist propaganda from abroad); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
5x6 (i945) (labor organizer soliciting union membership by a speech in a mass
meeting). But cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (rejecting argument
that right to receive information means that alien has right to deliver a speech in
United States).

4 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (z968).
"See

422 U.S. at 826.
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scrutinized the asserted government interests, rejecting as insubstantial a justification previously held legitimate in a case without
first amendment overtones, 4" distinguishing the prohibition at
issue from less restrictive alternatives, 48 and noting the absence
of any conflicting rights. 9
It is unlikely that a prohibition of advertising by class action
attorneys could withstand similarly exacting scrutiny." The concerns for fairness to class members and class opponents which
might prompt an across-the-board prohibition of advertising by
class action attorneys either may be met by less restrictive alternatives or seem too insubstantial to warrant the infringement of
first amendment rights. Problems of misrepresentation might be
solved through an independent prohibition that, because of the
public nature of advertising, could be readily policed. 1 The
problem of weak class representatives is attenuated in the advertising context since potential class representatives must still
make the effort to contact an attorney. In any event, the problem could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis through appropriate judicial inquiries during early stages of class action litigation.52 The danger of overdeterrence resulting from the increased
47 Compare id. at 827-28 (Virginia's interest in protecting its citizens from
information about abortions "entitled to little, if any weight, under the circumstances") with Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (upholding the power of one state to prohibit within its borders commercial advertising of optometric services in another state). See also The Supreme Court, z974

Term,
89 HARv. L. REV. 47, xi8-2o & n.5i (i975).
48

See 421 U.S. at 824. The Court mentioned that Virginia could have protected
the health of its citizens by disseminating further information to help them "make
better informed decisions." Id.
49

Id. at 828.
50 Constitutional attacks upon state regulation of professional activity outside

the first amendment context have previously been rejected by the Supreme Court.
See North Dakota Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. i56
(1973); Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (ig5g); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S.
442 (i954) ; Semler v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 6o8 (935). The
Bigelow Court stated that these "Fourteenth Amendment cases that concern the
regulation of professional activity" are not inconsistent with its decision. 421 U.S.
at 825 n.io.
"See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 6, at 141. See also note 7 supra.

"See, e.g., In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592 (M.D. Pa. 2974). In
Goldchip, the plaintiff's affidavit stated that he and his mother, the other named
plaintiff, had little business experience or knowledge of the facts and that they
were relying on the attorneys to investigate the facts and to advise them on the
proper course of action. See id. at 593. The court denied a motion to certify, until
the plaintiffs might produce sufficient facts to demonstrate the adequacy of their
representaton. The court noted that "[elven unknowledgeable and inexperienced
Plaintiffs" might meet its test, however, by "demonstrating a keen interest in the
progress and outcome of the litigation." Id. at 595-
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numbers of class suits advertising may elicit can only be assessed
from the perspective of the specific causes of action under which
class suits might be brought, and thus provides no justification
for an across-the-board prohibition.53
Once the ban on advertising by class attorneys is lifted, first
amendment considerations which might otherwise militate against
similar solicitation bans diminish. The Supreme Court has indicated in several recent decisions that first amendment values
may be given less weight where alternative means of communicating exist.54 In any event, if advertising is permitted, a prohibition
of solicitation can be regarded as a form of time, place, or manner
regulation, screening out the worst abuses of lawyer-initiated
client contact 5 5 without prohibiting that contact entirely.56 Since
time, place, or manner regulations are traditionally subject only
to a rationality inquiry, 57 solicitation bans may escape the strict
58
scrutiny advertising prohibitions invite.
" See pp. 1353-66 supra.
" See Pell v. Procunier, 4,7 U.S. 8,7, 823-28 (1974) ; Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 55x, 566-67 (1972). But cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765
(1972). In Kleindienst, where American citizens asserted a first amendment right

to debate in person with an alien denied entry into the United States, the Court
rejected the government's argument that the first amendment was inapplicable
because of the Americans' access to the alien's ideas by books and speeches. That
argument, the Court explained, "overlooks what may be particular qualities
inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate. . . ." Id. But the Court noted that "alternative means of access to Mandel's ideas might be a relevant factor" if the case
had called for a balancing analysis. Id.
"5See p. 1584 supra.

"6 But see Martin v. Struthers, 3i9 U.S. 141 (x943). In Martin, the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting personal delivery of handbills door-todoor. This personal method of communication, said the Court, was "essential to the
poorly financed causes of little people." Id. at 146. In the case of client contact
initiated by class attorneys, on the other hand, it is much less clear that solicitation
is a less expensive means than advertising to reach potential named plaintiffs. See
also Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
" See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 536, 558 (2965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
58 But compare the conclusion in Note, supra note ii, at 1158-92, that the Constitution protects both advertising and solicitation so long as there is no deception
or overreaching.
The Code's apparent exception from the solicitation ban for non-profit organizations such as the NAACP or public interest law firms, see note 7 supra, seems
to have been established in deference to the Supreme Court's decisions in NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 45 (2963), and its progeny, United Transp. Union v. State Bar,
401 U.S. 576 (ig7i); District 12, UMW v. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virgina ex rel. State Bar, 377 U.S. i (1964).
In these cases, the Supreme Court enunciated a first amendment right to engage in
collective activity to obtain effective access to courts. The Supreme Court in Button
and the later cases, however, was not called upon to make any comparison of
solicitation and advertising. It appears possible, therefore, that if advertising
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B. The Attorney-Client Relationship in Class Actions
i. The Class as the Attorney's Client.- The Code of Professional Responsibility envisions the role of the attorney to be
that of an advocate of the interests of his client, 0 the person, who
has sought out the attorney and entered a contractual relationship
with him.6 ° Although the lawyer has some freedom to make
tactical choices during litigation without consulting his client, the
lawyer must, on larger matters such as the terms of a settlement,
defer to the wishes of the client.61 An attorney can and should
inform the client of options the legal system may afford him,"2
but ultimately the definition of the "interest" to be asserted is determined by the client.63
It is clearly inappropriate to import this understanding of the
attorney-client relationship into the class action context by simply
were freely permitted, a rule banning solicitation might withstand constitutional
attack even when applied to non-profit organizations.
".ABA CODE, supra note i, EC 7-1 states that an attorney's duty is "to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law," in conformity with disciplinary rules and professional regulations. Critics of the legal profession generally do
not question that an attorney's first duty is to the client, but instead argue that the
attorney's professional responsibility encompasses additional duties which may
limit the attorney's pursuit of a client's interests. Judge Frankel, for example, has

suggested that the "adversary ideal" should be "modified" so that the "paramount
commitment of counsel concerning matters of fact should be to the discovery of
truth rather than to the advancement of the client's interest." Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1o31, 1052-59 (1975).
For responses to Judge Frankel's views, see Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search
For Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. io6o (975); Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth,
and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
io67 (1975). The SEC, Ralph Nader, and others have urged that the lawyer's
duty to a client should be subordinate to certain responsibilities to the public.
See M. Freedman, supra note 13, at 9-ix; Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities
of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-X974 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
ff 79,631, at 83,689; 3o Bus. LAW. (March, 1975) (special issue devoted to discussion of new duties to investors which SEC has sought to impose on securities
lawyers). For contrary views, see Krash, Professional Responsibility to Clients
and the Public Interest: Is There a Conflict?, i5 LAW OFrICE EcoN. & MANAGEMENT 418 (1974).
60 See generally ABA CODE, supra note i, Canon 2.
61 See ABA CODE, supra note i, EC 7-7, EC 7-9. See also ABA STANDARDS, THE

DEFENCE FvNCTION § 5.2 (1971) (Three decisions are to be made by the accused
"after full consultation with counsel": "(i) what plea to enter; (ii) whether to waive
jury trial; (iii) whether to testify in his own behalf." "[A]ll other strategic and
tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with
his client.").
62 See ABA CODE, supra note ",EC 7-8.
"aSee D. RosENTAL., LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHo's IN CHARGE 114-IS (1975)
(ABA CODE seems to envision client definition of interest, but in practice attorneys
are usurping control of major decisions).
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A chief

function of the class action device is to bring to the attention of

the court a complete view of the situation an adjudication will resolve. 4 This function would be disserved were the class attorney
to treat the named plaintiff as the exclusive client. The interests
of the named plaintiff and other members of the class may diverge
at various points during the litigation.6 5 If at such points an attorney's duty required advocacy of solely the named plaintiff's interests, the interests of other class members would be left effectively unrepresented. Treating both the named plaintiff and the
class, or each member of the class separately, as the attorney's
clients would not be much more satisfactory.6 6 At points where
interests diverged, the class attorney would face a conflict of interest.
Under the Code, an attorney faced with a conflict of interest
among his clients would be forced to withdraw from the employment of one of the clients.67 This solution - disaggregation of a
multi-person party into its constituent interest groups in order to
give the separate interests separate representation - is to some
extent recognized in the sub-classing provisions of rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 But, because of the numerosity of interested persons that makes class suit necessary in the
first place, sub-classing will never disaggregate the class into
4 See pp. 1366-71 supra.
" See pp. 1475-98 supra. See generally Bell, supra note 16.
66
It appears likely that in practice the attorney will choose to assert the

interests of the named plaintiff over those of other class members when a conflict
arises. Cf., e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 69-71, 76 (5th Cir. 1973)
(failure of class attorney to appeal award of retrospective relief only to named
plaintiff basis for refusal of court to give class judgment binding effect). The
attorney may have undertaken the case on the prompting of the named plaintiff
and may have personal contact throughout the litigation with few other class
members. Occasionally, the attorney may hope to obtain legal business from
the named plaintiff in the future. The tendency of the class attorney to favor the
named plaintiff might be analogized to the apparent tendency of corporate counsel
"subconsciously to consider management alone" as his client, because of personal
contact with management and dependence on management for continued employment. See Panel Discussion, Responsibility of Lawyers Advising Management, 30
Bus. LAW., March, 1975, at 13, 15 (remarks of Van Dusen).
67 ABA CODE, supra note i, DR 5-1o5 (A)-(C) provides that an attorney should
not accept or continue multiple employment if such a course of conduct is likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, unless it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and each consents to the representation after
full disclosure of the possible effect on the attorney's loyalty. In the class action
context, the possibility of obtaining informed consent from all individual class
members is remote, and the idea of obtaining informed consent from the class as a
whole is without meaning. The Code, then, seems to require the attorney to withdraw
from the litigation. See also ABA CODE, supra, EC 5-75, 5-16.
68
See pp. 1479-81 supra.
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single-person sub-classes. Thus, conflict of interest among individuals represented by one attorney appears inevitable and, if the
class suit is to proceed at all, an understanding of the lawyer-client
relationship must be developed that does not depend on the individualized representation of the interests of class members.
In a few cases, such a definition is relatively straightforward.
If the class is an association that has procedures for governing
itself, then the members of the association have within their control a means of deciding the interests of the association as a whole
and are able to communicate these interests to an attorney. 0 Because there is a mechanism for aggregating interests other than
choice by the attorney himself, it makes sense to cast the attorney
in his traditional role of counsellor and advocate with the association as his client, and the interest developed through the association's normal political channels as the interest to be advocated.70
11 See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 69I (S.D.N.Y.
1975); 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.

1975). In Robertson, the class consisted of
all players in the NBA and ABA active at the time the suit was commenced in
x97o or at any time before judgment. 389 F. Supp. at 873, 9o3. The named
plaintiffs were "elected player representative[s]" of the 14 teams in the NBA
when the suit commenced. Id. at 873. Every active player at the time the suit
was commenced authorized the institution of the suit. Id. at 902. In Halverson v.
Convenienit Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972), 75 of the 80 Convenient Food Mhrt franchisees in the Chicago area formed an association; the
attorney who became class counsel was invited by an officer to attend a meeting to
discuss the possibility of bringing an antitrust action against the franchisor; after
the attorney left, all the members present voted in favor of the suit; the association agreed to assume the costs. See id. at 929-30.
Class actions brought by associations are infrequent in part because associations
themselves ordinarily have standing to sue on behalf of their members. This
standing is usually statutorily conferred. Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, for example, provides that a labor union "may sue or be sued as an entity
and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United
States." 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (,970). See generally G. WEBSTER, THE LAW OF
AssocIATIoNs ff 17.09 (I975). Rule 23.2 provides that, even without statutory
standing, an unincorporated association may sue or be sued as a class. See FED.
R. CIv. P. 23.2.
70 For example, the duty of loyalty owed by an attorney hired by a corporation
runs to the entity and not to its shareholders, directors, or employees. See ABA
CoDE, supra note i, EC 5-x8. But since management of a corporation's affairs is
usually entrusted to its board of directors, elected by the shareholders, it is thought
that an attorney may "ordinarily assume" that, in "rendering legal advice to management," he is "serving the interests of the corporate entity." Panel Discussion,
supra note 66, at i5 (remarks of Van Dusen). Equating the corporation with
management simplifies the attorney's task of identifying the client's objectives.
The assumption that an attorney representing a corporate entity will be looking primarily to management for information as to the corporation's situation and
interests is reflected in the "control group" standard courts use to define those
communications between an attorney and corporate employees protected by the
attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210
F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. x962); Golminas v. Fred Teitelbaum Const. Co., 112

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS-

CLASS ACTIONS

1595

Ordinarily, however, a class is not an association. Class mem-

bers may have nothing in common except the common treatment
afforded them by the class opponent. They have neither a mechanism for resolving differences in their interests, nor a way of
articulating common goals to the attorney who represents them.
An understanding of the attorney's duty to the class can, nonetheless, be drawn from consideration of the purposes implicit in
society's decision to have class suits and in the role assigned the
judge in class litigation. The function of the class action is to
create a procedure in which the interests of the numerous persons who have been affected by action of the class opponent, or
who may be affected by the relief sought in the class suit, can be
made visible to the court.71 The existence of absentee interests,
either because they reinforce or because they diverge from the interests of the parties, is a relevant factor in the court's decision
of the merits of a case or the award of a remedy. The class procedure thus seeks to facilitate consideration by the court of the
greatest number of interests that will be affected by the outcome
of the litigation. To achieve this purpose, the judge is charged
with guarding the interests of absentees. He can use procedural
devices such as sub-classing to force a more representative party
structure, 7' and other procedures such as sampling notice " and
the absentee advocate 74 can free him to some extent from relying
on the parties to bring forward information about relevant affected
interests.
The lawyer's duty in representing the class must be consistent
with this theme. The first obligation of the class attorney, therefore, should be to discover the range of interests held by class
members. He ought also to report conflicts of interest among
class members to the judge so that he can consider whether disaggregation of the class is necessary for adequate representation.
Ill. App. 2d 445, 447-48, 251 N.E.2d 314, 316-17 (1969). But see Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 490-92 (7th Cir. I970), aff'd by equally
divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (i971). See generally Burnham, Confidentiality and
the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege and "Work Product" in
Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 545-48 (1968).
Obviously the ordinary assumption that management's views will accurately
reflect the interests of the corporation as a whole will often prove false. See Panel
Discussion, supra note 66, at I5; cf. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 43o F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.
1970) (in stockholder class and derivative suit alleging violation of federal
securities laws by directors and officers, invocation of corporation's attorney-client
privilege could not create absolute bar to stockholders' efforts to discover communication by management to corporate counsel).
71 See pp. 1366-7, supra.
72 See pp. 1479-8I supra.
73 See pp. 1441-42 supra.
74 See pp. I56i-65 supra.
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This obligation is analogous to lawyers' traditional duty to withdraw from the representation of clients with differing interests
unless each client consents to joint representation after full disclosure."5 Here, there is no possibility of obtaining such individual consent, so the judge must decide the propriety of joint
representation.
Disaggregation of the class will not always be feasible, and if
the suit is to proceed, the lawyer will inevitably have to subordinate interests of some class members to those of others; otherwise
advocacy of any interest would be impossible. This decision cannot, however, be kept secret from the court because its practical
effect is to foreclose actual representation of a potentially relevant interest. Thus, the third obligation of the class attorney
should be to disclose to the court that he has chosen to advocate
a position not shared by all those whom he putatively represents
and to identify the groups that he has been forced to ignore. With
this information, the judge is put in a position to take whatever
steps may be required to ensure the fairness of the litigation for example, the judge may require further disaggregation of
the class, may allow intervenors a more active role, or may appoint masters, experts, or amici.76
An attorney's duty to represent a class may be usefully analogized to a legislator's duty to represent his constituency. A
constituency need not share any overriding common interest.
Constituents may be affected differently by actions which concern
all of them, and thus may have different points of view as to what
action is in the best interests of the whole. 7 To represent a constituency, a legislator must first discover the various interests of
the constituents. In some circumstances, discovery of the diverse
interests may be all that is required of the legislator: at least at
preliminary stages of the legislative process, the very fact that
proposed action has a differing impact on various elements of a
constituency may be what is relevant. At other points a legislator
will be required to choose among alternatives each of which will
benefit or disadvantage various groups of constituents.
The legislator's choices are, of course, subject to a retrospective check through the electoral system. No similar check on the
class representative appears feasible. This does not mean that
no review of the choices made by the class attorney is possible.
If the attorney is lax in carrying out his obligation to discover the
diversity of the class, the court may order sampling notice and
7

See note 67 supra.

" See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1300-01 (1976).
7
1 See generally H. PITHIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 219-20 (X972).
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Moreover, the court has a range of

responses to an attorney's decision to advocate a particular position. At the punitive end of the spectrum, the court may remove

an attorney as class representative if it thinks his choice of position displays a gross insensitivity to the range of interests the
attorney is supposed to represent. 9 At the other end of the spectrum, the court may "redefine the client" by sub-classing or inviting the participation of amici or intervenors to represent sub-

ordinated interests. Finally, the court, which ultimately must set
the attorney's fee,80 can use the fee award as an incentive to

proper representation of the class.
Attorney-Client Relationships in Practice: Communica-

2.

tions with Class Members by the Class Attorney and Class OppoThe attorney-class relationship outlined above will prove

nent. -

unworkable if courts continue their present practice of restricting
communications between the attorney and the class he repre-

sents.

1

Indeed, the practice of restricting communications with

78Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4), 37(b)(2), 37(d)

(all allowing fees and ex-

penses to be taxed against an attorney who advises his client to ignore legitimate
discovery requests of opponent).
70 See pp. 1489-98 supra.
"oSee p. 1607 infra.
81 A gag rule may simply prohibit all communications by parties or counsel to
class members "until such time as an order may be entered by the Court approving
such communications." W.D. PA. R. 34(d), ruled invalid at least prior to certification, Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 5o8 F.2d 152, 163-64 (3 d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975). More commonly, such rules, following § 1.6i of the
197o edition of the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 49 F.R.D.
217, 229, contain a general ban on all unapproved communications supplemented
by a list of four types of specifically forbidden communications: (i) solicitation
of legal representation of class members; (2) solicitation of fees and expenses or
agreements to pay them; (3) solicitation of requests to opt out; and (4) misleading or misrepresentative communications. See S.D. FLA. R. 19B; N.D. GA. R.
221.2 & 221.3; N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 22; S.D. OHIO R. 3.9.4; S.D. TEx. R. 6;
W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 23(g). See also Mn. R. 20 (exhaustive list of forbidden
communications). The 1973 edition of the Manual exempts from the requirement
of prior approval "communications protected by a constitutional right," but
requires that such communications be filed with the court within five days.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II,

§ 1.41 (1973).

See also MD. R. 20.

District courts have adopted similar gag orders in administering specific cases.
See, e.g., American Fin. Sys. Inc. v. Pickrel, 18 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 292, 296, 315
(D. Md. 1974); Vance v. Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 16 FED. RULES SERv. 2D
1513, 1513-I4 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 1973-I
Trade Cas. [ 74,288, at 93,321 (D.D.C. 1972); DiCostanzo v. Chrysler Corp.,
57 F.R.D. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co.,
43 F.R.D. 452, 464 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp.
722, 728 (N.D. Calif. 1967). See also In re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation, 1972 Trade Cas. 11 73,864, at 91,627-28 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (defendant should not be permitted to negotiate individual settlements). But see
Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 43 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (after initial
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the class is encouraged by the Manual for Complex Litigation,8
although the Third Circuit recently found that such gag orders
were inconsistent with rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and raised grave constitutional questions."3 This section
of the Note will consider whether any restrictions on communications with the class are warranted, and if so, how access to the
class can be structured to comport with the Constitution and with
the needs of the class action procedure.
Gag orders reverse the rule in ordinary litigation that communications between attorney and client are freely permitted and,
indeed, encouraged. 4 The apparent rationale for this reversal
is the court's fear that the class attorney may abuse communications with the class. He may, for example, solicit fee arrangements or misrepresent the benefits of participation in the class
suit in order to prevent opt-outs. 8 5 Another rationale, arising

from the attorney's need to subordinate some class interests to
others, is that the advice the attorney offers the class and the
inquiries he makes of it may be skewed. These dangers are sufficiently serious to warrant some sort of check on the attorney's
communications with the class. Any checks adopted, however,
must be narrowly drawn to avoid restricting the flow of information from or counselling to the class.
One obvious check on misrepresentations concerning the prospects of the lawsuit would be to allow the class opponent's attorney to communicate his views of the suit to the class directly. The
interests of the class, and ultimately the interests of the judge,
whose decisions during the course of litigation turn at least in part
neutral notice, "either party may furnish the class . . . any information with respect" to lawsuit provided they do not "urge or solicit any action on the part of

class members").
82 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITiGATIoN, p. II, § 1.41 (973). See also Manual for
Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 49 F.R.D. 217, 229 (1970).
8"See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 5o8 F.2d 152, 162-63 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (2975).
84 Such communications are intended to be fostered by the attorney-client
privilege, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2291, at 545-549 (McNaughton rev. ed.
ig6x), and by the ethical principle that the lawyer should preserve the confidences
of a client, see ABA CODE, supra note i, EC 4-I. See also id., EC 7-8 ("lawyer
should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only
after client has been informed of relevant considerations"). Traditionally, in class
actions the relevance of the attorney-client privilege is analyzed in terms of the
relationship of the class attorney and the named plaintiff, see, e.g., Magida ex rel.
Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 195).
8 See Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622, 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding communication with class by class attorney improper
since there were "inferences which might easily be drawn from it which do not
reflect accurately the legal position" of class members); see MANUAL FOR CoM-

PLEX LITIOATION, pt. I, § 1.4X (1973).
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upon information as to the situation of class members, may be best
served if information about the litigation communicated to the
class and information about the class communicated to the court
is not within the exclusive control of the class attorney. A class
opponent may wish to communicate with class members directly
in order to obtain information that would show the court that the
situation of the class is not what the class attorney portrays it to
be.8" The opponent might also hope to persuade the class, or at
least some of its members, that the tactics of the class attorney
are questionable, 7 or that an individual settlement would be more
desirable than continued litigation. Moreover, the class and the
class opponent may be involved in an ongoing business relationship. s8 Were routine business communications unconnected with
the course of litigation required to be channeled through the class
attorney, these communications might be distorted or delayed,
whether advertently or not. Direct communication with the class
might also be desirable from the perspective of the class opponent, given an ongoing business relationship, in order to counteract the undermining of goodwill by communications from the class
attorney to the class and by the fact of litigation itself. 9
A rule allowing direct class-opponent communication with
the class may, however, contravene the traditional rule that counsel may communicate with the opposing litigant only through the
litigant's attorney.10 This rule reflects a concern that an un8

See, e.g., Bottino v. McDonald's Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cas. f1 74,8io, at

95,619 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
"I See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l,
Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendant franchisor wrote letter to
franchisee class members to persuade them that suit would create publicity
harmful to franchise business); American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Pickrel, i8 FED.
Ru.Es Sv. 2D 292, 294 (D. Md. 1974) (defendant sought court permission to
offer compromises to individual employees in Title VII suit after compromise
rejected by class representative on behalf of class). See pp. 1546-52 supra.
"8 See, e.g., Local 734 Bakery Drivers Pension Fund Trust v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 57 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (communications between
bank and class members who were trust or agency account clients).
8" See, e.g., id. (unsuccessful
attempt by defendant bank to obtain order
allowing it to respond to inquiries by trustees, beneficiaries, and other interested
persons about class suit concerning certain trust accounts without prior court
approval); cf. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757-58 (3d Cir. X974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (notice source of adverse publicity).
9
ABA CODE, supra note i, DR 7-I04 (lawyer must not communicate with
opposing party represented by counsel without that lawyer's consent); See In re
Schwabe, 242 Ore. 169, 174-75, 4o 8 P.2d 922, 924 (1965) (per curiam); Carpenter
v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 520, 292 P. 450 (1930) (per curiam) ; H. DRINKER, supra note
6, at 201-03. But Drinker states that where the opposing counsel refuses to convey
a settlement offer to his client, because of his "arrangement for a contingent fee" or
because he has outstanding a bill for legal services which has not been paid, "the
other lawyer should be permitted at least to bring the facts before the court, or
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sophisticated litigant will be unduly influenced by representations
of opposing counsel, 9' a concern that seems equally troubling in
the case of a class opponent, or his attorney, who is likely to be
more sophisticated than the members of the class. 2 And if the
class and the class opponent are involved in an ongoing business
relationship, communications from the class opponent to the class
may be coercive. There is the further danger that the class opponent is likely to have greater financial resources than the class
attorney, and will engage in repeated communications with class
members, thereby intimidating class members or undermining
their confidence in the class attorney's representation. The class
attorney's responses may come too late to prevent class members
from withdrawing from the litigation by opt-out or settlement. In
any event, the cost to the class attorney of responding to repeated
communications may be prohibitive.
The present practice in some federal courts of prohibiting
communications with the class by both the class attorney and the
class opponent in the absence of prior court approval, although
responsive to concerns of abuse, seems overbroad and potentially
dysfunctional. Class attorneys and class opponents may limit
their communications with a class in order to avoid the time
consuming process of obtaining prior judicial clearance and
limit the risk of antagonizing the judge. As a result, class
attorneys may be handicapped in their efforts to obtain a picture
of the different situations of class members, information-gathering and necessary business communications by class opponents
may be impaired, class members may be denied legal advice, and
the court itself may be deprived of information potentially relevant
to its litigation decisions. 3 Moreover, use of a prior restraint
even to take it up or allow his client to take it up direct with the other party,
at a time and place of which the declining lawyer is advised." Id. at 203.
91 H. DRImNxE, supra note 6, at 202. Drinker also emphasizes the duty not to
interfere with opposing counsel's fees. Id. n45.
92

See American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Pickrel, x8 FED.

RuLEs SERV. 2D 292, 295

(D. Md. 1974) (court limited defendant to "neutrally worded notice of settlement" due to concern that a Title VII class suit would be "eviscerated by violators
of the Civil Rights Act who are able to convince legally unsophisticated class

members that their claims are unlikely to succeed").
" Apart from the risk of misrepresentation, which may be protected against
by other means, the hazards which prompt the Manual's prior approval requirement are difficult to fathom. In the period after the filing of a class suit, it is not
clear what abuse the term "solicitation" encompasses. Communications to class
members do not stir up litigation. So long as a single named plaintiff has filed
suit, a class suit may proceed. See Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458
F.2d 927, 93o n4 (7th Cir. 1972). Subject to court certification, the litigation is
thus already stirred up. If the concern is that the class attorney will seek to
obtain contracts of employment including fee agreements from class members, a
more direct solution is for the court to specifically prohibit solicitation of fee
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to control communications to a class by the class attorney or class
94
opponent may be unconstitutional under the first amendment.
Supreme Court decisions suggest that, although courts do possess
authority to limit communications connected with litigation in
order to protect the integrity of the judicial process, those communications are protected by the first amendment. 5 Prior restraints, whether administrative or judicial, are traditionally
disfavored in first amendment jurisprudence, and should be permitted only where compellingly justifiedY A requirement that
communications with a class by the class attorney and the class

opponent be cleared in advance with the trial judge, therefore,
could withstand constitutional scrutiny, if at all, only if no less
restrictive alternative existed."
One alternative that would minimize the degree of prior restraint is suggested by provisions regulating tender offers added
in I968 to the Securities Exchange Act of 19 3 4 .' s Section 14(d)
(i) of the Act requires certain individuals offering to purchase
shares of a given corporation to file their tender offers with the
SEC and inform the corporation by the time the offers are made.9"
Section 4(e) prohibits false or misleading statements or omissions made in connection with tender offers or responses to tender
offers.'
A similar procedural framework could be adopted to
contracts, as vell as make the exclusive calculation of fees paid the class attorney,
ignoring any fee contracts entered into with class members. See pp. i6o6-18 infra.
" See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 162-63 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975), noted in 88 HARV. L. REv. 1911 (I975).
"5 The Supreme Court initially held first amendment protection of free speech
to impose limits on judicial regulation of adjudicative processes in a series of
cases overturning contempt convictions for out-of-court statements about trial
processes. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367 (i947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (194r). More recently, the Court has refused to distinguish in-court
and out-of-court statements. Thus, in Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697
(1974) (per curiam), and In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (,972) (per curiam), the
Court cited Craig v. Harney, supra, and appeared to apply the first amendment
clear and present danger test developed in the out-of-court cases, in overturning
contempt convictions for use of offensive language in court. See also Holt v.
Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965) (due process analysis).
90 See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (975);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
17 See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (,975).
9
Williams Act, IS U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (,970), amending
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1970).
99 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (1970).
100 5 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
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regulate communications with a class by a class attorney or class
opponent. Categories of forbidden communications could be established. A class attorney or class opponent would be required
to file a copy of any communication with the court before disseminating the communication to the class and to furnish the
adversary with a copy by the time of dissemination. 1 1 Courts
screening filings would limit their inspection to a search for
blatantly abusive communications likely to cause irreparable injury unless restrained in advance of dissemination. The court
would rely on the party opposing the communicator to bring to
its attention all other communications apparently in violation of
restrictions. If, after a hearing, a violation was established, the
court, in addition to taking any other appropriate disciplinary
measures, could order the offender to distribute corrective notice
to the class. 102
Within this framework, specific steps could be taken to deal
with the hazards presented by class attorney and class opponent
communications with a class. Misleading or coercive statements,
for example, could be included among the catalog of forbidden
communications." 3 An administrable test for identifying impermissible coercion could be developed by analogy to federal labor
law standards governing employer communications with organizing employees. 04 In communicating to the class the conse101 The court might also require that decisions by class members to opt out
or to settle individually with the class opponent be subject to revocation for a
period sufficient to allow the class attorney to make competing communications
with the class. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (securities deposited pursuant to tender
invitations may be withdrawn within specified time periods).
102See,
e.g., Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 932
(th Cir. 2972) (remedial notice considered by the court where attorney's letter
soliciting named plaintiffs contained misstatement). See also Weight Watchers of
Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 1972)
(plaintiff's request that defendant be required to send a retraction of letter
warning against participation in class suit denied).
If misrepresentations are made with the participation of attorneys on either
side, the traditional sanctions for unethical attorney conduct, including suspension,
disbarment, and contempt could be applied. See 88 HARv. L. REv. 191I, 2921 &
n.66 ('975). The court should not, however, use the sanctions of disqualifying
counsel or dismissing class allegations, which are unnecessarily harmful to class
interests. See Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., supra at 932 (dismissed) ;
Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(same). But see Taub v. Glickman, i4 FEn. RuLEs SERv. 2D 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(certification denied for inadequate representation; delay, defaults in calendar
calls, attorney's conduct in Kronenberg all mentioned).
103 Cf. i5 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (,970) (tender offers); ig U.S.C. § 77k (1970)
(false registration statements); 15 U.S.C. § 77X(2) (1970) (misstatement in offer
or sale of securities); i5 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2970) (manipulative or deceptive
devices in purchase or sale of securities) ; 27 C.F.R. § 240.Iob-5 (2975).
..4 See Taft-Hartiey Act of 1947, § 8(c), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 257(c) (197o)
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quences of allowing the class suit to go forward, a class opponent

might be permitted to refer only "to demonstrably probable con,, 'o Use of communications
sequences beyond his control ....
with the class as a weapon in a war of attrition could be discouraged by adopting a variation on the SEC's proxy rules.'
After a given number of communications with a class, a class
attorney or class opponent could communicate further with the
class only if he agreed to include the adversary's reply along with

the communication.

7

(employer's expression of views containing no threat of reprisal or promise of
benefit does not constitute evidence of unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (employer has first amendment right to
communicate views on unionization to employees so long as he makes no threats of
reprisal).
For a communication
105 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
by a class opponent apparently meeting this standard, see Weight Watchers of
Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 1972)
(prediction by franchisor that class suit would have a dire effect on franchisees'
public relations with customers). Such a prediction of extrinsic events would be
distinguishable from an employer's threat not to promote an employee or a
franchisor's threat not to renew a franchise, unless an invitation to opt out were
accepted. The Court in Gissel noted, as a second factor for identifying coercion,
the existence of a relationship of "economic dependence" making the recipient of
the communication more susceptible to intimidation by the threatening implications of the statement. 395 U.S. at 617.
100 17 C.F.R. § 240.4a-7(b), (c) (1975) (management of issuer that has or
plans to solicit proxies is required on request of security holder and on receipt of
material, envelopes, and postage, to mail proxy statements to security holders, or
in alternative to furnish a reasonably current list of addresses of security holders) ;
X7 C.F.R. § 240.I4a-8 (a), (b) (1975) (management must include in its proxy
statement a proposal for action at shareholders meeting submitted by shareholder
to management within specified period in advance of meeting; in case management
opposes proposal, it shall also include in its proxy statement a 200-word statement
by the security holder in support of the proposal).
107 In instances where the class attorney or the class opponent indicates a need
to speak with class members in person so that the safeguard of filing communications is no longer feasible, other safeguards may be employed. In one class
litigation, where it was desired to interview class members in order to obtain
information as to whether the suit was appropriate for class treatment, the court
approved a letter to he sent to class members by either party, inviting the recipient
to meet with the party to provide the necessary information, but emphasizing
that acceptance was purely voluntary. Bottino v. McDonald's Corp., 1973-2
Trade Cas.
74,8io, at 95,619 (S.D. Fla. x973). In another suit, the franchisor
class opponent was allowed to discuss the subject matter of the suit "in connection
with contract negotiations requested in each instance" by a franchisee class
member. Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc.,
455 F.2d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2972), aff'g 55 F.R.D. 5o, (E.D.N.Y. 1971). To protect
against abuse, however, the court required that the franchisees' personal attorney
be present at each negotiating session, that the class attorney be given five days
notice of each session as well as be afforded full opportunity to express his views,
and that the final session be held at a location convenient for the class attorney
to attend. See id.
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An approach like the one just set out would not be as constitutionally troublesome as the broad prior restraints courts
presently employ. So long as certain procedures are followed,
judicial orders temporarily prohibiting activity arguably protected by the first amendment are valid, at least in extraordinary
circumstances, even though the restrained party was not afforded
a hearing prior to the court's decision.108 And coercive and misleading statements have been held to fall outside the scope of first
amendment protection ...so that their ultimate restraint would
be permitted." 0
C. Litigation Costs in Class Actions:
Attorneys' Fees and Other Expenses
At least until recently, the fees which attorneys received for
class representation were sometimes spectacularly large, especially
in comparison with the sums recovered for class members."' In
the Doughboy-Hoffert portion of the antibiotics antitrust class
action settlement, for example, class members recovered on the
average about $364, while class attorneys shared approximately
$io million in fees." 2 Critics of class actions have suggested that
a pattern of "minuscule recoveries" and "a golden harvest of
fees" is characteristic at least of damages class actions." Judge
Lumbard stated an often-voiced conclusion in 1968: "Obviously
10'

Cf. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs, 393 U.S. 175, i8o (1968)

(ex parte

order invalid when no attempt made to notify other party).
10' See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)
(knowingly made false
statements not constitutionally protected); Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1941) (coercive picketing not
constitutionally protected).
'1°A court may wish to prohibit communications, such as proposals for fee
contracts, see pp. 16og-ii infra, which do not fall within the traditional categories
of speech excluded from first amendment protection. But see Valentine v. Chrestenson, 3r6 U.S. 52 (942). Such prohibitions may be justified, if allowing the
communications would risk significant distortion of the litigative process. See
Columbia Broadcasting Syst., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973), discussed, p. 1409, note 1O4 supra.
111 See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557
(E.D. Pa. 1969) (fees of class attorneys totaled over $5 million; average recovery
of class members was about $i5,ooo); In re Gypsum Cases, 1974-2 Trade Cas.
ff 75,272 (N.D. Cal. I974) (liaison counsel awarded $3,328,507). But see Note, The
Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1155-56
(i974).
11 See Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class Actions, X976 REsEARCH J. 251, 327-37,
359.
"' Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y.
X972); see Haas, supra note 8, at 1280; Handler, supra note 23, at 9-io; Simon,
supra note 8, at 378, 393-94. See also Note, supra note 21, at 1x54-55.

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS-

CLASS ACTIONS

1605

the only persons to gain from a class suit are not the potential
plaintiffs, but the attorneys who will represent them."'1 14
Moreover, the fact that an attorney will obtain a significant
fee from class litigation only if the class triumphs or the case is
settled may be the source of a conflict of interest between the
attorney and the class. An attorney may be willing to settle a
class action, without due regard for the best interests of class
members, in order to avoid the risk of defeat at trial. 1 5 This
potential conflict is exacerbated by a wide gap between the size of
fee awards and the judgments won for individual class members:
no class member may have a sufficient interest in the course of
litigation to impose any check on the strongly interested attorney's
dealings." 6
The apparently great disparity between attorneys' fees and
the benefits class actions confer upon individual class members
has also led some critics to suggest that class actions are in fact
"lawyer's lawsuits," 1 financed solely by class attorneys without
any "realistic expectation" of client reimbursement for litigation
expenses in the event of defeat."" Although contingent arrangements for attorneys' fees are not generally proscribed,"' speculation by an attorney with respect to other expenses constitutes
maintenance, a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 20 Courts suspecting maintenance have in some cases
allowed class opponents to attempt to discover whether a named
plaintiff has agreed to assume responsibility for litigation costs,' 2 '
and have narrowed the size of a class so that costs of notice would
be within a named plaintiff's resources. 2 2
This Section begins by examining the increasing efforts of
courts to control fee awards in class actions. These efforts focus
on the hours an attorney has worked, and therefore tend to reduce
114

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 57,

(2d Cir. i968) (Lumbard,

C.J., dissenting).
115 See Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict
of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 56-6o (i975). See also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456
F.2d 896, 9oo-ox (2d Cir. 1972) ; Wolfram, supra note 112, at 358-59.
""0 See Dam, supra note 115, at 58-59.
117 Andrews, supra note 13, at i8-i9.
1
8 SPECIAL COAMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RUiLES o
CIVIL PROCEDURE, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS,

(X972) ; see Simon, supra note 8, at 392.
110 See ABA CODE, supranote i, DR 5-io3 (A)
12
OId. DR 5-io3 (B).

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

20-2X

121

(2).

See, e.g., Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379,

384-86 (E.D. Pa. 1974), amended 69 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Stavrides v.
Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 6o F.R.D. 634, 637-38 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
122 See, e.g., P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.SA., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D.
Fla. x973).
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the size of fee awards. Regulation of attorneys' fees also creates
opportunities for courts to structure the incentives of class attorneys. The Section concludes with an analysis of maintenance,
suggesting that despite its dangers, toleration of the practice may
be justified in light of the purposes served by class suit.
i. Attorneys' Fees.- Typically attorneys' fees are fixed by a
contract between the attorney and client. 23 Fee contracts between
a class attorney and all members of a class are rare, however,
due to the large number of class members. Nevertheless, a class
attorney may attempt to arrange for fees through contract with
the named plaintiff or other class members, 2 4 or with the class
opponent as part of a settlement.2 2 Alternatively, the basis for fee
recovery in class actions may be noncontractual. A statutory provision may authorize courts to order unsuccessful litigants to pay
the fees of their victorious counterparts; 120 this is the usual source
of fees in class suits for injunctive or declaratory relief. 27 A
12

See generally ABA CODE DR 2-2o6; ABA CommlTTEE ON EcONO12cs OF

LAw PRAcTIcE, THE LAWYER'S HANDBOOX 282-305 (1962); L. PATTERSON & E.
CHEATHAm, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 263 (I97i).
124 See, e.g., Philadephia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557,
558 (E.D. Pa. 2969).
12 See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 220,
125-26 (8tb Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 493 F.2d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 1974); Mazur v. Behrens, 1974-2 Trade Cas.

ff 75,213 (N.D. Ill. 2974); Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 398 F. Supp. 1140
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Partee v. Pic-Walsh Freight Co., 8 CCH EmPL. PRAc. DEc. IT
9452

(W.D. Tenn. 1972).
226 Provisions for payment of attorneys' fees are included, for example, in both
Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 2964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooa-3b,
2oooe-5k (2970), as -well as in Section 728 of the Emergency School Aid Act of
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 2617 (Supp. III, 1973). In interpreting the fee award pro-

visions of these statutes, the courts have held that attorneys' fees should ordinarily
be granted to successful plaintiffs absent special circumstances rendering the award
unjust. See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ.,

412

U.S. 427, 428 (973)

(per

curiam) (Emergency School Aid Act); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) (Title II); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438
F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (Newman Title II rule equally applicable
to Title VII).
Under some statutes, fee awards may be tied to the type of relief obtained.
For example, Clayton Act § 4, I5 U.S.C. § X5 (2970), authorizes an award of

attorneys' fees only in cases where the plaintiff has obtained a treble damage
judgment. See, e.g., Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 367 F. Supp. 972
(N.D. Cal. 1973). No award may be made if the plaintiff receives only injunctive
relief, see Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649,
65o-5i (3d Cir. 2967); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 8o F. Supp. 888, 89g-goo
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), or if the litigation is resolved through settlement, see City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 459-60 (2d Cir. X974); Clabaugh v.
Southern Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 18z F. 7o6, 707-08 (5th Cir. 291o).
For a list of statutes providing for award of attorneys' fees, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 26o-61 n.33 (,975).
"27 The private attorney general theory, which had provided a nonstatutory
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judgment or settlement in damage litigation creates a "common
fund" from which attorneys' fees may be drawn under an unjust
enrichment theory. -8 Occasionally, a class opponent's bad faith
may justify assessing him for the class attorney's fees. 2 9
Where the only basis for a fee award is noncontractual, the
court's authority to determine the amount of the award to the
class attorney is clear. Even where there is a fee contract, courts
have the general power to override it, and set the amount of the
fee.' 30 In a number of recent cases, courts have articulated circumstances in which this power should be exercised.
basis for fee awards in class actions seeking injunctive relief, see, e.g., Fairley v.
Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 604-06 (5th Cir. 1974) (alternative holding); Lee v.
Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. i971), was repudiated by the
Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975), noted in The Supreme Court, r974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 47, 170 (I975),
which held that in the absence of a statutory or contractual provision, federal

courts can only award fees in common benefit or bad faith situations. See notes
128 &

129

infra.

See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974);
Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 165-66 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary
Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARv. L. REv. 849, 915-29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dawson II]. Under the common fund principle, an attorney may
assess a pro rata share of his fee from each individual who receives a portion of
a monetary fund resulting from litigation by the attorney. See generally Dawson,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARv. L. REv.
1597 (974).
In some circumstances, an attorney may be able to recover fees
even if the litigation confers only nonmonetary benefits. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. i, 4-9 (973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-97
(197o); Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1320-21 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part
and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. Pete v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund of 2950, 517 F.2d 1275, 1289-93 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (class
action). The Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (975), however, limited the applicability of this broader
"common benefit" doctrine to cases where "the classes of beneficiaries were small
in number and easily identifiable . . . . [,J [t]he benefits could be traced with
some accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that the costs could indeed
be shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting," id. at 265 n.39.
129 See, e.g., Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1974) (alternative holding); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 ( 4 th Cir. 1963); Sims v. Amos,
34o F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.) (alternative holding), aff'd mene., 409 U.S. 942
(1972). In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the federal courts' equitable power to award fees upon
a showing of bad faith. See id. at 258-6o, 270-71 n.46.
'See Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951). In Spilker, an attorney whose fee contract for a divorce suit took the form of seven notes was
awarded judgment on the second note, and later sued on the last five notes. The
court held that notwithstanding the usual principles of res judicata, the attorney's
judgment on the earlier note did not preclude the client from presenting legal or
equitable defenses in the second suit. The court stated that attorneys' fees contracts are "of special interest and concern to the courts" and are "not to be
enforced upon the same basis as ordinary contracts." Id. at 39. The principle
128
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In order to reduce the temptation which settlement negotiations pose for the class attorney to sacrifice class interests to
self-interest, courts generally have not allowed the class attorney
and the class opponent to fix the amount of the class attorney's
fee as part of a settlement agreement. However, courts have
allowed settlements to include provision for judicial award of "reasonable fees," or to mandate a "reasonable fee" not to exceed an
agreed-upon ceiling, at the class opponent's expense. 131 At least
in the context of class suits involving damage claims, tolerance of
negotiations between the class attorney and class opponent over
"reasonable fee" provisions and fee limits is not inconsistent with
a desire to minimize the conflict of interest the class attorney
faces in settlement negotiations. The settlement fund will provide
an alternative source of fees for the class attorney under a common fund theory. Thus, the decision to award a fee in addition
to the class relief rather than to leave the fee to be extracted by
the court from the fund only affects whether the amount of the
class recovery, or instead the absolute limit to the opponent's
liability, is left uncertain pending the court's determination of the
class attorney's fee.' 32
that a contract entered into between attorney and client should be scrutinized
closely by the court is of long standing. See, e.g., Ridge v. Healy, 251 F. 798, 804
(8th Cir. I918); Stiers v. Hall, 17o Va. 569, 197 S.E. 450 (x938); Thomas v.
Turners Adm'r, 87 Va. 1, 12 S.E. 149 (189o). See also Gross v. Russo, 76 Misc.
2d 44I, 441-42, 35i N.Y.S.2d 355, 356-57 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (contract between
attorney and client not to be viewed in same way as commercial contract).
131 See, e.g., Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., S5 F.2d x65, 167 (3d Cir. 1975)
(settlement agreement providing for attorneys' fees to be fixed by the court);
Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 120 (8th Cir.), ccrt.
denied, 423 U.S. 864 (I975), (settlement agreement providing for payment of up
to $1.25 million in attorneys' fees at court's direction).
12 Indeed, so long as the fee is set by the court, payment by the defendant
rather than from the fund may actually ameliorate the conflict of interest between
the attorney and the class. When the fee is paid out of the fund, the defendant
will have little incentive to argue in favor of a lower fee award; unless there is
an absentee advocate, see pp. 1561-65 supra, the court may not have very
much assistance in setting a fee which adequately compensates the class attorney
and yet does not unfairly diminish class members' recoveries. On the other hand,
if the defendant is liable for the class attorney's fee, the judge is likely to obtain
the benefit of an adversary presentation prior to fixing the amount of the award.
See Wolfram, supra note 112, at 359-60; Note, supra note iii, at 1155. Anticipating
this adversary process, the defendant may exact, as the price for a fee agreement,
a smaller reduction in the class recovery than the unopposed class attorney would
inflict through a direct assessment against the settlement fund.
In suits for injunctive relief, however, bargaining by the class attorney for an
agreement from the class opponent to pay fees may give rise to a conflict of
interest. A settlement resulting only in a consent decree will give rise to no common
fund from which fees can be drawn. Statutory fee provisions may have been
interpreted not to extend to fee awards in the event of settlement. See note 126

supra. As a result, if a suit for injunctive relief is settled, the class attorney's fee
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Courts have also acted to limit the effect of contingent fee
contracts entered into by class attorneys and class members.
Attorneys who have obtained the consent of a fraction of a class
to contracts fixing fees in terms of a percentage of each class
member's recovery have argued that courts should rely upon such
agreements as the measure of the fees to which an attorney is
entitled, not only from class members consenting to the contracts,
but also from nonconsenting class members whose obligation to
the attorney is based on the common fund principle. This argument
prevailed in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American
Brass Co. 3 3 Attorneys had obtained the consent of 138o of 1481
class members to a contingent fee arrangement. The court, finding no reason to differentiate, took the percentage used in the
agreement as the measure of fees for nonsigners as well as signers,
and awarded the attorneys over $5 million.3 4 In more recent

cases, however, courts have refused to extend percentage fee
arrangements to cover nonsigning class members, and have even
expressed a willingness to disregard such arrangements in fixing
the signers' fee obligations. Class attorneys in Illinois v. Harper
& Row Publishers,Inc. 35 failed to persuade the court to measure
fees due from the class by reference to percentage fee agreements
reached with a "number of specific plaintiffs."'1

36

Instead, the

court developed its own criteria and, in applying these standards,
gave no indication that the fee obligations of class members who
may depend upon the agreement of the class opponent, and the class attorney may
he tempted to trade off class relief in order to secure compensation. To some
degree, the adverse consequences of this conflict of interest can be reduced through
judicial review of settlements. See pp. 1573-75 supra. The most effective solution,
however, would be reinterpretation of statutory fee provisions to allow for fee
awards in the event of settlement.
133 47 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
134 Id. at 559-60. In support of its decision the court noted that the 25% fee
had been agreed to by "virtually all" of the claimants, who were "responsible government entities and substantial enterprises, for the most part represented by their
own counsel," and that there was "no persuasive reason for permitting discrimination in favor of" the noncontracting class members. Id. at 559- One class member,
however, the City of New York, which had sought to appear in the litigation by
its own counsel and argued that it did not owe any fee to class counsel, was
accorded a reduced fee of ixs of its recovery. Id. at 560. For criticism of the
decision, see Dawson II, supra note X28, at 923 & n.305.
135 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
136 Id. at 223. The court acknowledged that in some class suits percentage
fee contracts had been "automatically extended" to nonsigning class members. It
concluded, however, that such a procedure was not fair to "class members who
were unrepresented when the fee contracts were made." Id. at 223. The court
noted that the fee contracts, providing for fees of 20
of each class member's
recovery, were entered into before the performance of any services, and that it
was more sensible for the court to value the services after their performance. Id.
at 223-24.
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had consented to the percentage arrangement were any different
from the obligations of the other class members.'
A year later,
in Kiser v. Miller,"8 a court expressly refused to enforce a percentage fee plan against either signing or nonsigning class members, on the ground that the plan was "null and void as against
public policy."" 9 The Kiser court, concerned by the inequality
140
in bargaining power between class attorneys and class members,
found the percentage fees unreasonably large given the amount
of effort expended by attorneys on the case and the relative simplicity of the issues the case presented.'
Judicial hostility to percentage fee contracts in class actions
is generally appropriate. If such contracts are used only as the
measure of the fee charged signing class members, and if the fee
such contracts set is significantly larger than the fee a court would
award using more neutral criteria, 4 2 a possibility of conflict
of interest arises. An attorney may not regard all members of the
class as equally his clients but instead, in situations where litigation choices have a differential impact upon signing and nonsigning class members, may give extra weight to the interests of
the class members who have contracted for his services. For
example, if the majority of the class members who enter into
the fee agreement have individually recoverable claims, and if the
total number of class members who sign the agreement is
not large, there is a risk that an attorney will attempt to treat
the signing class members as individual clients, settle their claims,
3
14
and terminate the class suit.

Courts could adopt a rule providing that percentage fee contracts would fix the measure of the fees owed an attorney by
every member of a class if more than a designated proportion of
the class signed the contracts, but that the contracts would bind
no one, including the signers, if the threshold proportion were not
reached. So long as the required proportion is known with cerSee id. at

137

224-26.

See also Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union v. Ratner,

335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (attorneys' fees in suit which started as class action,
but in which union ultimately was substituted as plaintiff, should be determined
on quantum meruit basis and not by terms of retainer agreement signed by named
plaintiffs).
138364 F. Supp. 1311, 1317-19 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part and remanded in
part sub nom. Pete v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund of 195o, 5x7 F.2d 1275,
1289-93 (D.C. Cir. X975) (en banc).
129Id. at 1319.

Class members were retired coal miners, whom the court found to be as a

140

group "impoverished" and likely to lack "sophistication" in dealing with lawyers.

Id. at

1318-19.

14 1

142
14 3

Id.

See pp. i6i-x5 infra (discussing hours-worked standard).
See also pp. 1546-52 supra.

1976]

DEVELOPMENTS-

CLASS ACTIONS

1611

tainty by attorneys in advance of litigation, such a rule would
seem to resolve the conflict of interest problem. This is not a
satisfactory approach, however, at least from the perspective of
the nonsigning class members, since the terms of individual contracts usually will not accurately reflect the value of a class
attorney's services. Even class members with individually recoverable claims often will not be in a position to solicit competitive "bids" from other attorneys: once other lawyers learn
that a fellow attorney is planning to pursue a class suit they may
not be willing to compete for the right to represent the class, since
failure would result in an uncompensated expenditure of time. 4 "
Moreover, toleration of percentage fee contracts may be plausibly
justified only on the ground that such contracts offer attorneys
a necessary incentive to initiate class suit.14 5 Through use of
appropriate criteria in setting the amount of fee awards, however, courts can create an adequate incentive for attorneys to
bring class suits without surrendering control over the amount of
the fee.
Whether acting under statutory grants of authority or common
fund principles, or in response to bad faith, courts should design
fee-setting criteria so as not to discourage attorneys from bringing
class suits. Otherwise, the usefulness of the class action as a
means to full realization of substantive policy would be jeopardized. In setting fees, courts should be aware of the possibility of
using the fee award to create incentives for attorneys adequately
to represent class interests. On the other hand, courts should not
award fees larger than the amounts which are required to fulfill
this purpose. If attorneys collect more than the "reasonable
value" of the services which have produced a benefit for class
members, the reputation of the profession might suffer and the
parties against whom fees ultimately are assessed - either the
class members or the class opponent - might be unfairly burdened.
The approach courts currently take in setting the fees awarded
class action attorneys is generally consistent with these considerations. Most courts now take as their point of departure
the number of hours a class attorney has worked on a case, multi144

In any event, attorneys may regard such competition as unethical. Canon 7

of the ABA's original Canons of Professional Ethics, reprinted in H. DRINKER,
supra note 6, at 311, prohibited "[e]fforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer . . ." The current Code provides that "[i]f a lawyer knows a client has previously obtained counsel, he should
not accept employment in the matter unless the other counsel approves or withdraws, or the client terminates the prior employment." ABA CODE, supra note I,
EC 2-30.
145 See generally Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factorin Counsel
Fee Awards, 69 HA~v. L. REv. 658, 663 (1956).
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plying hours worked by an appropriate hourly rate, and then
adjusting the total award to reflect risk and the quality of representation. 4 ' Judges fixing fees in damage class actions, sensitive to charges that percentage fees create windfall gains for class
attorneys, 4 7 may see a standard based on hours worked as a
means both of reducing the size of fee awards and of demonstrating
the compensatory character of the fees awarded. 48 Use of an
hours-worked standard similarly guarantees a degree of rationality in fee calculations conducted pursuant to statutory authority;
here, however, the danger may not be that fees would otherwise
be too large, but that attorneys suing under such controversial
statutes as Title VII may be improperly penalized by courts for
engaging in unpopular litigation. 4 '
146

Until recently, many courts awarding fees in damage class actions fixed the

fees as a percentage of the recovery or settlement fund. See, e.g., Brown Co. Securities Litigation, 355 F. Supp. 574, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (25% of settlement
fund); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. I7M, 277 (S.D.N.Y. I972) (24% of settlement fund). In Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 16i (3d Cir. 2973), the Third Circuit developed a formula for
fee calculation requiring a court to consider only four variables: hours worked,
the attorney's hourly rate of compensation, the risk borne by the attorney, and the
quality of the attorney's work. See id. at 167-69. The Lindy formula not only
identified the relevant variables, but also provided courts with a structured process
for calculation: first calculate the number of hours worked, then multiply by the
hourly rate to determine a base fee; only after the base fee is fixed, consider such
intangibles as risk and quality. See id. The Lindy approach appears to be in the
process of replacing the percentage fee method as the principal basis for fee calculations in common fund situations. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union
v. Nixon, 521 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Grunin v. International House of
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975) ; City
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470-7, (2d Cir. I974).
With respect to statutory fee awards, the leading case, Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), set forth a framework of
analysis requiring a court to consider twelve interrelated variables. See id. at
717-19. Since the Lindy formula essentially captures the factors the Fifth Circuit
listed at greater length in Johnson, compare 487 F.2d at 167-69 with 488 F.2d at
717-19, the discussion here will treat Lindy as stating the prevailing rule for both
damages and injunction cases. See generally Note, Computing Attorney's Fees in
Class Actions: Recent Judicial Guidelines, i6 B.C. IND. & Coax. L. REV. 630 (1975).
147 See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495.F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974)
Federation of Postal Clerks v. United States, 6i F.R.D. 13, 18-19 (D.D.C. 1973);
Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 21X, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
148 See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 2974)
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d I61, 167 (3d Cir. 1973).
4' In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),
it is noteworthy that it was the class attorneys who appealed the trial court's
apparent failure to adhere closely to the hourly rate approach. The trial court had
without explanation excluded between 239.5 and 299.5 of the 659.g hours claimed
by the attorneys. See id. at 717. The total fee of $23,5oo represented an hourly
rate of only $20 if computed in terms of the 66o hours claimed by the attorneys.
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As the basis for an hourly rate of compensation, courts often
look to "the hourly amount to which attorneys of like skill in the
area would typically be entitled for a given type of work . . .2 0
Since the typical hourly rate is determined by reference to the
fees set through the legal services market for suits by individuals,
fee awards to class attorneys under this standard would reflect
the social value of the attorneys' services, at least as measured by
market pricing. In some circumstances, however, a reference
group of attorneys whose fee arrangements are set through
the market may not exist. For example, potential plaintiffs under
various civil rights acts may be unable to finance litigation themselves. Attorneys' fees, whether for class litigation or individual
suits, will ordinarily be set by courts acting pursuant to statutory
authorization,' rather than by attorney-client bargaining.
In the absence of a clearly relevant market, courts must exercise special care to insure that fee awards are not unduly influenced by judgments as to the relative social importance of various
statutory causes of action. 52 Such judicial ranking of statutes
The fee of $30,145 requested by the attorneys represented an hourly rate of
about $45.
150 City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 47, (2d Cir. 1974); accord,
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974)
("customary fee for similar work in the community") ; Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc.
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d x61, i67 (3d Cir. 1973)
(hourly rate to be calculated by looking to "attorney's legal reputation and status,"
also taking into account fact that "the reasonable rate of compensation differs for
different activities") ; In re Gypsum Cases, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 9I 75,272 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) (hourly rate based on "community standards").
...
See note 126 supra.
"' Special care is particularly warranted in light of the differential which has
developed between fees awarded in civil rights class actions and fees awarded in
securities and antitrust suits. Compare, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 486 (W.D.N.C. I975) (school desegregation suit; fees
come to approximately $65 per hour); Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., 379 F.
Supp. 1201 (E.D. La. 1974) (Title VII suit; fees set at $5o per hour for principal
attorneys); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 378 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D.
Miss. 1974) (Title VII suit; fees set at $35 per hour), with, e.g., Blank v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. i (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (securities fraud suit; fees set at $ioo
per hour for partners, with a 5o% bonus); Arenson v. Board of Trade, 372 F.
Supp. i349 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (antitrust suit; fees set at four times normal hourly
rate, yielding an average hourly rate of $358); Colton v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
59 F.R.D. 324, 329 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (antitrust suit; fees set at $152.29 per hour).
The apparent difference in the size of fee awards in civil rights and commercial
class actions may be the result of a number of factors. Courts are generally more
reluctant to award large fees where the fees are paid by the class opponent, the
usual situation in civil rights suits, than where the fees come out of the common
fund of class benefits, as is typically the case in commercial class actions. See, e.g.,
Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, io Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(fees set at rate of approximately $20 per hour in Title VII suit in order not to
unduly burden defendant). Solicitude for class opponents, however, may be carried
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would appear to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.'5 3 In
order to maintain the neutrality required by Alyeska Pipeline,
courts could take either of two courses where no direct market
comparison is possible. First, courts might use the fees paid attorneys litigating other statutory causes of action as a basis for
calculation. There seems to be no reason to believe that the litigation skills required to bring civil rights class actions, for instance, differ in any significant way from the skills demanded of
attorneys involved in, for example, antitrust suits. Second, courts
could regard the attorneys representing class opponents as the
reference group.'
In most cases, the fees the attorney for the
class opponent obtains will have been negotiated with the client,
and thus will be a product of the legal services market. Moreover, the fees of the class opponent's attorney should reflect the
to the point of unfairness to class members, and inconsistency with substantive law,
if it results in fees set so low as to thwart the congressional policy of relying, at
least in part, upon private attorneys general for enforcement of the civil rights laws,
see, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam). If attorneys representing the class in a civil rights suit are employed by
a nonprofit organization, courts may feel there is no harm in awarding a lower fee
inasmuch as the organization might not be motivated by economic considerations
in bringing suit. This view, however, overlooks the possibility that the nonprofit
organization may rely upon fees to cover its expenses; given such reliance, civil
rights suits, at least in the aggregate, may be discouraged by low fee awards even
if civil rights attorneys are public-minded. Finally, geographic factors may explain
differences in fee rates. Hourly rates may be generally lower in the areas in which
many civil rights suits are brought than they are in major commercial centers. It
may be, however, that the relevant market for attorneys in civil rights actions is
not strictly regional. In the recent steel industry Title VII suits, for example,
although litigation centered in Alabama, many of the attorneys in the cases, representing both plaintiffs and defendants, had their home offices in New York. See,
e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 833 (5th Cir.
,975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. April i9,1976). Regional variations in

attorneys' fees, therefore, also do not provide courts with a ready excuse for
avoiding consideration of whether fees awarded in civil rights class actions are
improperly lower than the fees awarded in commercial suits.
153 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska Pipeline, the Court held that in deciding
whether to grant fees in the first place, courts could not, "without legislative
guidance," judge "some statutes important and others unimportant .

. . ."

Id. at

263-64. The Alyeska Pipeline principle appears to apply equally to the situation
where courts might consider weighing statutory policies, or fail to take steps to
avoid de facto weighing, in determining the size of fee awards.
..4In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C.
X975), the court awarded class attorneys a total fee of $175,000- a relatively large
fee compared with other fees obtained for civil rights litigation. Judge McMillan
noted that defendant's counsel had charged more than the court's award for
"similar though unsuccessful services." Id. at 486. Yet even though the Swann
court deemed the request of class counsel for $205,000 to be "reasonable" it reduced the fee to $,75,000 since it preferred "to err on the conservative side" rather
than "contribute unnecessarily to the overpricing of litigation." Id.
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complexity of the issues under litigation, as well as the caliber of
the opposition a class attorney confronted, 5 5 and thus should
provide a fair measure of the services the class attorney rendered

the class.
The practice of increasing a fee award to reflect the risks of

litigation is plainly justified.'

A class attorney's fee is ordinarily

contingent upon some sort of recovery by the class, either through

settlement or litigation. As a result, attorneys will generally be
unwilling to initiate class suits unless fee awards are adjusted to

compensate the attorneys for assuming the risk of unsuccessful
litigation. Where a fee is taken out of a common fund, award of
a risk premium raises no problem of unfairness, since the premium
is simply part of the compensation class members pay for the
benefit class suit has afforded them. Where a fee is paid by the
class opponent under a statutory provision, however, a seeming
paradox arises: the greater the class opponent's chances of victory,
the greater the fee award the class opponent will have to pay in
the event of loss. Nonetheless, award of a risk premium under a
statutory fee provision is not, to any significant degree, unfair to
the class opponent. 5 7 The marginal increase in the fee award is
unlikely to affect the class opponent's litigation strategy since the
burden of the relief, rather than the amount of the fee, will usually
be his chief concern.' 58 Moreover, the class opponent only has
to pay if he has lost the litigation; the risk premium is not ex59
tracted from an innocent third party.
155 At least under some statutes, reference to the fees of attorneys for class
opponents may be a required part of the process of fixing fees for the class attorney.
Cf. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir.
1974) (purpose of Title VII's fee provision is in part to "enable litigants to obtain
competent counsel worthy of a contest with the caliber of counsel available to their
opposition").
256 Such a bonus is typically calculated as a percentage of the hourly compensation, see, e.g., National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Weinberger,
396 F. Supp. 842, 85o-5i (D.D.C. i975), or as a multiple of the basic fee, see, e.g.,
In re Gypsum Cases, 1974-2 Trade Cas. ff 75,272, at 97,774-90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
15 If a risk premium is included by a judge as part of a fee award to which
the class opponent has agreed under a "reasonable" attorneys' fees provision, any
potential for unfairness to the class opponent is mitigated by the class opponent's consent, at least so long as the class opponent had knowledge at the time
the fee agreement was reached that a risk premium might be awarded.
"' Ordinarily, if the defendant's probability of success at trial is high, the expected savings in terms of the cost of relief would outweigh any increase in the
cost of attorneys' fees in the event of defeat. However, should the potential
amount of the fees be substantial in comparison with the relief at stake, a riskaverse defendant might actually feel more compelled to settle when there is a more
favorable outlook on the merits.
"' In addition, any claim of unfairness must be premised on the assumption
that, for a class opponent, a greater chance of victory implies a lesser degree of
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The chief difficulty created by the award of a risk premium is
one of calculation. In theory, a judge might consider the class
attorney's attitude towards risk - the degree to which the attorney is or is not risk-averse - as well as the attorney's initial
assessment of the probability of success. Reliable information as
to an attorney's subjective judgments is not readily available, however, and thus the judge is left only with his own assessment of
the likelihood of the class' victory. Because it is largely a reflection of the judge's own experience, 160 this probability judgment
cannot be reduced to formula. However, the question of what
weight the judge should give to the probability assessment, once
it is made, is susceptible of general analysis. The weight given the
risk factor in fee calculations may have a significant effect on the
allocation of attorneys' resources between relatively safe and
unsafe lawsuits. For example, a court could encourage attorneys
to be indifferent between suits certain to win and those with only
an even chance of success by doubling fee awards for suits in the
latter category.'-" Since borderline violations of a statute are
more likely to be risky targets for suit, such equalization of atculpability. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the likelihood of successful
litigation does indeed correlate inversely with culpability: some account must be
taken of adventitious factors, such as the availability of evidence, which may determine the outcome of a lawsuit. Moreover, culpability may not be capable of
cardinal measure. Once liability is found, it may be possible to speak only of
culpability and nonculpability, and draw no further distinctions. The trial process
is a means of coming to a conclusion concerning liability. Once liability is adjudged,
an uncertainty as to the class opponent's liability disappears, and to treat the class
opponent as though this were not the case would be to deny the whole purpose
of the trial.
160 Appellate courts discussing the award of risk premiums have attempted to
formulate only very general standards. In Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973), the court
stated that "the district court should consider any information that may help to
establish the probability of success," but did note that "Etihe most important such
information in a civil antitrust suit may be the progress of any criminal action
brought against the defendants." The court in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974), found a number of questions relevant in fixing
a risk premium:
...
has a relevant government action been instituted or, perhaps, even
successfully concluded against the defendant; have related civil actions
already been instituted by others; and, are the issues novel and complex or
straightforward and well worn?
181 The award of risk premiums is unlikely to cause attorneys to become fully
indifferent between lawsuits less certain and more certain of success. Attorneys
may be risk-averse, and a court's equalization of incentives, made from a perspective of risk neutrality, may not correspond to an attorney's subjective evaluation of the benefits and burdens of particular lawsuits. Any tendency to riskaversion on the part of attorneys is likely to be increased if maintenance is allowed,
see pp. 1618-23 infra, since the attorneys will be assuming the costs of litigation both
during the course of a suit and in the event of its failure.
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torneys' incentives may be tantamount to inviting more challenges to conduct on the fringes of legality. In deciding what
weight to give to the probability of a suit's success, therefore,
courts must take into account the degree to which substantive
policy exhibits a preference for deterring borderline conduct, or
focuses instead on the elimination of more narrowly defined, egregious violations.
In addition to influencing class attorneys' choices among lawsuits, the risk premium may also have an effect on class attorneys'
conduct during the course of a suit. The prospect of a risk premium may increase a class attorney's willingness to reject an easy
settlement and adopt a litigation strategy that involves more
uncertainty but is more beneficial to the class. The incentive
structure the risk premium creates with respect to the conduct of
litigation may be reinforced by the impact of an hours-worked
basis for fee calculation. If the size of the fee which an attorney
receives is a function of the amount of time he puts into a case,
the attorney is to some degree discouraged from entering into
quick settlements simply to secure a fee.162 Of course, one effect
of an hours-worked standard may be to tempt class attorneys to
spend more time than is necessary in conducting class litigation.'6 3
Courts setting fees have therefore required class attorneys to
specify the activities to which they devoted time, and have refused to credit attorneys for superfluous hours.6
Notwithstanding the incentives created by the risk premium
and the hours-worked standard, direct adjustment of fee awards
to promote adequate representation of class interests may be
necessary. Award of -an additional "quality premium" may be
justified, for example, to encourage attorneys whose fees are not
otherwise connected to the size of a damage recovery to seek the
2

'6 Use of an hours-worked standard in conjunction with a risk premium may

also reduce the likelihood that the risk premium will tempt attorneys to bring
frivolous suits. An attorney bringing a suit which he considers frivolous will often
attempt to obtain a quick settlement from the class opponent rather than expose
his claim to prolonged scrutiny. Under the hourly rate approach, the basic fee in
such a case will be quite small, and the risk premium therefore also of -little value.
163 See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 47, (2d Cir. 1974);
Pomerantz, Class Action Controversies: Legal Fees, in CURENT PROBLEMS In
FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 367, 377-78 (B. Garfinkel ed. 1975).
14 See, e.g., Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. i, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. i975)
(io% discount on hours claimed); Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1318
(D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom.
Pete v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d X275, 1289-93
(D.C. Cir 1975) (en banc) (hours logged discounted by 35% to take into account numerous phone calls and conferences among attorneys and time spent

on the fee application); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. United States, 6i
F.R.D. X3, i9 D.D.C. x973) (hours discounted by 15%).
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best settlement possible in dealing with a class opponent.'0 5 In considering an award of a quality premium, or conversely a reduction
in a fee award on account of poor quality representation, a court
should be sensitive to the full range of opportunities which introduction of the quality factor creates for structuring the incentives of class attorneys.' 60 The court should make clear to
class attorneys at the outset of the suit that the size of their fees
will be affected by the quality of their performance, as well as
indicate in some detail what activities will be rewarded or punished. In identifying the factors relevant to determining the
quality of representation, the court should not take too narrow a
focus: along with attorneys' efforts going to the merits of a claim
the court should consider activities an attorney might undertake
that are unique to class representation.'
Thus, a court might
award a quality premium for an attorney's efforts to discover,
and reveal to the court, relevant differences in the situations of
class members.168 The court might also want to encourage activities designed to inform class members of the progress of the class
suit -for
example, dissemination of a newsletter. Finally, the
court might reduce fees to penalize an attorney who concludes a
settlement subsequently rejected by the court as inadequate, even
though the attorney eventually concludes a settlement winning
court approval.
2. Maintenance.- Like attorneys' fees, other costs of litigation are ordinarily recoverable only at the close of a class suit, and
only if the suit ends favorably for the class. If a common fund
5
..
Use of the hours-worked standard, unless supplemented by a quality premium, deprives an attorney of the financial stake in the size of the class recovery
that exists when the attorney's fee is fixed as a percentage of the class recovery.
See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
66
' A problem of double-counting arises if courts use explicit bonuses for highquality performance, or penalties for poor performance. An attorney's skills, or
more precisely the skills of his peers, are likely to be one factor affecting the typical
hourly rate a quality award is supposed to supplement. But the problem of doublecounting disappears if a court is careful to reward an attorney for an outstanding
performance, or penalize for a poor performance, only if the performance is one
which would not be expected from an attorney paid at the typical hourly rate
appropriate for the class attorney. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 16i, 168 (3d Cir. 1973).
167 Many courts have focused their attention on the class attorney's efforts in
litigating the merits of a class claim without seeming to take into account any
unusual effort the attorney might have expended on activities peculiar to class
representation. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, x68 (3d Cir. 1973); Blank v. Talley Indus.,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. x, 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Gypsum Cases, 1974-2 Trade
Cas. 9 75,272 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
168 See, e.g., National Ass'n for Mental Health, Inc. v. Weinberger, 68 F.R.D.
387, 394 (D.D.C. z975); National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v.
Weinberger, 396 F. Supp. 842, 850 (D.D.C. i975).
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is created, the expenses incurred in bringing suit can be deducted
from the recovery.'69 Even if no common fund results, it is possible that the class opponent will agree, as part of the terms of
a settlement, to pay litigation expenses as well as attorneys' fees.
Under at least some statutes, if a class should obtain a judgment
a court may charge litigation expenses, including the cost of
notice, against the class opponent. 70 Following the analogy of
attorneys' fees, it might be expected that the class attorney would
assume the other costs of litigation, both during the course of suit
and in the event of defeat. However, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, while it permits attorneys to enter into contingent
fee arrangements,'' does not allow attorneys to advance or guarantee the other costs of litigation unless the "client remains ultimately liable for such expenses."' 72
This ban on maintenance, were it enforced effectively, would
be an important obstacle to class suit, since the alternatives to
maintenance in the class action context are often either impractical
or unfair. The Code would permit the class attorney, as well as
...See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. i6i, 164-67 (1939);
Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 597 (D. Colo. 1974) (class counsel
awarded reimbursement from settlement fund for out-of-pocket expenses reasonably
incurred for class). In the event of a judgment, any statutory "costs," see note
170 infra, may still be taxed against the defendant directly, even where a common
fund is created. See, e.g., National Council of Community Mental Health Centers,
Inc. v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.D.C. 1974).
170 Such expenses may go beyond the traditional taxable costs such as docket,
court clerk, witness and reporter fees provided for under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970).

See generally Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental
Litigation, 58 CoRNELL L. REv. 1222, 1222-23 &nn.i-3 (,973) Under Title VII,
for example, courts have awarded the costs of expert witnesses and statistical evidence, see, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 4oo F. Supp. 993, 997 (S.D.N.Y.
9444 (C.D.
1975); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 CCH EMPL. PaAc. DEC.
Cal. 1974), and more generally, all "reasonable expenditures incurred by plaintiff's
attorneys," Peters v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 792, 794 (E.D.
Tex. 197), aff'd, 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (I973);
accord, Gregory v. Litton Syst., Inc., 3x6 F. Supp. 401, 404 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (award of
"actual expenses" in school desegregation case). It seems probable that the costs
of notice in a Title VII class action could similarly be taxed against the class

opponent. See generally Zugschwerdt, Remedies Granted in Employment Discrimination Cases, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-RESPONSIBLITIES,
RIGHTS, REMEDIES 239, 333 (J. Pemberton ed. 1975). Not all statutes which provide for attorneys' fee awards also provide for the award of litigation expenses,
however. Statutory fee awards under the Clayton Act, for example, do not encompass any expenses other than the traditional taxable costs. See Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 880 (1964).
171 ABA CODE, supra note I, DR 5-2o3(A)(2).
71 Id. DR 5-io3 (B) ; see id. EC 5-:8.
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the named plaintiff, to seek to obtain cash or agreements to pay
expenses from class members." 3 Such solicitation is likely not to
be completely successful, however, if only because of "free-rider"
effects, unless a class is given coherence by some preexisting
organizational form, 17 4 and is therefore capable of making decisions as an entity. Imposing the terms of expense agreements
reached with some class members upon nonconsenting class
members would be unfair, at least where the class has recovered
nothing, since the nonconsenting individuals would have received
no benefit from which an obligation to pay expenses could be
derived. Expense arrangements binding only some members of a
class, although apparently consistent with the Code,'1 7 are equally

objectionable since, if only some class members bear the costs of
unsuccessful litigation, the class attorney may face a conflict of
interest between his duty to the class as a whole and his felt
obligation to the financing class members. 7 6 Finally, redefinition
173ABA

Co1M.

oN PROFESSIONAL ETics, OPINIONS, NO. 1326 (1975)

states

that it is ethically proper for an attorney to solicit funds to be used for expenses
in connection with preparation for litigation of a class suit, or for the expense of
mailing notice, but that it is not proper for an attorney to solicit funds for his
own compensation from class members. The attorney is allowed, however, to
receive funds solicited by one class member from others for the express purpose of
compensating the attorney. ABA COIT. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No.
1280 (1973) endorsed a scheme whereby the original individual client of a class
attorney, in order to make pursuit of his claim financially feasible, could conduct
at his own expense a mail solicitation of potential class members for immediate
funds and for authorization to retain the attorney's services at a 35% contingent
fee and to assign himself a 12% contingent fee from the recovery. See also Ralston
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 433-34 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (the court
denied certification in part because the named plaintiff lacked adequate financial
resources, but suggested that class members might seek to "coalesce their finances"
prior to filing suit).
114 See Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 930-31 (7th
Cir. 1972) (preexisting association of most of the franchisees in class agreed to
pay expenses of class suit). But see Craig, Financing the Employment Discrimination Lawsuit, in HANDLING THE EMPLOYMENT DISCnM NATION CASE 23, 35
(G. Holmes & Q. Story eds. x975) (suggesting the usefulness of forming an association for the purpose of Title VII class litigation, and having the association assess
dues against its members).
"'The ABA and the courts have permitted the named plaintiff to assume the
costs of litigation. See ABA COMAT. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1326
(1975); ABA CoMMa. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1283 (1973); Stayrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 6o F.R.D. 634, 637-38 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
A joint financing effort by a number of class members would appear to be proper
under the Code so long as each of the participants was aware of and had consented
to the joint effort. See ABA CODE EC 5-15, EC 5-16, DR 5-io5(C), DR 5-io6.
17' The conflict may be most pronounced where the sole financing class member
is the named plaintiff. Reliance upon the named plaintiff to finance class suit may
not only be unfair but also impractical. Although the named plaintiff may have
an individually recoverable damage claim, the added costs of bringing a class suit
may well exceed the amount of his expected recovery. In many damage class
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of a class to include only those individuals consenting to expense
arrangements, even if it were practical, would also give rise to
problems of fairness. The court would be denied an opportunity
to see the full range of individuals commonly affected by a question of law or fact, and thus might reach an incorrect conclusion
as to the proper outcome of the litigation.' 77
Since class actions may in some circumstances be impractical
or improper absent maintenance, the justifications for banning the
practice must be measured against the justification for class actions
actions, no class members will have individually recoverable claims, and in fact the
combined recoveries of even ten or twelve named plaintiffs may be far less than
the expected class costs. In a class suit for injunctive relief, it is similarly unlikely
that a named plaintiff would have the resources or the desire unilaterally to
guarantee class costs for the benefit of a class from whom those costs could not
subsequently be recovered should the suit fail.
Perhaps because of the frequent impracticability of named-plaintiff financing
of class suits, courts have not always taken assertions that the named plaintiff is
financing litigation at face value. Two courts have allowed class opponents to
conduct discovery as to the named plaintiff's understanding of his responsibility to
reimburse the attorney for class costs. See Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 385-86 (E.D. Pa. 1974), amended, 69 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 6o F.R.D. 634, 637-38
(W.D. Pa. X973). The Sayre court did not, however, allow discovery as to the
named plaintiff's financial status; the court concluded that without more "compelling evidence of maintenance," the issue should be left to any subsequent disciplinary proceedings. 65 F.R.D. at 386. But see MacLean v Honeywell Inf. Sys., Inc.,
2o FED. RuLEs SERV. 2D xoi5, ioi6 (D. Mass. 1975) (defendant can inquire into
named plaintiff's ability to finance notice costs although defendant's questioning
of class counsel as to ability to advance such funds not yet relevant). The Southern
District of New York in two recent cases held that the named plaintiff's financial
ability to pay litigation costs is relevant to the issue of adequacy of representation
but also concluded that the issue should be examined through plaintiff's submission
of affidavits to the court in camera and not through discovery by the defendant.
See Waldman v. Electrospace Corp., 68 F.R.D. 281, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. X975);
Dennis v. Saks & Co., 2o FED. RULES SERV. 2D 994-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see
Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (ioth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914
(I975) (defendant could not seek to discover named plaintiff's financial status or
any agreements as to the financing of costs since disciplinary proceedings would
be the proper forum for such an inquiry).
Courts have also taken the financial constraints on the named plaintiff into
account in ruling on issues of class action procedure. See, e.g., P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 6I F.R.D. 372, 381 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (court limited size of class

so that notice costs would be within plaintiff's resources) ; Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 6i F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (class allegations dismissed in part
because named plaintiff lacked funds; no offer by attorney to advance costs).
See generally Bernstein, Securities -Class Actions: Financial Ability of the Class
Plaintiff,

172

N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1974, at i; Brodsky, Corporate and Securities

of Class Actions by Plaintiff's Counsel, z73
Litigation: Ethics -"Maintenance"
N.Y.L.J., April 2, 1975, at i (pt. 1); z73 N.Y.L.J., April 16, 1975, at i (pt. 2);
Hausmann, Legal Ethics and Litigation Tactics, 2 CrAss AcTioN REP. 3 (,973).
M'¢
See pp. X366-7I supra.
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in general - full realization of substantive policy. 78 Indeed, it is
precisely at this level that the first of the two major arguments
traditionally made in support of the maintenance ban is pitched.
If an attorney is permitted to assume the costs of litigation, it is
argued, a greater number of vexatious or frivolous suits - suits
without justification in substantive policy - may result.170
Whether class members are willing at the outset of litigation to
assume the indeterminate costs of an unsuccessful lawsuit, however, does not seem to be a particularly accurate test of a lawsuit's
justification in substantive policy. Given the existence of other
safeguards, such as summary judgment,8 0 concern over frivolous
suits does not appear to be a sufficient reason for the maintenance
ban.
The second of the chief justifications for prohibiting maintenance focuses on the fairness of the practice to class members.
The "financial interest in the outcome of litigation" which an
attorney develops because of maintenance arguably raises a danger
that the attorney's "proprietary interest" will adversely affect his
exercise of judgment on behalf of the client.1 8 For example, in
order to escape the burden of assuming the costs of litigation, an
attorney may prematurely agree to settlement. The force of this
argument diminishes in the class action context, however, since
the contingent character of fee awards will almost invariably
mean that a class attorney has a financial stake in the outcome
of litigation in any event. Moreover, in class actions alternative
remedies exist: risk premiums may be used to increase an at"'A number of the justifications traditionally offered for the maintenance ban
do not seem to be particularly apposite in the class action context. Because it
lessens the client's interest in litigation, and thus increases the attorney's freedom
to maneuver, it may be argued that maintenance increases the likelihood of fraudulent claims. See Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIf. L. REv. 48, 72
(935). But given the burdens of discovery, and other aspects of participation in
class litigation, it seems unlikely that a named plaintiff, even if relieved of the
perhaps awesome task of financing class litigation, would lose interest in the
progress of the suit and as a result fail to provide whatever supervision of attorney
conduct clients ordinarily supply. Moreover, the prospect of the attorney using
a promise of maintenance as a lure to trap unwary clients into unfair fee agreements, see id. at 72-75, diminishes substantially in the class action context given
judicial control over attorneys' fees. Finally, the objection to maintenance as a
professionally degrading form of speculation, see id. at 69-70, 72, loses much of its
force given that contingent fee contracts, to which the argument seems equally
applicable, are generally allowed, see ABA CODE, supra note i, EC 2-20.
179 See Radin, supra note 178, at 72.
180 The contingent nature of class attorneys' fees also works to inhibit frivolous
claims; an attorney who will not be paid unless he obtains relief for the class
through either settlement or litigation is likely to be reluctant to bring suits with
only a small chance of success. Frivolous claims are also discouraged if a court
makes use of an hours-worked standard in awarding fees. See p. 1620 supra.
11,See ABA CODE, supra note i, EC 5-7. See generally id. EC 5-1.
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torney's willingness to purse risky litigation strategies,' 82 and

judicial review of settlements provides courts with an opportunity
to protect class members from a class attorney's conflict of interest. 8 3 Thus, like the risk of frivolous suits maintenance may
create, the danger of unfairness to class members does not seem
sufficiently grave to warrant enforcement of the ban against maintenance if the ban would prove an effective obstacle to class suit.

VIII.

CONCLUSION: REFORM OF RULE 23 OR
LEGISLATIvE ACTION?

Original rule 23, although criticized from the start, I survived
intact for close to thirty years. Revised rule 23, however, just
entering upon its second decade, is apparently already under
scrutiny by the Rules Advisory Committee 2 and certain proposed reforms, allegedly under consideration by the Committee,
have leaked out into public print.' Attention to the issue of
reform of rule 23 is likely to increase as a result of New York's
recent adoption of a class action rule strikingly different from the
federal model.4 The avowed purpose of this Note has not been
182 See pp. i6i5-i8 supra.
183 See pp. 1552, x569, 1574-75 supra.
1 See p. 1343 supra.
2 ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, I974 ANN. REP. 36.

' See The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules: Current Deliberations, 4 CLASS
ACTION REP. 288 (975).
' The New York rule, adopted after over a decade of controversy, see Homburger, The z975 New York Judicial Conference Package: Class Actions and Comparative Negligence, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 415, 418-I9 n.6 (0976), reads as follows:
§ gor. Prerequisites to a class action
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all if:
I. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether
otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interest of the class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
b. Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action,
an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.
§ 902. Order allowing class action
Within sixty days after the time to serve a responsive pleading has expired for all persons named as defendants in an action brought as a class
action, the plaintiff shall move for an order to determine whether it is to be
so maintained. An order under this section may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits on the court's own motion or on motion of the parties. The action may be maintained as a class
action only if the court finds that the prerequisites under section 9oi have
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been satisfied. Among the matters which the court shall consider in determining whether the action may proceed as a class action are:
i. the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
2. the impracticability or inefficiency of prosecuting or defending
separate actions;
3. the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class;
4. the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claim in the particular forum;
5. the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
§ 9o3. Description of class
The order permitting a class action shall describe the class. When appropriate the court may limit the class to those members who do not request exclusion from the class within a specified time after notice.
§ 904. Notice of class action
(a) In class actions brought primarily for injunctive or declaratory
relief, notice of the pendency of the action need not be given to the class
unless the court finds that notice is necessary to protect the interests of the
represented parties and that the cost of notice will not prevent the action
from going forward.
(b) In all other class actions, reasonable notice of the commencement
of a class action shall be given to the class in such manner as the court
directs.
(c) The content of the notice shall be subject to court approval, In
determining the method by which notice is to be given, the court shall
consider
I. the cost of giving notice by each method considered
II. the resources of the parties and
III. the stake of each represented member of the class, and the
likelihood that significant numbers of represented members would desire to exclude themselves from the class or to appear individually,
which may be determined, in the court's discretion, by sending notice
to a random sample of the class.
(d) I. Preliminary determination of expenses of notification. Unless
the court orders otherwise, the plaintiff shall bear the expense of notification.
The court may, if justice requires, require that the defendant bear the expense of notification, or may require each of them to bear a part of the
expense in proportion to the likelihood that each will prevail upon the
merits. The court may hold a preliminary hearing to determine how the
costs of notice should be apportioned.
II. Final determination. Upon termination of the action by order or
judgment, the court may, but shall not be required to, allow to the prevailing party the expenses of notification as taxable disbursements under article
eighty-three of the civil practice law and rules.
§ 9o5. Judgment
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action, whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
§ 9o6. Actions conducted partially as class actions
When appropriate,
i. an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or
2. a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated
as a class.
The provisions of this article shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
Rule 907. Orders in conduct of class actions
In the conduct of class actions the court may make appropriate orders:
i. determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures
to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument;
2. requiring, for the protection of the members of the class, or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such
manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of
the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the repre-
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to survey the law of rule 23 but rather to consider several general questions of class action doctrine. Given the current interest in modifying the rule, however, it is fair to ask: what are the

implications of the arguments developed in this Note for reform
of rule 23?
There are two answers to this question. The first takes the
form of a list of the specific revisions of rule 23 which are sug-

gested by the arguments of this Note: '
First, the typicality requirement of rule 23(a) (3) should be
removed. The strict party alignment interpretation which the
Ninth Circuit gave to typicality in the LaMar decision is not
necessary given the inquiries courts must undertake in further-

ance of their obligation to insure adequacy of representation.'
The alternative construction of the typicality requirement, which

treats it in tandem with the adequacy of representation requirement of rule

23

(a) (4) as a limit on the degree of heterogeneity

permitted in a class,7 is also unnecessary in view of the great
capacity of the class action process to accommodate differences

within a class.8
sentation fair and adequate, or to appear and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
3. imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors;
4. requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly;
5. directing that a money judgment favorable to the class be paid
either in one sum, whether forthwith or within such period as the
court may fix, or in such installments as the court may specify;
6. dealing with similar procedural matters.
The orders may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time
to time.
Rule 9o8. Dismissal, discontinuance or compromise
A class action shall not be dismissed, discontinued, or compromised without the approval of the court. Notice of the proposed dismissal, discontinuance, or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
Rule gog. Attorneys' fees
If a judgment in an action maintained as a class action is rendered in
favor of the class, the court in its discretion may award attorneys' fees to
the representatives of the class based on the reasonable value of legal services
rendered and if justice requires, allow recovery of the amount awarded from
the opponent of the class.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & Ru.LEs §§ goi-og (McKinney Supp. 1976). For discussion
of the New York rule, see Homburger, supra, at 415-30. See also N.Y. Judicial
Conference, Twentieth Annual Report 204-1i (,975) (discussion of proposed
legislation differing in some respects from that which was adopted).
a Comparisons with the New York rule will be drawn in the accompanying
footnotes.
OSee pp. 1458-7, supra. The New York rule adopts the federal typicality
requirement. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & R-Ls § 9ox (a)(3) (McKinney Supp.
x976).
7 See p. 1472, note 94 supra.
5
See pp. 1472-98 supra.
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Second, the requirement that common questions predominate,
which presently must be satisfied only in class actions brought
under rule 2 3 (b) (3), should be made an express prerequisite to
class suit in all cases, and thus should be included among the
provisions of rule 23(a).'

It is chiefly through analysis of the

predomination question, as redefined under the substantive theory
of class actions, that a court verifies that class procedures indeed
will not distort the policies reflected in the causes of action under
1
which suit is brought." The dictates of the Rules Enabling Act, '
therefore, would seem to suggest that federal courts' responsibility to undertake predomination analysis be made clear in the
rule.
Third, the distinctions rule 2 3 (b) attempts to draw among the
situations in which class actions may be appropriate serve little
function, and therefore could be abandoned.' 2 Once stare decisis impacts are acknowledged, almost any class action can be
seen to possess characteristics resembling those set out in rule
2 3 (b) (I).13 Moreover, a great many class actions brought for
monetary relief also seek injunctive or declaratory remedies,' 4
and thus rule 2 3 (b) (2) also has the potential for encompassing
most class suits. Since the categories which rule 2 3 (b) sets out
are thus not intrinsically distinct, whatever reason exists for their
retention must be found in their ancillary function of separating
out that group of cases, defined by rule 2 3 (b) (3), in which individualized notice and extension to class members of a right to
opt out may be most desirable. In fact, however, individualized
notice is neither required nor necessarily improper in any identifiable subset of class actions,' 5 and extension of the right to opt
out ought to be generally disfavored.' 6 Not even this ancillary
justification, therefore, argues persuasively for the retention of
the rule 2 3 (b) distinctions.
Fourth, the superiority and manageability requirements of
rule 23 (b) (3) should neither be generalized to all class actions
'The New York rule includes the predomination requirement among the
general prerequisites for class suit. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw & RuLEs § gox (a) (2)
(McKinney Supp. 1976).
'o See pp. 15o4-I6 supra.
"28 U.S.C. § 2072 (x970) ; see pp. 1357-58 supra.
12 No such distinctions are drawn by the New York rule.
13 See pp. 1487-88 supra.
14 See, e.g., cases discussed in 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 23.40, at 91-93
n.23 (975

Supp.).
" See pp. 1402-16 supra.
6
See pp. 1487-89 supra.
1"The New York rule adopts the federal requirements. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc.

LAW & RuLES §§ 9o

(a) (5), 902(5) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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nor retained even if the rule 2 3 (b) distinctions are kept.' To the
extent that these requirements may be given content, it is as aspects of substantive predomination analysis.' Separate statement
of the superiority and manageability inquiries obscures the connection with predominaton, and gives rise to the possibility that
courts will undertake the inquiries without recognizing the need
to consider substantive factors in their analysis.: 9
Fifth, rule 23(c) (i) should be amended to make clear that,
although a judge's involvement in a class action should begin as
early as possible, a final order authorizing a class action, if it
ever need be given, need not issue prior to any ruling on rule 12,
rule 56, or other merits motions.2 0 Moreover, a provision should
be added requiring erstwhile class representatives to move for an
initial hearing on class action issues within a designated time
after the filing of a complaint." Rule 23 (d) should be amended to
give trial judges discretionary authority to establish procedures
for screening communications with class members by both class
representatives and the class opponent. 2 These changes would
open the way for courts to adopt an iterative mode of pretrial
class action procedure capable of generating the full range of inparty structures
formation and the opportunities for 2adjusting
3
needed for fair litigation of a class suit.
Sixth, rule 23(c) (2) should be eliminated. As an a priori matter, individualized notice is not constitutionally mandated in class
actions.14 Such notice may provide a useful means of insuring
adequacy of representation, but such a judgment can only be
made on a case-by-case basis,2 5 and rule 2 3 (d)(2) provides
courts with sufficient authority to order notice in particular cases.
'8 See pp. 1498-1504 supra.
10 See pp. I5OI-O4 & note 253 supra.
20
See pp. 1418-27 supra. The New York rule appears

to follow the

prevailing federal practice of requiring class action procedural issues to be de-

cided before the merits. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules § 902 (McKinney Supp.
1976).
21 See pp. 1431-32 supra. The New York rule adopts such a requirement.
See N.Y. Civ. PPAc. LAw & RULES § 902 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
22

See pp. x597-I6O4 supra. The New York rule does not address this question.

23 See

pp. I427-38 supra.
4 See pp 1402-6 supra.
25 The New York rule treats notice as a discretionary matter, see N.Y. Civ.
2

PRAc. LAW & RuLES § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1976), but seeks to provide guidance

for courts by distinguishing between class actions brought for injunctive or
declaratory relief and other class suits, see id. §§ 902 (a), (b). The rule considers
in detail the question of the cost of notice, see id. §§ 902(c), (d), authorizing,
inter alia, preliminary hearings on the merits to apportion notice costs, see id.
§ (d) (I). But see pp. 1418-19 supra.
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The right to opt out is likewise not constitutionally required. 0
Unlike giving notice, extending to class members an invitation to
opt out cannot even be said to be an ordinarily helpful means of
guaranteeing the fairness of class suit.2 7 In a few cases, however,
recognition of an exit right may be useful.28 Courts, therefore,
should have discretionary authority to confer such a right, and
rule 23 (d) should perhaps be amended to make this clear.2" The
same amendment might also grant courts discretion to require
class members to file proof of claim forms as a precondition to
participation in a class judgment. Because such a requirement
could greatly restrict the reach of a class judgment, it ought
not to be imposed as a matter of course, but only after a substantive predomination analysis has revealed no other way through
which a class action could be litigated in a manner consistent with
the values reflected in a cause of action.3 0
Seventh, if the above modifications are made, all of rule
23 (c) (3) should be deleted except for the first sentence; within
that sentence, the reference to subsections (i) and (2) of rule
2 3 (b) should be removed.
Eighth, rule 23 (e) might be amended to make it clear that trial
judges have discretion
in fixing notice requirements in the event
3
of settlement. '
The second answer to the question of reform of rule 23 is
less concerned with the details of such reform than with its significance. If there has been a central point to this Note, it is
this: The design of class action procedure requires sensitivity
both to the substantive values reflected in the causes of action
under which suit is brought and to the differing situations of class
members; such sensitivity presupposes reconsideration of class
action procedures with each new case, and thus the trial judge
must bear chief responsibility for the shape of class litigation.
Given this conception of class action procedure, a rule serves
only a very limited function. It calls the attention of the trial
judge to his various responsibilities, and grants him sufficient
authority to carry out his tasks, but in no sense can the rule be
said to resolve issues of class procedure. The effect of the revision
"8 See generally pp. 1407-a9 supra.
27 See pp. 1487-89 supra.
28 See pp. 1487-88 & notes 183-84 supra.
29
The New York rule grants such discretionary authority. See N.Y. Civ. Prae.
LAw & RuiLas § 903 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
30 See pp. x5o4-6 supra. The New York rule does not address the question of
an opt-in requirement.
31 See pp. 1542, note 32, 1566-67 supra. The New York rule takes the present
federal approach. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw & Runrs § 908 (McKinney Supp.
1976).
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of rule 23 in 1966 was to grant great discretion to trial judges;"
the effect of the amendments proposed here would be to expand
that discretion further by eliminating several of the obligatory
procedures that the 1966 rulemakers did impose. Reform of rule
23, on this view, is not the medium through which the central
questions of class procedure are addressed. At most, rule reform
simply clears the way for attention to those questions.
There are, however, two contexts other than rulemaking in
which the central questions can be faced. The first is provided
by doctrinal analysis, the discussion of the general approaches
which might structure courts' resolution of the issues raised by
particular class actions. Such a doctrinal analysis has been the
primary focus of this Note. The second context is legislative.
On a number of occasions in recent years, Congress, in authorizing or amending private rights of action has specifically addressed
the question of propriety of class suits under the cause of action,
and has answered the question through detailed regulations of
class litigation." Such legislative action should be encouraged,
given a substantive theory of class actions, since it takes away
the need for courts to engage in complex study of the fit of class
procedures with substantive values.3 4
Perhaps because analysis of congressional enactments has
traditionally been thought to be somewhat superfluous given the
ultimately political character of legislative action, recent commentary on legislative efforts to incorporate class actions within
specific regulatory frameworks has largely confined itself to description. 5 Ad hoc, political judgments concerning the wisdom
of the underlying cause of action will of necessity play an important role in congressional decisions concerning the extent
to which class actions should be permitted. Congressional decisions, however, may also be influenced by more general considerations, reflecting the relative usefulness, both singly and in
combination, of the various means for enforcing statutory directives, and may manifest themselves in certain recurring forms.
Analysis of these considerations and forms serves the function
not only of providing a language for legislative debate but also
"'See 383 U.S. 1031,

1035

(i966)

(Black, J., dissenting from transmittal

of revised rule 23 to Congress).
" See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §
231o(e) (Supp. IV, 1974), discussed, p. 1529, note 380 supra; p. 1634 infra; Truth
in Lending Act Amendments of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), discussed, pp. 1530-31 supra; p. 1634 infra.
" See generally pp. 136o-66 supra.
3' See, e.g., Foster, Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies for Group Wrongs

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Federal Questions, 1975 Wis. L.
REV. 295; Comment, The x974 Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, 53
N.C.L. R v. 1259 (1975).
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of affording courts means for interpreting legislative actions. The
remainder of this Conclusion attempts to sketch a framework
for such an analysis. This sketch should be taken as provisional
rather than definitive; the aim is to provide a preliminary view
rather than a complete account.
At the most general level, a legislative decision concerning
the role of class actions in a given regulatory scheme involves a
judgment as to the emphasis to be given public and private mechanisms for the enforcement of statutory directives. Assuming
that both mechanisms ultimately involve resort to courts in order
to force compliance with a statute,"0 such an evaluation will take
the form of an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of
administrative and private decisionmaking with respect to the
initiation of judicial action. At least in broad outline, the results
of this inquiry are not likely to be surprising. The vices and
virtues of administrative and private action are familar ones,
capable of summary in two pairs of contrasting propositions: 11
First, administrative decision of the question of whether judical action should be initiated will confer the benefits of a political
and bureaucratic process: respect for competing interests, recognition of resource limitations and thus of the need to screen
out unimportant claims, a continuing existence and thus the
capabilitr for planning and coordinating a number of separate
actions. But administrative decision suffers from the defects of
political and bureaucratic decisionmaking as well: a tendency to
take into account only familiar interests and indeed to be solicitous of familiar interests to the point of "capture," budgetary
limitations so severe that underenforcement results instead of
merely a restraint on the initiation of frivolous actions, routinization of aotivity and thus a resistance to responding to changing
conditions.
Second, the benefits of private decision of the question of
whether judicial action should be initiated are the benefits of individuality, of entrepreneurial decisionmaking: the possibility of
iconoclastic challenges to the conventional hierarchy of com" Administrative agencies, of course, may make decisions which are not subject to judicial review, see, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d X243 (ist Cir. 197o),
or which are given only deferential judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., Universal Camera

Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (I9gI). See also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.
560 (i975). The discussion here, however, will treat administrative agencies and
private litigants as equals with respect to the deference accorded their positions
by courts.
" The characteristics of agency decisionmaking were recently subjected to
exhaustive consideration in Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667 (975). The essential features of privatelyinitiated litigation are sketched from the perspective of the judge in Chayes, The
Role of the Jvdge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, X30-13
(1976).
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peting interests, resource constraints which are a function not of
extrinsic factors but of the prospects of a particular case and thus
likely to impose a discipline which mirrors a statute's own judgment of the merits of a case, and a capacity for innovation.
But the defects of individuality are present also: the risk of intolerance manifest in actions brought to vindicate specific interests
without regard for the need to accomodate other interests, a
cognate risk that evaluation of the desirability of a case which
looks only to the governing statute will ignore the perhaps constraining values of other statutes, a tendency towards disorganized
or uneven enforcement practices.
The class action, because of the activist role it requires of the
trial judge, to a degree combines the advantages of administrative
and private decisionmaking. The increased access to courts which
class actions make possible opens the way for spokesman for
ordinarily unrepresented interests to make use of litigation to claim
the benefit of statutory directives for those in their situation.
However, the heuristic effect of the class suit, a function largely
of the trial judge's performance of the twin obligations to insure
representation of all affected interests and to protect statutory
values from distortion, provides a check against litigation blind
to competing interests and values. And yet the mediation is incomplete: it occurs only in the context of a particular case. In
the aggregate, the hazards of individuality remain and the advantages of political decisionmaking are unrealized. Legislative
decisionmakers, therefore, are unlikely to see the class action as
itself a resolution of the question of whether to choose public or
private litigation.
In certain circumstances, the weight which legislators will
attach to the advantages or disadvantages of one or the other
mode of initiation will be so significant that the legislative decision
will be to lodge exclusive responsibility for initiating judicial
action with either public or private decisionmakers. 3 More commonly, however, legislation will reflect the fact that both modes
possess vices and virtues by conferring initiation rights upon both
public and private actors. The emphasis on government or private
action, though, varies from statute to statute. In some circumstances, Congress may give equal weight to both private and
government enforcement. The proposed Consumer Class Action
Bill, for example, would establish a private right of action against
all unfair or deceptive trade practices, enforceable through expansive class action provisions. 11 Not only would jurisdictional
"8 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.

§ 483 (,970) (making suit by Secretary of Labor ex-

clusive post-election remedy for violation of LMRDA rules governing union elections), discussed in Trbovich v. UIMW, 404 U.S. 528, 53o-36 (1972).
" Proposed Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation-II, 4 CrAss AcTioN
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barriers to bringing class suits be eliminated,4 ° but the bill would
also provide for collective calculation of damages and a fourstep distribution scheme,4 as well as liberal notice provisions designed to make small-claimant class actions feasible.4 As a result, private class actions would be able to obtain the full measure
of relief available to the FTC under the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act.3 More often, however, the form which
Congress gives to the two rights of action will reveal an emphasis
in favor of one or the other. Such an emphasis may manifest itself
in the imposition of either of two kinds of limits placed on government or private action: categorical limits restraining all actions of a given type regardless of whether actions of the other
type are brought; or priority rules restraining an action of one
type in the event-

and to the extent

-

that an action of the

other type is underway. Alternatively, procedural devices such
as intervention might be relied upon in order to realize at least
partially in actions of one type the advantages of the other type
as well.
There are two kinds of categorical limits. Jurisdictional constraints entirely deny private or government actors the opportunity to obtain a given mode of relief, and thus allocate exclusive
responsibility for the initiation of such relief to one or the other
actors. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of i964, 44 for
example, both private parties and the government have been
vested with broad enforcement authority to seek compensatory
and injunctive remedies." Yet while private parties may bring
class suits for broad structural relief, only the government is
(§§ 5-7 of proposed Act). The Act specifically provides
that while courts are to give weight to the interpretations of the FTC, they are not
required to await any admnistrative action or interpretation by the FTC before
applying federal law to the facts and that the failure of the FTC to institute proceedings against similar acts or practices should create no presumption as to their
validity.
Id. § 6.
40
Id. § S. While the Act imposes a jurisdictional amount requirement of
$25,000, it allows class members to aggregate their claims in order to meet this
requirement.
4 Id. at 345 (§ 8(d) of proposed Act). Section 8(d) (3) of this proposed Act provides that the residue of a class recovery may be made part of a fund to pay
the litigation costs of successful defendants, see also id. at 347 (§ xo(c) of proposed Act), thus establishing a mechanism which would help to counteract problems of overdeterrence without simultaneously unduly discouraging litigation.
42Id. at 346 (§ 9(c) of proposed Act). The Act requires the court to consider the cost of notice, the resources of the parties, the individual stakes of
absentees, and the likelihood of their participating or opting-out, and then to
choose between publication, sampling and individual notice.
43 See p. 1634 infra.
44 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe (Supp. II, I972).
4
1 Id. § 2oooe-5(f)
REPORTS 342, 344 (1975)
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statutorily empowered to bring suit against a "pattern or practice" of discrimination and thereby achieve industry-wide relief.4"
While as a practical matter private parties could achieve such
relief through a series of class suits, the "pattern or practice"
limitation may reflect a congressional preference for greater government input where broad and intricate decrees are likely to result from litigation.4 7
Remedial handicaps, by contrast, do not fully remove the
power of a government or private actor to obtain a given form of
relief, but they do condition the award of such relief upon the
satisfaction of certain obligations or limit the extent to which the
relief may be given. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,4" for
example, both the Secretary of Labor and private litigants may
obtain recovery of the full amount of unpaid minimum wages and
overtime compensation owed by an employer under the Act, as
well as an equal amount in liquidated damages and, where appropriate, injunctive relief.49 Special provisions govern private
class actions, however, which require class members affirmatively
to opt into the action,50 and thus make such suits quite difficult to
" Id. § 2oooe-6.
"'See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 843
(5th Cir. '975) ("It was unquestionably the design of Congress in the enactment
of § 707 to provide the government with a swift and effective weapon to vindicate the broad public interest in eliminating unlawful practices, at a level which
may or may not address the grievances of particular individuals.") (denying private intervention of right in government "pattern or practice" action). Originally, the "pattern or practice" authorization reflected a decision to lindt government initiation authority to cases of multiple violations. Under the 1972 amendments to Title VII, however, the "pattern or practice" authority was shifted from
the Attorney General to the EEOC, and the later was empowered for the first
time to bring actions for all violations of the Act. See Act of March 24, 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 107.
48 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. IV, 1974).
4"Id. §§ 216(c), 217. Prior to 1974, the Secretary's authority to bring an
action for damages under § 16(c) of the Act was limited to cases of settled law
in which he had received a written request from an employee claiming unpaid
minimum wages or overtime compensation. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
Moreover, while liquidated damages were available in private actions, such recovery was not allowed in actions brought by the Secretary. The 1974 amendments lifted these restrictions, and the Secretary's action for damages under §
I6 now parallels his injunctive right of action under § 17. Pub. L. No. 93-259,
§ 26, 88 Stat. 73 (1974). In neither proceeding is the prior consent of the employee required; a proceeding at law will provide for the recovery of liquidated
damages equal to the total unpaid wages and a § 17 action provides for an injunction against any such future failures. See generally Foster, supra note 35,
at 337-38.
5029 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(Supp. IV, 1974) ("No employee shall be a party
plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such
a party and such consent is filed in -the court in which such action is brought.").
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maintain.5 A similar structure is incorporated in recently enacted
revisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In addition to
its authority to issue cease and desist orders,"2 the FTC is empowered under section 2o6 of the new Magnuson-Moss WarrantyFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act to seek damages and
other legal and equitable relief for consumers injured by unlawful trade practices.5" This provision appears to authorize calculation of damages on a class-wide basis as well as distribution of unclaimed funds through a fluid recovery mechanism. 4 While the
Act creates a private right of action for unlawful trade practices
relating to consumer product warranties," private class suits under
this provision are subject to restrictive statutory prerequisites.
No action is cognizable in federal court unless each individual's
claim is greater than twenty-five dollars " and the aggregate value
of all claims presented exceeds $50,000; 57 moreover, in order to
bring a class action, there must be at least one hundred named
plaintiffs."8 Private enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act's prohibition of fraudulent credit practices 11 is also
limited: while the Truth in Lending Act 6o -which confers the
private right of action (1 - contains no minimum recovery provisions, it does establish a ceiling on the recovery available in class
actions, and also vests
in the judge a large measure of discretion in
62
calculatifhg damages.
See LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975); Montalvo v.
Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135 (sth Cir. 1970).
51 This is so largely because of an employee's hesitancy to incur his employer's
displeasure by affirmatively joining in an action against him. See Foster, supra
note 35, at 324-25 & n.105, 341.
52 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
53 15 U.S.C.A. § 57(b) (West Supp. 1976).
" See H.R. CONF. REP. No. I6o6, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40-42 (1974); S. CONE.
REP. No. 14o8, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974) ("While this section enumerates
several types of relief which may be granted, the nature of the relief authorized
is limited only by the nature of the injury done and the remedial powers of the
court . . . . The Section is not, however, intended to authorize punitive or exemplary damages.")
55 15 U.S.C. § 23io(d)(I) (Supp. IV, 1974). The Act provides for the recovery
of costs and attorneys' fees by successful plaintiffs, unless the court determines that
such an award would be inappropriate. Id. § 23 Io(d) (2).
56
Id. § 231o(d) (3) (A).
"7 Id. § 231o(d)(3)(B).
5
1d. § 231o(d)(3)(C).
" The Truth in Lending Act provides for enforcement by the Federal Trade
Commission Act and deems violations of the Truth in Lending Act to be violations
6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See id. § 16o7(c) (1970).
Id. §§ x6oi-i665.
61Id. § 1640 (Supp. IV, 1974).
62
1d. § 1640(a) (2) (b) (Supp. IV, 3974). The ceiling established by the
Act is the lesser of $xoo,ooo or i% of the defendant's net worth. Id. See generally
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Of the two kinds of categorical limits, jurisdictional constraints are plainly the more risky, since such constraints restrict
the right to obtain a given kind of relief to only one of the possible
actors; should obstacles emerge which limit the ability of that actor to obtain relief, substantial underenforcement of a statutory
directive may result. Accordingly, both as a matter of legislative
practice and of judicial construction, a jurisdictional constraint
should not be utilized unless it is determined that less rigorous
remedial handicaps will not sufficiently reduce the hazards of either
government or private action. Moreover, use of jurisdictional constraints should only follow close analysis of the practicality of government or private action in a given context.
The present situation with respect to enforcement of the antitrust laws provides a clear illustration both of the risks involved
in the use of jurisdictional constraints and of the equally effective
alternative which remedial handicaps may afford. Under the
current antitrust laws, the government is empowered to bring actions for injunctive relief and civil and criminal penalties, 3 while
private actions for treble damages serve as the sole means for
securing compensation.64 In an important class of cases, the private action for damages has failed to provide an effective remedy.
Price-fixing class actions brought by consumers may not be able
to go forward unless fluid recovery mechanisms are available, since
it may be impossible to identify specific class members, and in any
event the claims of class members may be so small that a significant proportion of a class may not claim compensation. 5 Federal
courts have held, however, that fluid recovery is not an available
remedy under the present antitrust laws,6" and thus have generally refused to allow consumer class actions.6 7 At present, thereComment, The '974 Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, 53 N.C.L. REV.
1259, 129O-92 (1975).

3See Sherman Act § 1-2, I5 U.S.C. H9 1-2 (197o) (violations punishable
by $5o,ooo fine or one year imprisonment or both); Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4 (i97o) (injunctive relief) ; Clayton Act § IS, i5 U.S.C. § 25 (1970) (same).
14 See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § i5 (1970)
(private actions for treble
damages). Private parties may also seek injunctive relief under Clayton Act §
x6, is U.S.C. § 26 (197o). The government may bring actions for damages,
however, only when the United States itself is injured by violations of the antitrust laws. See Clayton Act § 4a, IS U.S.C. § isa (1970).
" See, e.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. ff 73,879
(E.D. Pa. 1970), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
925 (1972), discussed, pp. i516-7, note 321 supra.
° See pp. 1531-32 supra.
17 See HOUSE COMMIN.
ON T3HE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ANTITRUST PARENS PATRIAE ACT, H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., ist Sess. 6-8 (1975)
(discussing problems of cost and manageability of consumer class actions under the antitrust laws
and concluding that "adequate enforcement mechanisms simply do not exist" when
violations injure consumers); Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer
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fore, trade restraints such as price-fixing which injure large numbers of consumers are in practice policed only by government injunctive and penalty actions. Not only is no compensation thus
afforded to injured consumers, but this dependence upon government actions creates a more general problem of underenforcement given the weaknesses to which government actions are
prone.
The defects of the current scheme have led both Congress and
the commentators to recognize the need for provisions creating
new rights of action: 68 the question has been one of how the
proper public-private balance should be struck. One alternative
would be simply to authorize the federal government to initiate
actions for damages. 9 This scheme, however, while it would perhaps yield greater compensation than is presently realized as well
as the advantages of administrative screening, would be vulnerable
to underenforcement. A second approach would be to enact legislation facilitating private class actions for damages through authorization of fluid recovery mechanisms." ° Substantial reliance
on private initiation in this context, however, may impose significant costs. The advantages of administrative screening would be
largely foregone, and the risk that defendants fearful of large
liabilities might settle nonmeritorious actions, though minimized
by summary judgment procedures and other safeguards, must
nevertheless be faced. 71 Moreover, the more attenuated the compensatory function becomes as a result of fluid recovery, and the
more a monetary recovery resembles a civil penalty than a damInterest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85
YALE L.J. 626, 627-29 (1976).
68 See H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 67, at 4-6 (emphasizing failure of current federal scheme to compensate injured consumers, resulting in unjust enrichment and "undermin[ing] the deterrent effect of the treble damage provision");
Hearings on H.R. 12528 and H.R. Z292Y Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1974) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Thomas Kauper)
("the [treble damages] remedy has been less effective in circumstances involving
multiple transactions of relatively small size . . . . there is a need for the availability of a method by which damages can be recovered where antitrust violations
have caused small individual damages to large numbers of citizen-consumers");
Hearings on Antitrust Parens PatriaeAmendments Before the Subcomm. on Monoppolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., ist
Sess. 34 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
6" See Handler & Blechman, supra note 67, at 675-76. The advantages of government initiation, at least with respect to the damage distribution scheme which
Handler and Blechman propose, might be gained in any case through the use of
quasi-administrative mechanisms to distribute damages' in private suits. See pp.
1520-21 supra.
70 See generally pp. X52o-36 supra.
'1

See pp.

1532-34

supra.
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age fund, the less willing society may be to tolerate the risk of
overenforcement which attends private actions. Finally, regardless
of whether fluid recovery and class-wide damages calculation are
deemed appropriate, private enforcement might still be insufficient in areas where private attorneys are unable to finance litigation costs.
Congress in fact has chosen a third alternative. The Parens
Patriae Act would authorize state attorneys general to recover
damages on behalf of consumers within their respective states injured by violations of the antitrust laws.7 2 The idea behind this
use of state officials to enforce federal laws may be that state
officials will be more disciplined in their decisions as to whether
to initiate antitrust damage actions, as well as better able to
assume the costs of litigation, than private actors, but less likely to
be over-constrained in their enforcement practices than federal
officials. This happy synthesis of the advantages of private and
government action is by no means certain, however: on the one
hand, elected state officials may initiate seemingly unneeded suits
in order to gain favorable publicity; on the other hand, such
officials, like federal officials, may have only limited resources and
face political constraints.
Responding to the concern that state officials may not be sufficiently restrained, Congress has imposed a number of remedial
handicaps on parens patriae actions. As recently amended by the
House and the Senate, the Act would allow collective calculation of treble damages and fluid distribution only in price-fixing
cases brought by state officials, and only where the defendant's
conduct has been determined to be in willful violation of the
law.73 Where the defendant's conduct is not willful, or a cause of
action other than price-fixing is alleged, collective calculation and
fluid distribution are not permitted. As a result, recovery in pricefixing cases probably will not be feasible absent a showing of willfulness, and state attorneys general will probably leave other
causes of action to private enforcement. This approach serves to
protect defendants from heavy damages liability in situations in
which the antitrust laws are not clear and administrative screening is most appropriate, while ensuring full deterrence and disgorgement of unjust enrichment, as well as compensation of
aggrieved consumers, where violations are clear.
If these remedial handicaps are necessary to make parens
patriae actions proper, the question arises as to why state officials
72 H.R. 8532, 94 th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4C(a)-(d) (1975); S. 1284, 94 th Cong.,

§§

401-o5 (1975).
CONG. REc. S8986-88 (daily ed. June io, 1976)
H2078-79 (daily ed. March 18, 1976) (House of Representatives).
Ist Sess.

"See

122

(Senate); id.
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need be relied upon at all. The same handicaps could be placed
upon private class actions, restricting such suits to cases in which
summary judgment is most likely to be available to screen out
nonmeritorious actions, and in which overenforcement is not likely
to be of major concern. Moreover, private class actions unlike
parens patriae suits, would not be constrained by political considerations.74 Under the antitrust laws as under the Truth in
Lending Act,75 careful structuring of remedial handicaps, rather
than resort to jurisdictional constraints, may be the key to striking the appropriate balance on the spectrum of private and government initiation.
Priority rules concern themselves with problems of ordering
the relationship of government and private actions in circumstances where categorical limits are inappropriate, or where whatever remedial handicaps which may have been imposed are not so
severe as to sharply distinguish government and private action.
Questions of ordering are likely not to be a matter of concern
under statutory schemes making use of jurisdictional constraints;
indeed, a statutory scheme may encourage initiation of litigation
concerning the same apparent statutory violation by both an empowered agency and an aggrieved class in order that the full range
of a statute's remedial policies may be realized. Under the antitrust laws, for example, litigated findings of liability in government proceedings may be used as prima facie evidence in subsequent private treble damage actions.76 Where government and
private remedies overlap, however, parallel actions may not be
encouraged. The underlying concern will occasionally reflect the
policies associated with res judicata doctrine: hostility to double
exaction, conservation of judicial resources, the value of repose.
Ordinarily, however, res judicata values will be realized through
stare decisis, the reluctance of courts to overturn complicated decrees or to issue conflicting injunctions, or alternatively the potential second litigant's satisfaction with the results of the first
action.7 7 More commonly, priority rules will derive from a con"' To the extent that litigation costs impede antitrust actions, they would appear to do so equally in class actions and parens patriae actions.
"75 1s U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), discussed, pp. 1634-35 & notes 59-62
supra.
'71 Clayton Act § 5(a), i5 U.S.C. § 16(a) (sg7o).
7'7See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 5o8 F.2d 152, 162 (3d Cir. x975)
(lower court stayed proceedings for six months in part to protect the operation
of consent decree entered in earlier government suit); Atlantis Devel. Corp. v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967) (intervention of right granted because
the stare decisis effect of a judgment would have precluded the applicant from
reopening in a later suit any of the issues upon which it relied) ; Shapiro, Some
Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARv. L.
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gressional preference for government or private initiation of a
cause of action. So long as Congress is neutral as between agency
and private initiation, unordered dual schemes may serve as an
effective means to encourage the full prosecution of statutory
violations. In some cases, however, the substantive goals of the
statutory scheme, as well as more general considerations, may suggest that action by government agencies and private parties should
not be equally preferred. Where this is true, it is not necessary to
forego the greater potential for fuller enforcement implicit in dual
schemes; rather, the preference for either private class or government representatives may be expressed within the dual scheme by
reserving to one the exclusive right to bring suit in the first
instance or by otherwise structuring enforcement procedures.
For example, under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Attorney General of the United States is empowered to seek injunctive relief against discrimination in education. 1 Since private
parties enjoy their own constitutional right of action 79 and thus
may seek the same degree of structural relief as the government,8 °
both private class and administrative actions are an effective
means of securing a full measure of redress. However, suit by the
Attorney General is conditioned upon receipt of a written request
from an aggrieved party and certification that such party is unable, for either financial or political reasons, to undertake his own
action.81 This provision, in practice serves not only to conserve
scarce government resources wherever private parties are capable
of instituting their own enforcement proceedings but also to maximize local control over educational policies. In contrast, Title
VII of the same Act, 2 while providing both private parties and
the government with broad enforcement authority to seek relief
from employment discrimination, 83 requires private parties to
file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a statement of intent to sue under the Act, and prohibits initiation of
private action for a prescribed period of time in order to provide
the Commission with an opportunity to seek conciliation and
settlement of the claim with the defendant.8" This preference
scheme - though more limited than that established by Title IV
733-34 (1968); Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1174, i8o-86 (976).
7842 U.S.C. § 2oooc-6 (1970).
7' See id. § 1983.
"oSee, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1).
8142 U.S.C. § 2oooc-6(b) (197o).
12 Id. §§ 2oooe to 20ooe-17 (Supp. II, 972).
REV. 721,

83

Id. § 20OOe--(f).
84 Id. § 2oooe-5 (b). Title VII also requires recourse to available state agencies
prior to private suit. Id. § 2oooe-5(c).
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allows the government prior to the initiation of any private
suits, to determine whether it is possible to secure voluntary compliance with statutory requirements.
The Fair Labor Standards Act " expresses a preference for
government action in a different form: it provides that the initiation of an action for damages by the Secretary of Labor terminates the statutory right of affected private parties to initiate their
own suits for minimum wage and overtime compensation."0 Thus,
the government's decision to initiate suit deprives private parties
of access to the courts and binds them to the decision in the
government's action. While it has been suggested that this cut-off
provision does not apply to private suits which have already been
commenced,' it seems clear that even if this interpretation is not
correct, the statutory scheme comports with constitutional requirements." Under the analysis developed earlier in this Note,8 the
differential distribution of access which results from the attribution of binding effect to the government action need only rationally further a legitimate government object, since the statutory
right to minimum wage and overtime compensation is in no sense
a "fundamental" one. In fact, the desire to shield the defendant
from relitigation - a goal which appears in itself to satisfy the
rationality requirement °0 - takes on particular significance
through the operation of the FLSA scheme. Under the Act, the
Secretary of Labor may obtain recovery of the full amount of unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation owed by an
employer, as well as liquidated damages.0 1 After administrative
distribution of recovered sums to aggrieved individuals who can be
identified, any remainder of the damage fund escheats to the
United States. 2 As a result of these provisions, the allowance of
subsequent claims by private parties in their own suit would in

-

8

11d. § 2oooe-5(f) (I).

8629

U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).

Similarly, private parties may not

institute abatement actions under either the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2875h2(b)(i) (B) (i97o), or the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1365(b) (i) (B) (Supp. III, 2973), once an appropriate government agency has
brought suit. Under the environmental statutes, private actions are barred only
so long as the government is diligently prosecuting its suit. Clean Air Act §
304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b)(i)(B) (1970); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(i)(B).
87See Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 6o F.R.D. 432, 437 (W.D. Pa.
,973) (dictum); S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., ist Sess. 39 (296).
88 See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (2934);
p. 24o6 & notes 76-78 supra.
89 See pp. 14o6-i6 & notes 8o-14o supra.
9p See pP. 14o7-o8 supra.
90 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. IV,
92

Id. §

216(C)

(1970)-

1974).
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most cases effectively impose double liability on the defendant for
a single violation.
Still, the FLSA scheme's use of binding effect to establish a
priority rule is not without constitutional consequences. Here, as
in a private class action, the decision to restrict access does not
result from a legislative decision; rather, it results from the Secretary of Labor's determination, pursuant to a statutory delegation
of authority, to initiate suit. The fact of delegation gives rise to a
requirement that the interests of the individuals whose claims are
foreclosed be adequately represented in the government suit.9 3 This

adequacy standard, however, may properly be less restrictive as
a constitutional matter than that imposed on class representatives.
The justifications supporting the delegation to the Secretary in the
first instance -the values of administrative screening, interestbalancing and decisionmaking - relate both to the decision to
initiate action and to the actual conduct of the litigation. As a
result, so long as the Secretary's decisions as to initiation and litigation are not arbitrary or capricious or made in bad faith,94 it
would seem appropriate to uphold his representation as adequate.
The fact that the 'Constitution does not impose substantial
barriers to the use of binding effect as a priority rule in statutory
schemes does not, however, mean that such use of binding effect
would necessarily be justified on policy grounds. In most cases,
of course, litigation of a single action will as a practical matter
eliminate the incentive for a subsequent suit.95 Where substantial incentive does remain, however, this may signal the existence
of serious problems in the initial suit: agency capture or the inability of private parties to reflect the broad public interests, for
example, may manifest themselves not only in initiation decisions
but also in the conduct of litigation and in relief negotiations. To
foreclose a subsequent suit in these circumstances might well
jeopardize the underlying goals of the statutory scheme. Rather,
it would seem to be wiser policy to further the objectives of binding
effect by taking steps to insure that all affected are satisfied with
the conduct of litigation 9' -through liberal grants of intervention rights and through statutory requirements of adequate representation 11 - while leaving open the opportunity, rarely exercised
in practice, to bring a subsequent suit.9"
"3 See pp. 1410-1i & notes io6-io8 supra.
"4Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1048, io59-6o (1976)
(union's duty of fair representation defined in terms of arbitrariness/bad faith
standard); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. i7i (1967) (same). See also pp. 1412-13 & notes
117-121 supra.
" See pp. 1638-39 & note 77 supra.
0' See pp. 1408-09 & notes 102-103 supra.
97 See, e.g., statutes cited in note 86 supra.
" Such a policy might not seem to be appropriate in those areas in which any
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A legislative judgment as to the relative merits of government
and private action need not manifest itself solely through categorical limits and priority rules. The optimal combination of the

advantages of government and private action may be achieved
not only by separating and ordering the two types of action but

by synthesizing the two. For example, a number of procedural
devices may be utilized to "open up" government actions in order

to achieve through these suits some of the benefits of private litigation as well. Provision for sampling notice," in conjunction
with liberal intervention rights for private parties significantly
affected by the relief sought, 100 might be effective as a means of
informing both the government and the. court of the interests at

stake in a given case.' 0' In addition, more rigorous judicial scrutiny of the adequacy of the government's representation -

even if

government action is not strictly binding upon private litigants might better serve the interests sought to be protected by statutory enforcement schemes. Even where it may be appropriate to
impose a less stringent adequacy standard on government than

on private representatives, procedures analogous to the notice and
court approval provisions of rule 23(e) might profitably be
applied to settlements of government-initiated as well as privately
initiated suits.0 2
decision as to relief is likely to stimulate controversy and to give rise to subsequent suits, and in which the relief itself is likely to be complex and ongoing.
See pp. 1400-01 supra. Decisions in Title VII suits, for example, may well fit into
this category, as the history of the Allegheny-Ludlum litigation would seem to
suggest, see pp. X408-09, note 102 supra.
" Under the Parens Patriae Act, for example, actions brought by state attorneys general, though not binding on private parties, must nevertheless be
accompanied by publication or other notice as the court directs to be the best
practicable notice under the circumstances. See H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 4C(c) (1975).
100 See generally Note, supra note 77.
'0' Of course, mechanisms which encourage private input and decrease judicial
deference to administrative judgments may not be appropriate where the very
reason for supporting government initiation is to vest administrative agencies with
substantial control over the form of relief granted as well as the power to decide
whether to initiate suit. Moreover, notice requirements might increase the cost
of suit, thus reducing the number of cases which could be litigated under a given
agency budget. Even so, where the disadvantages of administrative action appear to be significant, establishment of private and judicial checks on the quailty
of government representation would appear to be warranted. Furthermore, to
the extent that the information generated by private participation is paid for out
of private resources, the costs to the government of notice and a more cumbersome bargaining situation might be partially offset by savings in investigative
costs.
102 Courts have generally been reluctant to allow private parties to seek review
of government settlements. See, e.g., United States v. Automobile Manufacturers
Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 6,7, 619 (C.D. Cal. 1969) aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of
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Such mechanisms, however, may not be able to correct underenforcement of statutory directives by administrative agencies
attributable to limited agency resources or political constraints.
Private intervenors, for example, may not be able to raise claims
independent of those presented by the government.' 03 Courts,
however, have displayed a willingness to exercise some degree of
review over an agency's decision not to bring an action. In Dunlop v. Bachowski,'°4 the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of
Labor must articulate the reasons for a refusal to undertake enforcement proceedings under the LMRDA. 10 5 The Court ruled,
however, that once articulated, these reasons need survive only
an abuse of discretion standard. 0 6 Regardless of that standard
of review, it would appear that judicial oversight of agency initiation is appropriate only for fine-tuning government enforcement
policy, since 7agency enforcement will still be limited by resource
constraints.1

The primary cost of allowing private initiation - the loss of
agency screening and interest-balancing capacities - can be
mitigated by giving the government a role in private actions. The
participation of government agencies in private class actions may
help to guide courts in shaping intricate relief and supervising the
fairness of settlements and, in addition, may supply private representatives with resources necessary to initiate and sustain complex litigation. In class actions seeking injunctive or monetary
relief affecting a wide range of interests, agencies with relevant
expertise may be able, through amicus briefs or formal intervention, to broaden the court's perspective and thereby assist the court
in evaluating settlements and formulating relief. 08 In complicated
suits, it may be desirable for agency personnel to participate as
guardians of absentee interests during the settlement negotiations
themselves. 0 9 Furthermore, government agencies may supplement private litigation resources by, inter alia, subsidizing notice
New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (197o); United States v. Blue Chip
Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty
Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968). The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, however, which establishes a more open
procedure for judicial review of government consent decrees in antitrust cases,
requires the government to respond in court to the comments of outsiders and
provides for participation by outsiders as the court deems appropriate. See
I U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (Supp. IV, 1974).

'03 See Note, supra note 77, at ii95.

U.S. 560 (1975).
at S71.
Id. at 574.
107 Id. at 572-74.
.08 See Shapiro, supra note 77, at 734-36.
10' See pp. i562-63 supra.
104421
10 1d.
108
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costs or supplying government attorneys to aid in negotiations
against well-financed defendants." 0 Thus, government participation in private class suits might provide a means for utilizing public enforcement resources and agencies' interest-balancing capabilities, without requiring the large expenditure of tax revenues
necessary to finance government-initiated litigation. Given this
possibility some of the shortcomings of private initiation can perhaps be mitigated.
"o See, e.g., Van Bronkhurst v. Safeco Corp.,
1976).

529

F.2d 943, 944-45 (9th Cir.

